United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 49C-1071 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1962) (amended Apr. 26, 1962) (reported at 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,245)

Order Terminating Final Judgment (Oct. 11, 1990)

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Brown Shoe Co., Civ. No. 10527 (D. Mo. filed Nov. 28, 1955)

Docket sheet

United States v. Brown Shoe Co., No. 10527 (3) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 1959) (reported at 179 F. Supp. 721)

Final Judgment (Dec. 8, 1959)

Amendment to Opinion Filed November 20, 1959 (Dec. 4, 1959)

Order Granting Stay of Final Judgment Pending Appeal (Dec. 28, 1959)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for Appellant (Sept. 25, 1961)

Brief for the United States (Nov. 15, 1961)

Appellant's Reply Brief (Nov. 30, 1961)

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (affirming district court) ± Oyez)

Commentary

± Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, The Remarkable 50-Year Legacy of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, Antitrust, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2012, at 47.

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, Civ. A. No. 29287 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 25, 1961)

Docket sheet

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, Civ, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for the United States (Dec. 10, 1962)

Brief for Appellees (Jan. 10, 1963)

Reply Brief for the United States (Feb. 18, 1963)

Appellees' Petition for Rehearing (June 18, 1964)

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (± Oyez)

United States v. Alcoa (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Alcoa (Rome Cable), Civ. No. 8030 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1960) (Blue Book No. 1512)

Docket sheet

United States v. Alcoa (Rome Cable), 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) (finding no violation)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for the United States (Mar. 9, 1964)

Brief for Appellees (Apr. 9, 1964)

rev'd, United States v. Alcoa (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964)

United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., Civ. No. 336-60-WM (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 25, 1960) (Blue Book No. 1510) (National Archives copy)

Docket sheet

Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Vons Grocery Co., Civ. No. 336-60-WM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1964) (reported at 233 F. Supp. 976) (finding no violation)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for the United States (Feb. 16, 1966)

Brief for Appellees (Mar. 15, 1966)

Reply Brief for the United States (Mar. 18, 1966)

rev'd, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966)

On remand

Final Judgment, United States v. Von's Grocery Co ., Civ. No. 336-60-WM (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1967)

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. 59-C-215 (E.D. Wis. filed Oct. 1, 1959) (Blue Book No. 1479)

Docket sheet

United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F.Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. Sep 22, 1964) (No. 59-C-215) (finding no Section 7 violation), rev'd, 384 U.S. 546 (1966), on remand, 296 F.Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. Feb 28, 1969) (finding acquisition violated Section 7)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for the United States (Mar. 11, 1966)

Brief for Pabst Brewing Company (Apr. 13, 1966)

Reply Brief for the United States (Apr. 26, 1966)

rev'd, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966)

On remand

Final Judgment, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. 59-C-215 (Feb. 11, 1971)<

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 67 C 1632 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 22, 1967) (Blue Book No. 1861)

Docket sheet

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972)

Supreme Court

Brief for the United States (Oct 22, 1973)

Brief for the Appellees (Nov. 12, 1973)

Reply Brief for the United States (____)

Appendix (Index) (Sept. 26, 1973)

Appendix (Index to Exhibits)

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (± Oyez)

United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (± Oyez)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., Civ. No. 3523 (D.R.I. filed July 13, 1965) (Blue Book No. 1859) (DOJ copy)

Index to Record

Opinion, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., Civ. No. 3523 (D.R.I. Oct. 7, 1971)

Judgment ()ct. 7, 1971)

United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. Feb. 28, 1971) (finding that the transaction did not violate the Clayton Act)

Supreme Court

Brief for the United States (June 8, 1972)

Brief for Falstaff Brewing Corporation (July 10, 1972)

Reply Brief for the United States (Oct. 1, 1972)

rev'd, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973)

On remand

Opinion, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., Civ. No. 3523 (D.R.I. Oct 23, 1974) (Civ. No. 3523) (reported at 383 F. Supp. 1020)

Judgment (Oct. 24, 1974)

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (± Oyez)

Comptroller of the Currency

Annual Report 1971 (summary of the decision approving the merger begins on page 138)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Civ. A. No. 237-71C2 (W.D. Wash. filed Oct. 22, 1971) (Blue Book No. 2195)

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Civ. A. No. 237-71C2 , 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,496 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 1973) (finding that the transaction did not violate the Clayton Act)

Supreme Court

Transcript of Record (Index)

Brief for the United States (Dec. 29, 1973)

Answering Brief of Appellees (Feb. 27, 1974)

Brief for the Comtroller of the Currency (Apr. 8, 1974)

Reply Brief for the United States (Apr. 19, 1974)

aff'd, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974)

± United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

District court

Complaint, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-3333 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 13, 1989)

United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. Feb 21, 1990)

Final Judgment, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-3333 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 22, 1990) (entering consent judgment against Oy Tampella on the Section 7A premerger count for failure to make proper filing because of the omission of a required “4(c) document” in connection with its filing for Baker Hughes and ordering defendant Oy Tampella AB to pay $275,000).

D.C. Circuit

aff'd, ± United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

Merger Guidelines

2010 Merger Guidelines

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (rev. Aug. 19, 2010)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, News Release, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010)

Statement of Chairman Leibowitz on the Release of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010)

Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch on the Release of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010)

± Shearman & Sterling, The 2010 DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Increasing Realism While Reducing Predictability (Aug. 2010)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, News Release, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010)

± Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Developments at the Antitrust Division & The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines—One Year Later, Remarks as Prepared for the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2011 Antitrust Fall Forum, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 2011)

± Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years (Sept. 10, 2010)

± John Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2010 (review of Shapiro paper)

± James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, 'Tally-Ho!': UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 Antitrust L.J. 587 (2011)

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Questions for Public Comment (Sept. 22, 2009)

Christine A. Varney, Ass't Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Merger Guidelines Workshops, Remarks Before the Third Annual Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 22, 2009).

Carl Shapiro, Dep. Ass't Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Updating the Merger Guidelines: Issues for the Upcoming Workshops, Remarks Before the Fall Forum, Antitrust Section, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C (Nov. 12, 2009)

± Christine A. Varney, Ass't Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., An Update on the Review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Remarks as Prepared for the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project's Final Workshop (January 26, 2010)

± Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project (2009-2010) (webcast)

December 3, 2009 ( agenda) ( transcript)
December 8, 2009 (agenda) (transcript)
December 10, 2009 (agenda) (transcript)
January 14, 2010 (agenda) (transcript)
January 26, 2010 (agenda) (transcript)

± Public comments on FTC web site

± Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Continuity and Change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Oct. 2010

± Darren S. Tucker, Seventeen Years Later: Thoughts on Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Antitrust Source, Oct. 2009.

Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ. 619 (2010).

± Merger Guidelines Symposium, Truth on the Market blog (Oct. 2009)

Evolution of the merger guidelines

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (rev. Aug. 19, 2010)

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 8, 1997)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, News Release FTC/DOJ Announce Revised Guidelines On Efficiencies In Mergers (Apr. 8, 1997)

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Mar. 2006)

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Issue Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992)

U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement Accompanying
Release of Revised Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992)

Paul T. Denis, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Revision: A Draftsman’s Perspective, GCP: The Antitrust Chronicle, Dec. 2009

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984) (published at 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982) (published at 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (June 14, 1982)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement Concerning Horizontal Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982)

± See U.S. Dep't of Justice, 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine (June 10, 2002)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (May 30, 1968)

Oliver E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice—In Perspective (2002)

Note: The 1968, 1982, 1984 (except for Section 4), 1992, and 1997 Merger Guidelines have been superseded by the 2010 Merger Guidelines. Section 4 of the 1984 guidelines was superseded by the DOJ/FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines (June 30, 2020). With the new Biden admnstration, the FTC withdrew from the Vertical Merger Guidelines on September 15, 2021. The Biden administration DOJ and FTC are undertaking a review of both the horizontal and vertical merger guidelines and are likley to issue new guidelines in both areas in later 2022 or early 2023.

Reference Materials

Merger enforcement policy

± Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Years 1996-2011 (Jan. 2013).

± U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Merger Challenges Data, 1999 – 2003 (Dec. 18, 2003).

± American Antitrust Inst., Mergers, Market Power, and the Need for More Vigorous Enforcement (2016).
NB: This is a “Preview” of the merger chapter of the AAI’s 2016 Presidential Transition Report, which has not yet been published.

± N.Y. Times Editorial Board, How Mergers Damage the Economy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2015.

± Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality (Oct. 16, 2015)

± Theo Francis & Ryan Knutson, Wave of Megadeals Tests Antitrust Limits in U.S., Wall St. J. (Oct. 18, 2015).

± Hoberg-Phillips Data Library

± Gerard Hoberg & Gordon Phillips, Text-Based Network Industries and Endogenous Product Differentiation (July 3, 2015).

Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, International, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Enforcement in the Americas: Update from the U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the New York State Bar Association Summer Merger Forum, New York, NY (July 17, 2012).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Economic Evidence In Merger Analysis (DAF/COMP(2011)23, July 27, 2011).

± Christopher T. Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, An Experimental Approach to Merger Evaluation (July 27, 2013).

± Malcolm B. Coate, A Meta-Study of Merger Retrospectives in the United States (Nov. 7, 2013).

±John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 Antitrust L.J. 619 (2013).

± J. Thomas Rosch & Darren S. Tucker, Emerging Theories of Competitive Harm in Merger Enforcement, Antitrust Source, Oct. 2011.

± Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Merger Policy with Merger Choice (Mar. 19, 2011), final version at 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 1006 (2013).

± D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055 (2010).

± Malcolm B., Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush: Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 29, 2009).

± Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement (CEPS Working Paper No. 183, Mar. 2009)., final version at Global Competition Pol'y, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2009.

± William Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 Competition Pol'y Int'l 129 (2009).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement (Competition Policy Center. Paper CPC07-071, Oct. 2007), published in Where the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky, ed., 2008).

± Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Dynamic Merger Review (Nov. 28, 2008), final version at 118 J. Pol. Econ. 1200 (2010).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Antitrust, Summer 2008, at 29.

± Thomas O. Barnett, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Current Issues in Merger Enforcement: Thoughts on Theory, Litigation Practice, and Retrospectives, Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lecture, Washington, DC (June 26, 2008).

± Dennis W. Carlton, The Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It (Dec. 2007), final version at Global Competition Pol'y, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2009.

± Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger Retrospective Studies: A Review, Antitrust, Vol. 23, No. 1, at 34 (2008).

± Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers, in III Handbook of Industrial Organization 2369 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007).

± Malcom B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review Process, 73 Antitrust L.J. 531 (2006).

± David Scheffman, Sources of Information and Evidence in Merger Investigations (Jan. 2003).

Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 Antitrust L.J. 105 (2002).

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, The Standard for Merger Review, with a Particular Emphasis on Country Experience with the Change of Merger Review Standard from the Dominance Test to the SIC/SIEC Test (DAF/COMP(2009)21, May 10, 2010).

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Managing Complex Merger Cases (DAF/COMP(2007)44, Oct. 29, 2008).

± International Competition Newtork, ICN Investigative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review (June 2005).

± Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politicians Be More Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards (European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, RSC No. 2003/14, 2003).

± David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy,9 J. L. Econ. & Organ. 1 (1993).

± R. Preston McAfee & Michael A. Williams, Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy, J. Indus. Econ. 181 (1992).

± Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization, and Merger Guidelines, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 281 (1991).

Merger enforcement: DOJ & FTC

J. Robert Robertson & Corey W. Roush, Procedural and Substantive Differences in Merger Challenges by Different Authorities in the United States, 58 Antitrust Bull. 201 (2013).

Challenges to FTC enforcement authority

Axon Enterprise

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Axon Enter. v. FTC, No. 2:20-cv-00014-DMF (D. Arz. filed Jan. 3, 2020)

Docket sheet (downloaded Apr. 11, 2020)

Axon Enterprise, Inc., News Release, Axon Sues FTC for Alleged Violation of US Constitution (Jan. 3, 2020)

± Axon v. Federal Trade Commission Media & Investor Briefing Page

± Rick Smith, The FTC Acts as Both Prosecutor and Jury, WSJ.com (Jan. 6, 2020)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Jan. 9, 2020)

Exhibit Index

Ex. No.	Date	Document Description
1	1-9-2020	Declaration of Pamela B. Petersen
1A	2-26-2015	Joshua D. Wright, Section 5 Revisited: Time for the FTC to Define the Scope of Its Unfair Methods of Competition Authority (2015)
1B	2018	Andrew N. Vollmer, Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings, 52 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 103, 145 (2018)
1C	April 2007	Report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission
1D	6-17-2019	Sen. Mike Lee, Op.-Ed., Just One Agency Should Enforce Antitrust Law, Wash. Examiner
1E	12-9-2019	Brief of the Solicitor General filed in Selia Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, U.S. Supreme Court No. 19-7
1F	3-22-2018	FTC Order in the Matter of CoreLogic Inc., Docket No. C-4458
2	1-9-2020	Declaration of Antony P. Kim
2A	2015- present	Chart of Federal Trade Commission Adjudicative Proceedings

Text of Proposed Order

Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Jan. 23, 2020)

Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Jan. 30, 2020)

Notice of Tentative Ruling (Mar. 10, 2020)

Order (Apr. 8, 2020) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)

Notice of Appeal (Apr. 13, 2020)

Ninth Circuit

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, No. 20-15662 (docketed Apr. 14, 2020)

Docket sheet (downloaded June 7, 2020)

Supreme Court

Argument set for November 7, 2022

SEC v. Jarkesy

Fifth Circuit

Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Jarkesy v. SEC, No. 3-15255 (5th Cir. May 18, 2022)

Supreme Court

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari SEC v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Mar. 8, 2023)

Petition granted (June 30, 2023)

QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and
adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.
2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an
agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.
3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in
agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.

Brief for the Petitioner (Aug. 28, 2023)

Brief for Respondents (Oct. 11, 2023)

Reply Brief for the Petitioner (Nov. 13, 2023)

Oral argument scheduled for November 29, 2023

± Supreme Court web page

Commentary

Robert Stebbins, Abigail Edwards & Ariel Blask, The Jarkesy Decision and Ramifications for Administrative Proceedings, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (June 29, 2022)

Merger enforcement: Theory

± Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeanoy, Ex Post or Ex Ante? On the Optimal Timing of Merger Control (June 13, 2013).

Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Merger Policy with Merger Choice, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 1006 (2013).

± Joseph A. Clougherty & Jo Seldeslachts, The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments (____), final version at 29 J. L. Econ.& Org. 1114 (2013).

Enforcement retrospectives

Reports

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Roundtable on Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions: Note by the Delegation of the European Union (DAF/COMP/WD(2011)59, June 16, 2011).

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Roundtable on Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions: Note by the Delegation of the United States (DAF/COMP/WD(2011)58, June 20, 2011).

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Roundtable on Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions: Note by Mr. Oliver Budzinski (DAF/COMP(2011)9, June 15, 2011).

Lear, Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets, final report prepared for the UK Competition and Markets Authority (May 9, 2019)

Lear, Ex Post Review of Merger Control Decisions, report prepared for the European Commission (Dec. 2006)

± Appendices
Appendix I - A review of the literature on the ex-post assessment of merger decision
Appendix II - The empirical techniques
Appendix III - General questionnaire for experts
Appendix IV – Questionnaire for the identification of missing key arguments

± PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ex Post Evaluation of Mergers,report prepared for the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Competition Commission (Mar. 2005).

Commentary

± Daniel Hosken, Ex-Post Merger Evaluation (2013).

± Luca Aguzzoni, Elena Argentesi, Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Massimo Tognoni & Cristiana Vitale, They Played the Merger Game: A Retrospective Analysis in the UK Videogames Market (Sept. 2013).

± Richard Friberg & André Romahn, Ex-Post Merger Review and Divestitures (Feb. 9, 2012).

± Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler & Burcin B.Yurtoglu, How Effective Is European Merger Control?, 55 Eur. Econ. Rev. 980 (2011).

Tomaso Duso, Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data (Apr. 2003), final version at 50 J. L. & Econ. 455 (2007) (± slides)

Antitrust economics

Jill Walker, Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations ( 2020 OECD Global Forum on Competition Discussion Paper 2020)

Economic Analysis In Merger Investigations—Contribution from the United States (Dec. 2, 2020)

Economic Analysis In Merger Investigations—Contribution from the United Kingdom (Dec. 9, 2020)

± 2020 OECD Global Forum on Competition web page

± International Competition Network, The Role of Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis, in ICN Investigative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review ch. 4 (revised 2013).

± Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis (rev. Apr. 6, 2013).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Why Can’t We All Just Get Along: Structural Modeling and Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis (May 26, 2011).

± Gregory J. Werden, Luke Froeb & Michael Shor, Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control (May 20, 2010).

± Jiawei Chen, The Effects of Mergers with Dynamic Capacity Accumulation (May 10, 2008), final version at 27 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 92 (2009).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory: Implications for Merger Analysis (Oct. 1, 2009).

± Luke M. Froeb, The Use of Economics in Merger Analysis, PowerPoint Presentation before the IBC Conference on The Use of Economics in Competition Law, Brussels (Jan. 27, 2005).

± Gautam Gowrisankaran & Thomas J. Holmes, Mergers and the Evolution of Industry Concentration: Results from the Dominant Firm Model, 35 RAND J. Econ. 1 (2004).

± Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product, 58 Econ. Letters 367 (1998).

Gregory Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products, 44 J. Indus. Econ. 409 (1996).

± Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics 281 (1991).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (1990).

Gregory J. Werden, Horizontal Mergers: Comment, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1002 (1991).

Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: Reply, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1007 (1991).

Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal Mergers: A Re-Interpretation of the Farrell-Shapiro-Framework (Nov. 15, 2007).

Expert economic testimony

Arndt Christiansen & Christian Ewald, Best Practices for Expert Economic Opinions - Key Element of Forensic Economics in Competition Law (July 22, 2013).

Eur. Comm'n, DG Competition, Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases Concerning the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases (staff working paper 2010).

± OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Techniques for Presenting Complex Economic Theories to Judges (DAF/COMP(2008)31, Dec. 16, 2008).

Economics of mergers

± Bruce A.Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2016-082, (2016).

± Robert B. Kulick, Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity (Oct. 21, 2015).

± Henrik Horn & Lars Persson, Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets (Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Paper Series No. 513, July 15, 1998), final version at 19 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 1213 (2001).

Distribution of firm size

± Erzo G.J. Luttmer, Models of Growth and Firm Heterogeneity (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 678, Apr. 2010).

± Erzo G. J. Luttmer, On the Mechanics of Firm Growth (Feb. 2008).

Welfare effects

± Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin (Sept. 30, 2009).

± Robert Town, Douglas Wholey, Roger Feldman & Lawton R. Burns, The Welfare Consequences of Hospital Mergers (NBER Working Paper No. 12244, May 2006).

± Andreas Strohm, Efficiencies in Merger Control: All you Always Wanted to Know and Were Afraid to Ask (____).

± Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product, 58 Econ. Letters 367 (1998).

± Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968).

Industrial concentration

Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-082, 2016).,

± Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? (June 2016).

± The Economist, A Lapse in Concentration (Oct. 1, 2016).

± The Economist, Corporate Concentration (May 24, 2016).

± Michael Tanner, Five Myths about Economic Inequality in America (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 797, Sept. 7, 2016)

± Council of Economic Advisers, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power (Issue Brief, Apr. 2016).

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy (____).

± Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality (Oct. 16, 2015).

A. Ali, S. Klasa & E. Yeung, The Limitations of Industry Concentration Measures Constructed with Compustat Data: Implications for Financial Research, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3839.(2009).

Merger guidelines

Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (Apr. 2011), final version at 39 Rev. Indus. Org. 3 (2011).

± Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Merger Policy and the 2010 Merger Guidelines (U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-34, Oct. 16, 2010).

± Gregory K. Leonard, The 2010 Merger Guidelines: Do We Need Them? Are They All We Need? (Oct. 15, 2010)

± Jerry Hausman, 2010 Merger Guidelines: Empirical Analysis, Antitrust Source, Oct. 2010.

± Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 Antitrust L.J. 701 (2010).

± John Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2010 (review of Shapiro paper).

± James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, 'Tally-Ho!': UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 Antitrust L.J. 587 (2011).

± Christine A. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not Revolution, 77 Antitrust L.J. 651 (2011).

± Joseph Farrell, Fox, Or Dangerous Hedgehog? Keyte And Schwartz On The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77 Antitrust L.J. 661 (2011).

± Timothy J. Muris & Bilal Sayyed, Three Key Principles for Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Dec. 7, 2009).

± Gregory K. Leonard & Lawrence Wu, Revising the Merger Guidelines: Second Request Screens and the Agencies’ Empirical Approach to Competitive Effects (Dec. 2009).

Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Economics and the 1992 Guidelines: A Brief Survey, 8 Rev. Indus. Org. 139 (1993).

Merger guidelines—Economic techniques

± Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory and Merger Guidelines (undated) (± slides)

Jay Ezrielev & Joseph J. Simons, The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Critical Loss, and Linear Demand, 7 J. Competition Law & Econ. 497 (2011).

Market power

± Lawrence J. White, Market Power: How Does It Arise? How Is It Measured? (2012), forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook in Managerial Economics ch. 5 (Christopher R. Thomas & William F. Shughart II eds.).

± Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 511 (2013).

± Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Lerner Index of Monopoly Power: Origins and Uses (Jan. 18, 2011), final version at 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 558 (2011).

Aviv Nevo, Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 69 Econometrica 307 (2001).

± John Fingleton, Undefining Market Power (Trinity Economic Paper Series 2000/4, 2000).

George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 Antitrust L.J. 807 (1992).

± Robert E. Hall, The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in Industry, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 921 (1988).

± Stephen Martin, The Measurement of Profitability and the Diagnosis of Market Power, 6 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 301 (1988).

± William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981).

Franklin M. Fisher , Diagnosing Monopoly, 19 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus.7 (1979).

Abba Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 Rev. Econ. Stud. 157 (1934).

Concentration statistics

Maurizio Naldi & Marta Flamini, The CR4 Index and the Interval Estimation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: An Empirical Comparison (June 17, 2014).

Market definition

± Malcolm B. Coate, Market Definition is Not Alchemy (Jan. 22, 2014).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Should the DOJ’s Controversial Approach to Market Definition Control Merger Litigation: The Case of U. S. v. H&R Block (Oct. 24, 2013).

± Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, 79 Antitrust L.J. 361 (2013).

± Louis Kaplow, Market Definition (May 15, 2013), forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, ed., 2013).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee,, Market Definition, Background note by the Secretariat (DAF/COMP(2012)13/REV1, Sept. 21, 2012).

Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. Mckenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055 (2012).

± Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, Market Definition (June 15, 2012).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, In Defense of Market Definition (Feb. 14, 2012), final version at 57 Antitrust Bull. 667 (2012).

± Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines (May 2011), final version at 39 Rev. Indus. Org. 107 (2011).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition, 76 Antitrust L.J. 585 (2010).

± Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010).

± Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow (Feb. 13, 2012).

± Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3(1) Competition Pol'y Int'l 3 (Spring 2007).

± Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview (Nov. 2006), published in 74 Antitrust L.J. 129 (2007).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 328 Sept. 2006), final version published in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 1 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

± Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm (June 4, 2002), final version at 71 Antitrust L.J. 253 (2003).

± Gregory J. Werden., Market Delineation Algorithms Based on the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm (U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div. Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 02-8, July 27, 2002).

Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, 38 Antitrust Bull. 517 (1993).

Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Enough, 12 Res. L. & Econ. 207 (1989).

Critical loss analysis/recapture analysis

± Serge Moresi & Hans Zenger, Recapture Ratios In Merger Analysis (Oct. 29, 2017).

Christine Meyer & Yijia Wang, A Comprehensive Look at the Critical Loss Analysis in a Differentiated Products Market, 8 J. Competition L. & Econ. 863 (2012).

Jay Ezrielev & Joseph J. Simons, The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Critical Loss, and Linear Demand, 7 J. Competition Law & Econ. 497 (2011).

Adriaan ten Kate & Gunnar Niels, The Concept of Critical Loss for a Group of Differentiated Products, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ. 321 (2010).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the Confusion, GCP, Dec. 2009.

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss Analysis: Response, CPI Antitrust J. (Feb. 2010).

± Joseph J. Simons & Malcolm Coate, Critical Loss V. Diversion Analysis: Another Attempt at Consensus, 1 CPI Antitrust Journal ( Apr. 2010).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Models, Mathematics and Critical Loss (Nov. 2009).

± Kai Hüschelrath, Critical Loss Analysis in Market Definition and Merger Control ( ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 09-083, 2009).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust Source, Feb. 2008.

± Serge X. Moresi, Steven C. Salop & John R. Woodbury, Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test with Multi-Product Firms, Antitrust Source, Feb. 2008.

Niklas Strand, A Simple Critical Loss Test For The Geographical Market, 2 J. Competition L. & Econ. 697 (2007).

Corrigendum, 3 J. Competition L. & Econ. 307 (2007).

± Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Further Thoughts on Critical Loss, Antitrust Source, Mar. 2004.

± Barry C. Harris, Recent Observations About Critical Loss Analysis (Feb. 2004)

John D. Harkrider, Operationalizing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (Feb. 2004)

Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003).

± David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, The State of Critical Loss Analysis: Let’s Make Sure We Understand the Whole Story, Antitrust Source, Nov. 2003.

± Daniel O’Brien & Abraham Wickelgren, The State of Critical Loss Analysis: Reply to Scheffman and Simons, Antitrust Source, Mar. 2004.

± Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust, Spring 2003, at 49.

± Øystein Daljord, Lars Sørgard & Øyvind Thomassen, The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with the Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz and Shapiro (Apr. 2008), final version at 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 263 (2008).

James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Asymmetric Price Increase in Critical Loss Analysis: A Reply to Daljord, Sørgard, and Thomassen, __ J. Competition L. & Econ. ____ (2014)

± Daniel O’Brien & Abraham Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis (May 23, 2003), final version published in 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003).

± Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 02-9, July 22, 2002).

James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46 Antitrust Bull. (2001).

Barry Harris & Joseph Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution Is Necessary?, 12 Res. L. & Econ. 207 (1989).

The Philadelphia National Bank presumption

± Sean P. Sullivan, What Structural Presumption? Reuniting Evidence and Economics on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis (Aug. 1, 2015).

± Jonathan Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers (May 19, 2008), forthcoming in Antitrust Law & Economics (Keith Hylton ed., 2009).

± John Kwoka, Some Thoughts on Concentration, Market Shares, and Merger Enforcement Policy, Presented at the FTC/DOJ Workshop on Merger Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 17, 2004).

± Paul Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions (Sept. 25, 2001), final version at 48 Antitrust Bull. 119 (Spring 2003).

± E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline Industry, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 549 (1993).

"Upward pricing pressure": The Farrell-Shapiro alternative to market definition

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. Theoretical Econ. (Policies and Perspectives), Iss. 1, Art. 9 (Mar. 2010).

± John R. Woodbury, Article review, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2008, at 5 (commenting on the Nov. 28, 2008 version of Farrell-Shapiro paper)

± Richard Schmalensee, Should New Merger Guidelines Give UPP Market Definition?, 12(1) CPI Antitrust Chron. (2009).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss Analysis: Response, CPI Antitrust J. (Feb. 2010).

± Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, Understanding UPP, 10 B.E. J. of Theoretical Econ. (Policies & Perspectives), Issue 1, Art. 21 (2010).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld, 10 B.E. J. of Theoretical Econ. (Policies & Perspectives), Issue. 1, Art. 41.

± Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan, and Gloria Sheu, Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects (EAG Discussion Paper 16-2, Mar. 2016).

± Lydia Cheung, The Upward Pricing Pressure Test for Merger Analysis: An Empirical Examination (Feb. 13, 2013).

± Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen & Lars Sørgard, A Note on Upward Pricing Pressure: The Possibility of False Positives (May 2012), final version at 8 J. Competition L. & Econ. 881 (2012).

Robert Willig, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers: Upward Pricing Pressure, Product Quality, and Other Extensions, 39 Rev. Indus. Org. 19 (2011).

± Robert Willig, UPP Methodology Extensions to Product Quality and Capacity Issues (July 22, 2011).

± Ariel Pakes, Upward Pricing Pressure Screens in the New Merger Guidelines; Some Pro's and Con's, Presented at DG COMP (May 2011).

± Dennis W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Will the New Guidelines Clarify or Obscure Antitrust Policy?, Antitrust Source, Oct. 2010.

± Gopal Das Varma, Market Definition, Upward Pricing Pressure, and the Role of Courts: A Response to Carlton and Israel, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2010.

± Dennis Carlton & Mark Israel, Response to Gopal Das Varma's Market Definition, Upward Pricing Pressure, and the Role of Courts: A Response to Carlton and Israel, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2010.

± David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, Unilateral Effects for Differentiated Products: Theory, Assumptions, and Research, Antitrust Source, Apr. 2010.

± Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Effects with Differentiated Consumer Products: A Response to Scheffman and Simons, Antitrust Source, June 2010.

± David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, Unilateral Effects with Differentiated Consumer Products: A Response to Werden, Antitrust Source, Aug. 2010

± Malcolm B. Coate, The Enhanced UPP Screen: Merging Markets into the UPP Methodology (June 2010)

± Joe Simons & Malcolm Coate, Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications (Mar. 2010), final version at Eur. Competition J. 377 (2010)

± Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard, G. Steven Olley & Lawrence Wu, Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches Versus “Upward Pricing Pressure, Antitrust Source, Feb. 2010

± Serge Moresi, The Use of Upward Price Pressure Indices in Merger Analysis, Antitrust Source, Feb. 2010

± Serge Moresi, Cournot Competition and the UPP Test (Nov. 9, 2009).

Unilateral effects

See Horizontal Mergers—Unilateral effects

Diversion ratios

Serge Moresi & HansZenger, Aggregate Diversion and Market Elasticity (June 17, 2017)

Andrew P. Vassallo, The Use of Proportional Market Shares As Estimates of Diversion Ratios in Merger Analysis (____), final version at 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 231 (2013).

± Chris Walters, Diversion Ahead! Approximating Diversion Ratios for Retail Chain Mergers (Nov. 2007) (± slides)

± Oxera, Diversion Ratios: Why Does It Matter Where Customers Go If a Shop Is Closed? (Feb. 2009).

Unilateral effects/UPP — Applications

U.K. Competition Comm'n, A Report on the Completed Merger between Zipcar, Inc. and Streetcar Limited (Dec. 22, 2010) (public version) (using GUPPI)

Appendices and Glossary

± U.K. Competition Comm'n Zipcar/Streetcar web site

± RBB Brief 36, Road-testing UPP: the Zipcar/Streetcar merger (Mar. 2011).

U.K. Office of Fair Trading, Anticipated Acquisition by Co-operative Group Limited of Somerfield Limited (Nov. 17, 2008).

± Oxera, Taking Stock of the OFT’s Approach in Supermarket Mergers (Aug. 2010).

U.K. Competition Comm'n, A Report on the Acquisition by Somerfield plc of 115 Stores from Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc (Sept. 2005) (using symmetric IPR)

Appendix B: Key aspects of the economic analysis for Stage 1 of the local competitive effects methodology
Appendix D: Diversion ratios
Appendix E: Identification of problem stores

See U.K. Competition Comm'n web page for the remaining appendices

Coordinated effects

See Horizontal Mergers—Coordinated effects

"Nascent competitors"

± C. Scott Hemp hill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. Pa, L. Rev. 1879 (2020)

± Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 331 (2020)

± Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, __ Rev. Indus. Or. 1 (2020) (slides)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent and Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms, prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights (Sept. 24, 2019)

"Killer acquisitions"

± OECD, Competitive Effects of Killer Acquisitions (Feb. 24, 2021) (Panel III, OECD Open Competition Day)

± OECD, Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control Roundtable (2020) (OECD web page)

OECD, Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control (2020)

± Igor Letina, Armin Schmutzler & Regina Seibel, Killer Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on Innovation Strategies (Aug. 2020)

± Amy C. Madl, Killing Innovation?: Antitrust Implications of Killer Acquisitions, Yale J. Reg. Online Bull. 5 (2020)

± D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Law for Biotech and Killer Acquisitions, 72 Fla. L. Rev. Forum ( 2020)

± Chris Pike, Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control (OECD Competition Papers, May 2020)

± John M. Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions (2020)

± Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, (working paper), forthcoming 129 J. Pol. Econ. ___ (____).

Cournot competition

Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization ch. 5.7 (1988).

± Jorge M. Streb, Nash’s Interpretations of Equilibrium: Solving the Objections to Cournot (Nov. 2015)

± Benard Kipyegon Kirui, Reconciling Cournot and Bertrand Outcomes: A Review (2013)

± Diego Moreno & Luis Ubeda, Capacity Precommitment and Price Competition Yield the Cournot Outcome, 56 Games & Econ. Behavior 323 56 (2006).

Bertrand competition

± M.R. Baye & D. Kovenock, Bertrand Competition (____), final version at The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (S.N. Durlauf & L.E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).

± D. Kreps & J. Scheinkman, Quantity Pre-Commitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, 14 Bell J. Econ. 326 (1983).

Price effects from mergers

± Michael J. Doane, Luke Froeb, Gregory J. Werden & David M. Zimmer , Predicting Price Effects from Retail Mergers (Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper, Jan. 14, 2013).

± John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 Antitrust L.J. 619 (2013).

± Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan & Gloria Sheu, Approximating the Price Effects of Mergers: Numerical Evidence and an Empirical Application (Oct. 20, 2012).

± Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, On the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Theoretical Interpretation (GATE Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon—St Étienne 2012).

± Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool (Apr. 21, 2011), final version at 5 Am. Econ. J.: Eon. Pol'y 239 (2013).

± Gautam Gowrisankaran, Estimating the Impact of a Hospital Merger Using the Difference-in-Difference of Prices (Oct. 18, 2010), final version at 18 Int'l J. Econ. Bus.83 (2011).

± Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Selected Case Studies (Mar. 2008), final version at 52 J.L. & Econ. 417 (2010).

± Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & Steven Olley, Merger Retrospective Studies: A Review, Antitrust, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 2008.

Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. Competition Law & Econ. 433 (2008).

± Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Survey (CEPS Working Paper No. 140, Jan. 2007).

± Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz, & Gregory Werden, Pass-Through Rates and the Price Effects of Mergers (Oct. 6, 2003), final version at 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 703 (2005).

± Laurence Schumann, Robert P. Rogers & James D. Reitzes, Case Studies of the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers (FTC Bureau of Economics Apr. 1992).

David M. Barton & Roger Sherman. The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Case Study (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 98, Aug. 1983), final version at 33 J. Indus. Econ. 2 (1984).

Capacity reductions

Nicholas Hill, Analyzing Mergers Using Capacity Closures (EAG 08-8, Aug. 2008).

Product variety

F. M. Scherer, The Welfare Economics of Product Variety: An Application to the Ready-to- Eat Cereals Industry, 28 J. Indus. Econ. 113 (1979).

Spatial differentiation

± Nathan H. Miller & Matthew Osborne, Spatial Differentiation and Price Discrimination in the Cement Industry: Evidence from a Structural Model (Oct. 9, 2013), final version at 45 RAND J. Econ. 221 (2014).

Customer complaints

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2004)

FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Furthermore, while the Court does not doubt the sincerity of the anxiety expressed by SPRB customers, the substance of the concern articulated by the customers is little more than a truism of economics: a decrease in the number of suppliers may lead to a decrease in the level of competition in the market. Customers do not, of course, have the expertise to state what will happen in the SPRB market, and none have attempted to do so. The Court therefore concludes that the concern of some customers in the SPRB market that the transactions will lessen competition is not a persuasive indication that coordination among SPRB producers is more likely to occur.") (emphasis in original).

± Ken Heyer, Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to Customers (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Working Paper EAG 06-11, Sept. 2006), final version at 74 Antitrust L.J. 87 (2007).

Counting rivals

± Malcolm B. Coate, Counting Rivals or Measuring Share: Modeling Unilateral Effects for Merger Analysis (May 10, 2011).

"Natural experiments"/Event studies

± Malcolm B. Coate, The Use of Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis (May 2011).

± Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler & Burcin Yurtoglu, Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? A Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 30 Int'l Rev. of L. & econ. 186 (2010).

Simulation/demand estimation

See generally ± Aviv Nevo, Merger Simulations (undated)

± Jonas Björnerstedt & Frank Verboven, Does Merger Simulation Work? Evidence from the Swedish Analgesics Market (Jan. 2013).

Matthew C. Weinberg & Daniel Hosken, Evidence on the Accuracy of Merger Simulations, 95 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1584 (2013).

± Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, Using Cost Pass-Through to Calibrate Demand (U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Working Paper No. EAG 12-9, Oct. 2012).

± Nathan H. Miller, Conor Ryan, Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, Approximating the Price Eects of Mergers: Numerical Evidence and an Empirical Application (U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Working Paper No. EAG 12-8, Oct. 2012).

± Gloria Sheu & Charles Taragin, Calibrating the AIDS and Multinomial Logit Models with Observed Product Margins (U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div., Economic Analysis Group Working Paper No. EAG 12-7, Oct. 2012).

± Matthew C. Weinberg & Daniel Hoskin, Evidence on the Accuracy of Merger Simulations (Jan. 3, 2012), forthcoming Rev. Econ. & Stat..

± Matthew C. Weinberg, More Evidence on the Performance of Merger Simulations (Dec. 30, 2010), final version at 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 51 (2011).

± Christopher R. Knittel & Konstantinos Metaxoglou, Challenges in Merger Simulation Analysis, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 56 (2011).

± Michael D. Noel, Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light (Mar. 2, 2011).

± Jonathan B. Baker, Merger Simulation in an Administrative Context (Feb. 22, 2011).

± Christopher R. Knittel & Konstantinos Metaxoglou, In Search of the Truth: Challenges in Merger Simulation Analysis (Jan. 3, 2011).

± Peter J. Davis & Cristian Huse, Estimating the ‘Coordinated Effects’ of Mergers (Jan. 2010).

± Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ. 277 (2010).

± Enrique Andreu, Kirsten Edwards & Alejandro Requejo, Merger Simulation as a Screening Device: Simulating the Effects of the Kraft/Cadbury Transaction (Nov. 2010).

± Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen & Lars Sørgard, Merger Simulations with Observed Diversion Ratios (Sept. 30, 2010), final version at 31 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 83 (2011).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust, in 1 Issues In Competition Law and Policy 723 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

Gregory K. Leonard & J. Douglas Zona, Simulation in Competitive Analysis, in 2 Issues In Competition Law and Policy (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

± Oliver Budzinski, A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified? (University of Marburg Economic Paper No. 2008-01, May 2008).

± Gregory J. Werden, An Overview of Merger Simulation, Presentation to the Norwegian Competition Authority (Sept. 13, 2007) (PowerPoint).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust, Presentation to the Norwegian Competition Authority (Aug. 2007) (PowerPoint).

± Pierluigi Sabbatini, How To Simulate the Coordinated Effect of a Merger (Temi e Problemi Working Paper No. 12, rev. Mar. 2006).

Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Using Merger Simulation Models: Testing the Underlying Assumptions, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 693 (2005).

Mike Walker, The Potential for Significant Inaccuracies In Merger Simulation Models, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 473 (2005).

± Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & David T. Scheffman, A Daubert Discipline for Merger Simulation (Feb. 16, 2004).

± Luke M. Froeb, Merger Simulation Disciplined by Daubert, II (Jan. 29, 2004).

± Whither Merger Simulation?, Antitrust Source, May 2004.

± Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry (Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University, Working Paper #0032, Jan. 2003), final version at 49 J.L. & Econ. 627 (2006).

± Germán Coloma, Econometric Estimation of PCAIDS Models (2004).

± Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, Technical Report: Effects of Mergers Involving Differentiated Products (COMP/B1/2003/07, Oct. 7, 2004).

± Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation with Brand-Level Margin Data: Extending PCAIDS with Nests, Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, vol 4, no 1, article 2 (2004).

± Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, PCAIDS Merger Simulation with Nests: A New Framework for Unilateral Effects Analysis (Apr. 5, 2003) (PowerPoint).

± David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 319 (2003).

± Daniel Hosken, Daniel O’Brien, David Scheffman & Michael Vita, Demand System Estimation and its Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis (Apr. 2002).

± Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Antitrust Logit Model for Predicting Unilateral Competitive Effects, 70 Antitrust L.J. 257 (2002).

± Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Calibrated Economic Models Add Focus, Accuracy, and Persuasiveness to Merger Analysis (June 24, 2002), final version in The Pros and Cons of Merger Control 63 (Swedish Competition Authority 2002).

± Luke M. Froeb & Steven T. Tschantz, How Much Information Is Required to Accurately Predict Merger Effects? (June 25, 2001).

± Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications, 69 Antitrust L.J. 883 (2001).

± Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial Organization, 7 Int'l J. Econ. Bus. 133 (2000).

± A. Nevo, Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 31 RAND J. Econ. 395 (2000).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods Used in Antitrust Litigation: A Review and Critique, 1 J. Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n (1999).

± Philip Crooke, Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz & Gregory J. Werden, Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria, 15 Rev. Indus. Org. 205 (1999).

± Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications, 69 Antitrust L.J. 883 (1999).

Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321 (1997).

± Gregory J, Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Timothy J. Tardiff, The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization, 3 Int'l J. Econ. Bus. (1996).

± S. Berry, J. Levinsohn & A. Pakes, Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 63 Econometrica 841 (1995).

± Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 407 (1994).

± J. Hausman, G. Leonard & J. Zona, Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products, 34 Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 159 (1994).

± Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 312 (1980).

Ken Hendricks and Preston McAfee have put an interactive simulation model on the web. ± The Hendricks-McAfee Merger Simulator. Thomas Ross and Werner Antweiler have another interactive simulation model. ± Canadian Competition Policy Page Merger Simulation.

Simulation with diversion ratios

± Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen & Lars Sørgard, Merger Simulations with Observed Diversion Ratios (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Mar. 30, 2010), final version at 31 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 83 (2011).

Pass-through analysis

± Alexander MacKay, Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, Bias in Reduced-Form Estimates of Pass-Through (Jan. 8, 2014), final version at 123 Econ. Letters 200 (2014).

± Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan & Gloria Sheu, On the First Order Approximation of Counterfactual Price Effects in Oligopoly Models (Jan. 15, 2014).

± Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer & Gloria Sheu, Using Cost Pass-through to Calibrate Demand (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 12-9, Oct. 2012), final version at 118 Econ. Letters 451 (2013).

± Nicholas Li & Gee Hee Hong, Market Structure and Cost Pass-Through in Retail (University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 470, Jan. 14, 2013).

± E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fabinger, Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition (Feb. 24, 2013), final version at 121 J. Pol. Econ. 528 (2013) (± slides)

± E. Glen Weyl, Pass-Through and Merger Analysis (May 2010).

± Michal Fabinger & E. Glen Weyl, Pass-Through and Demand Forms (Dec. 2012).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Deffinition, 76 Antitrust L.J. 585 (2010).

± Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz & Gregory J. Werden, Pass Through Rates and the Price Effects of Mergers (Oct. 6, 2003), final version at 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 703 (2005).

± Severin Borenstein, A. Colin Cameron & Richard Gilbert, Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?, 112 Q.J. Econ. 305 (1997).

± Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Pfleiderer, A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 182 (1983).

Empirical analysis of particular mergers

± Gregory J. Werden, Inconvenient Truths and Constructive Suggestions on Merger Retrospective Studies (June 28, 2013).

± Robert B. Kulick, Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity (Oct. 21, 2015).

Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, Efficiencies Brewed: Pricing and Consolidation in the U.S. Beer Industry ( Aug. 14, 2013) (analyzing the merger of SABMiller and Molson Coors in the United States), final version at 46 RAND J. Econ. 328 (2015).

Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & Econ. S67 (2014).

± Luca Aguzzoni, Elena Argentesi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso & Massimo Tognoni, Ex-Post Merger Evaluation in the UK Retail Market for Books (June 2013).

± Jonas Björnerstedt & Frank Verboven, Does Merger Simulation Work? A Natural Experiment in the Swedish Analgesics Market(Jan. 2013).

± Panagiotis N. Fotis, Price-Based Techniques for Market Definition & Buying Power Index (2012) (analyzing a Greek dairy merger).

± Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation—Update (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, June 2012).

± RBB|Economics, Roll On Demand Estimation: The EC’s Empirical Analysis in Unilever/Sara Lee (RBB Brief 39, May 2012).

± Luca Aguzzoni, Elena Argentesi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso & Massimo Tognoni, Ex Post Merger Evaluation in the UK Retail Market for Books (May 2, 2012).

± Keith Brand, Christopher Garmon, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Aviv Nevo & Robert Town, Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry (Apr. 24, 2012).

Daniel Hosken, Louis Silvia & Christopher Taylor, Does Concentration Matter? Measurement of Petroleum Merger Price Effects, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 45 (2011).

± Luca Aguzzoni, Elena Argentesi, Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Massimo Tognoni & Cristiana Vitale, The Ex-Post Evaluation of Two Merger Decisions, Report prepared for the UK Competition Commission (LEAR—Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione Sept. 2011) (analyzing the merger between two specialist retailers of gaming products, GAME and Gamestation, and the merger between two specialist book chains, Waterstone’s and Ottakar’s, both of which were cleared by the Competition Commission).

± Nina Leheyda , Patrick Beschorner & Kai Hüschelrath , Ex-Post Assessment of Merger Effects: The Case of Pfizer and Pharmacia, 2003 (ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 11-035, 2011), final version at 3 J. Advanced Research in L. & Econ. 18 (2011).

± Enrique Andreu, Kirsten Edwards & Alejandro Requejo, Merger Simulation as a Screening Device: Simulating the Effects of the Kraft/Cadbury Transaction (Nov. 2010).

± Gautam Gowrisankaran, Estimating the Impact of a Hospital Merger Using the Difference-in-Difference of Prices (Oct. 18, 2010).

± Patrick S. Romano & David J. Balan, A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper 307, 2010).

± C. Lanier Benkard, Aaron Bodoh-Creed & John Lazarev, Simulating the Dynamic Effects of Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines (May 2010) (slides).

± Volodymyr Bilotkach, Multimarket Contact and Intensity of Competition: Evidence from an Airline Merger, 38 Rev. Indus. Org. 95 (2010).

± David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An Innovative Approach to an Old Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, Antitrust, Fall 2009, at 49.

± Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application to Hospital Mergers, 52 J. L. & Econ. 523 (2009).

± Aileen Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper 295, Jan. 2009).

± D. Haas-Wilson & C. Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on Chicago’s North Shore: A Retrospective Study (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper 294, 2009).

± Richard Gilbert & James Ratliff, Sky Wars: The Attempted Merger of EchoStar and DirecTV (2000), final version at The Antitrust Revolution ___ (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds. 5th ed., 2008).

± Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper 293, Nov. 2008).

± Eduardo P. S. Fiuza & Fabiana F. M. Tito, Time Series Econometrics In A Post-Acquisition Antitrust Analysis: The Brazilian Iron Ore Market (2007).

± Margaret Slade, Merger Simulations of Unilateral Effects: What Can We Learn from the UK Brewing Industry? (University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Economic Research Paper No. 767, Oct. 2006).

± Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, Simulating the (Unilateral) Effects of Mergers: Implications of the Oracle/PeopleSoft Case (Aug. 15, 2006).

Marc Ivaldi & Frank Verboven, Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers: Comments on the Underlying Assumptions, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 699 (2005) (Volvo–Scania merger).

± Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason & Daniel S. Hosken, Econometric Methods in Staples (Princeton Law & Public Affairs Working Paper No. 04-007, Apr. 9, 2004).

± Mark J. McCabe, Law Serials Pricing and Mergers: A Portfolio Approach, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, art. 11 (2004).

± G.E. Bamberger, D.W. Carlton & L.R Neumann, An Empirical Investigation of the Competitive Effects of Domestic Airline Alliances, 47 J. Law & Econ. 1 (2004).

± Mary T. Coleman, David W. Meyer & David T. Scheffman, Empirical Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects of a Horizontal Merger: The FTC's Cruise Ships Mergers Investigation (2003), published in 23 Rev. Indus. Organ. 121 (2003).

± Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry (Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization Working Paper No. 0032, Jan. 2003),final version at 49 J.L. & Econ. 627 (2006).

± Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Case Study, 49 J. Indus. Econ. 63 (2001).

± Aviv Nevo, Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 31 RAND J. Econ. 395 (2000).

Gregory J. Werden, Andrew Joskow & Richard Johnson, The Effects of Mergers on Price and Output: Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, 12 Managerial & Decision Econ. 341 (1991).

Minority interests

± Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro & Helder Vasconcelos, Quantifying the Coordinated E¤ects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions (May 2013).

± Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, Mergers and Partial Ownership (CESifo Working Paper No. 2912, Jan. 2010).

± Daniel O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 Antitrust L.J. 559 (2000).

Robert Reynolds & Bruce Snapp, The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures, 4 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 141 (1986).

Timothy F. Bresnahan & Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 155 (1986).

Institutional investors cross-holdings

± Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think (Feb. 22, 2017)

± Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors (Nov. 28, 2016)

± Jan Fichtnerand, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk (October 28, 2016).

± Stealth Socialism: Passive Investment Funds Create Headaches for Antitrust Authorities,The Economist , Sept.17, 2016.

± José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership (Ross School of Business Paper No. 1235, July 5, 2016),

± John Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, Antitrust Source, Dec. 2014 (reviewing earlier version of paper)

± José Azar, Sahil Raina, and Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (Ross School of Business Working Paper, July 23, 2016),

± Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267 (2016).

± Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 Harv.
L. Rev. F. 212 (2016)

Multimarket contacts

Jeremy I. Bulow, John D. Geanakoplos & Paul D. Klemperer, Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 488 (1985).

Barriers to entry

Dennis W. Carlton, Barriers to Entry, in 1 Issues In Competition Law and Policy 601 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

± Malcolm B. Coate, Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis (Feb. 2008).

± Directorate for Financial & Enterprise Affairs Competition Comm., Barriers to Entry (DAF/COMP(2005)42, Mar. 6, 2006).

± Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4457-04, Jan. 2004), final version published in 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 471 (2004).

± R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, What Is A Barrier To Entry? (June 6, 2003).

± Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47 (1982).

± R. E. Caves & M. E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q.J. Econ. 241 (1977).

Entry defenses/contestability

± United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Arthur J., DelBuono, Modeling the Ease of Entry in Merger Analysis: Can Financial Analysis Move the Ball? (Mar. 20, 2014).

± RBB|Economics, Where Economists Roam: Syniverse/MACH and contestability (RBB Brief 44, Sept. 2013).

± Catherine Schaumans & Frank Verboven, Entry and Competition in Differentiated Products Markets (Apr. 6, 2011).

± Malcolm B. Coate, Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis (Feb. 2008).

± Carl Davidson & Arijit Mukherjee, Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry, 25 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 157 (2007).

± R. Amir & V. Lambson, On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets, 67 Rev. Econ. Studies 235 (2000).

± Gregory J . Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis, 46 J. Indus. Econ. 525 (1998).

± Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 977 (1991).

Countervailing buyer power/buyer power defenses

± C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 Yale L.J. 2078 (2018)

± Jonathan Sallet, Buyer Power in Recent Merger Reviews, Antitrust, Fall 2017, at 82.

± Stephen P. King, Countervailing power and input pricing: When is a waterbed effect likely? (Apr. 24, 2012).

Dennis W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review, 39 Rev. Indus. Org. 127 (2011).

Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 Antitrust L.J. 589 (2005).

Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 Antitrust L. J. 669 (2005).

Efficiencies

± Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Efficient Mergers (U. Iowa Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 16-02, Mar. 2016).

William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers (2012).

± F.M. Scherer, Merger Efficiencies and Competition Policy (HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-048, Oct. 2012).

± Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies (University of Michigan Law School Empirical Legal Studies Center Working Paper No. 30, 2011).

Rabah Amir, Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency Gains, 27 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 264 (2009).

Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, Negotiating Remedies: Revealing the Merger Efficiency Gains, 27 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 188 (2008).

± David Reitman & Dipan Ghosh, Demand Side Merger Efficiencies (Dec. 30, 2009).

± Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Commission 1997–2007 (FTC Bureau of Economics Feb. 2009).

± Robert N. Rubinovitz, New Thinking on the Role of Fixed Cost Savings in Merger Analysis, Antitrust Source, Apr. 2008.

± Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Dynamic Efficiencies In Merger Analysis (DAF/COMP(2007)41, May 15, 2008).

Robert Rubinovitz, The Role of Fixed Cost Savings in Merger Analysis, 5 J. Competition L. & Econ. 233 (2008).

Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains, 26 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 913 (2008).

Albert Banal-Estañol, Inés Macho-Stadler & Jo Seldeslachts, Endogenous Mergers and Endogenous Efficiency Gains: The Efficiency Defence Revisited, 26 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 69 (2008).

± Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement: Comparison of U.S. and EU Approaches, Fordham Int'l L.J., 2006, vol. 30, Iss. 5, art. 3.

± Christian R. Fackelmann, Dynamic Efficiency Considerations in EC Merger Control: An Intractable Subject or a Promising Chance for Innovation? (University of Oxford, Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper No. L-09/06, June 19, 2006).

± Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Steven Tschantz, The Effects of Merger Efficiencies on Consumers of Differentiated Products, 1 Eur. Competition J. 245 (2005).

± Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, Efficiency Gains from Mergers (____).

Massimo Motta & Helder Vasconcelos, Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game. 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 777 (2005).

± Johan N.M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 803 (2005).

± Kenneth Heyer, Statement on Behalf of the United States Department of Justice at the Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearings on the Treatment of Efficiencies In Merger Enforcement (Nov. 17, 2005).

Adriaan Ten Kate, & Gunnar Niels, To What Extent are Cost Savings Passed on to Consumers? An Oligopoly Approach, 20 Eur. J. L. & Econ. 323 (2005).

± Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product, 58 Econ. Letters 367 (1998).

± ABA Sections of Antitrust Law, Comments in Response to the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Request for Public Comment Regarding the Appropriate Role of Efficiencies in Merger Enforcement (Nov. 10, 2005).

± William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, Delivered on the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines (June 10, 2002), final version at 71 Antitrust Law J. 207 (2003).

± Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis (UC Berkeley, Center for Competition Policy Working Paper No. CPC00-15, Oct. 2000), final version published in 68 Antitrust LJ. 685 (2001).

Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 707 (1999).

Paul Yde & Michael Vita, Merger Efficiencies: Reconsidering the “Passing-On” Requirement, 64 Antitrust L.J. 735 (1966).

Innovation

Complaint, United States v. General Motors Corp., Civ. A. No. 93-530 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 11, 1993) (Allison Transmission/ZF Friedrichshafen, AG) (introduced innovation markets).

± J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Role of Static and Dynamic Analysis in Pharmaceutical Antitrust, Remarks Before the Fifth Annual In-House Counsel Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust, New York, NY (Feb. 18, 2010).

± Bruno Jullien & Yassine Lefouili, Horizontal Mergers and Innovation (Mar. 2018)

Failing firm

Ian Conner, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, On “Failing” Firms—and Miraculous Recoveries, FTC Blog Post (May 27, 2020)

Debbie Feinstein & Alexis Gilman, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Power Shopping for an Alternative Buyer, FTC Blog Post (Mar. 31, 2015)

International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930)

Citizen Publ'g Co. v United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (± Oyez)

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures as Dean Foods Sells Fluid Milk Processing Plants to DFA out of Bankruptcy (May 1, 2020)

± Statement of Bureau of Competition Director Richard Feinstein on the FTC’s Closure of Its Investigation of Consummated Hospital Merger in Temple, Texas (Dec. 23, 2009).

± Closing Letter to Counsel For Scott & White Healthcare (Dec. 23, 2009).

± Thomas D. Fina & Vishal Mehta, The Failing Firm Defense: Alive and Well, Threshold, Aug. 2011 (load document and search for "Mehta").

± Ken Heyer & Sheldon Kimmel, Merger Review of Firms in Financial Distress (EAG Working Paper EAG 09-1, Mar. 2009).

± Henry McFarland & Philip Nelson, Failing Firms and Declining Industries, in 3 Issues In Competition Law and Policy 1691 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

± United States, Roundtable on Failing Firm Defence, Report to the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, DAF/COMP/WD(2009)99 (Oct. 6, 2009).

European merger antitrust law

Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.

Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, 2004 O.J. ( L 133) 1 (The "Implementing Regulation"), amended, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1033/2008 of 20 Oct. 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008 O.J. (L 279) 3 (Oct. 22, 2008) (Consolidated version—as published by DG COMP)

± DG COMP Merger Regulation web page

± DG COMP, Eur. Comm'n, EU Competition Law Rules Applicable to Merger Control (2010) (current as of Apr. 1, 2010).

± DG COMP, Eur. Comm'n, Best Practices on the Conduct of EC Merger Proceedings (Jan. 1, 2004).

± DG COMP, Eur. Comm'n, Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases Concerning the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases (Oct. 17, 2011).

Reports

Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, Ex-Post Review of Merger Control Decisions (Lear–Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione Dec. 2006) (annexes)

Commentary

± William E. Kovacic, Petros C. Mavroidis & Damien J. Neven, Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of the EU and US Practice (Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies Working Paper No: 01/2014, Jan. 2014).

± Dzmitry Bartalevich, EU Competition Policy since 1990: How Substantial Is Convergence Towards U.S. Antitrust? (Sept. 28, 2013). 6 J. CENTRUM Cathedra: The Business & Econ. Res. J. 273 (2013).

Mats A. Bergman, Malcolm B. Coate, Maria Jakobsson & Shawn W. Ulrick, Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States (Dec. 21, 2006), final version at 36 Rev. Indus. Org. 305 (2011).

± Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler, & Burcin Yurtoglu, How Effective Is European Merger Control? (Apr. 3, 2008), final version at 55 Eur. Econ. Rev. 980 (2011).

± Mats A. Bergman, Malcolm B. Coate, Maria Jakobsson & Shawn W. Ulrick, Merger Control in the European Union and the United States: Just the Facts (Mar. 4, 2010).

± Peter L. Ormosi, The Determinants of Merger Litigation Strategies: An Empirical Analysis of EC Mergers (CCP Working Paper 10-1, Jan. 07, 2010).

± François Lévêque, Are Merger Remedies Effective in the EU? (Feb. 2007).

Mats A. Bergman, Maria Jakobsson & Carlos Razo, An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission’s Merger Decisions, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 717 (2005).

± Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler, & Burcin Yurtoglu, EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment (Sept. 28, 2005).,

± Marc Ivaldi & Frank Verboven, Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy (Apr. 2004).

± Tomaso Duso, Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data (Feb. 2003).

Cross-border merger antitrust enforcement

Canada-U.S. Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (Mar. 25, 2014)

± OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Cross-Border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing And Emerging Economies (DAF/COMP/GF(2011)13, Feb. 13, 2012).

US-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices On Cooperation In Merger Investigations (Oct. 14, 2011) (± FTC news release)

± Oliver Budzinski, International Antitrust Institutions (July 4, 2012)

± Luis M.B. Cabral, An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 739 (2005).

Merger success and failure

± Ralph M. Sonenshine, Why Mergers Fail (July 2011).

Case Studies: Merger Review Clearances

Zillow/Trulia (FTC 2015)
Office Depot/OfficeMax (FTC 2013)
Vivendi/EMI (FTC 2012)
Express Scripts/Medco (FTC 2012)
Google/Motorola Mobility (DOJ 2012)
Google/Admeld (DOJ 2011)
Perdue/Coleman (DOJ 2011)
SABMiller/Molson Coors (DOJ 2008)
XM/Sirius (DOJ 2008)
Google/Doubleclick (FTC 2007)
Smithfield/Premium Standard (DOJ 2007)
Whirlpool/Maytag (DOJ 2006)
Sprint/Nextel (DOJ 2005)
Movielink Studio Joint Venture (DOJ 2004)
Caremark./AdvancePCS (FTC 2004)
Genzyme//Novazyme (FTC 2004)
AmeriSource/Bergen Brunswig (FTC 2001)
Cruise ships (FTC 2002)

± DOJ closing statements

XM /Sirius
(DOJ 2008)

Transaction

XM Satellite Radio & SIRIUS Satellite Radio, News Release, SIRIUS and XM to Combine in $13 Billion Merger of Equals (Feb. 19, 2007)

XM Satellite Radio & SIRIUS Satellite Radio, Investor Presentation (Feb. 20, 2007)

XM Satellite Radio Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2007

SIRIUS Satellite Radio Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2007

DOJ merger review

Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.'s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008)

FCC review

Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, News Release, Commission Approves Transaction between Sirius Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc. Subject to Conditions (July 28, 2008)

Memorandum Opinion and Order and Report and Order (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2008)

SIRIUS XM Radio, News Release, SIRIUS and XM Complete Merger (July 29, 2008)

Private action

Complaint, Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 09 CV 10035 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 7, 2009)

Docket sheet (downloaded Feb. 24, 2017)

Opinion & Order, Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035 HB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (denying motion to bifurcate) (reported at 756 F. Supp. 2d 445)

Opinion & Order, Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035 HB (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (granting class certification) (reported at 2011 WL 1194707)

Opinion & Order, Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035 HB (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (summary judgment) (reported at 775 F. Supp. 2d 650)

Opinion & Order, Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 CV 10035 HB (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011) (granting motion for final approval of class action settlement) (reported at 775 F. Supp. 2d 650)

Final Order and Judgment (Aug. 25, 2011)

Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Aug. 25, 2011)

Notice of Appeal (Sept. 13, 2011) (example--multiple notices filed)

Docket sheet No. 11-3696 (downloaded Feb. 24, 2011)

Brief of Appellant John Ireland with Appendix for Appeal 11-3965 (Feb. 3, 2012)

Brief of Appellants Steven Crutchfield, Scott D. Krueger, Asset Strategies, Inc., Charles B. Zuravin and Jennifer Deachin (Feb. 3, 2012)

Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees (Apr. 2, 2012)

Sirius Xm Radio Inc.’s Brief on Appeal (Apr. 2, 2012)

Reply Brief of Appellants Steven Crutchfield, Scott D. Krueger, Asset Strategies, Inc., Charles B. Zuravin and Jennifer Deachin (Apr. 16, 2012)

Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 11–3696–CV (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (unpublished) (reported at 507 F.App'x 1)

Mandate (Mar. 13, 2013)

Shareholder derivative actions

Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint of Plaintiff Robert Michael Shenk and the Amended Derivative Complaint of Plaintiff Jeffrey Goe (July 7, 2011)

Order, Shenk v. Karmazin, No. 11 Civ. 2943 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2012)

Economic commentary

Serge X. Moresi & Steven C. Salop, The Sirius/XM Satellite Radio Merger (2008), in The Antitrust Revolution 92 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds. 2014).

± Thomas W. Hazlett, The Economics of the Satellite Radio Merger (June 14, 2007) (commissioned by XM and Sirius)

± J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM–Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 697 ( 2008).

Financial commentary

± Richard Siklos & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merger Would End Satellite Radio’s Rivalry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2007.

± Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Unequals Try to Merge as Equals, N.Y. Times DealB%k, Feb. 25, 2007.

Google/Doubleclick
(FTC 2007)

Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/Doubleclick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007) (± FTC news release)

Concurring Statement of Commissioner Leibowitz
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Harbour

Smithfield/Premium Standard
(DOJ 2007)

Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of Smithfield Inc.’s Acquisition of Premium Standard Farms Inc. (May 4, 2007)

Whirlpool/Maytag
(DOJ 2006)

Department of Justice Antitrust Division Statement on the Closing of its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (Mar. 29, 2006)

Sprint/Nextel
(DOJ 2005)

Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on the Closing of the Investigation of Sprint Corporation's Acquisition of Nextel Communications Inc. (Aug. 3, 2005)

Movielink Studio Joint Venture
(DOJ 2004)

Justice Department Closes Antitrust Investigation into the Movielink Movies-On-Demand Joint Venture (June 3, 2004)

Caremark./AdvancePCS
(FTC 2004)

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission in the Matter of Caremark Rx, Inc./AdvancePCS, File No. 031 0239 (Feb. 11, 2004) (± FTC news release)

Genzyme//Novazyme
(FTC 2004)

Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the matter of Genzyme Corporation / Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., FTC File No. 021-0026 (Jan. 13, 2004) (± FTC news release)

Statement of Commissioner Harbour
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Thompson

AmeriSource/Bergen Brunswig
(FTC 2001)

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, AmeriSource Health Corporation/Bergen Brunswig Corporation (Aug. 24, 2001) (± FTC news release)

Concurring Statement of Commissioner Thompson

Cruise ships
(FTC 2002)

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd./P&O Princess Cruises plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises plc, FTC File No. 021 0041 (Oct. 4, 2002) (± FTC news release)

Dissenting Statement of Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson

Commentary:

± Warren S. Grimes & John E. Kwoka, A Study in Merger Enforcement Transparency: The FTC's Ocean Cruise Decision and the Presumption Governing High Concentration Mergers, Antitrust Source, May 2003.Â

± Mary Coleman & Joseph J. Simons, Response to Grimes and Kwoka, Antitrust Source, Sept. 2004.

± Warren S. Grimes, Reply to Coleman and Simons, Antitrust Source, Sept. 2004

David T. Scheffman, Cruise Investigation: Empirical Economic and Financial Analyses (Nov. 2002)

8. Other Horizontal

10. Market Definition

Primary Materials

Supplemental Materials

Reading and Class Notes

Reading and class notes

Statutes

Statutes

Significant Precedents

Merger Guidelines

2010 Merger Guidelines

Evolution of the merger guidelines

Reference Materials

Merger enforcement policy

Merger enforcement: DOJ & FTC

Challenges to FTC enforcement authority

Merger enforcement: Theory

Enforcement retrospectives

Commentary

Antitrust economics

Expert economic testimony

Economics of mergers

Distribution of firm size

Welfare effects

Industrial concentration

Merger guidelines

Merger guidelines—Economic techniques

Market power

Concentration statistics

Market definition

Critical loss analysis/recapture analysis

The Philadelphia National Bank presumption

"Upward pricing pressure": The Farrell-Shapiro alternative to market definition

Unilateral effects

Diversion ratios

Unilateral effects/UPP — Applications

Coordinated effects

"Nascent competitors"

"Killer acquisitions"

Cournot competition

Bertrand competition

Price effects from mergers

Capacity reductions

Product variety

Spatial differentiation

Customer complaints

Counting rivals

"Natural experiments"/Event studies

Simulation/demand estimation

Simulation with diversion ratios

Pass-through analysis

Empirical analysis of particular mergers

Minority interests

Institutional investors cross-holdings

Multimarket contacts

Barriers to entry

Entry defenses/contestability

Countervailing buyer power/buyer power defenses

Efficiencies

Innovation

Failing firm

European merger antitrust law

Cross-border merger antitrust enforcement

Merger success and failure

Case Studies: Merger Review Clearances

Zillow/Trulia (FTC 2015)

Office Depot/OfficeMax (FTC 2013)

Vivendi/EMI (FTC 2012)

Express Scripts/Medco (FTC 2012)

Google/Motorola Mobility (DOJ 2012)

Google/Admeld (DOJ 2011)

Perdue/Coleman (DOJ 2011)

SABMiller/Molson Coors (DOJ 2008)

XM /Sirius (DOJ 2008)

Google/Doubleclick (FTC 2007)

Smithfield/Premium Standard (DOJ 2007)

Whirlpool/Maytag (DOJ 2006)

Sprint/Nextel (DOJ 2005)

Movielink Studio Joint Venture (DOJ 2004)

Caremark./AdvancePCS (FTC 2004)

Genzyme//Novazyme (FTC 2004)

AmeriSource/Bergen Brunswig (FTC 2001)

Zillow/Trulia
(FTC 2015)

Office Depot/OfficeMax
(FTC 2013)

Vivendi/EMI
(FTC 2012)

Express Scripts/Medco
(FTC 2012)

Google/Motorola Mobility
(DOJ 2012)

Google/Admeld
(DOJ 2011)

Perdue/Coleman
(DOJ 2011)

SABMiller/Molson Coors
(DOJ 2008)

XM /Sirius
(DOJ 2008)

Google/Doubleclick
(FTC 2007)

Smithfield/Premium Standard
(DOJ 2007)

Whirlpool/Maytag
(DOJ 2006)

Sprint/Nextel
(DOJ 2005)

Movielink Studio Joint Venture
(DOJ 2004)

Caremark./AdvancePCS
(FTC 2004)

Genzyme//Novazyme
(FTC 2004)

AmeriSource/Bergen Brunswig
(FTC 2001)

Cruise ships
(FTC 2002)