United States of America v. Bazaarvoice, Inc.





Elimination of Competition in the Product Ratings and Reviews Platform Market

- Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews were each other's closest rivals
- Bazaarvoice acquired PowerReviews to end the rivalry and insulate itself from future competition
- No other firm has replaced, or is likely to replace, the lost competition



The Merger Violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act

- The relevant market is . . .
 - > product ratings and reviews platforms
 - > used by retailers and manufacturers with U.S.-facing websites
- The merger greatly increased concentration in an already concentrated market and is presumed illegal
- The merger eliminated price and innovation competition
- Entry or repositioning has not happened and is unlikely




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Clayton Act Section 7 Standard




"It is well established that a section 7 violation is proven upon a showing of reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect."

FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984)



Clayton Act Section 7 Standard




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Clayton Act Section 7 Standard



"Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' ... to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties."

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962)

"[D]oubts are to be resolved against the transaction."

FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989)



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Customers Won't Substitute Away From Product Ratings and Reviews

- "its critical for any modern eCommerce or even branded site. You need some form of ratings and reviews." World Kitchen, Trial Tr. 1303:14-16.
- "it [is] industry standard." Bed, Bath & Beyond, Trial Tr. 568:17-18.
- "I think its kind of expected." Astral Brands, Trial Tr. 1353:23.



Customers Won't Substitute Away From Product Ratings and Reviews

Q. And, so given that, in the event that the price of ratings and reviews went up 5 percent, you wouldn't drop ratings and reviews from your Web site entirely would you?

A. No.

Build.com, Trial Tr. 1195:17-20.



Customers Won't Substitute Away From Product Ratings and Reviews


"I think it's clear, given the penetration of ratings and reviews among websites, and that testimony and other documents that I've received, that many customers do view ratings and reviews as an important part of their offering, and one that they would be unlikely to consider giving up."

Dr. Shehadeh, Trial Tr. 1195:17 – 20

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U.S. market for ratings and reviews



U.S. market for ratings and reviews

Brett Hurt trial testimony:

- A. "Yes, for the <u>U.S. market</u> for ratings and reviews . . ."
- A. "In the <u>U.S. market</u> for ratings and reviews, yes."
- A. "I agreed with that for the <u>U.S. retail market</u> for ratings and reviews."
- A. "We had a competitor Reevoo in Europe, which has since entered the U.S. market."

Trial Tr. 130:11; 131:1; 131:19; 193:13




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United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963)




Mergers that increase concentration substantially in a concentrated market are presumptively illegal.

A merger in a concentrated market that created a firm with a 30% market share was *prima facie* illegal.

PRR Market Shares by Customer Count For IR500 Customers, 2012

PRR Market Shares by Revenue For IR500 Customers, 2012






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Bazaarvoice Intended to Reduce Competition



"[E]vidence indicating the purpose of the merging parties, where available, is an aid in predicting the probable future conduct of the parties and thus the probable effects of the merger."

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 329 n.48



Antitrust advice

DOCUMENTS KILL: THE IMPORTANCE OF EVERYDAY DOCUMENTS IN THE ANTITRUST MERGER REVIEW PROCESS

INTERNAL DOCUMENTS DISCUSSING NEARLY ANY
ASPECT OF A MERGER'S MARKETPLACE BENEFITS MAY
BECOME CRITICAL EVIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT
ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION

By Scott A. Sher

The Merger & Acquisition Advisor, Feb. 2002



Antitrust advice

"... it is becoming increasingly important to involve antitrust counsel ... in the early stages of consideration of a strategic transaction to help shape the creation of important documents with an eye towards antitrust scrutiny"




Antitrust advice

"... a company that argues that it faces vigorous competition from multiple sources will likely face an uphill battle if won/loss data reveals that only one or two other bidders regularly compete for the same accounts."


Frequency of Competitors in Bazaarvoice Win/Loss Opportunities

Core R&R Products Only



Competitor Count in Bazaarvoice "How the Deal was Done" Documents

Ratings and Reviews Deals Only



Source: GX1048

S1370-014.pptx Page 25



Feature Competition

- Q. And Bazaarvoice competed with PowerReviews with respect to their moderation capabilities?
- A. Yes.

Brett Hurt, Trial Tr. 112:15 - 17

- Q. And search engine optimization was a competitive battleground between PowerReviews and Bazaarvoice, correct?
- A. It was one of many factors that were considered by clients.

Brett Hurt, Trial Tr. 114:22-25



Feature Competition

Q. And is [analytics] something that Bazaarvoice marketed to its potential clients?

A. Yes.

Q. And it's something that you competed with PowerReviews on, correct?

A. Yes.

Brett Hurt, Trial Tr. 115:25



PowerReviews Pricing Pressure GX-477

Sunday, July 10, 2011 7:21 AM Michael Osborne; Heather Brunner RE: PR Pricing Analysis/ Recommendation MRO / Heather... I read thru the analysis and there are some areas where I need Paul to do his voice-over to make sure I understand his analysis. In the spirit of fierce conversations, I wanted to offer up some additional thoughts actions to consider as we develop a strategy / response to this Power Reviews pricing topic. This is a great role and impact our hear / see a danger From: Sent: To: Subject: is effectively elevati HTDWD's, Forecas "whew, this is PR co translate with custo topic is pretty emoti evident in Friday's f different posture re; PR's place in this deal was mainly a lever to knock us down on Follow Up Flag: So one of our first I really believe our making and messa price....as it is in many of our deals. that better frames t From: Shawn Gaide Sent: Wednesday, June To: Paul Dodd; Bill Fann Subject: FW: HTDWD right wins for the tea in HTDWD attached build from and incli Second, beyond out that are in addition Retail Gents, - Shawn Gaide, Jun 21, 2011 See some feedback bel Prepare a c (via Dave N From: Matt Curtin From: Matt Curtin
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 8:34 PM
To: Shawn Gaide; Bill Glass; Mat Thompson; Nils Marchand
Subject: RE: HTDWD - Clarks Shoes addresses t fact base to Point well taken! I think we do need to stand taller and dismiss the idea that we acti biter that causes price pressure in deals. That's about it. We need to talk about the loss rates. Complete P the positioni important to willing to ma Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 3:25 PM To: Matt Curtin; Bill Glass; Mat Thompson; Nils Marchand Subject: FW: HTDWD - Clarks Shoes Great brand name to add here - congrats Bill. One thing I'd like to float by you guys – I'd love for us to stop messaging that "this deal was highly Power Reviews competitive."

We haven't lost a significant deal to Power Reviews in a long time, meaning that PR's place in this deal was mainly a lever to HIGHLY CONFIDENT Seeing this in every HTDWD makes us seem small in the grand scheme of things, and I think it's bad for our brand internally. We don't compete with PR...we compete against a rapidly-growing social wallet that includes a ton of social vendors, and we're actually in the best position to serve as the social integration platform of record. We need to talk and act that way... From: Joel Pearson Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 3:17 PM To: HTDWD Subject: HTDWD - Clarks Shoes



Date: Fri, 16 To: Lawson E

Lawson

<Greg.Brown@bazaarvoice.com>
Subject: RE: PowerReviews info in SFDC

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

PowerReviews Pricing Pressure GX-1104

Friday, December 16, 2011 4:43 PM Tony Capasso; Bill Fanning Subject: Fw: PowerReviews info in SFDC Would you guys like to give some color commentary? Cheers, Paul Dodd Vice President of Retail Bazaarvoice o 512.551.6540 m 512.413.1183 From: Matt Curtin Sent: Friday, December 16, 2011 09:48 AM To: Lawson Ellinor; Paul Dodd; Greg Brown In MANU we really only see PR when it comes to negotiating the deal. They are brought in as a price-pressure lever (especially for the larger accounts). For A1s they are likely a more credible threat. I do not believe that we flag anywhere in SFDC today any competitive pressure from PR. It is more anecdotal account by account wif you need more. In MANU we really only see PR when it comes to negotiating the deal. They are brought in as a price-pressure lever (especially for the From: Laws Date: Fri, 16 To: Paul Dod <Greg.Brown larger accounts). Subject: Re: Paul...thanks From: Paul D

TRIAL EXHIBIT GX1104

(Deputy Clerk)

BZ-02322164

13-CV-0133-WHO

- Matt Curtin, Dec 16, 2011




Customer leverage

"But I really want to emphasize for the Court, that [switching is] not the good metric of what's going on with competition. The metric is how often are they trying to win each other's customers, bidding, providing leverage for the customers. So that's kind of a key thing to keep in mind here. When Bazaarvoice is trying to win a PowerReviews customer, they're giving that customer leverage."

Professor Shapiro, Trial Tr. 988:20-989:1



Big Fish Games Deposition





Gigya Cannot Replace PowerReviews

- Ratings and reviews is a small fraction of what Gigya does.
- Gigya does not have a network.
- Gigya does not offer syndication.
- Gigya has a simplistic ratings and reviews product that does not allow ratings on specific product attributes.
- Gigya's ratings and reviews product is not fully customizable.
- Gigya does not generally see Bazaarvoice as a competitor.

Trial Tr. 606:3-4; 605:9; 603:4-15; 1208:15-; 1301:3-8



Pluck Cannot Replace PowerReviews

- Q. And in your reports you do not describe any change by Pluck in their strategy for product ratings and reviews that would make them more competitive against Bazaarvoice; do you?
- A. Certainly, I've seen more activity from them at conferences and stuff, but I don't think I [cited] anything specifically at my report that goes to that, no.

Shehadeh Trial Tr. 1945:7-12




Magento Cannot Replace PowerReviews

- Magento's ratings and reviews module is not available to clients using other eCommerce platforms.
- Magento does not have moderation.
- Magento does not offer syndication.
- Magento has a simplistic ratings and reviews product that lacks full functionality.
- Magento has no fraud detection.
- Magento has no analytics tool.


Trial Tr. 884:7-15, 1956:3-1957:9; Lovesac Dep. Tr. 41:8-43:1






Notes: IR500 retailers who list a provider that does not offer product ratings and reviews under Customer Reviews & Forums are counted as "Firms not using PRR." In general, providers are considered to offer PRR if their online content indicates they offer PRR services. When IR500 retailers list multiple providers, their counts are apportioned to each provider equally. Systemax reports ProfitCenter Software as its Customer Reviews & Forums vendor though ProfitCenter Software is a former subsidiary of Systemax and is thus counted as "In-house."






















Orchard Supply Hardware






Abercrombie & Fitch

Confidential




Vitamin Shoppe's PowerReviews Contracts

Old Agreement (12/21/11)



New Agreement (7/26/13)



DX 1796



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Entry is not easy

"Bazaarvoice paid \$168 million for PowerReviews. Well, if somebody could just do that overnight and have the same set of assets, they sure wasted a lot of money, it seems to me, and I'm not going to assume that."

Professor Shapiro, Trial Tr. 2066:7-10