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# 14. Antitrust Merger Litigation

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Antitrust Law

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# Topics

- Plaintiffs and forums
- Typical litigation paradigms
- Litigation durations
- Contrasts in litigating with the DOJ and FTC
- Strategic litigation behavior at the FTC
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  - Temporary restraining orders (TROs)
  - Preliminary injunctions
  - Differences in the PI standards for the DOJ and FTC
- Permanent injunctions
- Recent litigated cases

# Antitrust merger litigation generally

Plaintiff	Trial Forum	Appeal
DOJ	Federal district court	Court of appeals
FTC		
–Preliminary inj.	Federal district court	Court of appeals
–Permanent inj.	FTC administrative trial	Full commission, then any court of appeals with venue
State AGs*	Federal district court	Court of appeals
Private parties*	Federal district court	Court of appeals


\* May bring state claims in state court or join state claims in federal court

# Types of injunctions in merger cases


Injunction type	Relief ordered
<b>TRO</b>	Maintain status quo pending decision on a preliminary injunction
<b>Preliminary injunction</b>	Premerger: Blocking injunctions (not hold separate) Postmerger: Hold separate/preserve assets for divestiture Recission in the right case
<b>Permanent injunction</b>	Premerger: Blocking injunction Postmerger: Divestiture (recission in one case)

# Typical litigation paradigms

## DOJ preclosing challenge



## FTC preclosing challenge



# Typical litigation paradigms

## DOJ postclosing challenge



## FTC postclosing challenge



# Litigation timing—Preclosing challenges

	DOJ			FTC		
	H&R Block	Oracle	Sunguard	Steris	Sysco	CCC
Complaint	5/23/2011	2/24/2004	10/23/2001	5/29/2015	2/20/2015	11/25/2008
PI hearing	↓ Consolidated	↓ Consolidated	↓ Consolidated	8/17/2015 (3 days)	5/5/2015 (8 days)	1/8/2009 (9 days)
PI				9/24/2015	6/23/2015	3/18/09
PI appeal						
Merits hearing	9/6/11 (9 days)	6/6/04	11/8/01 (10 hours)	Transaction closed; administrative proceeding dismissed	Transaction abandoned after PI	Transaction abandoned after PI
Live witnesses	8 fact 3 experts		3 experts			
Initial merits decision (FTC)	--	--	--			
Final decision	10/31/11	9/9/04	11/14/01			
Merits appeal	None	None	None			
Total time to conclusion	5 months	6.5 months	3 weeks	4 months	4 months	4 months

# Litigation timing—Postclosing challenges

	DOJ	FTC			
	Bazaarvoice	ProMedica	Polypore	Evanston	Chicago Bridge
Complaint	1/10/2013	1/6/2011	9/10/2008	2/10/2004	10/25/2001
Merits hearing	9/23/2013 to 10/10/2013	5/31/2011 to 8/18/2011	5/12/2009 to 8/20/2009	2/10/2005 (8 weeks)	11/12/2002 to 1/16/2003
Initial merits decision (FTC)	--	12/5/2011	2/22/2010	10/21/2005	6/18/2003
Final decision	1/8/2014 (merits only)	3/22/2012	12/13/2010	4/28/2008 (remedy)	1/6/2005
Total time to final decision	12 months	14.5 months	17 months	50 months	38.5 months
Merits appeal	(none)	4/22/2014	7/11/2012	(none)	1/25/2008
Total time to conclusion	12 months	39.5 months	46 months	50 months	75 months



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# Some initial observations

- Agencies typically will not continue litigation on the merits if they are denied a PI (which is affirmed on appeal)
  - DOJ has not continued on the merits after losing a PI since 1980
  - FTC, which had consistently continued litigation until 1995, when it discontinued the practice for the most part
    - Arguable exception: Whole Foods/Wild Oats

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# Contrasts between the DOJ and FTC

- Authority
  - DOJ
    - Purely a prosecutorial agency
  - FTC
    - Both prosecutes and adjudicates

# Contrasts between the DOJ and FTC

## ■ Adjudicators

### □ DOJ actions

- Same district court judge decides preliminary injunction and merits/permanent injunction
- Appeal to the federal court of appeals in the circuit containing the district court
- Appellate standard: Abuse of discretion

### □ FTC actions

- District court judge only decides preliminary injunction—has no further involvement in the merger challenge
- ALJ (an FTC employee) decides permanent injunction
- Initial appeal lies to the full Commission—usually most if not all of the same five people who voted out the complaint
- Appeal to any federal court of appeals with venue
- Appellate standard:<sup>2</sup>
  - Legal conclusions: De novo
  - Factual findings: Substantial evidence rule—regarded as very deferential
    - Substantial evidence is evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”<sup>3</sup>
    - 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) provides that “[t]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.”

<sup>2</sup> ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, No. 12-3583, at 7 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* (quoting Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824 (6th Cir. 2011))

# Contrasts between the DOJ and FTC

- Consolidation under FRCP 65(a)(2)
  - DOJ: Will consent to consolidating preliminary injunction hearing with trial on the merits
  - FTC: Never consents to consolidation—always insists on separate administrative trial and appeal to the full Commission
  
- Rules of procedure and evidence
  - DOJ:
    - Must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable to all federal court proceedings
  - FTC
    - Follows the FTC Rules of Practice
    - Do not incorporate FRCP or FRE
      - E.g., do not adopt limitations on the number of interrogatories or the length of depositions
  
- Preliminary injunction standard
  - Arguably lower threshold in FTC Section 13(b) proceedings than in DOJ Section 15 proceedings (discussed below)

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# Strategic litigation behavior at the FTC

- Prior to 1995
  - If the parties require the Commission to seek a PI, the Commission would continue litigation until either:
    - the parties terminated the transaction,
    - the case was decided on the merits after exhausting all appeals, or
    - the parties settled with a consent order acceptable to the Commission

# Strategic litigation behavior at the FTC

## ■ Poster child: Coca-Cola/Dr Pepper (1986-1995)

- Jan. 23, 1986 PepsiCo (27.4%) agrees to acquire Seven-Up (6.3%)
- Feb. 21, 1986 Coca-Cola (38.6%) agrees to acquire Dr Pepper (7.1%)
- June 24, 1986 PepsiCo and Seven-Up terminate transaction in light of FTC opposition
- June 24, 1986 FTC files Section 13(b) complaint against Coca-Cola/Dr Pepper
- July 15, 1986 FTC files administrative complaint against Coca-Cola/Dr Pepper
- July 15, 1986 PepsiCo acquires Seven-Up International (and splits brand)
- July 31, 1986 District court enters PI enjoining transaction
- Aug. 6, 1986 Dr Pepper terminates Coca-Cola purchase agreement
- Aug. 20, 1986 Dr Pepper sold to Hicks & Haas-led investor group
- Oct. 3, 1986 Seven-Up Co. sold to Hicks & Haas-led investor group
- Nov. 30, 1990 ALJ issues initial decision (finding liability but denying relief)—both sides appeal to full Commission
- June 13, 1994 Full Commission issues final decision (vacating denial of relief and entering order requiring prior approval of the FTC before acquiring any interest in a company that manufactures or sells branded concentrate, syrup, or carbonated soft drinks in the United States)
- Aug. 26, 1994 Coca-Cola appeals to D.C. Circuit
- May 25, 1995 FTC settles appeal by modifying order to require prior approval only if Coca-Cola acquires an interest in Dr Pepper or a Dr Pepper brand name

# Strategic litigation behavior at the FTC

- 1995 Pitofsky reforms<sup>1</sup>
  - Decision whether to continue to litigate following the denial of the Commission's petition for a preliminary injunction will be made on a case-by-case basis considering the following factors:
    - the factual findings and legal conclusions of the district court or any appellate court,
    - any new evidence developed during the course of the preliminary injunction proceeding,
    - whether the transaction raises important issues of fact, law, or merger policy that need resolution in administrative litigation,
    - an overall assessment of the costs and benefits of further proceedings, and
    - any other matter that bears on whether it would be in the public interest to proceed with the merger challenge
  - Since 1995, the Commission has not continued its administrative litigation following a loss on the Section 13(b) proceeding
    - The Commission may appeal denials of Section 13(b) preliminary injunctions and will continue the administrative litigation during the pendency of the appeal
    - Example: Whole Foods/Wild Oats

<sup>1</sup> Fed. Trade Comm'n, Administrative Litigation Following the Denial of a Preliminary Injunction: Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 39741 (Aug. 3, 1995).

# Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.<sup>1</sup>

- Seminal Supreme Court case on preliminary injunctions
- “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”<sup>2</sup>

- *Winter* test

A [private] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.<sup>3</sup>

- Sliding scale

- Prior to *Winter*, many courts held that the four factors could be balanced on a sliding scale, so that, for example, a weak showing of likelihood of success could be offset by a strong showing of irreparable harm
- Post-*Winter*, some courts have rejected the sliding scale, holding that *Winter* requires a likelihood of success on the merits as an independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction

<sup>1</sup> 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 20.



# Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.

- DOJ/FTC challenges
  - Irreparable harm is presumed to result if the law is violated
    - Other cases hold that the element of irreparable harm is simply not part of the test when the government is the plaintiff and is seeking to prevent a violation of law
  - Balance of the equities
    - The public equities when there is a likelihood of success on the merits
      - The public interest in effectively enforcing the antitrust laws
      - *In addition for a preliminary injunction*: The public interest in ensuring that effective relief may be ordered if the government succeeds at the trial on the merits
    - The public equities almost always outweigh any private equity
  - Therefore, the critical factor when the government seeks a preliminary injunction is the requisite likelihood of success on the merits

# Temporary restraining orders (TROs)

- Emergency interim relief a court may enter to maintain the status quo pending a fuller hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction
  - May be used to block the imminent closing of a challenged merger
  - Initiated by motion (usually filed simultaneously with the complaint) accompanied by a request to see the judge immediately
  
- Ex parte entry<sup>1</sup>
  - May be entered ex parte (without notice or participation by the adverse party) if—
    - immediate and irreparable injury will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and
    - the movant sought to give notice to the adverse party or there are good reasons why notice could not be given
  - In merger antitrust cases—
    - Immediate and irreparable injury will be threatened if the transaction will close and will be difficult to unwind postclosing (almost a presumption)
    - BUT as a practical matter the merging parties and their counsel are always available to appear to oppose the TRO
    - So TROs are never entered ex parte in government merger antitrust cases

<sup>1</sup> Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

# Temporary restraining orders (TROs)

## ■ Duration<sup>1</sup>

### □ Standard

- Not to exceed 14 calendar days
- May be extended for good cause by the court for an additional 14 calendar days
- The parties may agree on a longer extension (stipulated TRO)

### □ Short duration is the safeguard to the lack of higher standards

- Absent consent, if of a longer duration TRO will be treated as a preliminary injunction and must conform to the more rigorous preliminary injunction standards<sup>2</sup>

## ■ Standard

### □ The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction<sup>3</sup>

- If issued ex parte, efforts to give notice also may be taken into account

### □ But the respective harms to the parties and the public interest will be assessed in light of very limited duration of the TRO (as opposed through the end of the trial on the merits for a preliminary injunction)

<sup>1</sup> Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).

<sup>2</sup> *Sampson v. Murray* 415 U.S. 61, 86 & n.58 (1974); *accord* *United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 406 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 2005).

<sup>3</sup> *United States v. Tribune Publ'g Co.*, No. CV1601822AB (PJWX), 2016 WL 2989488, at \*1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016) (entering TRO in newspaper merger case).

# Temporary restraining orders (TROs)

- Rarely employed in modern merger antitrust practice
  - Judges strongly dislike the timing pressures of a TRO and believe that the litigating parties should be able to agree on a scheduling order that will—
    - Permit the merging parties to take all necessary discovery on an expedited basis prior to the preliminary injunction hearing
      - HSR-reportable transaction: If the investigating agency has done its job properly, it should not need additional discovery (BTW the agency almost always disagrees)
      - Non-HSR reportable transaction: Likely that both sides will require discovery
    - Include a stipulation not to close the transaction until the motion for a preliminary injunction is decided
  - Since same judge will decide preliminary injunction, usually unwise to be the party responsible for *not* reaching an agreement

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# Preliminary injunctions

- Purpose
  - To maintain the status quo ex ante until a final decision on the merits
  - In merger antitrust law, this usually means a blocking preliminary injunction if the transaction has not yet closed
    - Modern courts have held that “hold separate” injunctions, which allow the deal to close but require merged parties to be operated separately and not integrated, are usually regarded as inadequate relief

# Preliminary injunctions

## ■ Deal realities

- Moreover, a transaction is unlikely to survive as a business matter the time it would take for both a preliminary injunction and a subsequent trial on the merits
  - Most deals start to flounder if they have not closed within a year of signing
  - A HSR merger view is likely to take 6-8 months
  - Little time left practically for a trial and an appeal
- Federal judges in the District of Columbia recognize the time sensitivity of deals and usually give the parties the opportunity on a very expedited basis to present a complete case in the preliminary injunction proceeding
  - Usually includes 3-6 days of evidentiary hearings for live witnesses
  - *Trade-off*: Due to court schedules, the more trial days the parties want the more delayed the hearing

## ■ Other observations

- The DOJ/FTC need only show a likelihood of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction
- This is a lower standard than the actual success on the merits required for a permanent injunction

# Preliminary injunctions

- Implications—DOJ actions
  - Merging parties seek to avoid separate a stand-alone preliminary injunction proceeding by stipulating to a PI in return for an accelerated trial on the merits
  - Advantages for merging parties
    - Results in the use of the “actual success on the merits” standard, and
    - Shortens the time to get a trial on the merits
    - May sacrifice some trial days to get earlier calendar date
    - May consolidate preliminary injunction hearing with trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2)
  - DOJ practice is to consent (provided it obtains enough trial days to present case)
    - Recognizes that discovery will be complete before the PI hearing
    - Recognizes that judges (in D.D.C.) expect a full merits case to be presented even in a preliminary injunction proceeding, that they do not want two evidentiary proceedings, and that they are unlikely to reach a different conclusion in a full merits proceeding<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 828 F. Supp. 78, 86 n.12 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Despite the limited time involved, both parties have provided the court with a remarkably complete and detailed record; in fact, the record is more complete than many cases are after trial. Thus, the court feels confident in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits after a full trial, should a full trial ever occur in this case.”)

# Preliminary injunctions

## ■ Implications—FTC actions

- Merging party incentives
  - Merging parties have the same incentives to avoid separate a stand-alone preliminary injunction proceeding and to proceed on an “actual success” standard
- BUT FTC will not cooperate
  - Will not consent to consolidation of preliminary injunction hearing and trial on the merits under FRCP 65(a)(2)
    - Insists that statutory scheme indicates a strong congressional intent that the FTC to try the case on the merits in its own administrative proceeding
    - Federal courts have exhibited no willingness to consolidate over FTC opposition
  - Likes to litigate under the Section 13(b) standard (see below)
  - Cannot be pressured by federal court
    - The federal judge’s only role is to conduct the Section 13(b) proceeding
    - The federal judge will have no involvement in the trial on the merits



# Preliminary injunctions

- Implications—FTC actions (con't)
  - Consequences
    - FTC has incentive to seek a very quick preliminary injunction hearing date to minimize ability of merging parties to take adequate discovery, prepare expert testimony, and make a complete case in the Section 13(b) proceeding
      - FTC believes that a strong win in the Section 13(b) proceeding will dissuade the parties from pursuing litigation on the merits in a post-PI administrative proceeding given the long length of time to litigate to conclusion on the merits (including an appeal) and the nature of the forum (the same commissioners that voted out the complaint will hear any appeal from the initial decision by the administrative law judge)
      - Also, by the end of an HSR merger review, the FTC staff should have completed discovery for its affirmative case, while the merging parties have no opportunity for third-party discovery until a complaint has been filed.
    - Merging parties has incentive to litigate the Section 13(b) PI if they believe they can make a strong evidentiary showing and obtain a denial of the PI by a (neutral) federal judge, so as to incentivize the FTC to dismiss the administrative complaint as futile
      - But may stipulate to a PI and avoid a Section 13(b) decision if the time available to prepare is too short to take adequate discovery and prepare experts or if there are other reasons that make it likely that the merging parties will lose (e.g., a judge who is apparently unsympathetic or unsophisticated in complex antitrust litigation)

# Preliminary injunction standard

## ■ DOJ

- *Clayton Act § 15*: Authorizes the district courts in antitrust cases brought by the Attorney General to “make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.”<sup>1</sup>
- *Test*: Traditional four-factor test in private actions:
  - Likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits
  - Threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff in the absence of the injunction
  - Possibility of substantial harm to other interested parties from a grant of injunctive relief
  - Interest of the public
- DOJ does not have to show irreparable harm
- Likelihood of success key
  - Usually requires a showing that there is a “reasonable probability of success at trial”
    - Some older decisions require only that the case “raise questions going to the merits which are so substantial and complex as to warrant ... maintaining the status quo until they have been resolved.”
  - Courts give lip service to other factors, but rather if ever important in DOJ cases
- Type of relief
  - Blocking preliminary injunction
  - “Hold separate” injunctions that allow the deal to close are regarded as insufficient

<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 25.

# Preliminary injunction standard

## ■ FTC

- *FTC Act § 13(b)*: Authorizes the district court to enjoin consummation of a merger pending completion of an FTC administrative adjudication “[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest.”<sup>1</sup>
  - No requirement to show irreparable harm
- *Test*: “Serious questions”

The issue is whether the Commission has demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success. The Commission meets its burden if it “raise[s] questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the Court of Appeals.”<sup>2</sup>

## □ Application

- While the law recognizes FTC as an “expert agency” that (in principle) is entitled to some deference, most courts in practice appear to hold the FTC to the same standard as the DOJ (a “likelihood of success on the merits”) even if they do not explicitly say so
- *Query*: Is a question “serious” only if the evidence shows a likelihood of success on the merits?

<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

<sup>2</sup> *FTC v. Warner Commc'ns*, 742 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984) (collecting citations); *accord* *FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.*, 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J.); *id.* at 1042 (Tatel, J.); *FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.*, 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*, No. CV 15-2115 (EGS), 2016 WL 2899222, at \*6 (D.D.C. May 17, 2016); *FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2009).

# Preliminary injunction standard

## ■ Private parties

### □ Clayton Act § 16

- Provides private persons (including states) with a right of action to "sue for and have injunctive relief ... when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity."<sup>1</sup>
  - Interpreted to include TROs and preliminary injunctions as well as permanent injunctions

### □ Test: Same as DOJ + immediate threat of irreparable harm

- Irreparable harm is harm no remediable by damages
  - Courts typically find that harm is not irreparable → Damages are sufficient
  - But some cases hold that a harm resulting from a lessening of competition is a irreparable harm<sup>2</sup>
  - *Query*: Which is the proper reading in a private case?
- Threat of irreparable harm must be immediate
  - Means that the plaintiff "is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered."<sup>3</sup>
- Also requires actual or threatened antitrust injury and prudential standing
- The equities and the public interest count in the analysis (although still secondary to likelihood of success on the merits)

<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 26.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Grp.*, 822 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016).

<sup>3</sup> *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22.

# Preliminary injunction standard

- Private parties (con't)
  - Type of relief
    - While private parties can obtain preliminary injunctive relief, courts are reluctant to grant it
      - Especially true when deal has been challenged and settled by the DOJ or FTC
      - There are exceptions<sup>1</sup>
    - Courts typically find that harm is not irreparable → Damages are sufficient

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Grp.*, 822 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2016).

# Preliminary injunction—Appeals

## ■ Appeal

- The grant or denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1):

[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;

- The standard of review is abuse of discretion
  - Review legal conclusions de novo
  - Review factual findings for clear error

# Permanent injunctions

- Identical to usual federal court preliminary injunction standard
  - EXCEPT that a permanent injunction requires *actual* success on the merits<sup>1</sup>
  - Success on the merits requires proof by the preponderance of the evidence
  - Also, the record for a decision on a permanent injunction may be more developed if additional discovery and briefing have occurred since the preliminary injunction hearing
- Factual findings in the preliminary injunction hearing
  - Not binding
  - BUT unlikely to be overturned in the absence of new evidence

<sup>1</sup> Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987).

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent DOJ actions litigated to conclusion (not settled)

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
United States v. Anthem Inc., 2017 WL 685563 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2017)	Preclosing challenge	Blocking permanent injunction entered.
United States v. Aetna Inc., 2017 WL 325189 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2017)	Preclosing challenge	Blocking permanent injunction entered. Parties abandoned merger.
United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., 2014 WL 203966 (N.D. Cal. 2014)	Consummated transaction	No PI sought. Tried on the merits. Permanent injunction entered.
United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011)	Preclosing challenge	Consolidated under FRCP 65(a)(2). Tried on the merits. Blocking permanent injunction entered.
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004)	Preclosing challenge	Stipulated PI. Tried on the merits. No violation.
United States v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001)	Preclosing challenge	Consolidated under FRCP 65(a)(2). No violation.
United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wis. 2000)	Preclosing challenge	Stipulated PI. Tried on the merits. Blocking permanent injunction entered.
United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Ga.), <i>aff'd</i> , 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997)	Preclosing challenge	Stipulated PI. Tried on the merits. No violation.



# Recent litigated cases

- Recent DOJ actions litigated to a preliminary or final conclusion<sup>1</sup>

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)	Preclosing challenge	Consolidated under FRCP 65(a)(2). No violation.
United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), <i>vacated</i> , 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997)	Preclosing challenge	Stipulated PI. Tried on the merits. No violation. Judgment vacated when parties later terminated the transaction.
United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993)	Preclosing challenge	Preliminary injunction denied. DOJ dismissed case and did not pursue a full merits decision.
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.), <i>aff'd</i> , 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990)	Preclosing challenge	Consolidated under FRCP 65(a)(2). No violation. Affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), <i>aff'd</i> , 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990)	Preclosing challenge	Consolidated under FRCP 65(a)(2). Blocking permanent injunction entered.

<sup>1</sup> Includes actions where a decision was rendered on a preliminary or permanent injunction. Does not include actions where complaints were filed but were settled prior to a decision on a preliminary or permanent injunction.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC Section 13(b) actions<sup>1</sup>

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016), <i>on remand</i> , 2017 WL 1022015 (N.D. Ill Mar. 16, 2017)	Preclosing challenge	Preliminary injunction denied. Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Preliminary injunction entered on remand.
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F. 3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016)	Preclosing challenge	Preliminary injunction denied. Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned.
FTC v. Staples Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned.
FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned.
FTC v. Steris Corp., No. 1:15 CV 1080, 2015 WL 5657294 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2015)	Preclosing challenge	Denied preliminary injunction. Administrative complaint voluntarily dismissed.
FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned.

<sup>1</sup> Includes actions where a decision was rendered on a preliminary or permanent injunction. Does not include actions where complaints were filed but were settled prior to a decision on a preliminary or permanent injunction.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC Section 13(b) actions (con't)

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 2011), <i>aff'd</i> , 663 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2011), <i>rev'd</i> , 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013)		Dismissed on state action grounds. Affirmed by Eleventh Circuit. Reversed by Supreme Court.
FTC v. Promedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011)	Consummated transaction	Entered preliminary injunction enjoining ProMedica from further consolidating its operations with those of St. Luke's Hospital.
FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGx), 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011)	Consummated transaction	Denied preliminary injunction to enjoin Lab Corp from taking further steps to integrated acquired assets. Denial of injunction affirmed. Administrative complaint voluntarily dismissed.
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civ. Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), <i>aff'd</i> , 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011)	Consummated transaction	Denied permanent injunction to require Lundbeck to divest acquired assets or rescind acquisition agreement and dismissing action. Affirmed. (There was no accompanying administrative complaint.)
FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC Section 13(b) actions (con't)

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007), <i>rev'd and remanded</i> , 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (amended and reissued)	Preclosing challenge	Denied preliminary injunction, after which transaction closed. On appeal, reversed, finding FTC had established a likelihood of success on the merits, and remanded for consideration of the equities. Administrative litigation was settled with partial divestitures and Section 13(b) proceeding was voluntarily dismissed.
FTC v. Foster, No. CIV 07-352 JBACT. 2007 WL 1793441 (D.N.M. May 29, 2007)	Preclosing challenge	Denied blocking preliminary injunction. Administrative complaint voluntarily dismissed.
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004), <i>appeal voluntarily dismissed</i> , Nos. 04-5291, 04-7120, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004)	Preclosing challenge	Denied blocking preliminary injunction. Administrative complaint voluntarily dismissed.
FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned. Administrative litigation settled after Libbey and Newell agreed to provide the Commission with written notice prior to the acquisition, sale, transfer, or other conveyance of all or part of Anchor or Anchor's Food Service Business.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC Section 13(b) actions (con't)

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 164 F. Supp.2d 659 (D.D.C.), <i>on remand from</i> 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001), <i>rev'g and remanding</i> 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000)	Preclosing challenge	Denied blocking preliminary injunction. Reversed on appeal. On remand, action dismissed as moot when parties voluntarily terminated merger.
FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000)	Preclosing challenge	Entered blocking preliminary injunction. Transaction abandoned
FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998)	Dual preclosing challenges	Entered blocking preliminary injunction enjoining Cardinal Health's merger with Bergen Brunswig and McKesson's merger with AmeriSource. Transactions abandoned. Bergen Brunswig and AmeriSource then merged.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC actions in federal court for permanent injunctive relief

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
FTC v. St. Luke's Health Sys., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), <i>aff'd</i> , No. 14-35173 (9 <sup>th</sup> Cir. Feb. 10, 2015)	Consummated transaction	Divestiture ordered to sever affiliation between St. Luke's and the Saltzer Medical Group.  <i>Note:</i> FTC and State of Idaho jointly brought suit seeking permanent injunctive relief. Case was joined with a pending private action and tried simultaneously.

# Recent litigated cases

- Recent FTC administrative actions<sup>1</sup>

Case	Deal Status	Litigation Result
<i>In re ProMedica Health Sys., Inc.</i> , Dkt. No. 9346 (FTC June 25, 2012), <i>aff'd</i> , <i>ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. FTC</i> , No. 12-3583 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014)	Consummated transaction	Divestiture ordered
<i>In re Polypore Int'l, Inc.</i> , 149 F.T.C. 486 (Dkt. No. 9327) (FTC Dec. 13, 2010), <i>aff'd</i> , <i>Polypore Int'l, Inc. v. FTC</i> , 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012)	Consummated transaction	Divestiture ordered
<i>In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp.</i> , Dkt. No. 9315 (FTC Aug. 6, 2007, and Apr. 28, 2008) (opinions on liability and remedy)	Consummated transaction	Rejecting ALJ's divestiture order and instead requiring Evanston to set up two separate and independent contract negotiation teams to bargain with managed care organizations to revive competition between Evanston's two hospitals and the Highland Park hospital
<i>In re Chicago Bridge &amp; Iron Co.</i> , 138 F.T.C. 1024 (Jan. 6, 2005) (Dkt. No. 9300), <i>aff'd</i> , <i>Chicago Bridge &amp; Iron Co. v. FTC</i> , 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008).	Consummated transaction	Divestiture ordered

<sup>1</sup> Includes actions where an initial decision was issued.