ĺ			
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
2			
3	United States of America, et) Civil Action al.,) No. 16-CV-1493		
4)		
5	Plaintiffs,) STATUS CONFERENCE)		
6	vs.) Washington, DC) August 12, 2016		
	Anthem, Inc., et al.,) Time: 10:00 a.m.		
7) Defendants.)		
8			
9	TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE HELD BEFORE		
10	THE HONORABLE JUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON		
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
12	APPEARANCES		
13	For the Plaintiff:		
14	United States Jon B. Jacobs Scott Ivan Fitzgerald		
15	Adam Severt U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE		
	Antitrust Division		
16	450 Fifth Street, NW Suite 4100		
17	Washington, DC 20530 (202) 598-8916		
18	State of California Natalie S. Manzo		
19	Department of Justice Antitrust Section		
20	300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702		
21	Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 897-2707		
22	District of Columbia Catherine Anne Jackson		
23	OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 4th Street, NW		
24	Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001		
25			
-			

1	For the Defendant: Anthem, Inc.	Christopher M. Curran
2	michemy The.	John Mark Gidley WHITE & CASE LLP
3		701 13th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-3807
4		(202) 626-3600
5	Cigna Corporation	Charles F Rule Daniel J. Howley
6		Andrew J. Forman CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP
7		700 Sixth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 862-2420
9	Appearing by phone:	(202) 002 2420
J	Appearing by phone.	
10	State of California	Paula Gibson Patricia Nagler
11	State of Colorado	Abigail Leah Smith
12	State of Colorado	Devin M. Laiho Jennifer Hunt
13	State of Connecticut	Rachel Davis
14	State of Georgia	Daniel Walsh
15	State of Iowa	Layne M. Lendebak
16	State of Maine	Christina Moylan
17		
18	State of Maryland	John R. Tennis
19	State of New Hampshire	Jennifer Lynne Foley David Rienzo
20	State of New York	Irina Cristina Rodriguez
21		
22	State of Virginia	Sarah Allen Tyler Timothy Henry
23	State of Colorado	Abigail Leah Smith Devin M. Laiho
24		Jennifer Hunt
25	State of Tennessee	Cynthia Elaine Kinser

Court Reporter:	Janice E. Dickman, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter
	United States Courthouse, Room 652 333 Constitution Avenue, NW
	Washington, DC 20001 202-354-3267
	202 334 3207

1 *PROCEEDINGS* 2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good morning, Your Honor. 3 Calling civil action number 16-1493, the United States of 4 America, et al. v. Anthem, Incorporated and Cigna 5 Corporation. Representing the federal government and presenting argument this morning will be Mr. Jacobs and Mr. 6 7 Fitzgerald. Representing Anthem and others, but speaking, 8 will be Mr. Curran. Representing Cigna will be Mr. Rule. 9 We have many state plaintiffs listening in on the telephone, 10 Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Appreciate 12 everyone's appearance here this morning and I'm glad that 13 we've decided not to have everyone introduce themselves on 14 the record or we would never get any anything done. 15 The first matter I want to take up is the referral 16 matter in connection with the special master. Judge Richard 17 Levie of JAMS has been appointed as special master in the 18 Aetna/Humana case. He was, in fact, one of the proposed 19 special masters that the defendants requested in this case. 20 So I take it that you have no objection to a referral to him 21 in this action, is that correct? 2.2 MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, Christopher Curran for 23 We have no objection to the appointment of Judge --24 is it Levie or Levie? 25 THE COURT: Levie.

1 MR. CURRAN: We may have some comments on the proposed order of referral, but no objection to his appointment. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. Let's just start with the individual and then we'll move to the order. With respect 4 5 to -- yes? MR. RULE: Your Honor, for Cigna, we don't object. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I know he's one of 8 those that you proposed also. What's your position -- I 9 understand you proposed Judge Robertson, who is also an 10 excellent choice. He is unavailable. And I understand that 11 you didn't -- while you didn't request Judge Levie, you 12 didn't oppose him in the Aetna case. So do you have any objections to my entry of a similar order in this case? 13 14 MR. JACOBS: We do not oppose the appointment of 15 Mr. Levie or a referral order with the same terms as Judge 16 Bates entered in the U.S. v. Aetna case. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So what are 18 the issues with respect to the order that Anthem wants to 19 bring to my attention? 20 MR. CURRAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Christopher 21 Curran again. We saw your order last night, asking us to 2.2 review the order entered in the Aetna case, and I did so. have to two observations. I don't consider either 23 24 particularly substantive, but let me go ahead and mention 25 them.

2.2

The first relates to paragraph 5 of the Aetna order. And I think Your Honor will probably recall from reading this, that rulings of the special master under paragraph 5 are deemed final unless he certifies them for appeal. There's an exception for privilege issues. I believe that that review process is not comporting with Rule 53

THE COURT: Well, the parties can agree. We couldn't order it, but if you agree to it, then it comports with Rule 53.

MR. CURRAN: I don't think that's right. I think under Rule 53(f), the parties may change the standard of review for findings of fact, that's (f)(3), but (f)(4), in contract, is categorical in saying the Court must decide de novo all objections to conclusions of law made or recommended by a master.

THE COURT: Well, he's not going to be making conclusions of law with respect to the case. What we're submitting to him are discovery disputes. We're not asking him to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, for instance, on summary judgment motions or on questions related to the definition of the product market or the geographical market. What we're submitting to him, if you look at page 1, is all matters related to discovery, privilege, motions to compel, motions for protective order, scheduling, expert discovery, deposition designations for trial

2.2

And it seems to me that the whole point of this process is to streamline it. But, are you -- I've seen this similar provision in almost every referral to a special master in an antitrust case in this court. I had the same question. I looked at it and I think what -- it is the agreement of counsel that makes it appropriate. I don't believe I could simply do this unilaterally and take away your rights under the federal rules.

So my question is: Would you agree to this order as it's been written?

MR. CURRAN: Yes, we do agree. We like the idea of streamlining this whole process. Right? To me, its strictly a matter of technical legal compliance. And this order may affect the rights of nonparties. And it's because of that I felt duty bound to raise the point. Okay.

MR. CURRAN: The other point, again, this is technical, but Rule 53 has certain requirements, and one of them, under (b)(2), states that the appointing order must direct the master to proceed with all reasonable diligence.

THE COURT: Okay. And what's your other?

Now, I think there is an argument that the timeframe set forth in this order reflect a direction of reasonable diligence. But, in my experience, these orders, generally, specifically and expressly state that the special master shall proceed with all reasonable diligence. So, I

offer that, again, like the first observation --

2.2

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to my adding a sentence to this order that says a special master shall proceed with all reasonable diligence?

MR. JACOBS: We do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I believe that you all have received a communication with him already proposing a meeting this afternoon, that he plans to proceed with all reasonable diligence.

MR. CURRAN: I have no question about that. And we've accepted his invitation, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: I will then, with that addition, issue a similar order this afternoon, assuming that I leave the bench sometime today. And we'll get that out.

So that means that docket 52, the government's motion to appoint a special master is granted in part and denied in part because we're appointing one, but it's a different one than you proposed in the order. My written order will be issued later today.

With respect to the protective order, you have all been in this courtroom. I don't know if you're aware that Judge Bates has now entered the protective order in the Aetna case. It is largely similar to the one the government proposed in that case and the one that the parties agreed to in this case. But it deals with the disputed provision

2.2

concerning access by in-house counsel as follows -- first of all, have you all seen it? Are you aware that it's been entered? Does anybody know this?

MR. JACOBS: We have not, Your Honor. We have not had a chance to review it.

MR. RULE: We have not seen it, but we are aware that it was entered.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, it was handed to me about 30 seconds before you walked through that door. So I have it in hand, but haven't read it.

THE COURT: Okay. If anyone who has it turns to page 10, as I say, I believe -- I haven't sat down and looked at it word-for-word, I believe it is the protective order that everyone is seeking in this case, with one change, in -- on page 10, section E., permitted disclosure of confidential information, E.(1) says confidential information may be disclosed only to the following persons:

(a) is the Court and all persons assisting the Court, as your proposed order proposed; (b) talks about plaintiff's attorneys and paralegals and professional personnel consistent with your order; (c) says outside counsel of record for defendants consistent with your proposal, but there is a sentence added that says defendants may file motions with a special master seeking modification of this provision to share confidential information with a very

2.2

small number of specified in-house attorneys, so long as those attorneys are not involved in defendants' competitive decisionmaking.

So it does not permit disclosure to in-house attorneys and it does not contain the provision to which Cigna objected, and I believe Anthem objected, and which the government was not seeking. But it enables parties to seek leave of the special master to request it.

So, I realize you've had exactly 30 seconds to think about it. But, if you can tell me now, I would like to know. And if not, perhaps by the end of this hearing you can tell me, because everyone did specifically request the entry of identical protective orders in both cases. And I was sort of thinking I would be able to go first this morning, but he beat me to the punch. And I don't believe this is inconsistent with what you're proposing, it just adds -- it doesn't shut the door on the in-house counsel possibility. So what's your position?

MR. JACOBS: Speaking for the plaintiffs, Your
Honor, we agree with your assessment and we do not object to
your entry of a protective order under the same terms.
We've always thought that having a protective order that's
identical in both cases is important. And we also thought
it was important that the orders be entered on the same day,
since third parties have certain rights to object within a

2.2

certain time. And so if you enter it today with that provision, third -- the burden on third parties will be minimized.

THE COURT: Well, and given the demands that discovery is going to impose in this case and the defendants' desire to move very expeditiously to begin discovery, I'm very interested in entering this today.

So, Mr. Curran, do you have a position?

MR. CURRAN: You are correct that our number one concern is expedition. And in light of that, we have no objection to this proposed language.

THE COURT: Mr. Rule?

MR. RULE: Your Honor, we agree that expedition is important. We also continue to oppose the provision of confidential information to in-house counsel. We think that will slow the process down. And as long as that additional sentence does not in any way change the burden on the parties to get access -- have the in-house counsel get access to the information, we wouldn't oppose the protective order.

THE COURT: All it says -- and, you know, if you want to read it over and let me know for sure later this morning -- it simply says defendants may file motions with the special master seeking modification of this provision.

The provision says only that permitted disclosure is outside counsel of record.

1 So, they can seek modification of that to share with a very small number of specified in-house attorneys. 2 3 It doesn't say they're going to get it, it just says they 4 can seek it. 5 MR. RULE: Your Honor, I think with that explanation, not having read it but having heard you read 6 7 it, I don't think we would have any objection to that. 8 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to ask 9 you, because I think this is important and you did have a 10 specific objection to this provision, for you to take the 11 copy that has been handed around, take a look at it, and 12 I'll ask you again later, just to be sure for the record, 13 whether you object or not. Because my goal would be to 14 enter it as soon as I leave the bench also, along with the 15 other order. 16 MR. RULE: Understood, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, I have just given that page 19 of the order to Mr. Rule's colleague so he can review that. 20 May I raise one other point on the protective order? 21 THE COURT: Yes. 2.2 MR. RULE: And again, I don't want to be a 23 nuisance here, but this is paragraph (b) (2) it appears on --24 I guess the pagination is different in the two cases. 25 don't know which order -- or, which form you may be looking at.

1 THE COURT: I'm looking at his right now. 2 MR. CURRAN: It's the same language. If you look at (b)(2) on page 4, it's toward the bottom. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. CURRAN: And that first sentence, to me, is ambiguous. It begins, "If a protected person determines 6 7 that this order does not adequately protect its confidential information, it may, after meeting and conferring with the 8 9 parties within ten calendar days after receipt of a copy of 10 this order, " comma, "seek additional protection from this court for its confidential information." 11 12 I think, because of the misplacement of the comma, 13 the last comma in that sentence, the ten calendar days seems 14 to be referring to the period for the meeting and 15 conferring, rather than for the objection. So I propose to 16 Your Honor that there -- a comma be placed after it says, 17 "After meeting and conferring with the parties," a comma 18 should be inserted there, "within ten calendar days after 19 receipt of a copy of this order," and then that comma should 20 come out, "seek additional protection from this Court." 21 THE COURT: So what you're saying is the seeking 2.2 protection has to occur within ten calendar days, not the meeting and conferring? 23 24 MR. CURRAN: And I think that's the intent of my 25 provision. But that is my point, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any problem with that? MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, our concern is with third parties, particularly -- we have a large number, over 400, some are not represented. If, along with Cigna, who is studying the other provision, if we could give some additional thought to this. You know, I thought that the ten days may apply to the meet and conferring, instead of seeking extra protection of the Court. I do think this is one --

THE COURT: Where was the comma in the copy that you provided to me and the copy that you provided to Judge Bates?

2.2

MR. JACOBS: In the same place. And I -- you know, I do think that -- I agree with Mr. Curran, that there is a significance to the placement of the comma. And how the Aetna case has -- the order has been entered in the Aetna case, if I'm a third-party and I receive notice from both cases, if I have different deadlines for doing things, to object, I don't think that makes sense.

of the reasons, Mr. Curran, if you were saying to me that we lost a comma that was in what everybody proposed before and that has changed the meaning, that's one thing. But what you're saying is I'd now like you to change the meaning by changing the commas. And I'm not sure that that's -- I

2.2

mean, we can do whatever we want, but I think it's -- the whole point of this was to agree to something. You agreed to something, you proposed it, it was proposed in the other case, Judge Bates has entered it. Everybody has told me they want the same thing as Judge Bates. You may have to live with this at this point.

I'm happy to try to find out what Judge Bates meant, but I think it was incumbent upon all of you to have it say what you meant and not try to change what it means now. And I can't -- I don't --

MR. CURRAN: Well --

THE COURT: I mean, if I had signed the order that you docketed three days ago, this is what it would say, right?

MR. CURRAN: Yeah, yeah.

THE COURT: That you docketed twice three days ago.

MR. CURRAN: That's right. That's right. We are quite round-heeled in our negotiations with the government when it comes to things that are holding up our receipt of discovery. So we would have agreed to almost any term that they proposed because we knew any negotiation would delay discovery. That's the background here.

So when I see this provision, which I think is mistakenly ambiguous, and I think if Mr. Jacobs is right in his interpretation, that the ten days relates to the meeting and conferring, then this provision sets no time period by

2.2

which an objecting party shall seek Court review. And it further states that the materials don't get produced until the Court resolves the objection. That can't be what's intended.

So maybe one approach would be, Your Honor, to sign the order as it is. Perhaps Your Honor can confer with Judge Bates and the two of you could issue some joint statement as to the proper interpretation of that provision.

THE COURT: Mr. Jacobs?

MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, we would advocate you entering the order without any changes. We certainly don't object to you consulting with Judge Bates. But I would say that if within the ten-day period a third-party does come to Anthem and raise an objection, Anthem is certainly free to file something with the special master to try to expedite the process.


I think Mr. Curran is anticipating a situation where a third-party, within ten days, raises an objection, meets and confers with Anthem and then just sits back and does not file a motion to compel, so that its material never has to be produced. I think the special master can take care of those unique circumstances.


THE COURT: Well, one of the things that the order referring to the special master includes is protective orders. So if I sign this order we will have a protective

1 I can confer with Judge Bates, if we both decide to 2 modify them jointly and add a comma, we can do that. Or you 3 can also raise it with a special master and then by 4 agreement of the parties, or at his recommendation, we can 5 add the comma. But we probably should get at least a protective order signed and on the docket in our case, along 6 7 with the one that's already on the docket in his case. Does 8 that make sense to you? 9 MR. CURRAN: That sounds fine, Your Honor. Thank 10 you very much. 11 MR. JACOBS: That sounds fine with us, as well. 12 MR. RULE: Your Honor, I'm a sufficiently quick 13 study, but we don't object to the entry of the protective 14 order. 15 THE COURT: Oh, great. 16 MR. RULE: Again, not having read the rest of it, 17 I'm -- I understand that there are no other changes, except --18 it's not a change, the one issue that was raised by Anthem. 19 THE COURT: I am under the impression that the 20 only difference between the two provisions that were 21 submitted to Judge Bates in the first place was the question 2.2 of in-house counsel. So, I believe that he has not changed 23 anything, but I haven't had any more time than you have to 24 look at it. 25 So, I will ascertain that there are no other

```
1
       changes before I sign it. But I believe it is your order,
2
       with that one sentence added.
 3
                 MR. RULE: Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I just want to
 5
       take up one procedural matter about how we're going to move
 6
       through things. If I can just have Mr. Curran and Mr. Rule
7
       and counsel for the government briefly at the bench.
 8
                 (Bench discussion:)
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```







the assumption that April 30th is a hard date. But I believe that counting back 120 days for the regulators in

25

2.2

the state insurance area, to find that then I have to issue my opinion by the end of December. I think that's a less hard date and it's more in the lines of an estimate.

I think establishing a schedule based on the assumption that we have to accord the state regulators 120 days to decide after I've already approved the deal, if I approve the deal, that seems excessive, especially since we could be filing position papers and factual information with the state regulators in the interim. Also, the only way to give them 120 days would give me less than 120 days to make my decision, and I don't think that makes any sense, given the nature of this proceeding.

My current thinking, and I have some questions that I want to ask before I issue what the ultimate schedule is going to be, is I'm going to aim for a decision by the end of January. I'm going to require at least 30 days to issue that decision after I've received the statement of facts and the conclusions of law. So they're going to be due about a week after we've heard evidence, though there is going to be a week in the middle of the taking of the evidence when I'm not going to be able to hear you. And so you'll have a lot of time during the schedule to be working on your statement of facts and conclusions of law, and you should be doing that as we go anyway.

So, I'm thinking that the trial itself is going to

2.2

have to end at the end of January -- end of December or early January, and that means it will probably have to begin, given the amount of time its going to take, in mid to late November. Because it has to be consistent with all of the various scheduling demands and also other obligations on my calendar that can't be moved. If that is when the trial is going to be, that means, basically, the discovery is going to have to close in early November or the end of October.

There's a lot of factors that I've considered to get me to this point. I've read everything that was submitted to Judge Bates initially about scheduling and I've read what you've provided. I acknowledge that the government is asking in good faith for the time it believes it needs. But it is also true that the government had a year of discovery before we got here and the date of the filing of the complaint was 100 percent within its control.

But I also want to acknowledge that the time it took them to investigate was somewhat driven by the time it took Anthem to produce the necessary documents, and that Anthem's demands for expedition in discovery and in reaching a determination are somewhat inconsistent with its own pace of production to date. They're also inconsistent with the volume and broad scope of the material it seeks to receive from the government and from others.

So, the defendants, if they want to maintain this

2.2

kind of schedule and this kind of expedition and not change anything about April 30th, may have to tamp down their expectations on the number of depositions and the breadth of the subpoenas because if discovery is going to end at the end of October or early November, it's approximately 12 weeks. For instance, we wouldn't be able to spend 350 hours, which is about 35 days, on nonparty depositions, if you only have 12 weeks for discovery. So, all these things are interrelated.

It's also worth noting that the April 30th day isn't driven by any external factors outside the parties' control. The merger, parties may extend it by agreement.

And Anthem has told me, Well, Cigna can, but it won't, which raises the obvious question, well, whose problem should that be? Does it make sense to force the government and the Court and the special master and the third parties and the state regulators to abide by an extremely ambitious schedule in order to review a merger between two parties that don't seem to want to merge? I don't know how to answer that question.

So, in the end, we may need to just set a schedule that's the most fair compromise we can come up with, without plumbing the depths of that question. In order to do that, I don't need any more information from the parties about how long it took to get other cases to trial. It will take a

2.2

lot of time and effort to dig up those cases, lay the facts side by side, try to figure out if they're similar or different, who needs more time than the other, and all that time could be spent in crafting a schedule that works for you. So let's craft a schedule that works for you and not worry about what the schedule was that worked for AT&T.

So to do that, I would like to get a better handle, if we can, on what's actually going to be in dispute in this action, if you know; you may not know yet. But the complaint alleges multiple product markets. The first is a section IV of the complaint, the sale of commercial health insurance to national accounts.

One geographic market for that product is alleged to be the 14 states where Anthem sells under a Blue license. That's alleged to be a single relevant geographic market. And another is the entire United States, is alleged to be the relevant geographic market for that particular product, the national accounts.

Does either defendant know at this time if they intend to challenge either that characterization of the first relevant product market or the description of the geographic markets for that product?

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, at this time Anthem intends to challenge both of those allegations as to the product market and the relevant geographic market.

2.2

But if I may add a sentence on two on top of that,
I mean, basically our overall defense theory is that there
are so many alternatives for customers out there that
regardless of how you view the product market and the
geographic markets, their post-merger customers will have a
multitude of competitive alternatives. And we intend to be
able to show Your Honor, prove to Your Honor, through
witnesses and documents, that that's the case, and that
there is no threat of substantial lessening of competition,
no matter how you define the product markets and the
geographic markets.

THE COURT: Well, would that point towards stipulations on some of those issues that could streamline some of what has to be tried, if that's the -- if it doesn't matter?

MR. CURRAN: Yeah, I think --

THE COURT: I mean, I'm not asking you right now, but I think we have so much to do and we have so little time, and the point you just raised, if that's the point and that's what I really need to consider and focus on, if there's anything we can do to limit the steps along the way before we get to the point, I want everybody to think really hard and really creatively about that.

And I'm asking these questions not to box you in to your position, but to try to find out where there is

2.2

going to be room to either stipulate or put an issue aside.

I'm just trying to find out. All I've read is the complaint.

So it's helpful to me to start finding out where your pressure points are.

MR. CURRAN: And you're right to be focussing on the complaint. And we stand ready to address case management approaches that can streamline things. For example, I think it's paragraph 8 of the complaint, the government identifies certain specific markets. I think they talk about Los Angeles, New York, and a couple other major metropolitan areas. Why don't we focus on those and have those as the illustrative markets? They picked them. They're the ones who identified those markets in the complaint.

We are happy to accept their challenge as to those markets and we can focus on those. And if they've got some other markets they want to raise, fine. But this doesn't have to -- I mean, some of their submissions talk about 90 different markets and so forth. Our defense -- we're happy to approach this any way that's necessary. If we have to go through each of the 90 markets, great. We don't think that's necessary. We think we can show Your Honor that there are multiple competitive alternatives in every one of those geographic areas.

THE COURT: All right. I heard that. I want to keep walking through the complaint and asking the questions

1 that I have. Obviously, I'm going to give you many 2 opportunities to try to streamline the case and work on the 3 case management issue. 4 Section Roman numeral V of the complaint is a 5 different allegation. We're not talking about national accounts anymore, we're talking about sale of health 6 7 insurance to large group employers, more than 50 employees, 8 or more than 100 in certain states. So, do the -- and the 9 U.S. alleges that there are 35 metropolitan areas, each of 10 which would be a relevant geographic market. And I think 11 this may be what you were referring to just now. I'm not 12 sure if you were still talking about the national accounts. 13 Do the defendants intend to dispute that that's a 14 relevant product, the sale of health insurance to large 15 group employers? 16 MR. CURRAN: Yes, Your Honor. We think that these 17 demarcations between and among the markets, as alleged in 18 the complaint, are not well-founded as a matter of economics 19 and law. 20

THE COURT: The geographic markets or the product markets?

MR. CURRAN: Both. Both.

21

2.2

23

24

25

THE COURT: And then with respect to the sale of individual health insurance on the public exchanges, is that a relevant product market, in your view?

```
1
                 MR. CURRAN:
                              That one, Your Honor, I think I want
2
       to consult with our economists more about those public
 3
      exchanges under Obamacare.
 4
                 THE COURT: Do you -- can you estimate for me
 5
       right now, do you know, kind of, what proportion of Anthem
      or Cigna business is even devoted to the sale of individual
 6
 7
      policies, particularly in those two states?
 8
                 MR. CURRAN: People on my team know. I know it's
 9
       a -- a fraction, a smaller percent.
10
                 MR. PAUL: Smaller.
11
                 MR. CURRAN:
                              Small.
12
                 MR. PAUL: Less than 10.
13
                 MR. CURRAN: Less than 10 percent.
14
                 THE COURT: And similarly for Cigna? Were you the
15
       first people that said small?
16
                 MR. RULE: Yes, Your Honor. Our participation in
17
       the public exchange is small and very limited at this point.
18
      We're committed to them, but it is small.
19
                 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
20
                 MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, not to get ahead of us,
21
      but one of the efficiencies and synergies we see from this
2.2
      merger is that Anthem is committed to --
23
                 THE COURT: All right. This is really not the
24
      time to argue the merger.
25
                 MR. CURRAN: I'm sorry. I thought you wanted our
```

1 position on the allegations, but -- thank you. 2 THE COURT: No, I didn't ask for your position. 3 I'm just asking if you're going to dispute them or not. I'm 4 not asking for the substantive answer. I'm just trying to 5 figure out how many days we need for trial and where we're going to be able to compress and where we're not. I think 6 7 it's really important to try to stick to what we're trying 8 to get to now. I'll give you an opportunity to raise, at 9 the end, anything you think I need to hear. 10 MR. CURRAN: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Jacobs, with respect to the 12 government, when we get to your second issue, the sale of 13 the health insurance to the large group employers, are we 14 going to need to consider all 35 metropolitan areas 15 separately, or do we consider them in combination? 16 MR. JACOBS: Each of those relevant geographic 17 markets, if we find any competitive harm that is not 18 outweighed by pro competitive benefits would be enough to 19 enjoin the merger. 20 THE COURT: Each alone? 21 MR. JACOBS: Each alone. 2.2 THE COURT: To enjoin it nationwide? 23 MR. JACOBS: Each alone. And here's how we are, 24 at this point, thinking of presenting the evidence to you: 25 We identified so many because of the scope, we think, of the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

We do not intend to put on live witnesses in each and harm. every one of these 35 markets. We know that would be impractical. What we are considering doing is, through our economist, presenting you with market share data that will show that in most of these markets the merger is presumptively unlawful. The burden then shifts to Anthem to dispute them or show pro competitive justifications. And then picking probably three feature markets where we present live witnesses to you, both in the market we're talking about now, which is the downstream sale of health insurance to these large group employers, as well as the upstream market in the same 35 markets, the purchase of the contracting for doctor and other health care providers. So, we will, in total, present evidence to you on all of these markets. But in terms of trial time, I can assure you, we've not intended -- we are not intending to present live witnesses for all 35. THE COURT: So is your focus primarily the national accounts? MR. JACOBS: We will present some evidence on the national accounts market. We will present it on the large

national accounts market. We will present it on the large group market that we're talking about now, as well as the monopsony claims, the upstream purchase of physician services, for example, as well as individual.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me ask you

2.2

something: If the Court were to find for the government in connection with the national accounts or the large group employers, would that be the end of the case? Would there be any need to go on to the allegations concerning the individual policies sold on the exchanges or the purchasing of health care services?

MR. JACOBS: There would not.

THE COURT: But conversely, if I found that the merger passes muster, notwithstanding the alleged adverse effect on the competition in the market for the sale of national accounts or the large group accounts, is it the government's position that the impact on the sale of individual policies in certain counties in two states is enough to require enjoining the merger in its entirety?

MR. JACOBS: It would, Your Honor. And there's case law to support that in any relevant product and geographic market, if the merger is -- violates section 7, that is enough to enjoin the entire merger. There is also the upstream cases I've mentioned.

THE COURT: But if the first two were -- if it passed muster for the first two and you're just talking about this small aspect of their business, in a small portion of the country, is that something that more likely could be resolved through some sorts of agreements or structuring or other -- I guess what I'm trying to find out

2.2

is are there parts of this case that we can put aside because they're either going to ride with the larger parts of the case or they're not? And if we can't, we can't. But I'm trying to get everybody to think creatively about what are we really fighting about and what's going to fall or not with the larger parts of the case.

MR. JACOBS: Unfortunately, I don't think I can.

If there was a proposed remedy to the anticompetitive harm

for some of these markets that we have proved, then the

trial could be on just one or two other markets. We did

engage in discussions before filing the complaint. And our

remedy policies are not secret, they're on our internet site

and have certain criteria. And defendants' proposal to us

just didn't meet that criteria.

So now with a complaint with all four of these relevant product markets, I have not thought of a way in which we can just hold a trial on one or two of these markets.

THE COURT: All right. And I take it that with respect to the market for purchasing health insurance services, that you don't feel that that rises and falls with the first two. If there's enough competitors to make it not anticompetitive for the first two theories, then wouldn't there be enough competitors buying health care services? Or are they just entirely different inquiries?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

MR. JACOBS: Not necessarily. They are different inquiries because it's a very different market, acquiring health services from doctors and others upstream versus the sale to employers and others downstream. THE COURT: Has there been any change in the status of the case concerning whether there are proposed remedies? MR. JACOBS: There has not. THE COURT: Is the government -- and one thing I think some other judges have done in these cases, is there's an extraordinary amount of work that lawyers have to do to get prepared for trial, to do the discovery and get ready, and that needs to proceed and not be delayed by potential settlement discussions that are going on. But they can be going on on a parallel track. I think Judge Kollar-Kotelly said each team would have its department of war and its department of state. So is that something that the government is willing to undertake in this case? I realize you're going to have to two trials going at the same time. But is there some thought of continuing to think about remedies and think about a negotiated solution while this is going on? Is there a willingness to do that?

MR. JACOBS: There's absolutely a willingness. We're always willing to hear any proposals that the defendants have.

2.2

I think in terms of the case schedule, where this affects things the most, is one of the disputed issues that we highlighted for you in the joint report, whether if they come in -- our concern is if they come in late in the discovery period, even after fact discovery has closed, with a proposed remedy, and we need to evaluate that. We're going to need discovery from the proposed buyer, from the defendants, and potentially even third parties to find out whether that proposed remedy is really going to fix the entire case or portions of the case, so we don't have to try all four of these relevant products.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to do anything in a case management order that would forestall or chill the idea of proposing remedies and trying to work it out. I mean, it's better to have a solution, a business solution that suits the parties and suits the government than having an all-or-nothing ruling from the Court.

So, you know, I think we need -- we don't want to bake anything into the management order that says those discussions are going to happen, but they have may have to be coupled with, if late proposals come in, they may have to be coupled with flexibility on the April 30th. I mean, you can't have everything.

All right. I have a couple of questions for Mr. Curran, just about the status of things. First of all,

2.2

what's your thought about having some sort of negotiations proceeding in tandem? And that would not be, by the way, with Judge Levie. He's coming in to do discovery disputes. If there would be a neutral mediator, it would have to be something else.

MR. CURRAN: Like the United States, we have changed the name from department of war to department of defense. But we have both the department of defense and a department of state that stand ready for both.

Yes. I will say, I share Your Honor's concern that certain considerations and proposals could deter the possibility of working out a problem, because -- I think it's already happening, because the government has made it pretty clear that if we have any proposal to solve any alleged problem, then our whole proposed schedule gets blown up. And particularly taking that together with what Mr. Jacobs said about if a single location in the United States has got a problem, then the whole deal is off? Even if billions of dollars in savings are delivered to Americans elsewhere in the country? I mean, that dynamic is kind of a whipsaw that prevents progress.

THE COURT: I think he has a point, when you say that the date that is one 100 percent within the merging party's control is fixed cannot be changed, that imposes demands on the discovery schedule and the trial schedule and

1 you can't say we need to come in the day before trial, or be 2 able to come in at any point with a remedy if we're going to 3 remain inflexible about that. So --4 MR. CURRAN: May I address that? 5 THE COURT: Sure. MR. CURRAN: First of all, yes, we do take the 6 7 position that that April 30th date is fixed. And, Your 8 Honor, you're familiar, of course, some transactions are 9 hostile takeovers. This one certainly didn't start out that 10 way. But there are cases where the target is not willing 11 but, nonetheless, its shareholders vote to approve a 12 transaction over the objection of management. The Clayton Act, it's § 15, so it's 15 U.S.C. § 25, 13 14 contemplates the need for speed here. It's like --15 THE COURT: I'm not opposed to the need for speed. 16 I'm giving you speed. I'm saying that your insistence on 17 the speed may require backing down on insistence on other 18 things that are inconsistent with the speed. 19 MR. CURRAN: Okay. But, a couple of points: 20 Number one, the merger transaction was signed over a year 21 ago. Right? That's when that April 30th date was set. So 2.2 this is not gaming it or anything. The Department of 23 Justice could have brought the lawsuit a heck of a lot 24 earlier. They chose the timing of when the lawsuit was 25 brought.

2.2

And then, maybe more importantly, if we're right, if we're right that this merger can bring efficiencies that will save Americans billions of dollars, then that shouldn't be put at risk due to the possibility of delay. Okay?

THE COURT: Are there any issues involving third parties to this action that can independently affect or derail the merger that I need to know about? Such as issues related to Blue Cross Blue Shield. Is there anything other than what's going on between your two parties and what's going on between the United States and you that is something that could affect the status of the schedule of this matter?

MR. CURRAN: Of course. It's the Departments of Insurance, and it's the -- particularly the Departments of Insurance in four states; Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, and New Hampshire. Coincidentally, they're all plaintiffs in this action, those states, and they're all on the phone today.

Your Honor thought our estimation of 120 days seemed excessive, and of course Judge Bates said the same thing in a footnote in his order. I thought that, too, when I first heard the 150-day estimate I heard.

THE COURT: I have read everything you've given me on this issue. I'm not saying that you're not proposing it in good faith or you don't have reasons to propose it. We can't do it. You cannot have a decision by December 31st

2.2

because that means if I have to think about all the hundreds of thousands of pages you're going to give me of statements of fact and conclusions of law and I want a month to decide and write my opinion, which ordinarily I don't give myself a deadline at all, then that would mean that all the evidence would have to be in by the end of November, which would mean you wouldn't have any time to do the discovery that you want to do, not to mention what they want to do.

So I'm going to try, I'm telling you, I'm aiming towards the end of January. And I think that takes all of your concerns into account as best I can. I can't give you 120 days and realistically give everybody the number of days for trial they want, give everybody the amount of discovery they want, manage my own calendar with all the things I have to do, and as Judge Bates pointed out, do a well-reasoned, thoughtful decision, which is what you want and everybody wants

MR. CURRAN: Two comments, Your Honor. Number one, we will -- we stand ready to tamp down our expectations on discovery, as Your Honor said in some earlier comments.

We will do -- we will adjust and carry any burden necessary to get a prompt resolution of this.

Number two, the states -- we don't want these states to be taking so long to be doing these regulatory reviews. They're on the phone, maybe Your Honor can get them to commit.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

THE COURT: All right. I wasn't talking about anything that you said has to happen after I rule. So I understand about the state approval. So I was asking if there was anything else out there. There's some discussion about the rules related to membership in Blue Cross that could affect this. And I just wondered if that's an issue or that's not an issue right now? MR. CURRAN: From our perspective, that's not an issue as to the consummation of the merger. And the only concern we have is the one I referred to with the state DOIs. THE COURT: All right. Putting aside the amount of material in the media about the merger, there's plenty on the docket that refers to, you've both been very frank, about the contentious nature of the parties to the merger. I mean, they get along --MR. CURRAN: Not the counsel. THE COURT: The contentious nature of the merger. Is there any reason why the parties shouldn't be required to keep me apprised of the status of those issues as we go along, such as if they initiate negotiations to terminate or unwind or if there are issues concerning compliance with the terms of the agreement among yourselves, that that shouldn't be brought to my attention? MR. CURRAN: No. I think that would be appropriate, for you to request that. But, I will say that

1 there's no right to terminate by either company individually until April 30th. 2 3 THE COURT: I understand that. But I thought 4 there are -- I mean, you can negotiate whatever you want to 5 negotiate in the meantime. And as I understand it, there are contractual obligations that each side has to comply 6 7 with that could be deemed a breach by one side or the other. 8 And so I want to know if something happens to change the 9 underlying assumption, which is that we're marching towards 10 April 30th. 11 MR. CURRAN: Certainly, Your Honor. If there were 12 a discussion among the companies to -- an agreement, I 13 guess, to mutually agree to terminate the merger, that would 14 become an item that would have to be publicly disclosed and 15 we would immediately call it to your attention. 16 THE COURT: All right. I mean, I may want to know 17 a little before the public. 18 MR. CURRAN: Okay. That I'd have to maybe consult 19 with some security disclosure experts. 20 THE COURT: Just to get some sense of what's 21 happening. 2.2 All right. Now I have some questions just about 23 the dueling proposals. Why is there a provision in the 24 proposed schedule -- and one of you can answer this -- that 25 says the parties will file any motions for judgment of the

2.2

pleadings or motions for summary judgment, and it's injected into the schedule at a point before discovery is even complete. Is anyone actually contemplating a motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case and, if so, on what basis?

MR. CURRAN: Well, I guess the government will have to address whether the plaintiffs intend to move for judgment on the pleadings.

THE COURT: But I'm asking you. I don't understand the thought process behind a dispositive motion, particularly a motion for summary judgment before discovery has been completed and before the expert reports have been exchanged. Sort of seem to me that we have an issue of disputed material fact here that's going to turn on expert testimony and that's what the whole case is about.

MR. CURRAN: Yeah, yeah. The monopsony claim is a little out there, Your Honor. The idea that this merger will drive reimbursement rates so low that it will harm doctors and other health care providers, that claim may well be vulnerable to a motion for summary judgment. That's -- I think that's what we were thinking when we had that idea, the theoretical idea.

Now, it may be, Your Honor, that that doesn't make sense, even if it's meritorious, because that's the same 35 markets that are being addressed in the other counts.

7

THE COURT: Is seems that it's totally tied into it and the effort that would be involved in drafting motions 2 3 for summary judgment, attaching factual material to back it 4 up, not to mention arguing and, oh, wait, my reading it and 5 deciding it and writing about it at a time when you want to be in this courtroom presenting evidence, I was --6 MR. CURRAN: I agree. So, Your Honor, to streamline 8 the scheduling, we agree to forgo any such motions in order 9 to move the case along. 10 THE COURT: When this was in your schedule were 11 you thinking about defense motions or were you thinking 12 about government motions? MR. JACOBS: We were really thinking about defense 13 14 motions. And, Your Honor, if there are any pretrial motions 15 that need to be filed after discovery is over, there is an 16 entry later in both schedules for pretrial motions. 17 THE COURT: Motions in limine. 18 MR. JACOBS: Motions in limine, Daubert motions, 19 other motions. 20 THE COURT: When you say Daubert motions, I think 21 everybody told Judge Bates, and certainly since I think all 2.2 we're talking about here are economists, are you actually 23 anticipating Daubert hearings or Daubert motions in this case? 24 MR. JACOBS: We hope there will not be a need for 25 that. I believe we will probably have an efficiencies

expert, as well as an economist.

2.2

THE COURT: All right. What is the defense's realistic thought about whether we will be having Daubert hearings?

MR. CURRAN: I think it will be highly unlikely.

Again, the only reason we preserve the idea is we haven't seen the expert reports. If, you know, somebody comes forward with a palm reading expertise, we may want to raise this. I don't mean this quite so facetiously. Sometimes even economists start opining on things beyond their area of expertise. But in a bench trial we can just raise that with Your Honor.

THE COURT: That would seem to be more objections during -- even motions in limine, as opposed to a Daubert issue.

MR. CURRAN: We're willing to forgo that or conflate it into the trial.

need to provide for it or whether it's a realistic thing that needs to be baked into the trial. That's what I'm trying to figure out, what am I really going to be putting on my list of things to do? My general approach, my plan would be to very quickly tell you these are my trial dates, these are the dates that I expect certain things provided to me; the expert reports, the deposition designations,

2.2

etcetera, this is when I want my findings of facts and conclusions of law, and then to say, with respect to the rest of the case management order, I will await the recommendations of the special master. And you can figure out within there when you want to exchange your expert reports, when you want to have your depositions. I don't need to micromanage that. I just need you all to be here on the day of trial, ready to go. And so I think -- I don't plan to have a lot of detail in the next thing I plan to issue.

What is the current expectation on the question of whether there's going to be a motion for preliminary injunction? The defendants seem to indicate that it was unnecessary. And given the expedited schedule and the idea that merging PIs with the merits, I'm just not exactly sure what kind of motion --

MR. CURRAN: Yeah. We cannot close until all the regulatory restraints are gone. So I think it's academic to even talk about preliminary injunction. So I propose we not talk about it and we not address it; it's wholly unnecessary. And if such a motion were to be brought, that probably would be our number one defense, that an injunction is not necessary because there's no threat, no imminent threat of closing. These companies, Your Honor, are not going to, in the dead of night, go out and close this deal. They can't.

THE COURT: All right. What's the government's

1 position on whether we actually have to plan for motions for 2 preliminary injunction in this case management order? 3 MR. FITZGERALD: Good morning, Your Honor. Scott 4 Fitzgerald for the United States. 5 The situation we want to avoid is one where the parties close before you're able to make a decision on the 6 7 merits. We think if they're right, that there's no way for 8 them to close, they should be willing to agree to a 9 provision that says they won't. The fact they're not 10 willing to do that creates some uncertainty, and that's why 11 we've asked the Court to enter an order making sure that 12 doesn't happen. 13 THE COURT: This does seem to be a little bit of 14 semantics going on here. As I understand it, they're saying 15 they can't go and seek state regulatory approval until I've 16 ruled, and they can't merge until they've got the regulatory 17 approval. But it seems to me that there ought to be a 18 sentence or two that both sides can live with that sums that up 19 Does the government have an idea at this point how 20 many experts it is intending to call? 21 MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, right now we think 2.2 there's the two I mentioned before, an expert economist and in our rebuttal case an efficiencies expert. 23

THE COURT: All right. Why, if this expert is important to your case, are you saving it for rebuttal?

24

25

1 MR. JACOBS: Because he or she would only respond 2 to the defendants' efficiencies defense, which would be put 3 on in the defense case-in-chief. 4 THE COURT: Does the defense have some idea at 5 this point what we're talking about in terms of numbers of 6 experts? 7 MR. CURRAN: Ballpark, three or four. That 8 probably includes economists, as well as, perhaps, an 9 industry expert. 10 THE COURT: All right. The government estimates 11 that it needs three weeks to try its case. And I take it 12 you mean 15 trial days, and that doesn't include a rebuttal 13 case, is that correct? 14 MR. JACOBS: No, Your Honor. We were including 15 our rebuttal case in that. 16 THE COURT: Okay. And was that estimate, assuming 17 that your witnesses would briefly give their direct 18 testimony, to be followed by cross, or was that only 19 assuming direct provided to me in writing first? 20 MR. JACOBS: That assumed that some portion of our 21 direct testimony would be put in on paper. We were hoping 2.2 that as trial came closer, we would have some flexibility on 23 determining which witnesses would be most efficiently 24 presented to you on paper versus through live testimony. 25 THE COURT: All right. I mean, I generally think

2.2

it may be more helpful for comprehension and for the cross-examination to have the witness summarize what -- at least give some of their direct testimony in the courtroom and then be cross-examined, so I've got it all at the same time. But I was also going to ask for the expert reports well prior to the trial. I was going to ask for the deposition designations well prior to the trial, and some outlines of what your factual presentation is likely to include, which is slightly different than written direct testimony. And I don't -- but I think either way, I'm probably going to come out the same in terms of what the number of trial days are and then we'll make it fit.

The defendant, I guess, estimated six to eight days, and that was for its case-in-chief. You made that pretty clear in the pleadings. So, ultimately, if I decide that the government needs 15 or it needs 10 or it needs 12, I'm not inclined to make sure that each side gets equal number of days. I think each side needs to have an equal opportunity to put on their case. And if your case is shorter, then you may get fewer days. So I just want to let you know that at the outset.

I expect that my order will involve something less than the 22 days or so of hearing testimony that's being requested. What is the parties' position -- we've got Thanksgiving, we've got a week in early December where I'm

2.2

not going to be able to hear testimony -- about consecutive days versus breaking it up? Do you have a point of view about that?

MR. CURRAN: No. Again, our paramount consideration is getting the thing done. Breaking it up is perfectly fine. We know from the public calendar, Your Honor at least has scheduled a trial, although that might be before -- that's in November, I guess, a criminal trial.

In short, breaking it up is perfectly fine. We'll adjust to your schedule.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. All right. Does the government have any position about whether we need to run these all consecutive or whether we can break it up just to get -- I would like to get as much as early as possible. I think it's -- it may be easier to retain it having it all back to back, but it may be helpful for everybody to have an occasional day to catch their breath and to structure their testimony for the next day. I've been in an eight-week trial and I know what that's like.

MR. JACOBS: Plaintiffs agree that the trial does not have to be on consecutive trial dates. I do think what you're currently thinking about the timing of trial, that that does raise some issues. I know you've read all of our submissions on this and you've read our justification for our proposed start of trial in early January. I was

2.2

wondering if I could just supplement that argument with one thing that did not make it in the papers because it just happened earlier on Wednesday, and it affects this issue about the holidays.

On Wednesday, as you know, Judge Bates set trial in Aetna for December 5, 13 trial days. And he asked lead counsel for the United States, is there any problem with both cases being tried at once? And as the follow-up question from Judge Bates indicated, that was clearly a resource issue. And Mr. Conrath, representing the United States, said there is no issue. And there's not, in terms of resources.

I do think that there is an argument that our trial should start later than the Aetna case for just a few reasons. One, that is a simpler case than ours. There they have two relevant product markets, here we have four. And in your questions to Mr. Curran, it's very clear that they plan on contesting everything and having three to four experts. So, there doesn't seem to be any narrowing of issues.

We do expect that there will be at least some witnesses who will have to testify at both trials. And there may be some inconvenience there in terms of having them prepare for and give testimony in two different courtrooms. And finally, because our trial is more complex, I would ask for a longer trial period. And if we do start

2.2

in mid to late November or early December, that really does get us into the holidays.

I would just ask you to consider those factors in considering the start of the trial date, in light of what the Court has said about how fixed this April 30 date is.

THE COURT: Well, if we have anything close to the number of trial days you need and the number of trial days they need, even assuming Mr. Curran could be in two places at once, this trial is going to be longer than Judge Bates' trial. So if we, basically, fill January with the trial and with the submission to me of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, I don't get to start even writing my opinion until February.

Let's assume that I can't do it in a week. We're not -- this is not going to get resolved until the end of February, according to your schedule, which seems to be -- significantly impose upon the schedule that I'm being given as -- I'm being told that what I'm doing is already impossible. It makes it even more impossible. And then you do have the issues of counsel's unavailability. And I think the parties are entitled to have the lawyers that they want to try the case.

I don't see that we can do this whole thing in January. What I am doing is trying to figure out, is there some portion of it we can do in January and thus, you know,

1 keep pushing down and down into December, out of November, to give you the maximum amount of time for discovery. 2 3 I regret the impact this is going to have on all 4 of your holidays, and surely all of your associates' 5 holidays, and your lawyers' holidays, but I just don't see any way around that. 6 7 MR. JACOBS: I would just conclude by saying that given the Court's view on how hard and fast April 30 is, 8 9 that you just decide to start the trial as late as you think 10 is practicable. 11 THE COURT: That is what I'm going to try to do. 12 And, obviously -- and I guess, Mr. Rule, this is to you in 13 particular -- if there comes a time when there's flexibility 14 as to April 30, everyone should let me know. 15 It is, as I said at the beginning, a bizarre 16 situation that we are doing all of this for the benefit of a 17 merger that may not be desired. It's a lot of -- we're 18 turning a lot of people upside down and doing an 19 extraordinary amount of work, even the third parties are 20 going to have to produce on a very short schedule. And so, 21 if Cigna becomes more enamored of the merger, then maybe we 2.2 have more time. 23 MR. RULE: Your Honor, I appreciate that and

understand it. I was going to get up anyway and tell you

that I think it's important from Cigna's perspective to

24

25

2.2

correct the record. Cigna has said that it's committed to this transaction. It is committed to this transaction. We are deferring to Anthem, subject to reserving our right to speak for Cigna and to protect Cigna's interest because that's the custom; they're the buyer and they've contracted for the right to lead strategy.

But it is true that there is -- there are press stories about contention between the parties. But, it's also true that Cigna has made clear, from the board all the way down, including senior management, that they are committed to this agreement and that they are committed to their obligation to litigate this case. And they will do so.

We can't say what will happen on April 30th. You know, just like I assume for Anthem, that decision will be a board decision and it will be subject to the facts and circumstances that occur then.

But, I just want to make it clear that the company is committed to this transaction. You know, if anything changes, as Your Honor requested and as Mr. Curran agreed, certainly Cigna agrees that we will inform Your Honor of any changes. But as of now, there should be no doubt that we're committed to this agreement and we're committed to litigating to defend the agreement.

THE COURT: Every document that's been submitted to me on the question of scheduling has said you can't

2.2

assume, notwithstanding the fact that the merger partners can mutually agree to extend April 30th, that there is any wiggle room in April 30th. And what you're saying to me is slightly different than that and it puts a slightly different color on it, and it may not move the whole trial to February, I don't think I'm going to give that to the defendants -- I mean, to the plaintiffs.

But, I need to know if we have some room to maneuver here or we don't? Everybody needs to know. And it affects the discovery that you're going to be able to take, it affects everything.

MR. RULE: Your Honor, that's fair. I would say that the merger agreement speaks for itself. Cigna is committed to that agreement and to its responsibilities under that agreement. Under the agreement, either party can extend the deadline at January 31st, assuming there are no other breaches, if there -- if one party wants to because of pending regulatory approval. On April 30th either party can withdraw.

So it requires both parties to agree to it. And all I'm saying is that I can't tell you, I can't make a representation, I can't speculate as to what Cigna's board will do on April 30th, because there's a lot of time, a lot of water under the bridge.

It's Anthem's position that the agreement does say

2.2

that. It does say that both parties have to agree to extend it. I'm not in a position to tell Your Honor what the board of Cigna will do on that date, and so as I --

THE COURT: Is it not your position that the agreement says that? Does the agreement say something --

MR. RULE: No. The agreement definitely says that on April 30th either party can withdraw. I just can't represent that -- what Cigna's board would do on April 30th, because I don't know what the circumstances are. But it would be their decision. They certainly haven't opined at this point.

As I understand Anthem's position, it is that since they can't assume or guarantee that the agreement will be extended on April 30th because it requires an agreement of both parties to do that, that's why -- as I understand it, they believe that April 30th is a real deadline that Your Honor ought to take into account. You know, from that perspective, that's a fair assertion.

But it does not and should not be taken as an indication that Cigna is not committed to this agreement or not committed to litigating to defend it. And the extent to which over time we're differing to them, we're doing that because by custom the buyer tends to take the lead, and also we've got a contract where they reserve the right to lead the strategy. And so in order to try to expedite this, you

know, we certainly want to cooperate with that.

2.2

But I just want Your Honor to understand the agreement does say what it says. But, it should be absolutely clear that Cigna is committed to this agreement and committed to its obligations under the agreement.

THE COURT: That may be absolutely clear. You've made some other things absolutely not so clear. But, I appreciate what you're trying to tell me.

And it looks like Mr. Curran now wants to say something.

MR. CURRAN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple of observations, maybe, to put Mr. Rule's comments in perspective. You have the merger agreement, and maybe you've had an opportunity to look at it. The \$1.8 billion breakup fee, which is payable to Cigna, is contingent on Cigna's compliance with the merger agreement, including litigating this case, subject to our strategic direction.

So of course Mr. Rule has to say that Cigna is committed to the agreement and that it's committed to litigating the matter, otherwise the \$1.8 billion is at risk. Your Honor, you've seen the press. I can confirm that the relations --

THE COURT: I'm not going to make -- I have enough materials on the docket, I'm not going to make any decisions based on what I read in the press. I think that would be

1 completely inappropriate. The discussion of the willingness 2 of the parties to extend the time is on the record in this 3 case. You've put it in, the government put it in, everybody 4 put it in. 5 MR. CURRAN: Right. THE COURT: I don't want the penalty to be because 6 7 I didn't do what I could do in a schedule to make this work. 8 But I also don't want to put unnecessary and extraordinary 9 pressures on everyone to try a major case and handle 10 enormous amounts of discovery in a truncated schedule, if 11 the parties have within their control the ability to give us 12 more time. 13 MR. CURRAN: If we had that ability, Your Honor, 14 we would exercise it. We don't want to rush through this. 15 It's thrust upon us. That's the situation. And it's not 16 just Anthem's desire to get the deal closed; I already 17 referred to the efficiencies and the consumer savings. 18 There are also --19 THE COURT: I don't think --20 MR. CURRAN: I know you don't want to hear that 21 but --2.2 THE COURT: This isn't a PR opportunity. This is a scheduling conference, notwithstanding the fact --23 24 MR. CURRAN: This Court and the D.C. Circuit has 25 recognized that these merger cases have a lot of stakeholders

1 who have interests at risk; employees, suppliers, 2 shareholders, various others. There are a 100,000 employees 3 of the two companies combined. 4 THE COURT: And the government would say all that 5 is at risk the other way. I understand there is a lot at That's why I'm trying to come up with the right 6 7 schedule. MR. CURRAN: Okay. My whole point here, and I'll 8 9 wrap it up, is that when things are in limbo, when a major 10 merger or transformative transaction like this is in limbo, 11 a lot of stakeholders suffer and that's why deals fall 12 apart, when there's too much delay. 13 THE COURT: We are going to have a schedule and 14 everybody is going to know what it is very shortly and then 15 we'll work with it. MR. CURRAN: Thank you. 16 17 THE COURT: And I'm not going to change the 18 schedule unless the parties are committed, mutually 19 committed to changing the schedule. Once I enter it, that's 20 going to be it. 21 Yes. 2.2 MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, just briefly. On the point that you raised, you know, you don't want to set a 23 24 schedule that, I think, kills the deal, essentially is what 25 you were saying. In looking at other cases, courts have

2.2

expedited discovery where the deal may be threatened by external factors. In the recent Staples case that happened.

THE COURT: Look, you said that in your pleadings and I asked that question. I understand that. You know what I'm faced with, I've articulated that very point. But you've heard everything I've been told. I don't see how I can, consistent with everything that's in the record, have a trial that results in a decision at the end of February.

MR. JACOBS: I think, given what you heard from Mr. Rule, who represents Cigna, that you can. Because I think the April 30 deadline -- and what will happen then, if this trial is litigated and Anthem wins, if they're able to take that victory in hand, the state insurance commissions who, you know, look at a variety of issues, but in part they look at competitive issues, if April 30 comes and they go to Cigna and they say we need just a little more time to get a couple more states to check the boxes, what will happen?

Our point has always been we don't know. And you shouldn't rush this case to trial on an assumption that Cigna will say no on April 30.

When you asked that question of Mr. Rule right now, he said I don't know what will happen. That's our only point, that Mr. Rule's statement to you supports our argument here.

THE COURT: I understand that and I think we're

really back to where we started, which is the schedule that Anthem asked me to impose is too fast and -- but I don't know that I can make it as expansive as what you're asking for now, notwithstanding the fact that it's not expansive by any normal definition of that term.

All right. Mr. Rule?

2.2

MR. RULE: I just want to make it clear that I'm not --

THE COURT: Every time you make something clear, it gets less clear, you understand.

MR. RULE: I just want to make it clear that we -I can't make any representation about what will happen on
April 30th. That's -- that is what I'm clearly saying. The
agreement, though, does give either side the ability to
walk, no matter, you know, what's going on. And I think
both parties will undoubtedly look at the facts and
circumstances at that point and make a decision.

But I certainly -- we would agree and defer to the points that Anthem has made. Apart from the question of just trying to speculate what's going to happen and what parties are going to do on April 30th, that there are a lot of reasons, both consistent with how this District has handled merger cases, what the parties are committed to doing, and I think with Your Honor's guidance this morning, that we can in fact litigate this case in a fashion that,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

you know, reaches Your Honor's position of having a decision, certainly before February.

And so, we are very much committed to that and Your Honor should have no doubt that we are committed to trying to get this done as quickly as possible, consistent with everything you said here this morning.

THE COURT: Well, I think given Mr. Curran's statement this morning, while on the one hand he said we intend to -- we dispute the characterization of the relevant product market, we dispute all the definitions of the geographic markets, he also said if you assume that those are correct, there will be so much competition in the market anyway, that this will be beneficial price-wise for the population of the United States and there will be plenty of competition and this merger should go forward. If the defendants can prove that this merger should go forward, given their definition of the product market and the geographic market, then you need to think about if we can take any of those issues off the table and make them part of a stipulation and try the case that you have stood up here and tried to try since you got here. And I think then we may get it done sooner and in a shorter period of time and we may actually get it done in the period that you've got.

MR. RULE: Understood, Your Honor. I certainly want to say, on behalf of Cigna, too, that we agree with

Anthem, that there is plenty of competition in this market and that this merger is not anticompetitive and I believe we can show it and I think we can show it in the schedule that Mr. Curran has presented to the Court. THE COURT: All right. I look forward to hearing more from everyone, and I know I will. Thank you very much for your time this morning.

1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
2	
3	
4	I, JANICE DICKMAN, do hereby certify that the above
5	and foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of
6	my stenograph notes and is a full, true and complete
7	transcript of the proceedings to the best of my ability.
8	Dated this 12th day of August, 2016.
9	
10	
11	/s/
12	Janice E. Dickman, CRR, RMR Official Court Reporter
13	Room 6523 333 Constitution Avenue NW
14	Washington, D.C. 20001
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	