

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION**

**COMMISSIONERS: Jon Leibowitz, Chairman
 J. Thomas Rosch
 Edith Ramirez
 Julie Brill**

In the Matter of

**SIGMA CORPORATION,
a corporation.**

Docket No. C-4347

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”), having reason to believe that Respondent Sigma Corporation (“Sigma”) has violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues this Complaint stating its charges as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. This action concerns Sigma’s unfair methods of competition relating to the marketing and sale of ductile iron pipe fittings (“DIPF”).
2. Beginning in January 2008 and continuing through January 2009, Sigma, along with its competitors McWane, Inc. (“McWane”) and Star Pipe Products, Ltd. (“Star”), conspired to raise and stabilize the prices at which DIPF are sold in the United States. Sigma, McWane and Star (collectively, the “Sellers”) exchanged sales data in order to facilitate this price coordination.
3. The passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) in February 2009 significantly altered the competitive dynamics of the DIPF industry, and upset the terms of coordination among the Sellers. In the ARRA, the United States Congress allocated more than 6 billion dollars to water infrastructure projects, conditioned on the use of

domestically produced materials, including DIPF, in those projects (the “Buy American” requirement).

4. At the time the ARRA was passed, McWane was the sole supplier of a full line of domestically produced DIPF in the most commonly used size ranges. Federal stimulus of the domestic DIPF market potentially left McWane in a position to reap a monopoly profit.

5. In response to the passage of the ARRA and its Buy American provision, Sigma, Star and others attempted to enter the domestic DIPF market in competition with McWane.

6. Instead of competing with one another in the domestic DIPF market, Sigma and McWane conspired to monopolize that market by (i) entering into a distribution agreement that eliminated Sigma as an actual potential entrant into the domestic DIPF market, and (ii) excluding actual and potential competitors, including Star, through the adoption and enforcement of exclusive dealing policies.

7. Sigma’s conduct has restrained competition and led to higher prices for both imported and domestically produced DIPF.

THE RESPONDENT

8. Respondent Sigma is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey, with its principal place of business located at 700 Goldman Drive, Cream Ridge, New Jersey 08154. Sigma imports, markets and sells products for the waterworks industry, including DIPF.

9. At all times relevant herein, Sigma has been, and is now, a corporation as “corporation” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44.

10. Sigma’s acts and practices, including the acts and practices alleged herein, are in or affect commerce in the United States, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44.

THE DIPF INDUSTRY

11. DIPF are a component of pipeline systems transporting drinking and waste water under pressurized conditions in municipal distribution systems and treatment plants. DIPF are used to join pipes, valves and hydrants in straight lines, and to change, divide or direct the flow of water. The end users of DIPF are typically municipal and regional water authorities.

12. Independent wholesale distributors, known as “waterworks distributors,” are the primary channel of distribution of DIPF to end users. Waterworks distributors specialize in distributing products for water infrastructure projects, and generally handle the full spectrum of waterworks products, including pipes, DIPF, valves and hydrants. Waterworks distributors employ sales personnel dedicated to servicing the needs of end users, and are generally able to

satisfy the needs of end users for rapid service by stocking inventory in relatively close proximity to project sites.

13. Direct sales of DIPF to end users, or to the utility contractors that often serve as the agent of the end user in purchasing and installing DIPF, are uncommon. End users and DIPF suppliers alike prefer to work through waterworks distributors with locations near project sites. As a result, DIPF suppliers need to distribute DIPF through local waterworks distributors in each region of the country in order to compete effectively in that region.

14. Both imported and domestically produced DIPF are commercially available. All of the Sellers sell imported DIPF. Before Star's entry into domestic production in 2009, McWane was the sole domestic producer of a full line of small and medium-sized DIPF.

15. The end user of DIPF specifies whether on a particular project it will accept both imported and domestically produced DIPF, or only domestically produced DIPF. This specification is often mandated by municipal code, or by state or federal law.

16. Domestically produced DIPF sold for use in projects specified as domestic only are sold at higher prices than imported or domestically produced DIPF sold for use in projects not specified as domestic only.

THE RELEVANT MARKETS

17. The relevant product market in which to evaluate Sigma's conduct is the marketing and sale of DIPF, and narrower relevant markets as contained therein (collectively, the "relevant DIPF markets"), including:

- a. DIPF for projects not specified as domestic only;
- b. DIPF for projects specified as domestic only; and
- c. DIPF of certain size ranges (*e.g.*, 24" in diameter and smaller).

18. In particular, the marketing and sale of domestically produced small and medium-sized (3-24" in diameter) DIPF for use in projects specified as domestic only constitutes a separate relevant product market (the "relevant domestic DIPF market").

19. There are no widely used substitutes for DIPF, and no other product significantly constrains the prices of DIPF.

20. Before and after the passage of the ARRA, some end users purchasing DIPF for use in projects specified as domestic only were unable to substitute imported DIPF, or any other product, for domestically produced DIPF. The passage of the ARRA and its Buy American requirement temporarily expanded the relevant domestic DIPF market.

21. The relevant geographic market is the United States. To compete effectively within the United States, DIPF suppliers need distribution assets and relationships within the United States. DIPF suppliers located outside the United States that lack such assets and relationships are unable to constrain the prices of DIPF suppliers that have such assets and relationships.

22. The relevant DIPF markets have several features that facilitate price coordination among DIPF suppliers. The relevant DIPF markets are highly concentrated. In 2008, the Sellers collectively made more than 90 percent of sales within the relevant DIPF markets. Other features of the relevant DIPF markets that facilitate price coordination include product homogeneity, barriers to timely entry of new DIPF suppliers, inelastic demand at competitive prices, and uniform published prices.

THE SELLERS RESTRAINED PRICE COMPETITION IN THE RELEVANT DIPF MARKETS

23. Beginning in January 2008 and continuing through January 2009, the Sellers conspired to raise and stabilize the prices at which DIPF were sold in the United States.

24. Due to rising input costs, all of the Sellers desired price increases in 2008. However, McWane was concerned that Sigma and Star would not adhere to announced price increases, which would result in lost sales for McWane.

25. In January 2008, McWane formulated a plan to trade its support for higher prices in exchange for specific changes to the business methods of Sigma and Star that would reduce the risk that local sales personnel for these competitors would sell DIPF at prices lower than published levels.

26. McWane communicated the terms of its plan to Sigma and Star. Sigma and Star manifested their understanding and acceptance of McWane's offer by publicly taking steps to limit their discounting from published price levels in order to induce McWane to support higher price levels.

27. McWane then led a price increase, and Sigma and Star followed.

28. In June 2008, McWane formulated a plan to trade its support for higher prices in exchange for information from Sigma and Star documenting the volume of their monthly sales of DIPF. This exchange of information was to be achieved under the auspices of an entity styled as the Ductile Iron Fittings Research Association ("DIFRA").

29. McWane communicated the terms of its plan to Sigma and Star through a public letter sent by McWane to waterworks distributors, the common customers of the Sellers. A section of that letter was meaningless to distributors, but was intended to inform Sigma and Star of the terms of McWane's offer.

30. Sigma and Star manifested their understanding and acceptance of McWane's offer by initiating their participation in the DIFRA information exchange in order to induce McWane to support higher price levels.

31. McWane then led a price increase, and Sigma and Star followed.

DIFRA FACILITATED PRICE COORDINATION AMONG THE SELLERS

32. The DIFRA information exchange operated as follows. The Sellers submitted a report of their previous month's sales to an accounting firm. Shipments were reported in tons shipped, subdivided by diameter size range (*e.g.*, 2-12") and by joint type. Data submissions were aggregated and distributed to the Sellers. Data submitted to the accounting firm was typically no older than 45 days, and the summary reports returned to the Sellers contained data typically no more than 2 months old.

33. During its operation between June 2008 and January 2009, the DIFRA information exchange enabled each of the Sellers to determine and to monitor its own market share and, indirectly, the output levels of its rivals. In this way, the DIFRA information exchange facilitated price coordination among the Sellers on the pricing of DIPF.

SIGMA INVITED McWANE AND STAR TO COLLUDE WITH SIGMA

34. Sigma and Star stopped participating in the DIFRA information exchange in January 2009.

35. In April 2009, McWane announced a new price list for DIPF. McWane's new published prices for medium and large diameter DIPF, the size ranges dominated by Sigma and Star, were lower than prevailing prices.

36. Sigma perceived McWane's new price list as a punishment of Sigma and Star for failing to adhere to published price levels and for withdrawing from the DIFRA information exchange.

37. Sigma initially resisted McWane's new price list, and proposed, in public and private communications with McWane and Star, an alternative arrangement to alleviate McWane's concerns about secret discounting. One term of Sigma's proposal was an offer to resume participation in the DIFRA information exchange. Another term of Sigma's proposal was that McWane would rescind its announced price list and continue the use of the old price list in exchange for the commitment of Sigma and Star to adhere to published price levels for DIPF.

38. McWane and Star rejected Sigma's invitation to collude.

McWANE AND SIGMA CONSPIRED TO MONOPOLIZE THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC DIPF MARKET

39. At the time of the enactment of the ARRA in February 2009 and thereafter, McWane possessed monopoly power in the relevant domestic DIPF market.

40. At the time of the enactment of the ARRA, McWane was the only manufacturer of a full line of DIPF in the relevant domestic DIPF market and controlled nearly 100 percent of the relevant domestic DIPF market. Despite Star's entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market in late 2009, McWane continues to make more than 90 percent of sales in the relevant domestic DIPF market.

41. McWane's monopoly power in the relevant domestic DIPF market is protected by substantial barriers to effective entry and expansion, including the unfair methods of competition of McWane and Sigma, as alleged in Paragraphs 44 through 60 below.

42. For suppliers of the relevant DIPF that have existing relationships and goodwill with waterworks distributors and established reputations for quality and service in the provision of the relevant DIPF, McWane's unfair and exclusionary methods of competition are the primary barriers to effective entry and expansion in the relevant domestic DIPF market.

43. Federal stimulus of the relevant domestic DIPF market gave Sigma, Star and other suppliers of imported DIPF an incentive to enter the relevant domestic DIPF market.

McWane Eliminated Sigma as an Actual Potential Entrant

44. After the enactment of the ARRA, Sigma took steps to evaluate entry into domestic production of DIPF, including but not limited to (i) formulating a complete or nearly complete operational plan, (ii) arranging for an infusion of equity capital to fund domestic production, (iii) obtaining the approval of its Board of Directors for its entry plans, and (iv) casting prototype product.

45. McWane perceived that Sigma was preparing to enter the relevant domestic DIPF market. McWane sought to eliminate the risk of competition from Sigma by inducing Sigma to become a distributor of McWane's domestic DIPF rather than a competitor in the relevant domestic DIPF market.

46. McWane and Sigma executed a Master Distribution Agreement dated September 17, 2009 ("MDA"). The principal terms of the MDA were as follows:

- a. McWane would sell domestic DIPF to Sigma at a 20 percent discount off of McWane's published prices;

b. McWane would be Sigma's exclusive source for the relevant domestic DIPF;

c. Sigma would resell McWane's domestic DIPF at or very near McWane's published prices for domestic DIPF; and

d. Sigma would resell McWane's domestic DIPF to waterworks distributors only on the condition that the distributor agreed to purchase domestic DIPF exclusively from McWane or Sigma.

47. An unwritten term of the MDA was that McWane would also sell its domestic DIPF at or very near its published prices.

48. In the absence of a sufficiently profitable arrangement with McWane, Sigma would likely have entered the relevant domestic DIPF market in competition with McWane.

49. Under the MDA, McWane controlled the price at which Sigma could sell domestic DIPF and the customers to whom Sigma could sell domestic DIPF. Sigma's participation in the relevant domestic DIPF market under the MDA was not equivalent to, and for consumers not a substitute for, Sigma's competitive entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market.

50. Sigma's independent, competitive entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market would likely have benefitted consumers by constraining McWane's prices for the relevant domestic DIPF.

51. Through the MDA, McWane transferred a share of its sales and monopoly profits in the domestic DIPF market to Sigma in exchange for Sigma's commitment to abandon its plans to enter the relevant domestic DIPF market as an independent competitor.

52. Both McWane and Sigma entered into the MDA with the specific intent to maintain and share in McWane's monopoly profits in the relevant domestic DIPF market by eliminating competition among themselves and excluding their rivals.

McWane Excluded Star Through Exclusive Dealing

53. Star announced its entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market in June 2009. McWane knew that, initially, Star would have a shorter product line and a smaller inventory than McWane. Star would therefore have difficulty convincing a waterworks distributor to purchase all of its domestic DIPF from Star.

54. McWane responded to Star's entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market by adopting restrictive and exclusive distribution policies (collectively, "McWane's exclusive dealing policies").

a. McWane threatened waterworks distributors with delayed or diminished access to McWane's domestic DIPF, and the loss of accrued rebates on the purchase of McWane's domestic DIPF, if those distributors purchased domestic DIPF from Star.

b. As part of its MDA with McWane, Sigma agreed to implement a similar distribution policy, as alleged in Paragraph 46, above.

c. McWane threatened some waterworks distributors with the loss of rebates in other product categories, such as ductile iron pipe, waterworks valves, and hydrants, if those distributors purchased domestic DIPF from Star.

d. Beginning in 2011, McWane changed its rebate structure for domestic DIPF to require waterworks distributors to make certain minimum, and high, shares of their total domestic DIPF purchases from McWane in order to qualify for these rebates.

55. The purpose and effect of McWane's exclusive dealing policies has been and is to compel the majority of waterworks distributors to deal with McWane and Sigma on an exclusive or nearly exclusive basis for their domestic DIPF business.

a. Due to Star's perceived or actual status as an untested supplier of domestic DIPF with a shorter product line and smaller inventory than McWane, many distributors interested in purchasing domestic DIPF from Star were unwilling to switch all of their domestic DIPF business to Star.

b. Instead, many distributors wished to purchase domestic DIPF from both McWane/Sigma and Star, and thereby to garner the benefits of price and service competition.

c. McWane's exclusive dealing policies increased the risk of purchasing domestic DIPF from Star.

d. Distributors otherwise interested in purchasing domestic DIPF from Star were and are unwilling to do so under the terms of McWane's exclusive dealing policies, and have remained exclusive or nearly exclusive with McWane and Sigma, contrary to their preference.

56. McWane's exclusive dealing policies have foreclosed Star from a substantial volume of sales opportunities with waterworks distributors.

57. By foreclosing Star from a substantial volume of sales opportunities with waterworks distributors, McWane's exclusive dealing policies tend to minimize and delay Star's ability to benefit consumers by constraining the prices of domestically produced DIPF charged by McWane and Sigma.

58. McWane's exclusive dealing policies have also raised barriers to entry into the relevant domestic DIPF market by other potential entrants. This conduct has contributed to McWane's monopolization of the relevant domestic DIPF market.

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

59. The acts and practices of Sigma, as alleged herein, have the purpose, capacity, tendency, and effect of (i) maintaining and stabilizing prices of DIPF in the relevant DIPF markets, (ii) eliminating potential competition from Sigma in the relevant domestic DIPF market, (iii) impairing the competitive effectiveness of Star in the relevant domestic DIPF market, and (iv) raising barriers to entry for potential rivals in the relevant domestic DIPF market. The conduct of Sigma is reasonably capable of making a significant contribution to the enhancement or maintenance of McWane's monopoly power in the relevant domestic DIPF market.

60. There are no legitimate procompetitive efficiencies that justify the conduct of Sigma as alleged herein, or that outweigh its anticompetitive effects.

FIRST VIOLATION ALLEGED RESTRAINT OF TRADE

61. As alleged herein, Sigma conspired with its competitors to restrain price competition. These concerted actions unreasonably restrain trade and constitute unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such acts and practices, or the effects thereof, will continue or recur in the absence of appropriate relief.

SECOND VIOLATION ALLEGED RESTRAINT OF TRADE

62. As alleged herein, Sigma conspired with its competitors to exchange competitively sensitive sales information. These concerted actions unreasonably restrain trade and constitute unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such acts and practices, or the effects thereof, will continue or recur in the absence of appropriate relief.

THIRD VIOLATION ALLEGED INVITATION TO COLLUDE

63. As alleged herein, Sigma invited competitors to collude with Sigma. These actions constitute unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such acts and practices, or the effects thereof, will continue or recur in the absence of appropriate relief.

**FOURTH VIOLATION ALLEGED
RESTRAINT OF TRADE**

64. As alleged herein, McWane and Sigma entered into the MDA. The agreement unreasonably restrains trade and constitutes an unfair method of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such acts and practices, or the effects thereof, will continue or recur in the absence of appropriate relief.

**FIFTH VIOLATION ALLEGED
CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE**

65. As alleged herein, McWane and Sigma entered into the MDA with the specific intent to monopolize the relevant domestic DIPF market, and took overt acts to exclude their rivals in furtherance of their conspiracy, constituting an unfair method of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such acts and practices, or the effects thereof, will continue or recur in the absence of appropriate relief.

WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Federal Trade Commission on this twenty-seventh day of February, 2012 , issues its complaint against Sigma.

By the Commission.

Donald S. Clark
Secretary

SEAL: