UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

et al.,

v.

. CA No. 16-1493 (JDB)

Plaintiffs,

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ANTHEM, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

et al., . CA No. 16-1494 (JDB)

Plaintiffs,

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v.

AETNA, INC., et al., . Washington, D.C.

. Thursday, August 4, 2016

Defendants. . 10:06 a.m.

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TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN D. BATES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiffs

United States: JON B. JACOBS, ESQ.

SCOTT I. FITZGERALD, ESQ. CRAIG. W. CONRATH, ESQ. RYAN M. KANTOR, ESQ.

State of California: NATALIE S. MANZO, ESQ.

State of Colorado: JENNIFER HUNT, ESQ.

State of Connecticut: RACHEL O. DAVIS, ESQ.

State of Delaware: MICHAEL A. UNDORF, ESQ.

District of Columbia: CATHERINE A. JACKSON, ESQ.

State of Florida: LIZABETH A. BRADY, ESQ.

State of Georgia: DANIEL WALSH, ESQ.

State of Illinois: ROBERT W. PRATT, ESQ.

LAYNE M. LINDEBAK, ESQ. State of Iowa:

State of Maine: CHRISTINA M. MOYLAN, ESQ.

State of Maryland: JOHN TENNIS, ESQ.

State of New Hampshire: JENNIFER L. FOLEY, ESQ.

State of New York: IRINA C. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.

State of Ohio: THOMAS ANGER, ESQ.

Cmlth. of Pennsylvania: AARON SCHWARTZ, ESQ.

State of Tennessee: VICTOR J. DOMEN, JR., ESQ.

Cmlth. of Virginia: TYLER T. HENRY, ESQ.

For Defendants

AETNA, INC.: JOHN M. MAJORAS, ESQ.

PAULA W. RENDER, ESQ.

CHRISTOPHER N. THATCH, ESQ.

ANTHEM, INC.: CHRISTOPHER M. CURRAN, ESQ.

J. MARK GIDLEY, ESQ.

CIGNA CORP.: CHARLES F. RULE, ESQ.

> ANDREW J. FORMAN, ESQ. DANIEL J. HOWLEY, ESQ.

HUMANA, INC.: KENT A. GARDINER, ESQ.

SHARI ROSS LAHLOU, ESQ.

Court Reporter: BRYAN A. WAYNE, RPR, CRR

U.S. Courthouse, Room 4704-A

333 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 354-3186

PROCEEDINGS

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, calling civil action

No. 16-1493, the United States of America et al. v. Anthem, Inc.

and Cigna Corporation; and civil action No. 16-1494, United

States of America et al. v. Aetna, Incorporated and Humana, Inc.

Will counsel for the government in 1493 please rise and identify you and all your colleagues for the proceedings this morning.

MR. JACOBS: Good morning, Your Honor.

Jon Jacobs for plaintiff United States, and with me is my colleague, Scott Fitzgerald.

THE COURT: Good morning.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Would counsel for defendant Anthem identify yourself for the record and any and all your colleagues either here in court or on the telephone.

MR. CURRAN: Good morning, Judge Bates.

Christopher Curran for White & Case representing Anthem.

I'm accompanied by one of my law firm partners, Mr. Mark Gidley,
and we are also accompanied by the general counsel of Anthem,
Mr. Thomas Zielinski.

THE COURT: Good morning to you.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for Cigna, please.

MR. RULE: Good morning, Your Honor. Charles Rule on behalf of Cigna. With me today are Dan Howley and Andrew Forman.

1 THE COURT: Good morning to you. 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Representing the states in that case, would someone from the State of California, if you're in 3 the courtroom, identify yourself and your colleagues on the 4 5 phone. MS. MANZO: Natalie Manzo for the State of California. 6 7 On the phone we have Paula Lauren Gibson and Patricia Nagler. 8 THE DEPUTY CLERK: State of Connecticut? 9 MS. DAVIS: Rachel Davis, Your Honor. We do not have 10 anyone else on the phone. 11 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the District of 12 Columbia. 13 MS. JACKSON: Catherine Jackson for the District of 14 Columbia. We have no one on the phone. 15 THE DEPUTY CLERK: For the State of Georgia. 16 MR. WALSH: Daniel Walsh on behalf of the State of 17 Georgia. 18 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the State of Iowa. 19 MR. LINDEBAK: This is Layne Lindebak from the Iowa 20 Attorney General's office. 21 THE DEPUTY CLERK: From the State of Maine. 22 MS. MOYLAN: Christina Moylan for the State of Maine. 23 THE DEPUTY CLERK: From the State of Maryland, please. 24 MR. TENNIS: This is John Tennis for the Maryland 25 Attorney General's office.

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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you. For the State of New
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      Hampshire.
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                MS. FOLEY: Jennifer Foley from the New Hampshire
      Department of Justice.
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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the State of New York,
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      please.
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                MS. HOFFMANN: Elinor Hoffmann for the State of New
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      York.
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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the Commonwealth of
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      Virginia.
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                MR. HENRY: Tyler Henry on behalf of the Commonwealth
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      of Virginia.
                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the State of Colorado.
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                           Jennifer Hunt for the State of Colorado.
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                MS. HUNT:
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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you. One of the attorneys
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      for the State of Tennessee, please.
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                MR. DOMEN: Victor Domen for the State of Tennessee.
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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: And your colleagues, please?
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                MR. DOMEN: Cynthia Kinser as well.
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                THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you very much. Counsel for
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      the -- this is in case 16-1494. Counsel for the government,
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      please.
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                MR. CONRATH: Good morning, Your Honor. Craig Conrath
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      for the United States. With me on this case is Ryan Kantor, and
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      back there, Mr. Eric Welch.
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1 THE COURT: Good morning to all of you. 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the State of Delaware, 3 please. MR. UNDORF: Michael Undorf for the State of Delaware. 4 5 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you. Ms. Jackson from the 6 District again. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: We don't need to repeat those who have 8 already been identified. 9 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you. Can I just get counsel 10 for the defendants, Aetna and Humana, please, to identify 11 themselves. 12 MR. MAJORAS: Good morning, Your Honor. John Majoras 13 from Jones Day on behalf of Aetna. With me at counsel table are 14 my colleagues, Paula Render and Christopher Thatch. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. 16 MR. GARDINER: Good morning, Your Honor. For Humana, 17 Kent Gardiner from Crowell & Moring. With me is Shari Lahlou from Crowell & Moring as well, and also in the courtroom is 18 19 Elysia Solomon, associate general counsel for Humana. 20 THE COURT: Good morning to you. 21 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Just as a small housekeeping 22 measure, anybody on the phone, it would be extremely helpful for 23 the court reporter if, when you speak, you would identify

yourself and the party you represent before talking. Thank you

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very much.

THE COURT: Thank you. We'll think of a shorter way to identify everybody in future proceedings, but it's good to go through all who are here today; and there are many here in the courtroom as well, and apparently in an overflow courtroom.

We're going to try to get a little bit of a handle on scheduling and what's going to take place here, and I thought that what I would do is give you five minutes or so just to say anything further beyond the written filings that I've received with respect to your assessment of -- I'll just call it scheduling in this matter.

I'll hear from you in the order of the cases, meaning I'll hear first from the Department of Justice, then from Anthem and Cigna, but presumably Cigna won't have much to add since you didn't add much in writing, and the same thing with respect to Aetna and Humana.

Don't repeat everything that you've said. I'll have a few questions for each of you, but I do think I need to give you a couple of minutes just to give me your sense of how you think these matters should proceed, whether together or apart. So let's hear first from the Department of Justice with respect to that question.

MR. JACOBS: Thank you, Your Honor, and good morning. Jon Jacobs for the United States in the Anthem-Cigna case. As we made clear, we will be ready for trial in either case by February 17, which is just over six months from now. The

1 parties largely agree that these cases should be coordinated 2 during pretrial discovery but tried separately and that these 3 are appropriately related cases. THE COURT: What do you mean by "appropriately 4 5 related"? You mean under our local rules? 6 MR. JACOBS: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Why? 8 MR. JACOBS: Because there are common issues of fact. 9 THE COURT: There are also a lot of issues that are 10 not common, aren't there? 11 MR. JACOBS: That is true. 12 THE COURT: Which will predominate, those that are 13 common or those that are not common? 14 MR. JACOBS: Because most of the issues are not 15 common, we recommend separate trials. But we do recommend 16 coordination during pretrial discovery. Plaintiffs in both 17 cases, as well as Aetna and Humana, and, Your Honor, even Anthem 18 and Cigna -- I don't believe we mentioned in our papers that 19 when we received a request for our investigation file from both 20 Anthem and Cigna, they not only asked us for the documents 21 related to their merger, but for documents related to the other 22 merger as well. 23 THE COURT: That was mentioned in someone's papers. 24 MR. JACOBS: And that is appropriate, Your Honor,

because we are likely to use material received from both Aetna

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and Humana in our case challenging the Anthem-Cigna case.

So they're appropriately related cases I say because there are common issues of fact. We have the one common relevant product market. We will have common witnesses. We have common third-party competitors in several of those markets that are common, and there will be common discovery issues.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a generalized question.

Has the Antitrust Division ever had a situation -- maybe we can go back -- maybe the <u>Cardinal Health</u> case is one I can think of, but have you had many situations where you've had significant mergers in an industry that have both been challenged and you're going to try two cases either together or apart but basically at the same time, one of which -- the outcome of one of which could affect the outcome of the other? Have you ever had that before?

MR. JACOBS: I'm not aware in the Antitrust Division. The <u>Cardinal Health</u> case was brought by the Federal Trade

Commission in the 1990s. We have had cases somewhat similar to this in non-merger civil cases where we challenge a company's conduct under Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

We have private plaintiffs who follow suit, alleging that they're entitled to damages, and we coordinate during discovery to minimize the burden on third parties; but the trials are separate because there are different issues.

THE COURT: So what do you intend to do in this case?

In merger B, let's say, are you going to present through your

experts evidence that the market will look one way if merger A occurs and another way if merger A doesn't occur? Is that what we're going to have? We're going to have sort of alternative presentations with respect to the concentration in the market?

MR. JACOBS: Not really, because again, the one common product market is the sale of individual policies on the public exchanges. The common issues to be decided there by the Court is, is that a relevant product market. Whichever trial goes first will determine that question, and the second trial will follow that rule.

THE COURT: Maybe, maybe not. What if it's a different judge?

MR. JACOBS: Then if it's a different judge, then that different judge can decide for him or herself. But that's one reason why we related them, because there is that common issue. As I said, there is also common competitors in the geographic markets for individual commercial -- United and Kaiser are both competitors.

THE COURT: Do we expect to hear from them in these cases?

MR. JACOBS: We do, Your Honor, at least from United.

I don't expect as I stand here today that they will be witnesses in our case, but they certainly will receive third-party discovery requests from not only the Anthem-Cigna case but also Aetna-Humana.

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Because we do think it's appropriate, as Anthem and Cigna does, and I believe Aetna and Humana does, that all parties to both cases get everyone's documents, we have to negotiate a protective order that has identical protections in each case.

Just to give you an example how much longer that has taken just in the time since we filed the complaints on July 21st.

Less than a week after filing the cases, the United States sent a proposed protective order to the Aetna-Humana defendants and the Anthem-Cigna defendants. We're not only negotiating with one set of defendants, but two.

But it's been a little more difficult than that. We got a common response from Aetna-Humana saying here are some suggested edits. We got edits from Anthem. And independently we got it from Cigna, Anthem and Cigna not working well --

THE COURT: I appreciate the complexity of that, but there are a lot of cases that have multiple parties. The fact that multiple parties have to work on a protective order is not unique to this setting. I don't know that that makes this a particularly complex setting. You've basically got two other parties -- they're four companies but really two of them -- two pairs of companies. And it's not unusual to have a piece of civil litigation with that many parties involved.

MR. JACOBS: On the -- I'll call it primary question or a primary question to be decided, when should the trial date or dates be, we included in our brief a table of we think the

most comparable cases, not FTC cases seeking a preliminary injunction, which this court knows is under a different standard, but cases brought by the United States, a full trial on the merits.

THE COURT: Most comparable, although the ones in D.C., I think four of the eight are in D.C., and they're the ones with the shorter schedules. There's some in other jurisdictions that have much longer schedules. But the schedule you propose is longer than any of the other schedules in D.C. of cases that you've brought.

MR. JACOBS: And there's a reason for that. But before I get to that, I was going to say that in none of those cases am I aware was there a related case where we were working -- whether it's common in other civil cases or not, I'm not aware of any of those cases being situations where we were working to negotiate a common protective order. We were working to negotiate an identical or similar enough case management order.

THE COURT: Believe me, I'm not of the view that these are simple cases or that these are not complex in many regards. But I don't want to give the impression that just because there are multiple parties, that's a unique situation. It's not unique.

So the schedule that you proposed would lead to a trial-ready date of February 17, that date being the date for a

pretrial conference or final pretrial conference, and therefore trial thereafter consecutively, if you will.

Do you agree with the estimates provided by the defendants in the two cases of three weeks of trial for the Anthem case -- Anthem-Cigna case -- and two weeks of trial for the Aetna-Humana case?

MR. JACOBS: We don't. I can speak to the Anthem-Cigna case which should be longer. We estimate currently, with all of the issues that appear to be in dispute given Anthem's answer and our initial discussions with them, that we would need at least three weeks to put on our case-in-chief, and we estimate another at least half a week for our rebuttal case, which would primarily go to addressing the defendants' efficiencies defense.

With that scope of -- and that includes an estimate of how long the defendants would cross-examine our witnesses. With that estimate, Anthem's lawyers can give you an estimate of what their defense case is likely to look like, and I think I'll leave it to Mr. Conrath to estimate the length of the government's case in the Aetna-Humana case.

THE COURT: Will -- I'll save that question. Is there a possibility here of expediting the trial at least in each case by having some testimony in writing rather than all through live witnesses? We've done that in antitrust and some other cases in other settings. Why not here?

MR. JACOBS: That is certainly something that we would be open to, Your Honor, if you would find that helpful, and that would help to expedite matters. We are certainly agreeable to considering that.

THE COURT: With respect to coordination of pretrial proceedings and discovery, what about a special master to do that?

MR. JACOBS: We would not oppose Aetna's suggestion for the appointment of a special master. We would note that in the division's experience, often parties' behavior is better if they are in front of the judge who's ruling on the merits when addressing discovery disputes, but if this --

THE COURT: But you, of course, would take care of that from your side. Right?

MR. JACOBS: Right. Of course. That has been our experience, unfortunately. But if the Court finds that to be an efficient way to coordinate and make sure that common third parties are not overly burdened and the common discovery issues that arise in these two cases are addressed, we would not oppose that.

THE COURT: And I don't think that we would have a magistrate judge available to do that given our circumstances here at the moment with our magistrate judges; so there would probably have to be a special master appointed who would then be paid by the parties. Any objection to that by the Department of

Justice?

MR. JACOBS: No objection.

THE COURT: If we -- I know I'm speaking as if you're handling both cases, and to the extent that has to be -- you need the aid of your colleagues, please say so. But if you look at your February 17th date, which really would be a date sometime after February 17, perhaps shortly after the 17th of February. Then for the second trial, a date probably a month later at least, by your estimate, maybe two months later, you're talking about more than seven months between filing and trial for the first trial, and probably more like nine months between filing and trial for the second case.

That's significantly longer than any other merger case the Department's filed has taken to get to trial or be scheduled for trial in this district. Isn't that too conservative? Don't we need to push this along a little faster than that?

MR. JACOBS: Well, a couple of points on that, Your Honor. The average civil case in general takes approximately two years to get to trial.

THE COURT: I know, but the Clayton Act says something about that.

MR. JACOBS: But each of these cases is much more complex than that, and I would say much more complex than the other civil cases we listed in our brief in terms of the time from the filing of the complaint to trial. These are

unprecedented mergers in this industry, both very large. They raise a number of issues. So we understand that that would take a while.

We had developed our schedule from the ground up, thinking what do we need to develop an adequate record so that you have a sufficient record on which you can make a decision. Four months of fact discovery does not strike us as too much. One month of expert discovery and having a gap in between so the experts are able to absorb the material generated in fact discovery, and then approximately a month, I think a little less in our proposal, for pretrial matters.

The shorter cases that you cited from this district, I would just like to say --

THE COURT: You mean from your list?

MR. JACOBS: Yes, from our list. There are significant differences. I mean, the American-US Airways merger was very large, very significant, nationwide effects, but American was in bankruptcy and cited that fact in its papers for moving up the trial date.

It said this deal was the "foundation of our plan to exit bankruptcy." As the Court knows, when there's a bankruptcy situation, our time deadlines during the investigation are shortened, and it's a very different situation, as was the SunGard case.

In H&R Block, although it was technically a trial on the

merits, really should be considered a preliminary injunction hearing because the court converted it from a PI to a trial on the merits just before opening statements, and there was one product at issue in that case, a tax software.

THE COURT: I think conversion from PI to trial on the merits, whatever the uniqueness of that case, is also reflective of the fact that there often isn't that much difference between trying a case for preliminary injunction in an antitrust setting and trying it on the merits.

MR. JACOBS: So that's <u>H&R Block</u>, what we consider to be a relatively, compared to these cases, very straightforward relevant product market, a particular type of tax software, and the relevant geographic market was stipulated, wasn't an issue.

Electrolux, that actually was a case where the government agreed with the schedule, in part because it was a very different case than this one. It had to do with ranges and oven tops and so forth.

THE COURT: There always are reasons that contribute to the expedited schedule, whether it be the government's agreement or something else. Bankruptcy, for example. Here, the primary reason that is pushing these cases, from the defendants' perspective, on a faster track, is their contractual agreements with respect to the mergers. Should I ignore that?

MR. JACOBS: Well, Your Honor, we think you should ignore that for purposes of scheduling. What you should do is

take a look at these cases and ask what time is necessary to build the factual record that is necessary, and not use a deadline that is under the parties' control themselves.

They set this date knowing -- in the Anthem-Cigna case -- that there were antitrust risks here, and that they had to obtain approval from a number, they say 26 state insurance commissions.

They knew that when they drafted the contract. Now they are using their schedule, Anthem's schedule, is not really based on a ground-up approach, how much time do we need here, it's really coming from the other direction saying, well, we have this deadline, April 30.

THE COURT: I think they're really using the deadline for the court proceeding more of January 31, leaving the April 30 additional four months to take care of the state insurance.

MR. JACOBS: The April 30 date is about nine months out, and they're saying, you know, we really need this court to hold a trial, make a decision, write a written opinion, before the end of this calendar year, primarily because they're not getting along with Cigna.

THE COURT: But they also say, they announced these mergers -- each of them did, slightly different dates -- but a year ago. And the Department of Justice took a year to investigate.

MR. JACOBS: Well, we did. We had a year-long

investigation in terms of --

THE COURT: Is that unusually long, or is that typical?

MR. JACOBS: It is not unusually long for a case of this magnitude. And I will say although -- a couple things on the investigation. Although we opened the investigation shortly after the mergers were announced, about a year before the complaints were filed, we only got their documents in early March. So we only had their documents for about four months before the complaint was filed, and we continued getting data after that. That's the first point.

The second point is, like we always do, we investigated a broader range of product markets that we ended up not suing on. Anthem and Cigna compete on vision insurance; they compete on dental insurance. They compete in many more than the 35 local markets we ended up alleging in the complaint.

So we did what we were supposed to do during the investigation, determined whether to bring an enforcement action, and if so, the proper scope of that action. And that is why the investigation took as long as it did.

THE COURT: All right. What's your reaction -- well,

I'll save this for later too. Let me hear from --

MR. JACOBS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: First I guess maybe I should hear from your colleague. Is it Mr. Conrath?

MR. CONRATH: Yes.

Craig Conrath, Your Honor, in the Aetna-Humana matter. I won't repeat either what's in our papers or what Mr. Jacobs has already explained, but let me add a couple of additional thoughts.

One is that a very, very accelerated schedule in a merger case uniquely disadvantages the plaintiffs. We are law enforcement plaintiffs in these merger cases, which means that a very substantial amount of the information that we need to prove our case to make available to you to decide the case is in the hands of the defendants.

THE COURT: So give me an example of the -- just generically -- of the kind of additional information that you think you need to acquire during discovery that you haven't already acquired during the investigation.

MR. CONRATH: Okay, sure. There's a fair amount of additional information. We have to make sure all the evidence that we have is in shape, ready to be presented at a full trial on the merits. But a few examples of some of the kinds of things that we need is for the Medicare -- in the Medicare Advantage markets, recent competitive actions by Aetna and Humana. Aetna and Humana and third-party competitors have made their submissions to the department of HHS in June for their 27 plans that will be competing.

We need the planning documents, the decisions, and the

analysis that they used to prepare those to submit those plans because that's where they sit down and say, okay, what do we think the competition is going to do? Who is the competition here? What benefits do we need to offer? What price do we have to offer? Highly relevant to the kinds of questions that the Court will be called upon to decide, and in order to present the Court with up-to-date information, we need to get that.

Advantage market. These two are two of the fastest growing Medicare Advantage companies. They have plans to move into new territories. One of the allegations in the complaint is their growth will put them more and more in competition with each other. Those plans, the latest information that we have is from end of September of last year; so we would seek more current information about their plans to grow and expand and compete with each other.

In individual commercial markets sold on the public exchanges, there are recent competitive actions by Aetna and Humana and third-party competitors in those markets. Each of them have recently submitted their 2017 plans. And in the same vein, the strategic decisions they made, who are we competing with, what prices should we offer, would be highly relevant to the Court's analysis.

There have been some recent marketplace changes in the individual commercial exchange markets as some companies are

pulling back, which might make some of these markets more concentrated than even they were based on the information we had before.

On issues that go more to defenses or claims we expect to hear from the other side that we need to prepare for, we expect that they are -- based on the arguments, we had a lot of back and forth telling them what our view was during the investigation, hearing from them what their view was, but we expect them to argue about the effect of regulation, that maybe HHS regulations would prevent any anticompetitive harm from occurring.

And we would want to seek discovery from Aetna and Humana custodians, who are the ones actually responsible for negotiating regulatory compliance with that part of HHS, so that we can evaluate whether it's really a binding constraint.

There's likely to be, we understand, a substantial claim of efficiencies from this merger. This is something that we tried to look at during the course of the investigation. They put out a big proposal -- in fact, as the evidence mounted for the anticompetitive effect of the merger, the amount of efficiencies they claimed also grew. And we investigated that some during the investigation.

But a big part of what we got back was, well, we're working on it. And we asked, well, where are the facts? What's the backup? How are you going to achieve these? The answer is substantial as well. That's underway. They hired six

consulting firms to do this analysis. We'd have to take discovery from them.

THE COURT: Let me interject by asking, is the -- sort of on the remedial end, is the information that's in a footnote in Aetna-Humana's filing about the sale of certain Medicare Advantage assets to another company, is that something new, or is that something that the Department of Justice has already taken into account?

MR. CONRATH: That is the very next topic I was going to address because it's very relevant. So they floated -- at the very end of the investigation, they floated the generic idea of what if we divest some contracts. So I should be clear here. They're not talking about let's take Humana's Medicare Advantage division and sell it as an ongoing entity to someone else.

What they're saying is we'll take the Aetna contracts with individuals in a particular county, and we'll send them a notice that says you signed up last open season for a contract to get your Medicare Advantage product from Aetna, but due to a federal court order, now it's going to be provided by a company called Molina, and you're stuck with that. And they won't write this in the notice, I presume, but the fact is they're stuck with that until the next open season.

There's a very significant -- if you can imagine, that means there's a very significant question whether that's a sustainable ongoing plan. So we had a little bit of discovery

at the very end of the investigation.

THE COURT: That needs to be explored more, you believe?

MR. CONRATH: This surely needs to be explored more if the plan is to present that at trial. Now we understand they have a contract; we haven't seen it. But will that firm be a replacement for either Aetna's or Humana's competition is a very serious question.

THE COURT: Speaking for the Department of Justice as a whole, is one case simpler than the other?

MR. CONRATH: So there are fewer product markets in the Aetna case.

THE COURT: Two versus four?

MR. CONRATH: That's right. There are more geographic markets. It looks pretty clear that Aetna is going to present a proposed remedy and inject that into the trial. I think that hasn't been ruled out in the other case, but I don't think it's really been proposed.

We know that a lot of things happen, cases widen and narrow during the course of pretrial; so that's one of the reasons we suggest the parallel ready dates. But if you look at the two of them today, based on where we are today, probably the Aetna-Humana case is simpler than the other.

THE COURT: And how long for trial?

MR. CONRATH: So I estimate our case -- I should say,

we approached the defendants shortly after the complaint was

filed and said, you know, what are you planning to contest here?

You haven't answered yet, but if you can tell us what's going to

be at issue, for example, remedy, efficiency, product market.

As far as we know, everything's on the table to be litigated. I

think it's probably, to put on our case, I would estimate about

7 two weeks.

THE COURT: All right. What else do you want to add?

MR. CONRATH: I think that's it, Your Honor. Let me
leave you with this thought: We know the Court wants a full,
robust, and reliable record to make this decision, and we built
our schedule from the ground up to give the time to be able to
put that in front of you. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Mr. Curran.

MR. CURRAN: Judge Bates, the Anthem case was assigned to Your Honor as a result of the random assignment of cases in the clerk's office.

THE COURT: Oh, let me clear up something by asking one of the Department of Justice attorneys this question. Was there some reason that one case got 1493 and the other case got 1494, or is it just that someone came in to file the two cases and happened to hand one to the clerk before the other?

MR. JACOBS: My understanding, Your Honor, is that the Anthem case was filed first because we have more state

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co-plaintiffs, and there was something about starting the case
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      on ECF that made it easier to do that.
                THE COURT: Something from the clerk's office
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      perspective or something from...
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                MR. JACOBS: We did it from our office.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. JACOBS: We didn't file the case in person.
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                THE COURT: All right.
                MR. JACOBS: The exact reason for that, Your Honor,
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      I'll be honest, I'm not sure.
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                THE COURT: But there's no legal or other procedural
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      reason one case was filed before the other?
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                MR. JACOBS: That's right. There is not.
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                THE COURT: Just this technological reason.
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                MR. JACOBS: Yes.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Curran.
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                MR. CURRAN: Judge Bates, the fact of the matter is
      the Anthem case was filed first.
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                THE COURT: And it has a lower number.
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           (Laughter)
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                MR. CURRAN: That's right. Assigned to Your Honor
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      randomly. The Aetna case was assigned to Your Honor solely
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      because the Department of Justice attorneys designated that case
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      as related to this one.
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                THE COURT: That too is true.
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MR. CURRAN: I submit that that designation is not supported by rule 40.5 of the local rules. We cited in our submission to you three cases that I think support that point: the <u>Dale</u> case, the <u>Reno</u> case, and the <u>Keepseagle</u> case.

All of those cases are -- in general they rely on the <u>Tripp</u> case, which was an unusual case coming out of this court because it was issued by a three-judge panel of the calendar committee at the time. And that <u>Tripp</u> case, which is arguably the leading case on what constitutes a related case in this district, says that for a case to be related on the basis of common issues of fact, it has to have a direct factual nexus to the core allegations of the complaint. That's the conclusion in <u>Tripp</u>.

The submissions that Your Honor has gotten from the other parties in this case refute any suggestion that that standard is met here. First of all, even before the complaints were filed, at the press conference that the Department of Justice senior officials held, they affirmatively stated that the investigations were separate and the cases are separate and that they involve separate markets and separate products. And then the complaints bear that out.

The Aetna brief to Your Honor is very interesting. On page 5, beginning on line 7, it contains a paragraph that with Your Honor's indulgence I'd like to read to you. Or refer you to specifically. Because there, Your Honor, I submit that Aetna and Humana indicate that the cases are highly distinct from each

1 other --2 THE COURT: Page 5? 3 MR. CURRAN: Yeah, page 5, beginning line 7. 4 THE COURT: Oh, line 7. I don't see a paragraph 5 beginning on line 7. 6 MR. CURRAN: Okay. "For present purposes, Aetna and 7 Humana merely observe that the two cases are highly distinct 8 from each other in a number of key respects. As noted above, the two cases center on very different issues" --9 10 THE COURT: Well, you don't disagree with that, do 11 you? 12 MR. CURRAN: No. In fact, I agree wholeheartedly. 13 THE COURT: So you both agree on that. 14 MR. CURRAN: So we both agree that different products, 15 different markets, and as Aetna and Humana say here, no common 16 witnesses. 17 THE COURT: The government seems to feel there will be 18 some common witnesses. Let's assume there will be some. 19 MR. CURRAN: It's still not enough. The fundamental 20 allegations are different, distinct, different product markets. 21 Under General Dynamics and its progeny, as Your Honor knows from 22 the Arch Coal case, the analysis in an antitrust case, 23 particularly a Clayton Section 7 case, focuses on the particular 24 markets alleged. These two cases are so fundamentally distinct that there is 25

no basis for them to be conjoined or designated as related, particularly given this court's historical effort to make random assignment of cases a key part of the Court's --

THE COURT: So what makes the most sense to you, that the two cases be before different judges but there be a special master assigned, hired, who will coordinate the discovery and pretrial proceedings with respect to both cases under the supervision of the two judges, and then the trials will be set based on the availability of counsel and the judge separately in each case? Is that what makes the most sense to you?

MR. CURRAN: For the most part, yes. First of all, I think you have to keep our case because it was randomly assigned to you.

THE COURT: I hate to tell you something, but I'm actually senior judge. I don't have to keep any case.

(Laughter)

I can send any case back.

MR. CURRAN: Yes.

THE COURT: But go ahead.

MR. CURRAN: I hope Your Honor keeps our case. But it certainly -- it's the one that was randomly assigned to you. That's indisputable. The other case, I think, under rule 40.5, should be then sent to the calendar committee for reassignment. Whether there's a common special master or not we're agnostic to, but I question whether that's really necessary. Given the

fundamental differences in the cases, discovery is not going to overlap significantly.

Now, Mr. Jacobs was pointing out that we asked for the entire file of the investigation of the Aetna-Humana case.

Well, of course we did, because as Mr. Jacobs himself said, and as their papers indicate, their investigation was sweeping into all sorts of areas far beyond the scope of what they ultimately alleged.

So of course we want access to their broader investigation to the extent it relates to the commercial health insurance business that's at issue in our case. So there's no inconsistency there. In fact, it's perfectly consistent. And I would assume that the Aetna folks would want access to our entire investigation file because there might be something in that broad investigation that's relevant to their case.

THE COURT: You're not portraying someone who's really agnostic on it. It sounds like you don't think there should be a common special master.

MR. CURRAN: But I don't want to rule it out, and of course we would contribute. If Your Honor and perhaps the other judge were to think that it's nonetheless wise to do a special master, sure. I just don't see that as advancing the interests of judicial economy.

So that's maybe enough about the related case point. Our fundamental issue is speed.

THE COURT: But it's a speed that is determined at least in part by you and your partner in the merger. You've set those dates. And what -- other than the interests of Anthem and Cigna with respect to the merger, what harm would there be if a trial didn't take place until, instead of the October date that you proposed, until January? What harm would there be?

MR. CURRAN: First of all, I think it would kill the deal, but the harm --

THE COURT: It would kill the deal because of those involved in the deal deciding that it should kill the deal.

MR. CURRAN: Well, not exactly. As Your Honor pointed out earlier, this merger agreement was reached over a year ago. Right? And that's when these dates were set. We're distinct in that sense from the Aetna-Humana situation where they have already extended, by agreement. We at Anthem want to acquire Cigna, and we have a contract that gives us rights to make that acquisition if we can overcome the regulatory hurdles.

It's apparent, as DOJ alleges in paragraph 14 of their complaint, that there's now contentiousness between Anthem and Cigna. And I think that's also apparent from the public record where Anthem came out after the complaint with a press statement saying that they were fully supportive of pushing forward and will fight this and want to get the deal done, whereas Cigna said first they were exploring their options and then they said they will abide by their contractual obligations.

a suitor that's no longer interested in being pursued.

So we have a situation here where Anthem, the acquiror,

wants to do the deal, Cigna, at least its top management, is now

30, which is all Anthem can extend to unilaterally, that's real

THE COURT: And it also has 120 days, by your

estimate, for getting state insurance approvals. That looks

You need to do it fast, fast, fast, fast because we need

this buffer of four months to deal with the remaining state

So under that scenario, I submit that our end date of April

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like a long time. And indeed, it looks to me as if you're effectively saying, court -- I won't say "judge" meaning this judge, but whatever judge -- court, you need to really hurry up.

That's a little bit odd.

insurance approvals that we have to get.

and hard and fixed.

MR. CURRAN: But in a broader perspective, if the merger agreement was assigned in July 2015 and picked this end date of April 2017, in that perspective, it's pretty reasonable that the parties thought they could get through a DOJ investigation -- now, it turns out DOJ took a year to do the investigation, notwithstanding the Hart-Scott-Rodino contemplation of a couple of 30-day extensions. DOJ took a long time. They got a lot of information. They should be trial-ready.

THE COURT: Although you didn't finish producing their

information, although they said in March, Anthem finished producing its information February 9.

MR. CURRAN: That's right. That's right. That's finished. Anthem began producing right after the deal was announced and right after the deal was disclosed to DOJ. It was a rolling production. It's not like there was a dumping of stuff in February of this year and then there was only six months left. Even six months after substantial compliance is a long time for DOJ to be conducting this investigation.

And then, for them, after making these tremendous demands and requiring a heroic and expensive production by Anthem and Cigna, for them in their submission to Your Honor to say that the delay is the merging parties' delay? That's pretty beyond the pale there. DOJ has taken a long time. The merging parties do not want to be in this predicament. They do not want to be in this rushed, cramped position. But it's a consequence of factors beyond their control.

And in this regard, it's not that different from what we see in the <u>SunGard</u> case, which Mr. Gidley and I tried, and various other cases where this court's determination of the Section 7 issue may still not allow the merger to take place immediately. In that case, it was the bankruptcy court that still had to approve things. Same in the US Air-American situation. When this court set the trial -- set the expedition, there was still a bankruptcy proceeding that had to approve.

And in the AT&T merger case, there was a simultaneous FCC investigation. So sometimes there are other regulatory or court proceedings that are separate barriers to closure.

THE COURT: I'm not questioning that the state insurance approvals have to be obtained. I'm just wondering whether the four months you've allotted in the schedule is reasonable given all of the other factors that we have here.

MR. CURRAN: I anticipated some skepticism; so that's exactly why we submitted so many declarations to Your Honor from counsel that are experts in this field. So as Your Honor can see, in the Donaldson declaration, we have the supervising attorney, and then we have sub-declarations from various of the states at issue.

There are various periods of time, some of them statutorily dictated, for public hearings and otherwise. And that's why we've laid it out in such detail to Your Honor. And I've seen no rebuttal or suggestion that those estimates are incorrect or exaggerated.

THE COURT: Other than the one I've just given. But go ahead.

MR. CURRAN: Fair judicial skepticism is one thing, but no counter-declaration, no assertion or anything else like that. So we feel that we're in this pickle through no cause of our own, a long DOJ investigation, a necessary state situation on the far end. And by the way, Your Honor, the state -- maybe

this was clear from the Donaldson declaration, one of the key maybe the key issue at the states is whether the proposed acquisition will cause a substantial lessening of competition. It's basically a paraphrase of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

So we think that if Your Honor, or whoever the judge is, were to conclude that there's no Section 7 violation, we think that we would then move pretty effectively through the process. But nonetheless, the time period is dictated by state regulation. And those states, as indicated in these declarations, various of the states have said they're suspending their consideration until this court proceeding is --

THE COURT: Some states. Four states.

MR. CURRAN: Actually it's five overnight. New York announced that they too were suspending. And as Mr. Donaldson said in his declaration, there may be more.

THE COURT: So if I adopt the schedule that you propose, which pushes the Anthem-Cigna case forward to trial on October 17, am I really doing what the court of appeals has suggested, and that is taking all the time that I need to deal with and decide a case of this complexity and magnitude? That's a very fast schedule, looking at other cases, and certainly looking at cases of this magnitude according to the Department of Justice.

Aren't I running head on into the observations of judges like Judge Tatel that rushing is not what the Court should do?

MR. CURRAN: Well, I'm glad you asked that. couple of responses to that. Maybe my first one is, in that Whole Foods opinion, which was cited as though it was D.C. Circuit precedent in the DOJ submission, in fact is not.

THE COURT: I recognize that, but you should also recognize that district judges do take seriously what the court of appeals says.

MR. CURRAN: What even an individual circuit judge -so Judge Tatel, for example, did not join that opinion; right? That was strictly Circuit Judge Brown. But more importantly, on the merits, we don't want Your Honor to rush through this. want Your Honor to use the allotted time in the best way that's possible and productive. We proposed that October date two weeks ago. This case is already two weeks old.

We think that because of DOJ's lack of cooperation with us, we've lost a couple of weeks, but we're not wedded to that start date. All we want is to have judicial resolution by the end of If Your Honor thinks that starting on November 1 or November 15 or something like that is still okay and getting a judicial resolution by the end of the year, fine. We want to be flexible.

THE COURT: Why the end of the year rather than the end of January?

MR. CURRAN: By the end of the year.

THE COURT: Why?

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MR. CURRAN: Because 120 days, January 1 to April 30 is 120 days.

THE COURT: That's the only reason?

MR. CURRAN: That's the only reason. That's the only reason. It's the predicament we were put in through no fault of our own as a result of the state regulation. It's the only reason. So we want to get judicial resolution by the end of the year. We're willing to do whatever it takes to work with the Court and to work with DOJ to make that happen.

We said three weeks. That was our best estimate of the duration of the trial.

THE COURT: What's your best estimate now that you've heard what the government said?

MR. CURRAN: Well, I thought three weeks was on the long side, and I figured if we asked for three weeks, maybe we'd get two. We tried the original Staples-Office Depot case before Judge Hogan in one week, we tried the SunGard case before Judge Huvelle in a couple of days. We can try this in whatever period of time the Court permits. I think a two-week trial or something in that order of magnitude would be sufficient. Again, we want to be flexible. All we really care about is getting a judicial resolution by the end of the year.

We're willing to adjust discovery periods --

THE COURT: So notwithstanding the Department of

Justice's estimate that it needs three and a half weeks for its

case, and presumably you would need, if they took that long, you'd probably need a week or two for your case, notwithstanding that, I should ignore that and I should set the case on a shorter schedule. And I'm not saying that judges don't do that, and I'm not saying that I haven't set a case on a shorter schedule than the parties have indicated. But that's what you want me to do?

MR. CURRAN: Absolutely. I think the DOJ to say that they need three or four weeks for their case-in-chief, that's hard to square with the history of Section 7 cases. I think that would be unprecedented.

And by the way, Your Honor, you know that chart, there was a bunch of discussion about the chart in the DOJ's submission. Some of those cases, like the Bazaarvoice case, that was a post-closing case. So there was no urgency there, no rush. That whole analysis is skewed.

We put forth in our brief actual injunctive actions under Section 7, some of them FTC actions, some of them DOJ actions. But those are the real precedents here. And what we're asking for is not out of line with what this court has done, including what Your Honor has done.

Now, I know that there's an argument that Arch Coal is not as complex as our case. It's easy to argue about relative complexity of different cases. I've read and analyzed your Arch Coal decision in some detail. That was a complex case,

with an esoteric industry, dealing with Btu powers of various types of coal, the visibility of railway cars --

THE COURT: I'm not sure you're going to convince me or most members of the public that health care is not an esoteric industry.

(Laughter)

MR. CURRAN: Well, that may be true, but at least it's an industry that you and I and everyone else has some familiarity with out of the blocks, in contrast to the Arch Coal situation dealing with Wyoming coal mining, where I don't think any of us walk into that with some basic understanding.

So, yeah, there are going to be challenges, there are challenges in all of these cases, and that's part of the process. And Your Honor has recognized that. Your Honor recognized that in Arch Coal and in an article you wrote after that case.

So we think, yeah, there are challenges, but speed is essential here. It's dictated by Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as Your Honor I think alluded to in your comments when Mr. Jacobs was addressing you.

THE COURT: But it doesn't dictate a specific expedition, it just dictates expedition, and as I think all will agree, if these cases were tried in the spring, it would still be an expedited schedule in this court compared to most cases.

MR. CURRAN: Compared to most cases, that's right, but

any other questions or concerns Your Honor has.

THE COURT: Let's hear from your colleagues. I may

not compared to most Section 7 cases. I'm available to answer

THE COURT: Let's hear from your colleagues. I may have some more questions for you or others, but let's hear from others. Cigna have anything to add?

MR. RULE: Your Honor, I think as we said in our papers, we would defer to Anthem. I don't think anything Mr. Curran has said I would dispute.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rule.

All right. Aetna. You think your case is simpler than the Anthem case?

MR. MAJORAS: I think our case is simpler. We've obviously been looking at the Anthem case since it was filed by the Department of Justice on the same day, and if you look at the different allegations, especially the product market allegations, it is a, in our view, I think consistent with what the DOJ has said, a broader case than what you will see in the Aetna case.

I think also there are some aspects of the Aetna case that, despite the number of geographic markets that are alleged, a number of issues are going to override all of those markets.

So, for example, one of the things that the Department of Justice has done is it has excluded original Medicare as part of the product market. And we think the evidence will make it very clear from the outset of when you first go on the CMS Web site

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and it says to people who have now aged in, here are your choices, the Medicare Advantage options or original Medicare.

And we think, when we get into the economic data on that, it will show that original Medicare belongs on all of these product markets that the DOJ has alleged.

MR. MAJORAS: Well, I think we are looking at the prospect, Your Honor, of whether it can be submitted short of trial in terms of on the papers. But I think that the information in particular that the economic experts will be able to add in terms of the movement among plans and back and forth and what the different options are and the fact that, although the plans may have different features, if you look at what are important to seniors as they choose them and as they choose over time, it will show that it's in that market. And we think the expert testimony on that will be very helpful.

But in terms of simplifying the trial, it certainly will do that because we think when that is apparent, that original Medicare belongs in that market, it's going to take care of virtually every market that is alleged -- geographic market alleged by the Department of Justice and move it outside of any ability to claim there is a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.

Likewise, with respect to the divestiture, as counsel indicated, Mr. Conrath indicated, there is a divestiture. It

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was announced by Aetna and Humana a few days ago, earlier this week. But that has been in the works for a long time. I think this allegation that during the course of the investigation there was a vague statement about a divestiture is hardly the case.

The divestiture option was put on the table frankly to try to resolve the case, to try to settle the case before it ever got to the point of litigation. The parties who were potential buyers were put before the Department of Justice.

THE COURT: I think the only thing they've said, in response to my question, although they were going to raise it independently, is that that's another subject that requires factual exploration in terms of discovery. I don't think they're faulting or criticizing you for it.

MR. MAJORAS: No, I don't take it as a criticism that we did it. I think the issue is, was it known to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice's answer to our potential resolution of the case was to file the lawsuit. That was the first we had heard of their answer.

Will there be some discovery on that? I certainly think there will be. However, that issue is yet another issue that's going to override or at least apply across the vast number of the geographic markets.

THE COURT: When do you suggest that the Aetna-Humana case should be tried?

MR. MAJORAS: We have said, purposely vaguely, mid-fall. I hate to get into the judge's calendar -
THE COURT: What does mid-fall mean?

MR. MAJORAS: Your Honor, I think in the October-November period is the ideal time for this. If you look at the cases that we've been hearing about and the timing available and what needs to be done in these cases, I think that appropriately allows both parties to take the discovery they need, put on what we need from our defense standpoint.

THE COURT: Do you agree with Anthem that -- maybe I should put it differently. Do you agree generally that if Anthem's case needs to be tried in mid-fall and your case needs to be tried in mid-fall and your case needs to be tried in mid-fall, the same judge can't do both?

MR. MAJORAS: No, I don't agree with that at all. And we have not put that in our papers specifically because we don't agree with that.

THE COURT: So how would the same judge do both?

MR. MAJORAS: Well, I think the sequencing of the trials would be one, and obviously would be dependent upon Your Honor's views of how to handle that. I think that there can be a sequencing of the trials one into the next in terms of -- the real issue being when and how Your Honor would want to come to a decision, what time you would want to do that with respect to the first case, whether those decisions are pending both cases being tried, whether there's some other alternative opinions to

1 I haven't sat on that side of the bench to know 2 those --3 THE COURT: So you're of the view that there is so 4 little overlap that the outcome of one case doesn't have any 5 impact on the other case? 6 MR. MAJORAS: I can't sit here and say what the impact 7 would be of one case on the other. 8 THE COURT: In some of these markets, all four 9 companies, or at least three of the companies do compete. 10 Right? 11 MR. MAJORAS: Yes. 12 THE COURT: So even though you might not be -- all 13 four might not be in the top four or five competitors in that 14 market, they are all competitors in the market. 15 MR. MAJORAS: Well, then, you would have to look at 16 each individual geographic market at the time. 17 THE COURT: Some of the geographic markets may be 18 different, but in terms of the product market. 19 MR. MAJORAS: For the product market, certainly in the 20 commercial products that are alleged, there is an overlap 21 between the cases, and I think as you suggested very early in

I think having separate judges look at that issue in particular does set up the potential that there could be

very well carry over to the next case.

these proceedings, that the decision on the product market may

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conflicting decisions on that. I think if you look at the relationship of the cases between the regulations that are going to be involved, the antitrust issues, and the antitrust legal aspects of how to analyze the different markets even though they may be different between the cases, is something that I think will be very efficient for the Court to be able to handle and do it in a way that doesn't create a conflict.

Our discussion on the differences in the cases that Mr. Curran read was specifically on the question of whether the cases should be tried together. And here I think all parties before you have agreed there should not be a trial.

I'm not going to belabor that since it's already been stated, but the comments about how the case would be presented to the Court, we don't see a great deal of overlap in terms of witnesses and things like that. But from a discovery standpoint, I think we suggested the special master, I've used that before in other cases. In the airlines case we think it was very effective.

THE COURT: And you think it would work well even with the separation of the two cases?

MR. MAJORAS: I think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would it work well even if the cases were before two different judges?

MR. MAJORAS: Well, first, the judge would have to agree to appoint the same special master.

THE COURT: Assuming the judges were willing to do that.

MR. MAJORAS: But then there's also, depending on what happens with special master opinions, if they have to go up to the judge ultimately for some type of review, again, we have the potential for conflict, we also have the potential of delay in the process. The third parties are going to have views in terms of how their information should be delivered during the course of discovery. I think the special master in the same case with you in charge of it is going to be able to do that much more efficiently and without the prospect of conflicts.

But in terms of the last -- the last thing in terms of my remarks, Your Honor, not to repeat what we have in our briefing, but I think you look at these cases, and you look at the time period that the cases have been put in front of the courts, this court in particular, but district courts around the country, the time period that we're suggesting is very typical and falls really within the range in which we see these cases presented.

All cases have complexity; so to sit here and say this merger was less or more complex than another one I think is difficult to do and probably not worth our time. But it is worth our time to talk about the fact that courts have been able to say, yes, here's the time period, here's the time period for the trial. I've yet to be in front of a judge where we get to say, Judge, we want to go as long as we want and the judge

agrees with me. We know how to take care of issues in terms of how cases are presented in the time period that is allotted for the trial and also allotted for the pretrial.

The issue, as we said, Your Honor, we have a drop-dead date of the end of this year.

THE COURT: Should I give more weight to your drop-dead date than to Anthem's drop-dead date, or are both drop-dead dates, so to speak, of the same import here?

MR. MAJORAS: Well, I think you give them the same import, but the difference of course is they're different in timing. Our drop-dead date is the end of this year. That had already been extended once. And my understanding of the Anthem deal is that the drop-dead date now is the end of April. And I think that's a critical issue in terms of how these cases ought to be sequenced.

Are those dates at the control of the parties? Sure, from some aspect, they are. They were set quite some time ago with a view in mind of how long this should take, also recognizing that there could be litigation. Our case has been under investigation for over 13 months. And for the DOJ really to come in here and say we need more time because we don't know that much about it -- and I recognize that's a paraphrase of what they said earlier --

THE COURT: They would say an overstatement.

MR. MAJORAS: That may be the case. And perhaps it

is. But it's not an overstatement to say that they've had subpoena power for third parties throughout the course of this investigation, that they've collected millions of documents from the parties during the course of this investigation, that they've looked at all of these different markets during the course of the investigation, did not disclose the number of markets and the specific counties to us until fairly late in the investigation, only a few months ago.

So to suggest that somehow it is one-sided is not correct.

And likewise, to talk about the regulatory issues, that somehow they have to investigate that, CMS is part of the government.

We've already been told that and we recognize that.

THE COURT: So if I were to agree with you and Mr. Curran with respect to the significance of the deadlines that are in play here, and that therefore each of these cases needs to be resolved by the end of the year, and therefore each needs to be tried approximately in the October-November time frame, but I were to disagree with you as to whether one judge can effectively do that, what should I do?

MR. MAJORAS: My view is, and our view is that this case is one that is both going to be ready, and because of the issues that we just talked about in terms of how the cases align and the issues in the case, this is a case that can be and ought to be tried initially and ought to be tried by you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MAJORAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything from Humana?

MR. GARDINER: Nothing further from Humana, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So from the government's perspective, if I thought that these cases merited, whether because of the deadlines set by the parties, by the corporate parties, or for other reasons, greater expedition than you're arguing, and therefore needed to be resolved by the end of the year or shortly thereafter, what should I do? Should I hold on to both cases and try both cases? Is that what you would suggest?

MR. CONRATH: I think we can't say we know the answer to that, Your Honor. We understand --

THE COURT: I know you don't know my schedule. Take a guess that my schedule is flexible enough to do it. I'm not saying that's true. Indeed, there's a real question mark there. But just assume for the moment that it could be done by one judge, this judge. Is that what should be done?

MR. CONRATH: We take Rule 41 to be a judicial efficiency rule, and Mr. Jacobs identified some of what seemed like the judicial efficiencies that apply here, and they would apply in a very difficult situation that you're positing.

Yeah -- yes, but, look, we understand at the end of the day it's the judicial efficiency that matters, and the Court -- we'll respect whatever decision obviously of the Court. If the Court

felt the need to make another decision, we would obviously adjust and deal with keeping them as coordinated as was possible under a different arrangement.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not sure exactly what your answer was to my question.

(Laughter)

MR. CONRATH: I guess that reveals the question that we weren't exactly expecting, Your Honor. Let me put it this way. We think the Court -- there are efficiencies to keeping them together, and if the Court --

THE COURT: Together meaning before one judge?

MR. CONRATH: Yes, before one judge. No other way.

And that would be our recommendation. But we respect the reasons why you might decide otherwise.

THE COURT: And what's your reaction to the view -paraphrasing what was said -- that the estimates you're giving
for trial are longer than necessary and these cases can be tried
in a shorter period of time?

MR. CONRATH: When I heard that, I tried to think back to my experience in prior cases, and I think I would say that they're usually -- they've gone both ways, both a little longer than the trial lawyers estimated beforehand, but also a little shortening beforehand. You know, in the 10 to 20 percent range.

THE COURT: Well, I assume they'd go shorter if the trial lawyers estimate X, and the judge allots X minus 2.

MR. CONRATH: Well, that's not the situation I would suggest. Obviously, that's one way to address it. And we've seen courts assign hours per party, and that's one way to handle it. I think, as the plaintiffs with the ultimate burden of persuasion, we would urge sufficient time that we can get our case in and be convincing, but obviously we know that courts have limited time and understand that one of the ways that that's dealt with sometimes is setting a fixed time.

THE COURT: I assume that when Anthem says first three weeks and now even down to two weeks for trial, they're saving some of that time for themselves. So they're saying in the Anthem-Cigna case, that that case, the government only needs a week or a little more to present the case. And when Aetna says two weeks, they saying to the government, you only need a week or a little more to present your case. Do you think that's a sufficient time?

MR. CONRATH: No, I don't. I think that's too short.

If you think that -- just thinking about what are -- the evidence that the Court's likely to hear, in particular, economic evidence is very important in merger cases, both examination and cross-examination in order to effectively get it in front of the Court --

THE COURT: If all issues have to be tried, if there isn't any simplification of the Aetna-Humana case, how many expert witnesses do you think the government would be presenting

in its case-in-chief? How many expert witnesses?

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MR. CONRATH: Perhaps two, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just two. Okay.

MR. CONRATH: You touched on the subject of simplification, if I could just comment briefly on that.

Because we've heard the suggestion from Aetna that maybe the whole question of Medicare and Medicare Advantage would simplify the whole trial and enable it to go much faster.

Actions sometimes speak louder than words, because last week they served discovery on HHS related to the Medicare product market definition question, that we now hear from HHS just one speck there would require, they estimate, about 250 million records. They want records of everyone who's ever enrolled in Medicare and Medicare Advantage since 2001.

These are records that are their reports, they can include people's medical conditions and identifying information. Just to mask that data that they've sought in order to enable it to be produced is a process that could take, based on HHS's first response to us, more time than they're anticipating for the entire proceeding.

But sometimes actions speak louder than words. The suggestion that this can be simplified so fast is inconsistent with the idea that you need this vast, burdensome discovery on HHS. You really can't have it both ways.

THE COURT: Let me ask one other question, but it may

be that this is a better question with respect to the Anthem case. Take your last best shot at telling me why these are related cases, why the United States believes that notwithstanding independent product markets, and even geographic markets for the most part, and issues that will be unique to each case that are very, very important — the product market and inclusion or exclusion of Medicare, for instance, on the Aetna case, the monopsony issues with respect to the Anthem case — why nonetheless are these cases under our local rules really cases that predominantly have common issues of fact and/or law?

MR. JACOBS: Well, the overlap, as I said before, really goes to the individual market, and there will be a question about what the proper relevant product market is there, hearing expert testimony in whichever case is tried first, and that that will have an effect on the definition of the relevant product market in the second case in that same market.

There are no common relevant geographic markets because in the individual cases relevant geographic markets we contend are at the county level. But as I mentioned before, there are similar third parties who are competitors in both of the cases that, even if we don't bring them into the courtroom for you to hear, their documents, perhaps deposition testimony depending on how the Court wants the admission of that handled at trial, will come in.

THE COURT: Common witnesses isn't really what the local rules are built on, though, the fact that there might be common witnesses in the case. All right. Anything else on that?

MR. JACOBS: Not on that issue, Your Honor. If I could just touch on what you're characterizing as the significance of Anthem's deadline? You know, the significance of the deadline for Anthem, its date is much farther out. It's almost nine months from now.

It's our belief that if this court decides that that is a significant deadline, and that instead of building up and deciding how much time do we need to build the appropriate record, rather, let's decide what the deadline is and work back.

The Court would be assuming that nine months from now, if

Anthem tries the case, wins -- because this argument is only

relevant if the Court denies our request for injunction -- that

it will not be able to go to Cigna, that things won't be patched

up enough then to say we won in court, we're this close --

THE COURT: Well, I have no idea how things will stand between Anthem and Cigna then and whether Cigna will say, well, it's a better economic decision for us to say, no, it's a regulatory obstacle and under our agreement you can't push us beyond April 30 and so give us \$1.8 billion.

MR. JACOBS: That's precisely my point, Your Honor. We're assuming -- if you decide that that deadline is

significant, you're assuming that Cigna will terminate on May 1.

And we don't know that. I mean, we know --

THE COURT: No, you don't.

MR. JACOBS: Right. And the length of time between now and April 30 and the effect that an opinion from this court denying a request for injunction would have both on Cigna, but also the state DOIs -- as Mr. Curran said, there are some statutory deadlines there, but part of their analysis is competitive as well.

Second, Mr. Conrath offered a list of things, and you asked the appropriate question, what do you really need after a year of discovery, or if you want to characterize it, you know, four months with their documents, what else do you need? I have a similar list of things we need from the parties, which I can go through, if Your Honor would like to hear it, but I would like to point out one thing. In addition to additional discovery on Anthem and Cigna, there's important third-party discovery that we need time for.

And while this court may decide it's appropriate to expedite this and require the defendants to respond to our document request in less than 30 days, Rule 45 gives third parties some rights that we don't think can be sped up. I've mentioned United before. They're a competitor in the national accounts market. We received relatively few documents from them in the investigation. We're going to need substantially more

from them. We're going to have to get documents from Anthem's joint venture partners, the other BlueCross BlueShield plans, as well as the BlueCross BlueShield Association.

One of the ways this merger lessens competition is that today, Anthem, that competes under the Blue Cross and Blue Shield license in 14 states, in one of -- some of those states it doesn't have the shield license -- cooperates with its joint venture plans to win national accounts against the likes of United and Cigna and Aetna.

If this merger goes through, Anthem is going to own Cigna. And so it's going to be both at the same time competing with the Blues' plans to win national employer business, and competing against them with their Cigna hat on. We need some more discovery to find out how that's going to work if there's concern among other Blues plans, and we did receive in the investigation some documents from other Blue Cross plans but not many.

So those are just two examples of some third-party discovery. We were made aware yesterday that Anthem served a draft subpoena on a third party in Connecticut. So it's already going on third-party discovery, and I don't want the Court to assume that things can be expedited and that all discovery that needs to be done is for us to give them our investigative file and for them to give us more documents, because it's more complicated than that. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I have a couple of observations. Mr. Curran.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, I just wanted to respond briefly to Mr. Jacobs on that. First, perhaps, on the relatedness point. The case law shows that the designation -- correctness of the designation is the burden of the party asserting relatedness. And I think it's pretty apparent that DOJ cannot carry that burden here under this court's case law and under local rule 40.5, for reasons I've already said.

Now, Mr. Jacobs makes a point that there may be common witnesses in the two cases, but the cases are so different, like in the case of United Healthcare, United Healthcare might have witnesses in both cases, but in one case it would be United Healthcare's people dealing with commercial health insurance, and the other with Medicare Advantage. So that's kind of a false argument there.

And I guess I've already said this, but our end date is real. There's every indication that it is. DOJ kind of gloated in their complaint about the contentiousness between the parties, so they shouldn't be heard now to be suggesting that that's not real. They made the allegation.

Again, Your Honor, we just want the speed necessary to make sure that there's a judicial determination about this merger, not just for the parties, but also for the customers who may benefit from the huge efficiencies that we claim. If we're

right about the efficiencies that this merger will bring, and this merger dies on the vine, then customers and consumers will be deprived of those potential efficiencies. And I think that's what Section 15 of the Clayton Act is all about, making sure there's a judicial determination, not an executive branch determination that survives strictly because of delay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Before I get into talking about this a little bit, I should make sure that none of you have a problem with my handling particularly the Anthem case. Before I became a judge, I did represent the BlueCross BlueShield Association and several Blue Cross plans in various contexts, not merger contexts. That's 20 years ago, 15, 20 years ago. But I want to make sure that that doesn't pop up later on as a surprise to anyone and that there's no problem from that perspective. So first I'll ask Anthem if there's any problem.

MR. CURRAN: No, Your Honor. In fact, I had forgotten you had once been in private practice.

THE COURT: I've sort of forgotten that too.

(Laughter)

MR. CURRAN: No. That issue does not concern us. Thank you.

MR. JACOBS: The government doesn't have an objection either, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So basically, in trying these cases, we've got three alternatives it sounds like. Try them both in 2016, try one in 2016 and one early in 2017 -- early meaning perhaps in February -- by the February time period, March at the very latest. Or let them both slide until early 2017, as the government would like. The defendants all would like them both tried in 2016.

Both DOJ and Aetna think, apparently, that I could do that. I question whether they are right. These cases, as the Department of Justice has brought them, are of great magnitude and significance, and to say that I could complete the task by the end of the year, if that's what I decide would have to happen with these cases, in both cases, seems to me to fly in the face of what the government is saying is necessary in order to prepare the two cases, and the magnitude and significance of the two cases. So I don't think it's really realistic to think that one judge could accomplish that and be fair to all parties and to the public with respect to these matters, given whatever significance one thinks they have, and certainly everyone agrees that they are of some significance.

So if it's going to be done in 2016, if I'm going to pay attention to the deadlines that the companies have imposed upon themselves, the merger partners, then I'm going to have to send one case back for reassignment to another judge.

So I think you all have to think about that, because that's

my determination, that I can't do both, and I'll give you time if you need it to think about, okay, based on that determination, do you still think that each case has to be decided by the end of the year and therefore I should send one case back for reassignment. And you can respond to that or ask for more time when I finish.

I do believe that coordination of the pretrial discovery proceedings is something that can be advantageous here even if there are two judges handling the cases. Whether the cases are going to trial in 2016 or 2017 or a little bit of each, I think it needs to be someone who's experienced and knows what they're doing with discovery of this complexity and magnitude, but there are such people out there. And I would suggest that we should do that in any event.

There's a little bit of complication if there are two judges in terms of review, but I don't think that's an insurmountable hurdle; I think that's something the judges could easily coordinate with the special master and not have that be a cause for delay or inefficiency.

So, unless the schedule is put off, I'm sending one of these cases back. I'm not telling you which one I'm going to send back. There are reasons to do one or the other. There are reasons based on the simple fact that the Anthem case was filed first. That is serendipitous, as the government has confirmed. It's just the way it happened. There are reasons to go the

other way that have to do with which merger occurred first, which merger the Department of Justice was notified of first, and the facts even, I suppose, that the state insurance approvals are in a much better posture with the Aetna case than they are with the Anthem case. I think 18 to 20 have already been accomplished.

But there are reasons -- I'm not going to go into all of them. There are reasons to send one or the other case, and I think for your purposes, I think you just have to understand that there's a 50 percent chance for each of you that the case would be before me, and then a 50 percent chance that it'll be before one of 16 or 17 other judges.

So, I guess that my inclination is to say that if I have one case to try, I will do it on a faster schedule than the government is proposing. What exactly that schedule will be, I think I need to think through a little bit both in terms of my own availability and calendar, but also with respect to some of the things that have been said both in writing and here today, with respect to whichever of the two cases. But I think it will be on a faster schedule than the government is proposing.

Whether it will be on a schedule that matches up exactly with the deadlines that the parties to the mergers have agreed to remains to be seen, and for the case that I'm not doing, that's up to the other judge. It's not up to me to set that schedule.

So I'd like anyone to react to these musings in whatever way you'd like to.

MR. CURRAN: Your Honor, maybe two points. Number one, we are not posturing about the need for a judicial resolution at the end of the year. So the idea of trying the Anthem case next year from our perspective is a nonstarter. That would just kill the deal. So in terms of timing, that's where we are.

In terms of which case Your Honor holds --

THE COURT: You think that that's something that the parties to mergers can always do to the courts? They can come in and say, look, we want to merge, the Department of Justice challenges it, but you've got to decide this by X date because otherwise it's going to kill our merger? We've decided that it's going to kill our merger. So is that a position that merger partners can always put the courts in?

MR. CURRAN: I think not. I think not.

THE COURT: Well, if not, then why here?

MR. CURRAN: Because we set these dates in a merger agreement well over a year ago. There's no gaming of the dates. There's no demonstrated possibility of extending the dates. So in this situation --

THE COURT: It's only that you can put the courts in that position if the two merger partners aren't getting along very well.

MR. CURRAN: Well, no. I'd say -- I think the Clayton Act contemplates expedition where the circumstances are such that expedition is clearly warranted. If we could extend the date, we would. We can't. So we're stuck. And that's the predicament we think is not really of our own making. Yeah, the merger agreement set those dates. That was way far ago and well before it was foreseeable that we would be here now.

We worked with the Department of Justice in good faith. You know, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act contemplates like a 30-day period, and then a second request and then a 30-day period. Instead of those 60-plus days, we spent a year there dealing with multiple requests, wave after wave. You see the George Paul declaration which talks about the terabytes of data, the 20-some depositions of Anthem alone, the four million documents totaling 19 million pages, all of that stuff.

So here the dates are real and set long ago. It's not a situation -- in fact, I would contrast it with the Aetna-Humana situation where they are getting along and they plainly have the ability to extend their deadline if they wish. And it was only in June of this year that they set December.

So I think the facts and circumstances -- and I'm not impugning anyone's integrity or anything else like that. It's just the circumstances are different.

And then one further point, Judge Bates.

THE COURT: I'd be encouraging merger partners not to

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get along, because that way they could force the courts to decide the cases on their schedule.

MR. CURRAN: I hope you don't have any doubt about the bona fides here --

THE COURT: I don't have any doubts about the bona fides. I'm not questioning the bona fides. I'm just questioning the control over the Court's schedule that the circumstances warrant.

MR. CURRAN: One further point, and this is circling back to some of the case law. I referred to the <u>Tripp</u> case before, which again is that unusual case with the calendar committee issuing an opinion. And that case emphasizes the importance of the random assignment process and the integrity that that imbues with the court.

There the three-judge panel wrote that "The fundamental rationale for the general rule requiring random assignment of cases is to ensure greater public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. The rule guarantees fair and equal distribution of cases to all judges, avoids public perception or appearance of favoritism in assignments, and reduces opportunities for judge-shopping."

So I would submit to Your Honor that principles of judicial administration and public perception would support Your Honor keeping the case which was randomly assigned to you, and instead sending back for random assignment the second case, because

that's consistent with these principles that underlie this court's random assignment process.

THE COURT: I think that's consistent with these principles, but I don't think doing it otherwise is inconsistent with them either. I mean, there's no risk that anyone would perceive that things have happened other than randomly even if I decided that, for a variety of reasons, weighing each case, that it made more sense for me to hold on to the Aetna case, I can't even imagine how anyone would be perceiving that this was some process that was skewed by the parties or by the Court.

MR. CURRAN: Yeah. Well, maybe. But some might submit that when a party files two complaints and files the first and may learn who the judge is, and then makes an election whether to designate a case as related or not, that that's not fully on the up and up. I don't know if that's what happened here, but we have a mistaken designation of relatedness.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CURRAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MAJORAS: Your Honor, John Majoras again. Just so that our position is clear in terms of the sequencing of the tries. You had given three alternatives. We are not in any way suggesting to the Court that both cases need to be tried in 2016.

THE COURT: Just yours.

(Laughter)

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MR. MAJORAS: Well, absolutely. Absolutely.

THE COURT: I think that's Anthem's position too.

(Laughter)

MR. MAJORAS: What I'm suggesting, though, Your Honor, is that instead of looking at things such as whether the parties are getting along with each other and, as you pointed out, would seem to suggest not getting along as a better way to get an early trial date, the objective issues are pretty clear.

The deadline of the Aetna deal is at the end of this year. The Aetna deal has been around longer, has been under investigation longer than the Cigna-Anthem deal. The Cigna-Anthem parties have already indicated that their deadline can be extended until the end of April.

All of those are straightforward issues in terms of the sequencing and allowing the Court to try these cases in a way that perhaps may not be what the lawyers want, but are still going to be in a situation where the parties can get their mergers done if they are successful in defeating the action brought by the government.

And I think on this last point, and in terms of the randomness and forum shopping, to suggest or even imply that Aetna and Humana somehow were doing any kind of forum shopping, your assignment to this case is no different than any other random assignment that is made in terms of how it came about.

think a situation where in the old days if you actually had to show up in front of the clerk with two different complaints, it's a situation where the government reached into their left pocket first and their right pocket second in terms of the

randomness of how these got assigned.

So to somehow suggest that there is forum shopping or that there's going to be anything that gets into the integrity of the court system, I think is inappropriate under the circumstances here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anything else from anyone?

MR. CONRATH: Judge, two very small points.

THE COURT: Small but important, right?

MR. CONRATH: Yes. Small but important. Small but significant, which is an antitrust jargon joke. You see that the laughter was behind me. I apologize.

Two points. One, Mr. Curran made I thought a very candid statement about these deadlines which are really option dates. Nothing happens on December 31. The parties do nothing, the deal just continues to exist until the Court rules. There's an option that one party gets to back out of the deal, but they can change that date, they can do nothing. Either of those lets the deal just keep running.

But Mr. Curran said, if we could extend it, we would.

Well, because they recognize that's right. As I say, that may

not be true for Mr. Curran, but that's surely true for Aetna and Humana, who appear to be getting along just fine.

So the Court shouldn't feel that a party can successfully take itself hostage and demand that the Court make a decision in the time that they picked. There's no particular importance to that date. They could have picked April 30, as the other parties did at approximately the same time; they could have picked November 30, and they could be in here saying we need to have a trial in two weeks. The Court should take the time the Court needs to make a decision on a full and fair record.

The other thing I need to touch is the question of assignments since this has been raised. The local rule -- we think that we were obligated to identify these as related. The local rule says that civil cases are related if they involve common issues of fact.

So we understand that whether they stay related is a question for the Court later. We related them because they involve common issues of fact and we felt obligated --

THE COURT: I'm not faulting you for identifying them as related. I'm just questioning whether, upon further examination, whether they should stay related.

MR. CONRATH: And we understand that, Your Honor. Thank you.

MR. JACOBS: Excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What, you want to rebut what he said?

(Laughter)

MR. JACOBS: I though Mr. Conrath was going to address this point. Mr. Curran suggested that maybe we made the related case decision after we filed the first case and saw that it had been assigned to you. And that is not true. We decided before filing both of these complaints, they were going to be related.

As I said before, we happened to file the Anthem case first for some reason, because there are more state co-plaintiffs.

But we did not engage in any kind of judge shopping. We decided internally, we're going to file these, they will be on the same day, these will be related cases, and then we went ahead and did it that way.

THE COURT: Well, if you pay any attention to media or the lawyer talking heads in the media, one would think that you would not have chosen to have the case assigned to me.

(Laughter)

I hope none of you are paying attention to that stuff.

All right. I will take action along the lines that I've indicated. In all likelihood, I will be back in touch with those who are on the case that will stay with me promptly to see if we need to get back together to set the actual schedule in the case, and with respect to this question of special master.

The question of special master, I probably will coordinate on that with whoever the other judge is so that we can see if we can do that and do it in a way that works for all involved. And

I will do this promptly. If we get back together, it's likely to be next week, not later than next week. And I appreciate the promptness of your submissions, the care that you've given to both those and what you said here today.

Some of these scheduling and logistical matters are, quite frankly, not easy to get through, but we'll get through them and get on with getting to the pretrial proceedings and the resolution of these important cases as quickly as we can. So thank you again.

(Proceedings adjourned at 11:48 a.m.)

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CERTIFICATE

I, BRYAN A. WAYNE, Official Court Reporter, certify that the foregoing pages are a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Bryan A. Wayne
BRYAN A. WAYNE