

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION**

COMMISSIONERS: **Lina M. Khan, Chair**
 Rebecca Kelly Slaughter
 Christine S. Wilson
 Alvaro M. Bedoya

In the Matter of

**Illumina, Inc.,
a corporation;**

and

**GRAIL, Inc.,
a corporation.**

**Docket No. 9401
PUBLIC VERSION**

OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

By Chair Lina M. Khan:

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

This proceeding arises from the acquisition by Illumina, Inc. of GRAIL, Inc.² (“the Acquisition”). GRAIL is the developer of a multi-cancer early detection (“MCED”) test that utilizes blood samples drawn from patients. Illumina produces next-generation sequencing (“NGS”) platforms, which are used to analyze genetic material from the blood samples drawn for MCED tests. NGS platforms, thus, are key inputs for MCED testing. The acquisition of GRAIL potentially gives Illumina incentives to favor GRAIL over its rivals by providing GRAIL preferential access or preferential terms for acquiring NGS inputs. Such preferences could distort competition in the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. This case considers whether the Acquisition may cause a substantial lessening of competition. Given the extraordinary importance of promptly developing effective and affordable tools for the early detection of cancer, impairment of the innovation and commercialization process by the Acquisition would be a serious concern.

The Complaint alleges that the Acquisition may lessen competition substantially in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 45; Compl. at 1 and ¶ 81. Specifically, the Complaint asserts that the Acquisition will diminish innovation and potentially increase prices and decrease choice and quality of MCED tests. Compl. ¶ 1. Respondents filed an Answer in which they deny the material allegations of the Complaint and assert that the Acquisition will benefit patients and save lives by accelerating the development, approval, and adoption of GRAIL’s MCED test, Galleri. Ans. 1-3.

¹ We use the following abbreviations in this Opinion:

Ans.	Answer and Defenses of Respondents Illumina, Inc. and GRAIL, Inc.
Compl.	Complaint
CCAB	Complaint Counsel’s Appeal of the Initial Decision
RAB	Respondents Illumina, Inc. and Grail, Inc.’s Answering Brief to Complaint Counsel’s Appeal Brief
CCB	Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Brief
CCRB	Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Reply Brief
RB	Respondents’ Post-Trial Brief
RRB	Respondents’ Post-Trial Reply Brief
RPPF	Respondents’ Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact
ID	Initial Decision (Revised <i>In Camera</i>)
IDF	Initial Decision Finding of Fact
IDL	Initial Decision Conclusion of Law
IHT	Investigational Hearing Transcript
Tr.	Trial Transcript
PX	Complaint Counsel’s Exhibit
RX	Respondents’ Exhibit

² GRAIL, Inc. is now GRAIL, LLC. PX0378 (SEC Form 8-K, Illumina, Inc., Aug. 18, 2021) at 003 (describing merger transactions). This Opinion will refer to both entities as GRAIL. For periods up to the transactions on August 18, 2021, the references refer to GRAIL, Inc., and for periods after those transactions, they refer to GRAIL, LLC.

The case went to a multi-week trial before Chief Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) D. Michael Chappell. Judge Chappell received live or deposition testimony from 56 fact witnesses and 10 expert witnesses. ID 2-3. He admitted over 4,500 exhibits into evidence. ID 3. In an Initial Decision issued on September 1, 2022, Judge Chappell found that Complaint Counsel had failed to prove that a substantial lessening of competition is probable or imminent. ID 193. Accordingly, he found that Complaint Counsel had failed to meet their *prima facie* burden, and he dismissed the Complaint. ID 193-94. Complaint Counsel filed a timely appeal. The Commission heard the parties’ oral arguments on December 13, 2022.

Based on our *de novo* review of the facts and the law in this matter, we conclude that the Acquisition may substantially lessen competition in the relevant United States market for the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s Initial Decision and enter an order requiring Illumina to divest GRAIL.³

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED FINDINGS

A. Cancer Screening and MCED Tests

Cancer is a disease characterized by the development of abnormal cells that divide uncontrollably. RX3869 (Cote Expert Report) ¶ 26. Cancer is understood to be caused by accumulated changes or mutations to the DNA inside cells. *Id.* As a result of changes to DNA, cancer cells differ from normal cells such that they undergo rapid and uncontrolled growth which leads to the formation of tumors. *Id.* ¶ 27. Cancer cells may spread to other parts of the body from where the cancer originated, which is the major cause of cancer deaths. *Id.*

Cancer is the second-leading cause of death in the United States after heart disease and affects one in three people in the United States. RX3869 (Cote Expert Report) ¶ 25; IDF ¶ 65; PX6097 (Abrams Expert Report) ¶ 17. The American Cancer Society estimated that over 1.7 million new cancer cases would be diagnosed in 2019 in the United States. RX3030 at 003 (American Cancer Society, Cancer Facts & Figures 2019). Approximately 630,000 Americans die from cancer each year. IDF ¶ 66. A significant reason why the death toll is so high is that most cancers are discovered only after they have grown and spread in a person’s body, by which point it may be too late to treat the patient effectively. Nolan Tr. 2724-25; Conroy Tr. 1736. Single-cancer screening tests are used to identify five cancer types in the United States: breast, cervical, colon, lung, and prostate. IDF ¶ 69. However, there are no standard screening tests today for most cancers in asymptomatic people. IDF ¶ 68. Stages of cancer range from Stage 0 to Stage IV, with Stage IV being the most advanced. IDF ¶ 77. From Stage 0 to Stage IV, the higher the number, the larger the cancer tumor and the more it has spread into nearby tissues, until Stage IV, which means the cancer has spread to distant parts of the body. IDF ¶ 77 (internal quotation omitted). Currently, over half of cancers in the United States are diagnosed at Stages III and IV. If patients could have cancer detected at an earlier stage, their treatment would benefit dramatically. IDF ¶ 83. By some estimates, patients with cancers diagnosed early, or when they are considered “localized,” have an 89 percent survival rate, compared to a

³ The Commission has reviewed the entire Initial Decision, and all portions of it that are inconsistent with this Opinion are rejected.

21 percent survival rate if diagnosed late or after distant metastases. IDF ¶ 82. Better screening methods to detect more cancers at an earlier stage thus have the potential to extend and improve many human lives.

1. MCED Tests

GRAIL is in an innovation race with other cancer screening companies to develop blood-based screening tests that can detect multiple cancers in asymptomatic individuals at an early stage. ID 167; IDF ¶ 130; PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 156. Typically, cancers are detected and diagnosed through a tissue biopsy or involve an invasive procedure like a colonoscopy. IDF ¶ 87. Tests that sample blood or other bodily fluids, rather than tissue, are known as “liquid biopsy” tests and are being newly developed for cancer screening. IDF ¶¶ 88-89. Liquid biopsy offers advantages over tissue biopsy. Whereas tissue biopsy requires the surgical removal of tumor tissue for pathology testing, liquid biopsy extracts information from the patient’s blood. IDF ¶ 90. Most patients are comfortable and familiar with blood draws. *Id.* MCED tests are intended to be used for the general population, with the goal of screening asymptomatic adults for cancer. IDF ¶ 131. Besides GRAIL, companies working to develop MCED tests include Exact Sciences Corporation (“Exact”), Natera, Inc. (“Natera”), [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Singlera Genomics, Inc. (“Singlera”), Helio Health, Inc. (“Helio”), and [REDACTED]. IDF ¶¶ 273, 338 (*in camera*), 354-5 (*in camera*), 359-60, 387, 395-96 (*in camera*), 484; Rabinowitz Tr. 354; Chahine Tr. 1000-01, 1056-57.

MCED tests work by analyzing “biomarkers,” which are a type of signature or fingerprint at a molecular level that may indicate the presence of cancer. IDF ¶¶ 115-16. A biomarker is either a protein or DNA or RNA or other molecule that is present when cancer is present and absent when there is no cancer. IDF ¶ 116. As cells within the body die, their chromosomes are broken down into small pieces and released into the bloodstream as cell-free DNA (“cfDNA”). IDF ¶ 99. Cancer cells behave similarly. IDF ¶ 101. The cfDNA that cancer cells release to the bloodstream is known as “circulating tumor DNA” (“ctDNA”) and can be analyzed by an MCED test. IDF ¶¶ 102, 134. Because most of the DNA in blood is derived from normal cells, there is a very small amount of ctDNA relative to normal cfDNA. IDF ¶ 104. Detecting cancer signals in otherwise healthy individuals is difficult: finding ctDNA in the blood is like finding a “needle in a haystack of normal cfDNA”. IDF ¶ 105 (quoting PX2013 at 009).

Scientists are focusing on several classes of biomarkers in attempting to detect cancer through a blood test. IDF ¶ 114. For example, as described above, DNA mutations in ctDNA may be examined directly as part of a screening test. IDF ¶¶ 117-120, 136; IDF ¶ 277 (*in camera*). Cell-free RNA (“cfRNA”) may also be useful in the identification of cancer. IDF ¶ 112. Some cancer screening tests rely on methylation patterns in DNA. IDF ¶¶ 121-23, 136. Methylation is a chemical process at the DNA level that plays a role in gene expression. IDF ¶ 121. Methylation changes can lead to genes becoming over-expressed, under-expressed, or silenced altogether. IDF ¶ 122. For example, certain methylation modifications can turn off a tumor suppressor gene, leading to tumor growth and cancer. *Id.* Abnormal methylation patterns are a hallmark of cancer, and MCED tests can utilize them for cancer detection in the blood. IDF ¶¶ 123, 136. Other forms of biomarker analysis include “fragmentomics,” or analysis of aberrant

patterns of cfDNA lengths, IDF ¶¶ 124-25, and “proteomics,” or the analysis of proteins. IDF ¶ 126. Elevated protein expression level is potentially informative for cancer detection. IDF ¶ 127. “Multiomics” refers to utilizing more than one class of biomarker, and potentially more than one type of analyte molecule, to analyze a sample. IDF ¶ 129. The various cancer screening companies are taking different technical approaches to MCED development and focusing on different biomarkers. ID 164. These different approaches are a facet of competition among them. *Id.*⁴

2. Performance Metrics for MCED Tests

The scientific community uses various metrics to evaluate the performance of screening tests such as MCEds. IDF ¶ 140. “Sensitivity” measures the proportion of actual positive samples that are correctly identified as such, or how often a test correctly generates a positive result for people who have the condition for which they are being tested. IDF ¶ 141. Low sensitivity leads to high false negative rates. *Id.* “Specificity” measures the proportion of actual negative samples that are correctly identified as such, or how often a test correctly generates a negative result for people who do not have the condition for which they are being tested. IDF ¶ 143. Low specificity leads to high false positive rates. According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), “A false positive result will lead to potentially harmful follow-up procedures and result in unnecessary anxiety to the individual.” IDF ¶ 144. Positive Predictive Value (“PPV”) is related to the false positive rate. IDF ¶ 146. It is the percentage of patients with a positive test who actually have cancer. *Id.*

B. NGS Platforms

Next Generation Sequencing is a method of DNA sequencing, which is the process of determining the order of nucleotides (A, C, G, or T) in a DNA molecule. IDF ¶ 521. NGS is performed by preparing a DNA sample into a library of fragments which is then loaded onto a glass chip known as a “flow cell” and read by the sequencer. IDF ¶¶ 523-26; Rabinowitz Tr. 307; PX0113 at 002 (Illumina) (A Beginner’s Guide to NGS). NGS entails the use of “consumables,” materials that are used up as part of the sequencing workflow. Aravanis Tr. 1845-46. The two primary types of consumables involved in NGS are library preparation reagents or sample preparation reagents, and core consumables. IDF ¶ 15. Library preparation reagents are used to prepare a sample for testing. IDF ¶ 16. Core consumables are reagents that are required to generate sequencing data on the instrument, such as a flow cell. PX7045 (Chudova IHT) at 83-84; IDF ¶ 17.

⁴ As Illumina’s CEO Francis deSouza stated publicly in June 2017:

There are 70-plus players now in the liquid biopsy space. We want to encourage them to look at all different avenues because this is important and the outcome’s terrific for mankind. There are different points of view . . . And to be honest, I think people are approaching it slightly differently and the market will sort of determine where the biology is and what the right answer is.

The two categories of NGS platforms are short read and long read, with the main differences between them being (1) the number of DNA fragments that the instrument can sequence simultaneously, and (2) the length of those sequenced DNA fragments. IDF ¶¶ 527-28. Short-read sequencers typically prepare each DNA sample into short fragments that are 350 base pairs or less in length. IDF ¶ 529. They provide high read count and low cost per read relative to long-read sequencing. IDF ¶ 532. For example, Illumina’s short-read NovaSeq 6000 can read up to 20 billion DNA fragments per run. Aravanis Tr. 1788. By contrast, long-read sequencers can read tens of millions of DNA fragments per run. IDF ¶ 534. As discussed below, short-read NGS platforms are best suited for use with MCED tests.

1. Use of NGS Platforms for MCED Tests

The term “throughput” means how many samples can be processed over a given period. IDF ¶ 547. Companies consider throughput in determining which sequencer to use. IDF ¶ 552. Throughput affects the “number of people you can get tested in a day,” which “relates to cost and the number of people that you can serve.” IDF ¶ 548 (quoting Conroy Tr. 1580-81). Throughput is measured in “reads per run” or “gigabases per run.” IDF ¶¶ 550-51. “Reads” are the strings of nucleotide bases in each library molecule being sequenced, and “reads per run” measures the number of DNA library molecules an instrument can sequence on each run of the instrument. IDF ¶¶ 549-50. A “gigabase” is a measurement of sequencing information, and is calculated as the number of reads times the length of the read. IDF ¶ 551.

MCED tests require high-throughput NGS platforms. IDF ¶¶ 545, 552-55. Such tests are intensive users of NGS. For example, Guardant’s MCED test in development must sequence approximately [REDACTED] DNA fragments per patient sample because “the fraction of all the cell-free DNA that is found in circulation that originates from the tumor is very small And so in order for you to capture any trace of the tumor, you have to sample multiple [REDACTED] of fragments to find any of them that actually come from the tumor.” IDF ¶ 555 (quoting Chudova Tr. 1211) (*in camera*). Moreover, as MCED tests reach population scale, MCED providers require high throughput so that they can screen many thousands of patient samples per day or per week. PX7070 (Felton IHT) at 52; Nolan Tr. 2720; *see also*, Felton Tr. 1990-91. Finally, throughput affects the MCED test provider’s costs and labor to run the tests. *See, e.g.*, Nolan Tr. 2716; PX7100 (Chudova Dep.) at 61-62 (*in camera*) [REDACTED].

The accuracy of an NGS sequencer refers to the error rate and the types of errors produced by the sequencer. IDF ¶ 556. Accuracy denotes “the fidelity of being able to know that the mutation that you think you’re looking for and you find is actually there or the converse of that, that a negative result for a mutation is reliable.” IDF ¶ 557 (quoting Conroy Tr. 1581). The accuracy of an NGS platform is the most important feature to MCED test developers, because wrong reads cause wrong results with potentially fatal consequences for patients. IDF ¶¶ 558-59. Low accuracy also increases costs to run a cancer screening test because low accuracy requires more sequencing to tell mutation from error. IDF ¶¶ 561-62.

The cost of an NGS platform is an important feature to MCED test developers. IDF ¶ 563. NGS instruments with a low cost per sample are likely to be a major requirement for MCED test providers as they screen many thousands of patient samples per day or per week. IDF ¶¶ 564-65; PX7070 (Felton IHT) at 52; [REDACTED].

Native cell free DNA (cfDNA) is formatted into smaller chunks, and any ctDNA fragments are of relatively short length. IDF ¶¶ 535-36. Consequently, short-read NGS platforms provide the performance parameters needed for use with MCED tests. *See* IDF ¶ 536; IDF ¶ 537 (citing Illumina CEO, Francis deSouza’s view that short-read NGS platforms are much more suitable). As one MCED developer, Natera, explained, “[i]t wouldn’t make any sense to use a long-read sequencer for cell-free DNA. It would be enormously cost-prohibitive to do something like that Nobody would apply that to short-fragment circulating tumor DNA.” IDF ¶ 540 (quoting PX7111 (Fesko Dep.) at 55-56).

2. Illumina’s NGS Technology

Illumina currently sells eleven models of NGS instruments. IDF ¶ 567. The NovaSeq 6000 is Illumina’s high-throughput platform. IDF ¶¶ 566, 568. It can read up to 20 billion DNA fragments per 44-hour run, IDF ¶ 587; Aravanis (Illumina) Tr. 1788, and it generates more than [REDACTED] times the number of reads per flow cell, and more than [REDACTED] times the number of reads per hour, as any non-Illumina instrument widely available for purchase in the United States as of trial. IDF ¶¶ 569-70. Illumina describes the NovaSeq as the “bread and butter” instrument for liquid biopsy. IDF ¶ 572. The NovaSeq is the only sequencer for which Illumina identifies cell-free sequencing and liquid biopsy analysis and methylation sequencing as key applications. IDF ¶ 571. The NextSeq is Illumina’s medium or mid-throughput platform. IDF ¶ 575. [REDACTED]

Illumina also sells multiple versions of flow cells: SP, S1, S2, and S4. IDF ¶ 585. The main difference among the flow cells is magnitude of output. *Id.* The highest output version, the S4, can load 10 billion DNA library fragments, yielding 10 billion single-end reads (or 20 billion paired-end reads if each fragment is read both forward and backward). IDF ¶ 586.

Illumina sells NGS equipment to GRAIL, Exact, [REDACTED], Guardant, Freenome, Singlera, [REDACTED], and Helio, among others. IDF ¶¶ 588, 627 (*in camera*). GRAIL’s Galleri test relies on Illumina’s NGS instruments and reagents, including the NovaSeq. IDF ¶¶ 589-90. GRAIL considers Illumina to be the “gold standard” and most accurate NGS platform, and believes that using Illumina sequencers is “one of the standard approaches to use in the field” IDF ¶¶ 591-92 (quoting Jamshidi (GRAIL) Tr. 4029). After evaluating various NGS platforms, GRAIL concluded that Illumina currently outperforms all other sequencing options across numerous metrics. IDF ¶ 593. The accuracy of Illumina’s NGS sequencers approaches

about one error in several thousand bases, which is necessary to obtain the required specificity for an early detection test and to avoid too many false positives. IDF ¶ 595.

Illumina’s advanced performance characteristics are protected by its intellectual property. “Illumina owns a spectrum of [intellectual property] covering various improvements that enable Illumina’s superior sequencing accuracy, speed, and efficiency. These patents and pending applications have expiration dates ranging from 2023 to beyond 2030. [Illumina’s] patented innovations touch every aspect of the sequencing workflow” IDF ¶ 599 (quoting deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2229-32); PX2822 (Illumina) at 006-07.

3. Importance of Illumina for MCED Test Developers

The ALJ determined that currently only Illumina offers NGS instruments with the characteristics that MCED test developers need. ID 149. We agree. In findings of fact that we here adopt, the ALJ set forth testimony of six MCED developers who explained how they depend on Illumina NGS platforms to run the MCED tests that they are developing or planning because of Illumina’s uniquely superior performance parameters. IDF ¶¶ 598, 600-34; *see also* ID 150. For example, Guardant believes that in comparison to Illumina’s NovaSeq, other NGS platforms are “two or three or five factor[s] away” from what Guardant needs for its MCED test, and “do not allow [Guardant] to sequence this many molecules directly from cfDNA” as it needs for its MCED test in development. IDF ¶¶ 610-11.⁵ Freenome finds that the high throughput of Illumina’s sequencer allows Freenome to achieve “operational efficiency” because it enables Freenome to use a single asset to perform higher-volume testing, as opposed to multiple assets that require daily, weekly, or monthly maintenance. IDF ¶ 617. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IDF ¶ 601 (*in camera*). Singlera and [REDACTED] believe they do not have a viable alternative to Illumina for their tests. IDF ¶¶ 626, 633-34. *See also*, Lengauer (Third Rock Ventures)⁶ Tr. 238-39 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. As Dr. Bert Vogelstein, a co-founder and former consultant of MCED developer Thrive and current Professor of Oncology at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, testified, “[t]he only technology available for short-read sequencing that is at a throughput and cost that would enable liquid biopsy to be analyzed is sold by Illumina.” IDF ¶ 598. [REDACTED]

4. Non-Illumina NGS Platforms

Non-Illumina NGS platforms do not provide an adequate substitute for MCED test developers’ needs. In detailed findings of fact that we adopt here, the ALJ explained that the substitute platforms are inadequate in terms of throughput, accuracy, cost, level of development,

⁵ *See also*, Chudova Tr. 1212, 1300 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

⁶ Dr. Lengauer is the co-founder and former Chief Innovation Officer of Thrive.

risks associated with adoption, or a combination of those factors. IDF ¶¶ 635-722. We highlight some of these facts here and in Sections VII.C.2 and VII.D.2.a below.

a. Thermo Fisher

Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. (“Thermo Fisher”) offers the Ion Torrent line of NGS platforms. IDF ¶ 635. As described in IDF ¶¶ 635-56 (*in camera*) and discussed further in Section VII.C.2 below, Thermo Fisher’s NGS is not an adequate substitute to Illumina’s NGS for MCED test developers due to throughput, cost, and error issues. Thermo Fisher believes that Illumina’s NGS sequencers are better suited than Thermo Fisher’s own NGS sequencers for “any application that requires a very large number of samples . . . like early cancer detection.” IDF ¶ 639. Thermo Fisher sequencers are not currently being used for any MCED tests in development, and [REDACTED] IDF ¶¶ 636, 638 (*in camera*).

b. BGI

BGI Genomics Co., Ltd. (“BGI”) is a China-based genomics company that supplies next-generation sequencing. IDF ¶ 657. MCED developers testified that BGI’s quality, performance, and efficiency do not compare favorably to Illumina’s, deterring them from considering BGI as a supplier. IDF ¶¶ 665-67, 669-70; PX5027 (Illumina) at 57-58 (acknowledging “inconsistent product quality” throughout BGI’s offerings). Customers also described an unwillingness to adopt BGI’s products due to concerns that Illumina’s intellectual property may hinder BGI. IDF ¶¶ 664, 666. Customers also testified to privacy concerns, acknowledged by Illumina, regarding patient data being in the hands of a Chinese company. IDF ¶¶ 666, 668, 671.

c. PacBio/Omniome

Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. (“PacBio”) is a California-based company that supplies long-read sequencing platforms. IDF ¶ 672. Omniome, Inc. is a biotechnology company that was acquired by PacBio in July 2021. IDF ¶¶ 673, 679. [REDACTED] IDF ¶ 674 (*in camera*). Omniome currently does not have a commercial NGS platform on the market. IDF ¶ 680. [REDACTED] IDF ¶ 682 (*in camera*).

d. Oxford Nanopore

Oxford Nanopore Technologies (“Oxford Nanopore”) is a United Kingdom-based supplier of NGS sequencers. IDF ¶ 684. Oxford Nanopore is optimized for reading longer molecules and is unsuitable for the MCED tests of the companies who testified about it. IDF ¶¶ 685-86, 689. Both MCED developers and Illumina itself testified that Oxford Nanopore is an inadequate substitute for Illumina in terms of accuracy and throughput. IDF ¶¶ 685-87, 690-91.

e. Singular Genomics

Singular Genomics (“Singular”) is developing an NGS sequencer called the G4 sequencer. IDF ¶ 692. Singular expects its G4 system to compete with Illumina for sales of sequencers to MCED test developers. IDF ¶ 693. Singular has a goal of [REDACTED] less than NovaSeq’s 10 billion reads per flow cell. IDF ¶¶ 694-95 (*in camera*). Singular faces a number of risks to commercialization, including intellectual property risk and limited operating history. IDF ¶¶ 697-98.

f. Ultima Genomics

Ultima Genomics (“Ultima”) is an NGS sequencing platform developer. IDF ¶ 701. As of June 2021, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was in the process of running three pilot tests on Ultima’s platform. IDF ¶ 704. Ultima met with [REDACTED] has not contracted to participate in Ultima’s early access program. IDF ¶ 705 (*in camera*).

g. Element Biosciences

Element Biosciences (“Element”), founded in 2017, is in the process of developing an NGS sequencer, but currently does not have a commercial NGS platform on the market. IDF ¶ 706. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

h. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

C. The Parties

1. Illumina

Respondent Illumina is a publicly-traded, for-profit Delaware corporation, founded in 1998, with its headquarters in San Diego, California. IDF ¶ 1. Illumina’s principal product offerings are short-read NGS instruments used for DNA sequencing and associated consumables and analytical software. IDF ¶ 4. Illumina is the dominant NGS provider, describing itself as “the global leader in sequencing- and array-based solutions for genetic and genomic analysis.” PX0061 at 005. Illumina’s customers include genomic research centers, academic institutions, government laboratories, and hospitals, as well as pharmaceutical, biotechnology, commercial molecular diagnostic laboratories, and consumer genomics companies. IDF ¶ 6. Illumina’s instruments are “based on [Illumina’s] proprietary technologies,” IDF ¶ 11, and its sequencing instruments require, from a technical perspective, the use of Illumina’s consumables. IDF ¶ 12. Illumina is the only supplier of the core consumables that run on Illumina’s instrumentation. IDF ¶ 18. In 2020, consumable sales accounted for 71% of Illumina’s total revenue, with instrument sales accounting for a further 13%. IDF ¶¶ 13-14.

2. GRAIL

In 2016, Illumina formed GRAIL with the goal of developing a test to detect multiple types of cancer in asymptomatic individuals through a blood draw. IDF ¶¶ 21, 27. At that time, Illumina held a controlling stake in GRAIL. IDF ¶ 27. In connection with its formation, GRAIL raised \$100 million from investors. IDF ¶ 28. Illumina retained 55 percent ownership of GRAIL on a fully-diluted basis and over 90 percent of share voting rights. IDF ¶ 29. As part of Illumina’s controlling stake, Illumina and GRAIL executed a long-term supply agreement in which Illumina provided, *inter alia*, discounted supply terms to GRAIL in exchange for shares of common stock. IDF ¶ 29. Before Illumina reduced its interest in GRAIL, “[GRAIL] had access to technology and pricing that was preferential to [Illumina’s] customers.” PX2406 (Illumina) (Email from J. Flatley (Illumina) to F. deSouza et al. (Illumina), Jan. 2, 2017, attaching draft Q&A document) at 005.⁷

GRAIL required a substantial amount of capital to conduct its foundational clinical trials. IDF ¶ 37. Illumina decided to bring in outside investors to spread the risk while ensuring that GRAIL had the capital it needed to move from concept through clinical trials. IDF ¶ 38. In February 2017, Illumina completed a capital raising campaign in connection with which Illumina reduced its stake in GRAIL to less than 20%. IDF ¶ 40. Illumina thereafter reduced its equity stake in GRAIL to approximately 12% of GRAIL’s outstanding shares on a fully diluted basis. *Id.*

When Illumina spun off GRAIL in February 2017 by reducing Illumina’s stake in GRAIL to less than 20%, Illumina signed an amended long-term supply agreement to supply GRAIL with NGS instruments and reagents. IDF ¶ 41. The agreement included a royalty payment to Illumina of approximately 7% of future net sales of any GRAIL oncology products

⁷ Respondents acknowledge that Illumina provided GRAIL with special pricing and other benefits when Illumina wholly owned GRAIL. RAB 22.

or services until it paid cumulative royalties of \$1 billion, at which point the royalty rate would decline to 5%. *Id.*

After Illumina’s reduction of its stake in GRAIL, GRAIL had “access to technology on [the] same terms and price as [Illumina’s] other large customers.” PX2406 at 005. An Illumina Q&A document stated that Illumina “believe[d] that this [would] accelerate the liquid biopsy market for all.” *Id.*

As of September 2020, GRAIL had raised \$1.9 billion through a combination of venture capital and strategic partners and had grown to over 400 employees. IDF ¶¶ 44, 46.

D. The Acquisition

On September 20, 2020, Illumina entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger to acquire GRAIL for total consideration of \$8 billion. IDF ¶ 58. On August 18, 2021, Illumina consummated the Acquisition. IDF ¶ 60. At the same time, Illumina committed to holding GRAIL as a separate company during the regulatory review being undertaken by the European Commission. IDF ¶ 60. As part of its hold-separate commitment, Illumina represented that “from Closing until the [European Commission] Decision Date,” “the management and staff of Illumina will have no involvement in GRAIL” and that “the day-to-day operation of GRAIL will remain the sole responsibility of GRAIL’s management and the day-to-day operation of Illumina will remain the sole responsibility of Illumina’s management.” IDF ¶ 61 (quoting PX2851 (Illumina) at 002 (Hold-Separate Commitments)).

Illumina has now paid GRAIL the \$8 billion consideration owed under the merger agreement and GRAIL’s Board of Directors has been dissolved. IDF ¶ 64.

E. Regulatory Requirements for MCED Tests

Under the U.S. regulatory regime, a company can offer a clinical test to patients in three ways: as a Laboratory Developed Test (“LDT”), as a single-site in-vitro diagnostic (“IVD”) test,⁸ or as an IVD distributed kit. Goswami Tr. 3185-87. LDTs are the most common offering and involve a company self-certifying its product after clinically and analytically validating the test and then running the test in a single laboratory that has received certification under Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (“CLIA”) and College of American Pathologists (“CAP”) guidelines. Goswami Tr. 3185-86, 3195-96; PX0043 (GRAIL) at 041 (GRAIL 2020 Form S-1); IDF ¶¶ 161-65. The FDA does not review or validate safety or efficacy data associated with a test sold as an LDT. Goswami Tr. 3221-22, 3262; IDF ¶ 165; *see also* PX0043 at 041 (GRAIL 2020 Form S-1). LDTs have lower rates of adoption than FDA-approved tests. IDF ¶ 166.

The other two paths to market, a single-site IVD or a distributed (kitted) IVD, both require FDA approval. A single-site IVD is a test that has been approved by the FDA, but only to run in a single lab, typically the developer’s own lab. IDF ¶ 189. A distributed or kitted IVD is an IVD test that has received FDA approval permitting analysis by independent testing

⁸ An IVD test is a test of human tissue or blood samples that is performed outside the body. IDF ¶ 187.

providers, such as hospitals or large reference labs like LabCorp or Quest Diagnostics. IDF ¶ 190. A distributed IVD model allows a test to reach a larger market because customers across the country no longer have to send samples to a single site for results. [REDACTED]

To gain widespread commercialization and reimbursement of an MCED test, developers need FDA approval for their tests. IDF ¶ 169. For example, FDA approval is necessary for Medicare coverage. IDF ¶ 170. Below we briefly describe the relevant FDA approval process.

Medical devices marketed in the United States are subject to regulatory requirements set forth in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and 21 CFR §§ 1-58, 800-1299. IDF ¶ 168. The FDA classifies an MCED test as a Class III device, the highest-risk category of medical devices, which requires a Premarket Approval (“PMA”). IDF ¶¶ 173-74. A PMA is a regulatory approval from the FDA that requires submitting a lengthy application involving clinical and analytical validation data collected during clinical trials. IDF ¶ 178; *see also* IDF ¶¶ 179-80, 182-83.

An approved IVD test must “lock-in” its specific NGS instrument, reagents, and other system components as part of final FDA approval. PX7045 (Chudova IHT) at 73-74; PX7044 (Stahl IHT) at 60-61. Modifying any component of the approved IVD could require conducting an additional clinical trial with the modified component. PX7045 (Chudova IHT) at 73-74. Because the test is locked-in with a particular NGS platform, switching to new technology platforms is difficult. PX7045 (Chudova IHT) at 73-74; PX7044 (Stahl IHT) at 60-61.

To issue FDA clearance for a distributed IVD test, the FDA typically requires an agreement between a test developer and the sequencing company being used. IDF ¶ 937. As Megan Bailey, CEO of PGDx, explained, the FDA “want[s] to see a co-development agreement typically demonstrating that there is a direct and formal partnership between the instrument provider and the content provider.” IDF ¶ 938 (quoting PX7049 (Bailey IHT) at 42-43). In order to distribute a test to third-party labs, an MCED test developer would need an IVD agreement with Illumina. Goswami Tr. 3262-63, 3268.

F. GRAIL’s Galleri Test

GRAIL’s flagship test is its MCED test, called Galleri. IDF ¶ 48. The test is intended to be used as a screening test in asymptomatic populations. Ofman Tr. 3431. Galleri was offered for sale on a limited basis as a laboratory developed test (“LDT”) in April 2021. IDF ¶ 52. GRAIL currently sells Galleri for a charge of \$949, IDF ¶ 56, and is targeting large, self-insured employers and concierge medicine practices, among other providers. IDF ¶ 53.

Galleri uses a targeted methylation assay to look for cfDNA shed by cancer cells. IDF ¶ 211. It seeks to detect cancer signals by identifying abnormal methylation patterns in a patient’s DNA. IDF ¶ 209. Galleri also uses methylation patterns to predict where the cancer came from in the body (*i.e.*, the molecular cancer signal of origin). IDF ¶ 50. *See infra* Section VII.D.3.c.i (discussing tissue-of-origin issues). GRAIL has developed two versions of Galleri

and is currently developing a third, [REDACTED]. IDF ¶ 214 (*in camera*).

GRAIL claims that Galleri has the ability to detect over 50 cancers from a single blood draw. IDF ¶ 51. However, the parties debate the merits of this claim. To understand the parties' respective positions, some familiarity with the clinical studies is required.

1. Clinical Studies

Starting in approximately 2016, with enrollment concluding in 2019, Galleri underwent a study known as the Circulating Cell-Free Genome Atlas Study ("CCGA"). IDF ¶¶ 216-17. The study comprised three sub-studies: CCGA-1, CCGA-2, and CCGA-3. IDF ¶ 221. CCGA was a prospective, observational, case-control study. RX3409 at 001. A case-control study involves collecting samples from patients after they have already been diagnosed with the disease (the "cases"). Conroy Tr. 1744. The "controls" are typically people who do not have the disease that the cases have. *Id.* Galleri detected more than 50 cancer types in the CCGA-3 study, with specificity of 99.5% and sensitivity of 51.5%. IDF ¶ 231. However, CCGA's study population differed from Galleri's intended-use population of asymptomatic adults: 56% of CCGA's participants had a newly diagnosed cancer ranging from early to late-stage, and of those with cancer in CCGA-3, over 70% were identified through clinical presentation. IDF ¶ 220; RX3409 at 006. In case-control studies, sensitivity is typically significantly better because the cases detected are typically later stage, and sensitivity of DNA tests is greater for patients with larger, more distributed metastasized cancers. Conroy Tr. 1744-45. GRAIL acknowledges that CCGA did not study the same population as the intended use of the test – asymptomatic patients. Ofman Tr. 3294-95; RX3409 at 010 (authors of the CCGA-3 study caution that "CCGA is a case-control study, and as such, is not reflective of performance in a screening population."). GRAIL is conducting another study, PATHFINDER, which is a prospective, interventional, clinical practice study of 6,600 individuals with no suspicion of cancer. IDF ¶ 241. The interim results of PATHFINDER showed that the Galleri test detected seven types of stage one through stage three cancer. IDF ¶ 245. GRAIL states that PATHFINDER was not designed to find 50 cancers in a real-world population, which would require hundreds of thousands of individuals. Ofman Tr. 3298. Nonetheless, as of trial, Galleri had been clinically shown to detect seven types of stage one through stage three cancer in an asymptomatic screening population. Cote Tr. 4000-01.⁹

In September 2021, GRAIL launched a 140,000-person clinical trial for Galleri in partnership with the United Kingdom National Health Service ("NHS"). IDF ¶ 249. [REDACTED]

⁹ GRAIL has also undertaken two additional studies known as STRIVE and SUMMIT. IDF ¶ 232. STRIVE enrolled 99,252 women undergoing mammography for screening indications. IDF ¶ 233. SUMMIT enrolled 13,000 individuals between the ages of 50-77 from the United Kingdom with a substantial smoking history. IDF ¶ 236. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IDF ¶¶ 234, 238 (*in camera*).

[REDACTED]. Results of these trials are not part of the record.

2. FDA Approval Status

As of the end of the evidentiary hearing, Galleri had not been approved by the FDA. IDF ¶ 258. [REDACTED] IDF ¶ 260 (*in camera*).

G. Other MCED Test Developers

GRAIL states that [REDACTED] PX6049 (GRAIL) at 34 (GRAIL, Narrative Response to Second Request, Mar. 1, 2021 (*in camera*)).

GRAIL’s Executive Leadership Team, including its former Chief Executive Officer, Hans Bishop, has tracked potential competitors, often in coordination with GRAIL’s internal competitive intelligence analysis team (“CIA Team”). IDF ¶¶ 261-62. The CIA team’s objective has been to “track, analyze and report on competitor activities to: (a) Gain insights into competitor strategies, (b) Inform Commercial and Product, (c) Develop competitive strategies, [and] (d) Help position GRAIL in the marketplace.” IDF ¶ 266 (quoting PX4018 at 003; PX4444 (GRAIL) at 002). GRAIL evaluated competitors according to three categories: viable technology approach, clinical studies, and commercial capabilities. IDF ¶ 264. In an internal presentation titled “Competitive Threats to Galleri After Launch,” GRAIL identified several “competitive threats” including Exact, Thrive, Guardant, Singlera, and Freenome, who were labeled as “Top Tier” threats. IDF ¶ 267.

1. Exact/Thrive

Exact is a molecular diagnostics company based in Madison, Wisconsin with locations across the United States and in Europe. IDF ¶ 270. Exact acquired Thrive Earlier Detection Corporation (“Thrive”) in early January 2021. IDF ¶ 272. Exact currently sells a stool-based colorectal screening test called Cologuard that looks for specific changes in DNA to detect cancer. IDF ¶ 271.

Exact, through Thrive, is developing an MCED test called CancerSEEK. IDF ¶ 273. CancerSEEK is a cancer screening test that analyzes a combination of several different biomarkers to indicate the existence of cancer in the body. IDF ¶¶ 275-77. CancerSEEK relies on Illumina NGS technology to find cancers. Conroy Tr. 1544, 1580, 1583. The technology that underlies CancerSEEK is capable of detecting all cancers that shed cancer-related DNA into blood or secrete proteins at high levels, IDF ¶ 278, and [REDACTED] Conroy (Exact) Tr. 1650 (*in camera*). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Lengauer Tr. 270-72 (*in camera*).

CancerSEEK received breakthrough device designation from the FDA. IDF ¶ 305. This is a designation that the FDA can give if there is very strong medical need and it would benefit patients to accelerate approval of the test. IDF ¶ 305. Such a designation provides the test developer with easier access to FDA staff and feedback throughout the PMA process. IDF ¶ 259.

[REDACTED]
Conroy Tr. 1628 (*in camera*); see also IDF ¶¶ 300-01. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IDF ¶¶ 302-03. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Conroy Tr. 1556-57 (*in camera*).

There are two published studies on CancerSEEK, the Cohen study and the DETECT A study. IDF ¶ 282. We adopt the ALJ's findings on the Cohen study in IDF ¶¶ 283-88. DETECT-A was a [REDACTED], interventional study involving the multi-cancer screening of 10,000 women who had no prior history of cancer. IDF ¶ 291; RX3419 at 1; Conroy Tr. 1703 (*in camera*). The purpose of the study was to understand the sensitivity, specificity, and safety of CancerSEEK, as well as how it fits within the existing physician workflow. Lengauer Tr. 165. CancerSEEK identified ten types of cancer in the DETECT-A study: appendix, breast, carcinoma, unknown primary origin, colorectal, kidney, lung, lymphoma, ovary, thyroid, and uterine. IDF ¶ 297. CancerSEEK achieved specificity of 95.3% for patients who received a single blood test, 99.6% for patients with confirmatory blood tests and diagnostic PET-CT imaging, and positive predictive value (PPV) of 40.6% for patients who received a confirmatory blood test plus any form of imaging. Lengauer Tr. 166-67; RX3419 at 008 Table 2.¹⁰ Dr. Lengauer assessed that DETECT-A's results meant that CancerSEEK could "more than double the cancers detected . . . compared to the classical standard of screening methods." Lengauer Tr. 165-66.

[REDACTED]
Conroy Tr. 1617 (*in camera*). Exact/Thrive seeks to bring "the most accurate test, the one that discovers the most cancers as early as possible," IDF ¶ 315 (quoting Conroy Tr. 1616-18), and has "engaged in further improvements of the test while [] preparing towards a registrational trial." Lengauer Tr. 170. Exact/Thrive has spent roughly [REDACTED] to develop the CancerSEEK test and projects to spend another [REDACTED] prior to launch. IDF ¶ 274 (*in camera*).

¹⁰ Across cancers, the test achieved sensitivity of 30.2% in its baseline blood test, 27.1% in a confirmational blood test, and 15.6% with follow-on PET-CT imaging. PX3419 at Table 2. The authors explained that the DETECT-A study did not employ methods subsequently developed to boost sensitivity. *Id.* at 4.

Exact/Thrive views itself as competing with GRAIL, IDF ¶ 315; Exact/Thrive managers and executives described GRAIL as Exact/Thrive’s “major” and “principal” rival, Lengauer Tr. 205, Conroy Tr. 1614; and a contemporaneous Exact/Thrive email from September 2020 characterized GRAIL as Exact/Thrive’s “most direct” competitor. PX8530 at 003. GRAIL views Exact/Thrive as a “top tier” competitor in early detection, as the ALJ set forth in IDF ¶¶ 321-31, which we adopt. For example, GRAIL identified Exact and Thrive as two of six “market leaders/front runners” in “early detection” based on “threat characteristics.” IDF ¶ 324. GRAIL convened a “Thrive Red Team” in 2020 and tasked it with “evaluating key questions about Thrive’s product, regulatory, reimbursement, clinical and commercial strategy, as well as risks that GRAIL should mitigate in our own strategies.” IDF ¶¶ 326, 328. As part of this effort, GRAIL gathered and internally disseminated competitive intelligence regarding Thrive’s launch strategy. IDF ¶ 330.

2. Guardant

Guardant is a clinical diagnostics company headquartered in Redwood City, California, that is currently developing blood-based tests for oncology applications. IDF ¶ 381-82. Guardant’s R&D efforts include three oncology related clinical applications: a therapy selection test, a minimal residual disease test, and a cancer screening test. Chudova Tr. 1138-39. These three applications span the different phases of a cancer diagnosis, from an undiagnosed patient to patients currently undergoing various stages of treatment. Chudova Tr. 1138-39.

Guardant is developing a single cancer test focused on colorectal cancer (CRC). IDF ¶ 384. The test, now known as Guardant Reveal, was formerly known as LUNAR-1. IDF ¶ 384. Guardant Reveal is a minimal residual disease test. Chudova Tr. 1150-51. Guardant is also developing an NGS-based blood biopsy early cancer screening test using genomic and methylation signatures called LUNAR-2. IDF ¶ 386. The initial version of LUNAR-2 will screen for colorectal cancer. IDF ¶ 387. Guardant’s business strategy involves first creating a CRC test that it hopes will be adopted, then moving to a test that

_____ IDF ¶ 388; Chudova Tr. 1199-1200 (*in camera*). Dr. Chudova, Guardant’s SVP of Technology, testified that the benefit of prioritizing cancers with existing screening modalities is that “clinically it’s established that screening for those indications is beneficial for the patients.” Chudova Tr. 1153-54. _____

_____ IDF ¶ 395 (*in camera*).

Guardant is currently conducting a clinical trial on the use of its screening test for CRC. Chudova Tr. 1154-55. _____

_____ Getty Tr. 2529 (*in camera*). _____

_____ PX8309 (Guardant) at 016 (*in camera*).

3. Singlera

Singlera is headquartered in Shanghai, China and has United States offices in La Jolla, California. IDF ¶ 481. Singlera currently operates four laboratories, including one in the United States. IDF ¶ 482. Singlera is a test developer focused on early cancer detection using targeted DNA methylation technology for cell-free DNA. IDF ¶ 483. Singlera is working on developing four single-cancer screening tests and an MCED test called PanSeer. IDF ¶ 484. Singlera’s ColonES test is a blood-based early detection test for colorectal cancer that uses DNA methylation to detect colorectal cancer. IDF ¶ 485. Singlera’s PanSeer is a blood-based early detection test designed to detect multiple cancers using the same methylation analysis, assay, software, and algorithm as ColonES. IDF ¶ 491. Singlera expects to launch ColonES before it launches PanSeer. *Id.* ¶ 490.

Singlera published a paper regarding PanSeer from a proof-of-concept study of pre-symptomatic patients in China, the Taizhou Longitudinal Study, in 2020. IDF ¶¶ 493-94. In the retrospective, observational study from part of the Taizhou Longitudinal Study, PanSeer detected five types of cancer – lung cancer, liver cancer, esophageal cancer, colorectal cancer, and gastric cancer –with a 95.1% specificity, 87.6% sensitivity in post-diagnostic cancer patients, and 94.9% sensitivity in 98 pre-diagnostic cancer patients. *Id.* ¶ 496. Singlera envisions that any patient testing positive on PanSeer would undergo an additional blood test and/or follow up imaging to allow tissue of origin mapping. *Id.* ¶ 497. Singlera plans to launch PanSeer as an FDA-approved test. PX7042 (Gao IHT) at 96. As such, Singlera believes it could take five to ten years to conduct the clinical studies needed for FDA approval. Gao Tr. 2926.

4. Freenome

Freenome is a biotech company with headquarters in South San Francisco, California. IDF ¶ 348. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX7121 (Otte Dep.) at 16-17 (*in camera*).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. Natera

Natera, Inc., headquartered in Austin, Texas, is an advanced genetic testing company that focuses on extracting information from small amounts of DNA. IDF ¶¶ 450, 452. The company has an oncology test called Signatera that monitors minimal residual disease. IDF ¶ 453. Natera also offers a noninvasive prenatal [NIPT] test called Panorama. Rabinowitz Tr. 287-89.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Natera believes that its main MCED competitors are GRAIL, Guardant, and Exact. IDF ¶ 476.

6. Helio Health

Helio is a healthcare company headquartered in Irvine, California, and focused on the early detection of cancer using blood specimens. IDF ¶¶ 424, 427. Helio is developing a test for the early detection of liver cancer called the “HelioLiver” test, IDF ¶ 428, which [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Helio has not conducted any clinical trials or tests to screen for cancers other than liver cancer. IDF ¶ 437.

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Pleadings, Motions, and Trial

On March 30, 2021, the Commission challenged the Acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Compl. at 1 and ¶ 81. According to the Complaint, Illumina recognized that cancer screening is “the largest liquid biopsy market opportunity” worldwide, with a projected market size of tens of billions of dollars by 2035. Compl. ¶ 10. The Complaint alleges that Respondent GRAIL is racing against several other firms to develop and commercialize MCED technology. Compl. ¶ 4. The Complaint further alleges that Illumina is a dominant provider of NGS platforms, and that Illumina’s NGS platforms are an essential input for the development and commercialization of MCED tests for which GRAIL’s rivals have no substitutes. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. Due to the technical limitations of other NGS and non-NGS products, the Complaint alleges, GRAIL’s rivals cannot

use any product other than Illumina’s NGS platforms to develop a clinically effective and commercially viable MCED test capable of competing with Galleri. Compl. ¶ 6.

After the Acquisition, the Complaint alleges, Illumina would have both the ability and an increased incentive to foreclose and disadvantage GRAIL’s rivals and thereby substantially lessen competition. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 50, 71, 80. As the only supplier of a critical input, the Complaint asserts, Illumina possesses the ability to control the fate of rivals to GRAIL’s MCED tests. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13. Lacking an alternative to Illumina’s NGS platforms, GRAIL’s MCED rivals would be unable to avoid the effects of Illumina’s raising their costs or otherwise disadvantaging them. Compl. ¶ 13. Illumina allegedly could foreclose or disadvantage a rival of GRAIL by, for example, raising the prices it charges the test developer for NGS instruments and consumables, or by denying needed technical assistance or license agreements. Compl. ¶ 11. The Complaint further alleges that post-consummation Illumina would stand to profit significantly from sales of GRAIL’s MCED test, giving it the incentive to limit the competitiveness of, kill, or disable any MCED products that Respondents expect to compete closely with Galleri by foreclosing or disadvantaging the rival firms. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. In sum, the Complaint alleges that the Acquisition will substantially lessen competition in the market for the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests in the United States by diminishing innovation and potentially increasing prices and reducing the choice and quality of MCED tests. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 31, 81.

Respondents’ Answer asserts that the Acquisition will accelerate the development, approval, and adoption of Galleri and thereby save “tens of thousands of lives.” Ans. 1. According to Respondents, Illumina is uniquely suited to use its experience and resources to accelerate adoption of Galleri. Ans. 3.

Respondents argue that Complaint Counsel failed to define valid upstream or downstream product markets. Furthermore, Respondents aver that Illumina would have no incentive to engage in a foreclosure strategy because it would incur reduced sales on its NGS products in return for uncertain future gains by Galleri. Ans. 5-7. Respondents maintain that the other NGS-based tests described in the Complaint are at an early stage of development and will not likely develop into close substitutes for Galleri. Ans. 8-9. Respondents claim merger-specific efficiencies from the Acquisition including, but not limited to, accelerated FDA approval and Medicare reimbursement, accelerated private reimbursement, and accelerated international expansion. Ans. 12-13. Finally, Respondents assert that Illumina offered contractual commitments to its U.S. oncology customers that address the Commission’s stated concerns. Ans. 3-4. As described by Respondent, these commitments, now known as the “Open Offer,” include *inter alia* a 12-year supply agreement under which Illumina would commit not to increase the price of sequencing instruments or consumables; would commit to decrease the cost of sequencing on Illumina’s highest-throughput instrument (using the highest-throughput consumable); and would commit to provide access to the same sequencing products at the same pricing provided to GRAIL. Ans. 3-4.

B. Initial Decision

The ALJ issued an Initial Decision on September 1, 2022, holding that Complaint Counsel had failed to prove that the Acquisition will likely result in a substantial lessening of competition in violation of Section 7. ID 193. The ALJ found that Complaint Counsel established a relevant product market consisting of the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. IDL ¶ 20; ID 161-67. He found that “Grail and other cancer screening companies are presently competing to develop the best performing cancer screening test, with an objective of screening for multiple cancers.” ID 164. The ALJ characterized this as “*existing* competition,” ID 167 (emphasis in original), analogous to a racetrack in which some companies are further along than others, but all are on the same racetrack. *Id.* The ALJ found that the relevant geographic market is the United States. *Id.* at 161 (noting that the geographic market is uncontested).

Further, the ALJ found that currently, and for the near future, Illumina is the only viable supplier of NGS platforms that meet the requirements of MCED test developers. ID 151-52. The other platforms that Respondent pointed to have flaws such as lower accuracy, higher cost, and lower throughput; some platforms are pre-launch and have not been subject to verification and testing. *Id.* at 150-152. Even if an MCED developer could switch to another NGS platform, the ALJ found, the costs of switching could run to the millions of dollars and take years. *Id.* at 152.

However, the ALJ found that *FTC v. Arch Coal*, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004), requires a substantial lessening of competition to be “sufficiently probable and imminent to warrant relief” (internal quotation omitted). ID 131. Noting that GRAIL’s Galleri is the only MCED test currently on the market, the ALJ reviewed the state of development of rival tests and concluded that Complaint Counsel had failed to prove that commercial competition would commence in the “near future.” ID 143 (quoting CCB 135, 141, 143). Most of the developers identified by Complaint Counsel are five to seven years away from launching any sort of MCED test, the ALJ determined. ID 145. The ALJ found that most of the in-development tests are focused on one or a few cancers. ID 145. Such tests would not be a reasonable substitute for a test like Galleri, the ALJ found, which has been demonstrated to detect seven or more cancers. ID 145; IDF ¶ 245.

The ALJ acknowledged that, absent the Open Offer, Illumina has the ability to adversely impact MCED test developer customers through a variety of means, including by withholding or delaying supply of existing products, withholding or delaying supply of new or improved products, and misusing confidential information. ID 171. However, the ALJ found that such proof is less significant in this case than Complaint Counsel suggest because, he found, these abilities existed before the Acquisition and are not a function of it. ID 171-72. Moreover, the ALJ found that Complaint Counsel had failed to prove that the relative profits and benefits to Illumina of engaging in a foreclosure strategy outweighed the costs, and therefore failed to prove that such a strategy was likely. ID 172-78.

Finally, the ALJ found that the Open Offer would constrain Illumina from using the tools that Complaint Counsel assert will raise rivals’ costs or otherwise foreclose GRAIL’s rivals. ID

179. For example, the ALJ found, the Open Offer imposes obligations on Illumina with respect to supply, price, services, access to new technology, and IVD agreements. ID 179-80. The ALJ also found that several customers have signed the Open Offer, which he stated undermines any assertion that the agreement is illusory. ID 181. After finding that Complaint Counsel had failed to prove that harm to GRAIL’s rivals was likely during the 12-year term of the Open Offer, the ALJ concluded that the absence of harm to GRAIL’s competitors in the reasonably near future undermined claims of likely harm to existing innovation and future commercial competition. ID 193.

Thus, the ALJ found that Complaint Counsel had failed to show that a likelihood of harm to GRAIL’s rivals is “probable or imminent,” and consequently, he found, Complaint Counsel cannot demonstrate that a resulting substantial lessening of competition is probable or imminent. ID 193. He therefore dismissed the Complaint. ID 194.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commission reviews the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law *de novo*, considering “such parts of the record as are cited or as may be necessary to resolve the issues presented.” 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a). The Commission may “exercise all the powers which it could have exercised if it had made the initial decision.” *Id.*; *see also* 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2022). The *de novo* standard of review applies to both findings of fact and inferences drawn from those facts. *See Otto Bock HealthCare N. Am., Inc.*, 168 F.T.C. 324, 335 (2019); *Realcomp II, Ltd.*, 148 F.T.C. 137, 370 n.11 (2009), *pet. for review denied*, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Commission can give “some deference” to the ALJ’s witness credibility determinations because, as the trier of fact, the ALJ had the opportunity to “closely scrutinize witnesses’ overall demeanor and to judge their credibility.” *Trans Union Corp.*, 129 F.T.C. 471, 482 (2000). However, “an agency has plenary authority to reverse ALJ decisions on factual as well as legal issues, including factual findings ‘based on the demeanor of a witness.’” *Realcomp*, 148 F.T.C. at 370 n.11 (quoting *FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp.*, 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955)). As the Ninth Circuit explained in *NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co.*, 407 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1969), the “presumptively broader gauge and experience of members of the [agency]” have a meaningful role for resolving inferences to be drawn from the record and for the proper application of the statute. *Id.* at 1369 (quotation omitted). While the Commission must give “attentive consideration” to the ALJ’s findings, and cannot depart from them without support from the record, “in the last analysis, it is the agency’s function, not the [administrative law judge’s], to make the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and where there is substantial evidence supporting each result it is the agency’s choice that governs.” *Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC*, 522 F.3d 378, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting *Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC*, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).

V. JURISDICTION

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act grants the Commission authority to prevent “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” by “persons, partnerships, or corporations.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(2). Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21, vests jurisdiction in the FTC to

determine the legality of corporate acquisitions under Section 7 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Illumina is a corporation as “corporation” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, over which the Commission has jurisdiction. *See* JX1 (Joint Stipulations of Law and Fact) ¶ 1. GRAIL is a corporation as “corporation” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, over which the Commission has jurisdiction. *See* Respondents’ Reply to Complaint Counsel’s Post Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Response to Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 5. Illumina’s and GRAIL’s acts and practices at issue regarding the Acquisition are in or affect commerce as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, and are subject matter over which the FTC has jurisdiction. Respondents’ Response to Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 7; 15 U.S.C. § 21(a).

VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Clayton Act § 7 prohibits acquisitions the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. By using the words “may be substantially to lessen competition” Congress indicated that its concern was with “probabilities, not certainties,” and that the government need only show a “reasonable likelihood” of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market. *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 323, 362 (1962). “[T]he statute requires a prediction, and doubts are to be resolved against the transaction.” *FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc.*, 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989).

Merger enforcement seeks to prevent the unlawful acquisition, enhancement, and exercise of market power. *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 336. The “primary vice” of a vertical merger is that it may foreclose competitors from a segment of the market otherwise open to them, acting as a “clog on competition.” *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 323-4 (quotation omitted). Such a transaction may raise barriers to entry that enhance the market power of existing firms, increasing their ability to engage in anticompetitive practices. *U.S. Steel Corp. v. FTC*, 426 F.2d 592, 604 (6th Cir. 1970).

As the statutory language suggests, Congress enacted Section 7 to curtail anticompetitive harm in its incipiency. *Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. NV v. FTC*, 534 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 323 n.39); *Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC*, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979) (Congress wished to “nip anticompetitive practices in the bud” before they blossomed into a Sherman Act restraint of trade). Even in a consummated merger, the ultimate issue under Section 7 is whether anticompetitive effects are reasonably probable in the future, not whether such effects have occurred as of the time of trial. *United States v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 415 U.S. 486, 505-06 (1974); *Polypore Int’l, Inc.*, 150 F.T.C. 586, 598-99 (2010), *pet. for review denied*, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012).

Courts traditionally have analyzed Section 7 cases under a burden-shifting framework. *United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.*, 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990). First, the government must establish its *prima facie* case by making a “fact-specific” showing that a merger is “likely to be anticompetitive.” *United States v. AT&T*, 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019). If the government establishes its *prima facie* case, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence that the *prima facie* case inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future competition, or to sufficiently discredit the evidence underlying the

prima facie case. *Id.* If the defendant rebuts the *prima facie* case, “the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effects shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.” *Baker Hughes*, 908 F.2d at 983. Although this burden-shifting framework “conjures up images of a tennis match,” in practice, each side usually introduces all of its evidence at one time. *Univ. Health*, 938 F.2d at 1219 n.25.

With respect to the violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as alleged in this case, it follows from the alleged violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and therefore does not require an independent analysis. *Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.*, 138 F.T.C. 1024, 1031 (2004); *see also Stanley Works v. FTC*, 469 F.2d 498, 499 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972); *R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.*, 120 F.T.C. 36, 150 n. 32 (1995); *Beatrice Foods Co.*, 67 F.T.C. 473, 724-725 (1965).

VII. LIABILITY

A. The Relevant Product Market

The purpose of market definition under the Clayton Act is to identify the “line of commerce” and the “section of the country” in which an acquisition may substantially lessen competition. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 18; *United States v. Cont’l Can Co.*, 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964) (“the purpose of delineating a line of commerce is to provide an adequate basis for measuring the effects of a given acquisition”); *United States v. Oracle Corp.*, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110 (N.D. Ca. 2004). “The ‘relevant product market’ identifies the product[s] and services with which the defendants’ products compete,” while “the ‘relevant geographic market’ identifies the geographic area in which the defendants compete in marketing their products or services.” *FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D.D.C. 2009).

The Initial Decision found that research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests constitutes the relevant product market for evaluating Illumina’s acquisition of GRAIL. ID 164-68. Respondents challenge that conclusion, arguing that the Initial Decision’s market comprises products that are not reasonably interchangeable and that will not constrain pricing in the reasonably foreseeable future. RAB 38. Complaint Counsel respond that Respondents have waived their right to challenge market definition and argue that even if not waived, Respondents’ arguments fail substantively. We agree that Respondents’ substantive challenge regarding market definition lacks merit.¹²

¹² Complaint Counsel assert that, by failing to file a Notice of Appeal, Respondents have waived their right to appeal the Initial Decision on relevant product market or related product grounds. Reply 20. However, the Commission does not treat a prevailing party’s objections to an ALJ’s failure to rule in its favor on alternative grounds as a matter for cross-appeal. *See* Order of the Commission, *In re Impax Labs., Inc.*, Docket No. 9373, 2018 WL 3249714, at *1 (FTC June 27, 2018) (granting extension to word limit in lieu of cross-appeal on relevant market for prevailing party); Order, *In re LabMD*, Docket No. 9357, 2015 WL 9412608, at *1 (FTC Dec. 18, 2015) (denying “protective cross-appeal” to prevailing party). Thus, we find that Respondents did not need to file a cross-appeal to preserve their relevant product market and related product arguments.

To “measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition . . . the relevant market is defined as the area of effective competition.” *Ohio v. Am. Express Co.*, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (internal quotation omitted). This case involves alleged harm to competition among firms currently engaged in research and development of MCED tests for subsequent commercial sale. Here the competitors’ ultimate offerings are nascent, in the sense that they are still in active development. One product, Galleri, is on the market in the limited fashion available through LDT sales. Galleri’s rivals are in active development in competition with Galleri but have not yet launched commercial sales.

The Complaint alleges that the Acquisition is likely to frustrate that active development, thwarting both research and development and the ensuing competition. The goal of market definition here is to define the boundaries of the competition within which foreclosure or disadvantaging of a participant is likely to reduce innovation, delay rivals’ entry, and raise price or reduce variety or quality of the ensuing goods. The relevant market will encompass those firms whose presence drives this competition and whose foreclosure or disadvantaging may thwart it. As discussed below, we conclude that that area of effective competition is the research, development, and commercialization (present and future) of MCED tests.

Below, we first address the area of effective competition at issue for commercialization and then direct our focus to the research and development competition allegedly threatened by the Acquisition. In combination, we find that these areas of competition establish a relevant product market for the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests.

1. Commercialization of MCED Tests Has the Practical Indicia of an Antitrust Market

Courts can define a relevant product market by looking to the “practical indicia” enumerated by *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 325; *Olin Corp. v. FTC*, 986 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1993); *FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt.*, 548 F.3d 1028, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Those indicia include “industry or public recognition of the [market] as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.” *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 325.¹³ The indicia are “practical aids” as opposed to “talismanic” criteria “to be rigidly applied,” *FTC v. Swedish Match*, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2000) (cleaned up); thus, “[markets] can exist even if only some of these factors are present.” *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997); see also 2 J. Kalinowski, *Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation* (Second Ed.), § 24.02[1][b][i] (the existence of three or four indicia has been held “sufficient to delineate a submarket” under *Brown Shoe*.)

Respondents concede that MCED tests are distinguishable from other types of cancer tests, RRB 16, but they argue that the MCED-based test market accepted by the Initial Decision is too broad. RAB 39-40. Respondents argue that Complaint Counsel’s relevant market impermissibly includes products still in development whose precise attributes are unknown, and that may not be viewed as substitutes for Galleri when they launch. RB 19-20. However, given

¹³ Although the Supreme Court in *Brown Shoe* spoke in terms of submarkets, it made clear that these submarkets, in themselves, “constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.” 370 U.S. at 325.

that the purpose of market definition is to elucidate the potential for competitive harm, the market defined in this case must be broad enough to encompass competition to commercialize MCED tests. The record establishes that such commercialization has the practical indicia of a relevant market under *Brown Shoe*.

a. Peculiar Characteristics and Uses

MCED tests have unique characteristics that set them apart from current standard-of-care cancer screening modalities, from other blood-based screening tests, and from other oncology tests. MCED tests are designed to detect multiple types of early-stage cancer in asymptomatic individuals by examining the presence of ctDNA in the bloodstream. *See, e.g.*, PX2005 (Illumina) at 004-005, 009, 013; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; Gao Tr. 2874-75, 2878-79.

Traditionally, cancers are detected through a tissue biopsy or involve an invasive procedure like a colonoscopy. PX8398 (Cance Decl.) ¶ 5. Current standard-of-care screenings such as mammography or colonoscopy typically only screen for a single type of cancer; they can be more invasive and uncomfortable than a blood test. *See, e.g.*, Ofman Tr. 3308 (listing single-cancer screening tests); PX0059 at 011 (characterizing liquid biopsy as a “minimally invasive tool”). In traditional tissue biopsies, a portion of tissue must be removed – sometimes surgically, which takes more time and is expensive. PX7053 (Fesko IHT) at 21; PX7040 (Getty IHT) at 51-54.

Other blood-based cancer tests perform a different function from MCEDs. Respondents do not contest that Galleri is in a different market from single-cancer screening tests, therapy selection tests, or MRD tests, RRB 16, effectively conceding that MCEDs have peculiar characteristics and uses. For example, diagnostic aid to cancer tests (“DAC”) are designed to [REDACTED]. They help a doctor confirm or rule out a cancer diagnosis. PX7069 (Bishop IHT) at 69-70. Therapy selection tests are intended to help clinicians choose the appropriate treatment for patients diagnosed with advanced cancer. [REDACTED]. And minimal residual disease (“MRD”) tests are used to monitor cancer in already diagnosed patients following completion of therapy. PX7092 (Ofman Dep.) at 94.

The Initial Decision asserts that the conclusion that MCED tests are a distinct product from other oncology tests “borders on the obvious.” ID 162. Indeed, MCED tests stand out because they are novel and offer potentially exceptional utility in the early detection of cancer in an asymptomatic population. They plainly have “peculiar characteristics and uses” and meet this element of *Brown Shoe*’s practical indicia.

b. Distinct Customers

MCED tests are designed for patients who do not have symptoms of cancer and have not been treated for it. Lengauer Tr. 167; PX4082 (GRAIL) at 008-009; PX7100 (Chudova Dep.) at

15. For example, Galleri is recommended for use in asymptomatic adults aged 50 and older. PX0043 at 004. This contrasts with DAC, therapy selection, and MRD tests that are designed for patients with symptoms or a diagnosis of cancer. Section VII.A.1.a above.

MCED test developers' marketing plans also reveal a distinct customer base. Such developers expect to market their tests to primary care physicians or other physicians conducting annual wellness screenings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. MCED developers' plans contrast with sales of other oncology tests, such as MRD and therapy selection tests, which are marketed to oncologists and other cancer specialists. Getty Tr. 2503 (therapy selection tests); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

Respondents appear to concede that MCED tests will have distinct customers, saying without explanation that this is a "nonissue." RAB 39. Complaint Counsel have demonstrated this element of the *Brown Shoe* practical indicia.

c. Distinct Prices and Sensitivity to Price Changes

Unlike non-screening tests designed for patients with a suspicion or diagnosis of cancer, MCED tests are targeted toward a more general population, with a goal of screening a large portion of asymptomatic adults in the United States. PX7090 (Sood Dep.) at 110-11; PX4082 (GRAIL) at 008-009; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The tests must be priced low enough to achieve wide acceptance because out-of-pocket costs to patients will be the [REDACTED] for primary care physicians in choosing among screening tests. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. As Illumina's CEO deSouza explained, [REDACTED] PX7072

(deSouza IHT) at 149 (*in camera*). GRAIL performed its own analysis of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PX4079 (GRAIL) at 007 (*in camera*).

Other MCED test developers expect their tests to compete with Galleri on price, among other factors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Such evidence of cross elasticity

contributes to finding price sensitivity. *See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

In sum, the evidence shows that MCED test providers will likely employ distinct pricing strategies for their screening tests versus other types of cancer tests due to the need to attract a unique population of asymptomatic individuals and to persuade payers to reimburse the tests at population scale. Although empirical data on sensitivity to price changes are not yet available, MCED providers expect to compete with one another on price. This indicator supports a relevant MCED market.

d. Industry Recognition of the Research, Development, and Commercialization of MCED Tests as a Separate Economic Entity

The evidence summarized in Section VII.A.2.b below amply demonstrates that MCED developers, including GRAIL, see themselves as competing in a distinct market and view each other as key competitors.¹⁴ GRAIL assiduously tracks other MCED developers as competitive threats, evaluating their technical approaches and commercial potential. In addition, GRAIL identifies itself as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and refers to the [REDACTED] Bishop Tr. 1319 (*in camera*); PX0063 at 001; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In 2020, GRAIL [REDACTED]. Other stakeholders also recognize the unique value proposition that MCED tests offer. Thrive’s former Chief Innovation Officer and co-founder, Dr. Lengauer, testified at trial, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. And in Congress, the proposed Medicare Multi-Cancer Early Detection Screening Coverage Act of 2021 stated that MCED tests “can complement the covered early detection tests” rather than replace them. *See Medicare Multi-Cancer Early Detection Screening Coverage Act of 2021, H.R. 1946, 117th Cong. (2021); S. 1873, 117th Cong. (2021)*. Thus, copious evidence supports recognition of the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests as a distinct economic entity, meeting this element of the practical indicia.

e. Other *Brown Shoe* Practical Indicia

The remaining practical indicia that *Brown Shoe* lists are unique production facilities and specialized vendors. Respondents argue that each MCED developer uses [REDACTED] and that these differences constitute “unique production facilities” that weigh against placing the various MCEDs in the same market. RB 55 (*in camera*). Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would mean that no two MCED test providers could be in the same market, since each uses proprietary

¹⁴ *See* ID 165; IDF ¶¶ 261-67, 321-31; PX4082 at 036.

methods to operate its tests. However, proprietary aspects to test design, without more, do not place otherwise competing tests into individualized product markets. *See, e.g., CCC Holdings Inc.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33, 38-39 (no dispute that multiple proprietary databases were in same market). Respondents' own expert testified that prescribers may decide which test to prescribe based on performance characteristics such as number of cancers detected, specificity, and sensitivity. RX3869 (Cote Expert Report) ¶ 90. He did not identify [REDACTED] as important factors, which is understandable because the most relevant question for present purposes is whether the products meet the specified need, not how they are produced. We therefore do not find MCED developers' proprietary methods a persuasive basis for rejecting an MCED-based market. As to specialized vendors, Respondents argue that some tests require imaging after a positive blood test, which means that those tests require an imaging provider who is not in Galleri's workflow. RB 62. However, GRAIL's website states that its MCED test "requires confirmatory diagnostic evaluation" through follow-up procedures such as imaging, PX0063 at 002 (emphasis added), *see infra* Section VII.D.3.c.i. Because Galleri also requires follow-up, this feature does not eliminate specialized vendors and thus does not distinguish Galleri from other MCED tests in development.

In sum, we find that four of *Brown Shoe's* practical indicia – peculiar characteristics and uses, distinct customers, distinct prices and sensitivity to price changes, and industry recognition of the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests as a separate economic entity – establish a relevant product market here.¹⁵

f. MCED Tests Will Be Sufficiently Interchangeable to Form an Antitrust Market

Respondents claim that GRAIL's rivals are "years away" from launching an MCED test and that Complaint Counsel failed to prove that any of the tests in development are reasonably interchangeable with Galleri. RAB 7. While Respondents' arguments may have relevance for defining a relevant market for existing MCED tests, they miss the mark for a market defined around the research, development, and commercialization of such tests. The purpose of market definition is to illuminate the competitive effects of a merger or other economic arrangement. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 325; *Guidelines* § 4. Here, Complaint Counsel have alleged that Respondents will have the ability and incentive to foreclose GRAIL's competitors as they seek to develop and bring their MCED tests to market. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. The applicable question is

¹⁵ In addition to the qualitative approach of the *Brown Shoe* practical indicia, the Commission and courts can define a relevant market using the quantitative approach of the hypothetical monopolist test ("HMT") set forth in the U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Horizontal Merger Guidelines") § 4.1.1 (2010). The HMT begins with a candidate group of products and asks whether a hypothetical monopolist of those products would likely impose a small but significant, non-transitory increase in price ("SSNIP") on at least one product in the candidate market. *Id.* Because commercialization of MCED tests is at a very early stage, the cross-elasticity data necessary for a quantitative HMT are not available; however, markets can be delineated using other evidence when the HMT cannot be run. The ultimate goal is to determine whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.1.3, and the Commission uses the data and tools that are available for that inquiry.

whether MCED tests will be sufficiently interchangeable in the future such that the merged firm has an incentive to disadvantage GRAIL’s rivals as they pursue research, development, and commercialization. The balance of evidence shows that they will.

MCED tests in development share core features and functionality with Galleri: they are designed to detect multiple cancers by blood draw in asymptomatic patients. ID 164; *see, e.g.*, PX4082 (Grail) at 008-009; PX7100 (Chudova Dep.) at 15-16; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. GRAIL has acknowledged the competitive threat that rival MCED firms pose. For example, in a March 2020 presentation, GRAIL identified [REDACTED] and noted that GRAIL [REDACTED]. In July 2020, GRAIL was concerned [REDACTED], and discussed [REDACTED], also [REDACTED]. These are just some of myriad examples of GRAIL monitoring and planning strategic responses to MCED rivals with products in development. *See* Sections II.G and VII.A.2.b. These ordinary-course documents would make no sense unless GRAIL viewed rival products as potentially developing into substitutes for Galleri. For their part, MCED test developers testified that they are competing with GRAIL today and plan to compete with GRAIL going forward across a variety of metrics. ID 164-65; IDF ¶ 507; [REDACTED]; *see also* PX4616 (GRAIL) at 017 (MCED “evolving into [a] highly competitive landscape, though many seem to be starting with one cancer type, with intent to add more”).

The record shows that MCED developers are engaged in current R&D competition with GRAIL and with each other as they pursue commercialization of their MCED tests, converging on the common goal of using blood tests to detect as many cancers as possible, as accurately as possible, at an early stage. That record shows that successful MCED tests will be sufficiently interchangeable to compete in an antitrust market, potentially triggering incentives to foreclose or otherwise disadvantage rival R&D efforts. We now examine those R&D efforts in greater detail.

2. R&D for MCED Tests Is an Important Aspect of Competition in this Relevant Market

a. Evidence of Current R&D Competition

Complaint Counsel have demonstrated the existence of current competition in the research and development of MCED tests. Cancer screening companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the research and development of MCED tests with the same objective – to detect multiple cancers in asymptomatic patients by analyzing biomarkers in the blood. ID 164;

e.g., IDF ¶¶ 274, 403, 498. These companies are seeking to improve their tests by validating additional cancers and adding tissue of origin capabilities while improving sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive value. ID 165. From among several possibilities, they are choosing the scientific approaches that they believe will most likely result in success. ID 165.

The ALJ correctly characterized this activity as “present[] compet[ition].” ID 164. Because only Galleri has been released to the market while the other products are in various stages of development and testing, *see, e.g.*, IDF ¶ 52 and Section VII.A above, empirical data reflecting switching among the various products do not yet exist. However, this does not prevent us from discerning the presence of actual R&D competition among MCED testing companies and defining a market accordingly. Indeed, we must do so: if our relevant market definition failed to account for current R&D competition among firms seeking to commercialize MCED tests, it would also fail to detect threats to that competition. *See* ID 163-64; IDF ¶¶ 316-17. The definition of the relevant market should “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry.” *FTC v. Tronox Ltd.*, 332 F. Supp. 3d 187, 202 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotation omitted). Here, those realities are an intense, active effort by various firms to research, develop, and launch the most effective MCED test.

As the ALJ found, development and commercialization efforts in the MCED market are akin to a race in which some cancer screening companies are further along than others, but all are on the same racetrack. ID 167. MCED test developers have discovered that a number of DNA mutations and methylation biomarkers are common across many different cancers. IDF ¶ 135. Accordingly, MCED test developers are assembling panels of biomarkers intended to detect a large number of early-stage cancers. IDF ¶ 278 (Exact/Thrive’s CancerSEEK is intended to detect all cancers that shed cancer-related DNA into the blood or secrete proteins at high levels);

[REDACTED]; IDF ¶ 491 (Singlera has developed PanSeer technology, which is designed to detect multiple cancers). MCED firms are exerting themselves in a competitive race to match or exceed Galleri by researching, developing, and releasing tests that will accurately detect multiple cancers. This effort thus constitutes an area of effective competition. If GRAIL’s rivals are seeking to fund their MCED test development with investments or cash infusions, those funding efforts would become more difficult if an anticompetitive transaction impedes those rivals’ access to NGS on competitive terms. *See, e.g.*, [REDACTED].

We note that different cancer screening companies are taking different technical approaches, with some focusing on methylation sites in DNA and others combining a multiomic approach that focuses on genomics, proteomics, and metabolomics. IDF ¶ 136. The different technical approaches taken by MCED firms are facets of competition, particularly in a nascent market engaged in innovation. ID 164 (citing IDF ¶¶ 129, 136, 351); *e.g.*, IDF ¶¶ 50, 350, 386, 429, 491; *see United States v. Energy Sols., Inc.*, 265 F. Supp. 3d 415, 436 (D. Del. 2017) (products comprising a relevant market “need not be identical, only reasonable substitutes”). Market participants including Respondents acknowledge that the variety of technical approaches

benefits innovation and patients. PX7069 (Bishop (GRAIL) IHT) at 154-56 (“difficult problems are, by definition, hard to solve, and having a multitude of different approaches is a good thing”). The different approaches all point toward the same goal – “to get to the highest-performing technology.” *Id.*; *see also* PX7086 (Cance (American Cancer Society) Dep.) at 101 (“I don’t believe we will have one test be 100 percent accurate and zero percent inaccurate. So, therefore, multiple companies and institutions developing and improving this technology is very important.”).¹⁶

Although Respondents argue otherwise, RAB 38-39 (claiming insufficient evidence of interchangeability to support a relevant product market), potentially differentiated product features do not defeat a relevant market here. *See Cont’l Can*, 378 U.S. at 449. Even Respondents’ experts acknowledged that differentiation among products does not mean they do not compete in the same market, particularly during research and development. PX7132 (Willig Trial Dep.) at 84 (“[P]roducts can compete on the basis of differentiated features.”); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
As companies seek to improve their tests, the features may differ, but they share the same broad goal of detecting more cancers as accurately as possible.¹⁷ GRAIL itself acknowledges that [REDACTED]. At the R&D phase of a market, the fact that the tests ultimately commercialized may differ on various parameters such as sensitivity, price, or number of cancers detected, is evidence of competition, not of its absence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Given that “the goal of the [market definition] exercise is to enable and facilitate the examination of competitive effects,” *United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA*, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2022 WL 16949715, at *18 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2022), we must recognize the reality of competition among companies engaged in research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. Complaint Counsel’s market definition does so.

¹⁶ Dr. William Cance is the Chief Medical and Scientific Officer for the American Cancer Society. *See also* PX0376 at 007 (exploring different points of view will enable the market to determine the right answer).

¹⁷ For example, [REDACTED]; *see also* IDF ¶ 315 (Exact/Thrive hopes to “bring the very best test that we can bring, the most accurate test, the one that discovers the most cancers as early as possible.”).

b. MCED Developers' Competitive Assessments of Each Other

Evidence of MCED test developers' assessments of competition, including their ordinary course of business documents, reinforces our conclusion that actual competition exists in a market for the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. Market definition must "take into account the realities of competition," *Whole Foods*, 548 F.3d at 1039. Ordinary course of business documents reveal the contours of competition from the perspective of the market participants, who may be presumed to "have accurate perceptions of economic realities." *Id.* at 1045 (concurring op.) (quoting *Rothery Storage*, 792 F.2d at 218 n.4). Here, GRAIL assessed its MCED developer competitors by tracking, analyzing, and reporting on their activities to gain insight into their strategies and to develop competitive plans. ID 165; IDF ¶¶ 261-66, 321-31; PX4082 at 036 (email attaching GRAIL 2020 S-1/Amended, Sept. 2020 (defining "competitors" as companies "that have stated that they are developing tests designed to detect cancer" and identifying, *inter alia*, Exact, Freenome, Guardant, Singlera, and Thrive)). As noted previously, GRAIL's competitive intelligence analysis team evaluated potential competitors in terms of viable technology approach, clinical studies, and commercial capabilities. IDF ¶ 264. The team was involved in "evaluating all of the advances going on in our spaces" and was "intended to understand how [the MCED] field is advancing." IDF ¶ 263 (quoting PX7069). For this purpose, the team "track[s] to various degrees many potentially competitive technologies, academic projects, small companies that span the gamut in terms of development stage, indication, biomarker type, technology platform, cancer type, and other factors." IDF ¶ 263 (quoting PX4259). In an internal presentation titled "Competitive Threats to Galleri After Launch," GRAIL identified Exact, Thrive, Guardant, Singlera, and Freenome among the "Top Tier" threats. IDF ¶ 267. In addition, GRAIL formed a "Thrive Red Team," specifically targeting Exact/Thrive, which evaluated Thrive's "product, regulatory, reimbursement, clinical and commercial strategy, and . . . recommend[ed] GRAIL mitigations" to the competitive threats from Thrive. IDF ¶ 329 (quoting PX4006); *see also* IDF ¶¶ 326-28, 330-31. Illumina's executives recognized that acquiring GRAIL would mean potentially

[REDACTED]

The companies presently engaged in researching and developing MCED tests view GRAIL as a competitor. *E.g.*, PX8530 (Exact/Thrive considers GRAIL its "most direct competitor"); IDF ¶¶ 416-17 (Guardant is "really focused" on GRAIL and considers GRAIL "the most formidable" competitor to its MCED test under development); IDF ¶ 507 (Singlera considers GRAIL, Freenome, and Thrive as its top competitors and expects to compete with GRAIL on additional innovation); IDF ¶ 445 (Helio); IDF ¶ 476 (Natera).

It bears emphasis that, although only one MCED test has yet been released to the marketplace, competition in the relevant market is already occurring. As the discussion above makes clear, firms today are racing to develop an effective MCED test that detects as many cancers as possible with the greatest precision that can be attained. For example,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In addition, as the ALJ found, Exact/Thrive is currently competing against GRAIL in “prelaunch activities” associated with bringing a new medical test to market such as “competing for mindshare with physicians, with health systems, with payers.” IDF ¶ 316 (quoting Conroy Tr. 1614). Exact/Thrive is competing with GRAIL for scientists and talent for its research and development efforts because individuals working in early cancer detection have a specialized skill set. IDF ¶ 317.

In arguing that we should disregard competitive tests as insufficiently commercialized, Respondents cite *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2001), for the premise that courts “consider only substitutes that constrain pricing in the reasonably foreseeable future, and only products that can enter the market in a relatively short time can perform this function.” RAB 38-39. However, in that monopolization case, Microsoft was seeking to include in the relevant operating system market middleware products that were not operating systems, but that might evolve at some point in the future to take over some operating system functions. 253 F.3d at 53. By contrast, the relevant market that Complaint Counsel defined in this Clayton Act case for the purpose of identifying competitive harm includes the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests, a locus of current competition and an object of Clayton Act concern. Respondents’ position that we should ignore vigorous, current R&D competition merely because it is not yet commercialized would eliminate the ability of enforcers and courts to protect consumers from anticompetitive pre-commercialization conduct with egregious, long-term consequences in a world of continuous technological advance. Indeed, Respondents’ position would violate the explicit intent of the *Microsoft* decision as well as the established precedent recognizing the benefits of R&D competition. See *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 79 (“it would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will – particularly in industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts”); *United States v. Anthem, Inc.*, 855 F.3d 345, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (a “threat to innovation is anticompetitive in its own right.”); cf. *FTC v. Actavis, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013) (recognizing that “a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects” despite there being only the monopolist patent holder on the “market” to date).

Congress prescribed a “pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant product market and not a formal, legalistic one.” *United States v. Anthem, Inc.*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 193 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 336). A relevant market consisting of the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests accurately reflects competitive realities in the nascent MCED test industry, and properly trains our focus on the area of effective competition and locus of likely competitive effects. It is therefore appropriately defined for purposes of this proceeding.

B. The Relevant Geographic Market

The Complaint alleges that the relevant geographic market is the United States, Compl. ¶ 37, and Respondents do not contest this geographic market. Respondents’ Response to

Proposed Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 32-35. Thus, the relevant geographic market is the United States. ID 160-61.

C. The Related Product

As explained in Section II.B above, Illumina’s NGS platforms are an input to the development and supply of MCED tests and are therefore a related product to MCED tests. Such inputs are referred to as related products because they are positioned vertically or are complementary to the products or services in the relevant product market. Control over a related product may enable a vertically integrated defendant to foreclose or disadvantage its competitors in the relevant product market.

Respondents voice two objections regarding the related product. First, they argue that Complaint Counsel needed to demonstrate that the related product was a relevant antitrust market in its own right. Second, they contend that competition from other NGS platforms undermines any claim that GRAIL’s MCED rivals depend on Illumina’s NGS platform. As discussed below, neither assertion is persuasive.

1. The Related Product Need Not Be a Relevant Market

Respondents argue that Complaint Counsel are required to define a related product market. RAB 41. However, we conclude that it suffices for Complaint Counsel to demonstrate that Illumina’s NGS platform is a critical input for MCED developers; Complaint Counsel need not also demonstrate that NGS is a relevant product market.

The Clayton Act proscribes transactions that “in any line of commerce” may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18. As the Supreme Court held, the purpose of defining a market is to identify where competitive harm may occur: “Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’ Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market affected.” *United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (quoting *Standard Oil of Calif. v. United States*, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949)). The sufficiency of a defendant’s control over an input to foreclose or disadvantage its rivals in the relevant market is a different issue than the ability to cause competitive harm in the related product’s market. Competitive harm needs to be shown only in the relevant market, so market definition is required only there. Here, Complaint Counsel seek to establish competitive harm in the market for research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests, so that is the only market they need to define.

Respondents’ brief to the Commission cites no authority for the claim that Complaint Counsel must define a related market. In the proceeding before the ALJ, Respondents cited *Fruehauf* and *AT&T* to support their position, RB 73-74, but those cases are not persuasive. In *Fruehauf*, the court did indeed define one downstream and two upstream markets. 603 F.2d 345, 349 (2d Cir. 1979). However, this was because the Commission had alleged that the merger would “substantially . . . lessen competition” in all three markets, so defining those markets was

necessary to undertake a traditional Clayton Act analysis. The *AT&T* case, meanwhile, actually helps Complaint Counsel. There the district court accepted the government’s definition of a relevant downstream market for the distribution of live-TV programming. *United States v. AT&T Inc.*, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 196 (D.D.C. 2018), *aff’d sub nom. United States v. AT&T, Inc.*, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The court observed, “That does not mean that Turner’s position in the upstream programming market is irrelevant to evaluating the Government’s theories of harm in this case,” *id.*, but the court did not require the government to define a second market. *Id.*, *aff’d*, 916 F.3d at 1032-33.

2. Dependence of GRAIL’s MCED Rivals on Illumina’s NGS Platform

As the ALJ found, and as we explained in Section II.B above, Illumina’s NGS platforms are a critical input for MCED test developers because they require short-read NGS platforms like Illumina’s that are highly accurate with high throughput at a reasonable cost. Alternative NGS platforms to Illumina’s are insufficient, either because they lack characteristics essential for MCED test development, or because they will not become available to MCED test developers in the United States within a reasonable time frame, or both. *See* ID 150.¹⁸ These platforms do not allow users to sequence as many molecules of cfDNA as Illumina and are less accurate than it. IDF ¶¶ 601, 610-11. The Initial Decision extensively documented the shortcomings of these platforms:

Thermo Fisher: Thermo Fisher itself believes that Illumina’s NGS sequencers are better suited than Thermo Fisher’s NGS sequencers for “any application that requires a very large number of samples . . . like early cancer detection.” IDF ¶ 639. Thermo Fisher sequencers are not currently being used for any MCED tests in development, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].¹⁹ The cost per read of Thermo Fisher’s GeneStudio is higher than the cost per read of Illumina’s NovaSeq. IDF ¶ 643.

¹⁸ Respondents argued before the ALJ that Complaint Counsel’s relevant market is “under-inclusive” because it does not include screening tests based on non-NGS technologies such as microarrays and proteomics. RB 27-28. This suggests that NGS tests are not essential inputs for MCED test developers. The record does not support that position. One of the purported test developers Respondents cite, [REDACTED]

Another is developing only single-cancer tests with no public plans for an MCED. Leite Tr. 2179-80. Respondents failed to present reliable evidence regarding the other alleged competitors, relying on printouts of websites that in some cases do not even mention cancer. *See, e.g.*, RX3587, RX3651, RX3259. Secondhand descriptions of products by Respondents’ expert, Dr. Cote, fail to fill the gap and establish the relevance of any non-NGS MCED test.

¹⁹ Thermo Fisher’s NGS platform can read approximately 130 million DNA fragments per run of the instrument. IDF ¶ 641. Thermo Fisher believes its highest throughput sequencer, the GeneStudio, is not an option for MCED developers because “a platform with considerably more output per run than 130

The views of MCED test developers align with Thermo Fisher’s. [REDACTED] finds that Thermo Fisher’s platform has a significantly lower throughput and higher error profile than Illumina’s NovaSeq, and that it could likely process less than one patient sample on a run of the instrument for [REDACTED] MCED test in development, as compared to 400 patient samples per run on the NovaSeq. IDF ¶¶ 644 (*in camera*), 646 (*in camera*). [REDACTED] thus believes that Thermo Fisher’s platform “would be completely impractical from a screening assay standpoint based on the throughput and the error rate of that system.” IDF ¶ 645 (quoting [REDACTED]). Similarly, [REDACTED] believes that Thermo Fisher is not a viable system for a multi-cancer test because it lacks the throughput and accuracy that Illumina achieves. IDF ¶ 651 (*in camera*). [REDACTED] believes that the error rate of Thermo Fisher’s NGS platform is too high. IDF ¶ 652 (*in camera*).

BGI: Singlera does not use BGI sequencers to run its PanSeer test because Singlera believes BGI has a poor reputation for reliability and service. IDF ¶ 665. Similarly, [REDACTED] will not likely switch to BGI upon expiration of Illumina’s patents²⁰ because [REDACTED] believes that: (1) the performance of the BGI sequencer is not as good as Illumina’s; (2) Illumina may have other intellectual property that could hinder BGI; and (3) [REDACTED] “customers were very concerned about being dependent on a Chinese sequencing system . . . [and] didn’t want data to be in the hands of a Chinese company.” [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] would not consider using BGI machines because it has “a strict policy not to [have] . . . anyone outside the United States . . . have access to data of U.S. citizens.” IDF ¶ 668 (quoting [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] believes BGI’s quality and efficiency “doesn’t compare to Illumina” IDF ¶ 670 (*in camera*) (quoting [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED]

million reads” would be “preferred . . . In general, [Thermo Fisher’s] system isn’t well suited to a kind of test that needs a very large number of samples . . . running through it very quickly.” IDF ¶ 642 (quoting Felton (Thermo Fisher) Tr. 1987-89).

²⁰ Illumina sued BGI in 2019 and 2020 alleging that BGI’s sequencers and reagents infringe patents held by Illumina. IDF ¶ 659. As of July 2020, Illumina had 11 active IP infringement suits against BGI. IDF ¶¶ 660, 663. Singlera testified at trial that using BGI for its PanSeer test was “out of the picture” because of the intellectual property dispute. IDF ¶ 664. Later, on July 14, 2022, Illumina entered into a settlement and license agreement with BGI that resolves certain patent and antitrust claims between the two companies. IDF ¶ 663. Respondents offered a Form 8-K filing as evidence of the settlement agreement. RX4064. However, the alleged settlement involves a “litigation standstill” and Complaint Counsel assert that once the standstill terminates in 2025, Illumina is free to sue BGI again. ALJ Order on Respondents’ Mot. to Reopen Evidentiary Record at 2 (Aug. 8, 2022).

[REDACTED]. The Department of Defense reinforced customer concerns about BGI on October 5, 2022 when it designated BGI as one of several “‘Chinese military companies’ operating direct[ly] or indirectly in the United States” and which advance China’s “Military-Civil Fusion strategy” that “supports the modernization goals of the People’s Liberation Army.”²¹ The DoD designation is likely to increase U.S. companies’ concerns about utilizing BGI NGS platforms for sensitive activities such as cancer screening.

PacBio/Omniome: PacBio and Omniome do not offer adequate substitutes for Illumina’s NGS. PacBio does not view its long read technology as an alternative to Illumina’s NGS for MCED test developers. IDF ¶ 674. Sequencing ctDNA fragments using PacBio’s long-read sequencing platforms [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Omniome plans to launch a sequencer in 2023, three years after initially projected. IDF ¶ 682 (*in camera*). However, [REDACTED] did not even consider Omniome’s NGS platform because it believed that “[e]ven [Omniome’s] speculations on what their final numbers were going to be on the throughput and the cost were prohibitively expensive and not enough throughput for [REDACTED] application.” IDF ¶ 681 (*in camera*) (quoting [REDACTED]).

Oxford Nanopore: [REDACTED] finds that it cannot use Oxford Nanopore’s NGS platform for its MCED test in development because it is “optimized for long molecules [and we] don’t have . . . long molecules in their native state in cfDNA.” IDF ¶ 686 [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also believes Oxford Nanopore has a substantially higher error rate than Illumina. [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] believes Oxford Nanopore “doesn’t have the accuracy or throughput needed to be able to run [its MCED test] on that platform.” IDF ¶ 687 (quoting [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] views Oxford Nanopore’s long-read sequencing platform as “not nearly as advanced as . . . Illumina . . . so it’s not something necessarily that’s suitable” for its cancer screening test. IDF ¶ 688 (quoting [REDACTED]). Even Illumina acknowledges that its NGS technology is “superior in a meaningful way . . . around data accuracy[.]” IDF ¶ 690.

Respondents point to companies with NGS platforms currently in development that they say will be viable platforms for MCED tests in the near future, including Singular, [REDACTED] Element, and PacBio/Omniome (discussed above). ID 151 (*in camera*). However, as demonstrated here and in Section VII.D.2.a below, these nascent platforms are unlikely to serve as adequate replacements for Illumina’s NGS platform due to throughput, accuracy, or other concerns. *See, e.g.*, IDF ¶¶ 694-95 (*in camera*), 699-700 (*in camera*) (Singular has a goal of [REDACTED] less than NovaSeq’s 10 billion reads per flow cell; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] could not currently consider switching to the Singular platform for their NGS tests); IDF ¶ 722 (*in camera*) (quoting [REDACTED])

²¹ Complaint Counsel’s Mot. Requesting Off’l Notice of the Dept. of Defense Designation Regarding BGI Genomics Co., LTD., Ex. A, B (Nov. 1, 2022). We have taken official notice of the DoD designation pursuant to Commission Rule 3.43(f), 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(f). Order Taking Off’l Notice of the Dept. of Defense Designation Regarding BGI Genomics Co., LTD. at 2 (Nov. 29, 2022).

[REDACTED]; IDF ¶¶ 711-12 (*in camera*), 716 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²²

In any event, the evidence fails to prove that the assertedly forthcoming alternative NGS platforms are likely to become commercially available in the near future. ID 151. Several of these potential NGS platforms are still in an early phase of development and face significant barriers to development and commercialization. ID 151-52; IDF ¶¶ 723-29. Their performance has not yet been subject to the verification and testing needed before adoption. ID 151. For example, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IDF ¶¶ 719-20 (*in camera*). Even post-launch, additional time would likely be required before an MCED developer could rely on a new NGS platform. As Francis deSouza of Illumina acknowledged, it is “not uncommon” for clinical customers to wait years to adopt a new sequencer in order “to see how well it will perform in the real world, then perform validation.” IDF ¶¶ 728-29 (citing deSouza Tr. 2410, 2450). Thus, it could take years after their launch for potential platforms to be used by MCED developers. ID 152.

Finally, even if there were viable alternatives to Illumina’s NGS, the evidence shows that MCED tests are validated to a particular sequencing platform and that there are significant costs and delays associated with switching NGS platforms. ID 152; IDF ¶¶ 730 (*in camera*), 731-733, 734 (*in camera*), 735-736, 737-745 (*in camera*). GRAIL acknowledges that once a company develops a testing assay on a sequencer, it is “very costly” to move to a different sequencer. IDF ¶ 731. MCED tests must be “tailor-made” to an NGS platform, similar to how a key is designed for a lock. IDF ¶ 730 (quoting [REDACTED]). As the ALJ explained, switching NGS platforms would require redesigning the MCED test, training technicians on the use of a new platform, revalidating the test on the new platform, performing a clinical sample analysis, and potentially obtaining new regulatory approvals,²³ all of which could

²² Entry barriers for the NGS related product are formidable. NGS platforms require large sums and years to develop with no guarantee of success. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The ALJ found that would-be entrants to NGS platforms face reputational and customer-acceptance barriers to launching new products. IDF ¶¶ 723, 727-29. There are also intellectual property barriers to entry. For example, Illumina maintains patents over innovations that “touch[] every aspect of the sequencing workflow, including nucleotides, enzymes, reagent mixes, instruments, optics, analysis software, and bioinformatics, which result from Illumina’s significant investments in research and development.” deSouza Tr. 2229-32; PX2822 at 006-007; PX9067 at 017 (Qiagen was forced to abandon the U.S. sequencing market due to IP challenges by Illumina).

²³ To obtain a PMA for a distributed or kitted IVD, the test developer must specify its NGS instruments, reagents, and other system components. ID 152 n.39; IDF ¶ 191. As a result, an approved distributed IVD test is “lock[ed]-in” to those systems once clinical trials begin, making switching to new technology

cost millions of dollars and take years to complete. ID 152; IDF ¶¶ 735-36, 738 (*in camera*), 740 (*in camera*), 742-45 (*in camera*); *see also* IDF ¶¶ 732-33 (stating Illumina’s acknowledgment that switching would require considerable time).

Consequently, the record supports Complaint Counsel’s contention that Illumina’s NGS platforms are a critical input for MCED developers. Illumina is the only viable supplier of the critical NGS inputs on which MCED developers depend.

D. Anticompetitive Effects

1. Legal Standard

Congress passed the Clayton Act amendments of 1950 in part to cover vertical mergers. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 317.²⁴ Congress extended Section 7 to address vertical mergers that “deprive . . . rivals of a fair opportunity to compete” and thereby act as a “clog on competition.” *Id.* at 323-24 (quotation omitted). Economic arrangements between companies in a supplier-customer relationship are characterized as vertical. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 323. As relevant here, a vertical merger may increase barriers to entry or reduce competition by foreclosing competitors of the purchasing firm in the merger from access to a potential source of supply, or from access on competitive terms. *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 352; *Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Systems Corp.*, 224 F. Supp. 2d 657, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In keeping with this guidance from caselaw, we use “foreclose” and “foreclosure” in this Opinion generally to refer to Illumina’s reducing the ability of MCED developers to use its NGS platforms on competitive terms. Such foreclosure may be achieved by increasing prices, withholding or degrading access, reducing service or support, or otherwise increasing the costs or reducing the efficiency or efficacy of Illumina’s NGS platforms for MCED rivals.

Case law provides two different but overlapping standards for evaluating the likely effect of a vertical transaction. *Brown Shoe* and its progeny, including *U.S. Steel*, 426 F.2d 592, and *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 353, examine the “share of the market foreclosed” and identify “various economic and historical factors” that a court should review in determining whether a vertical merger may substantially lessen competition. *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 352-53. The factors

platforms difficult. IDF ¶¶ 191, 193. Modifying any component of the approved distributed IVD test could require conducting additional clinical trials with the modified component. IDF ¶ 192.

²⁴ “As enacted in 1914, § 7 of the original Clayton Act prohibited . . . [acquisitions that] would result in a substantial lessening of competition *between the acquiring and the acquired* companies.” *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added). “The Act did not . . . appear to preclude [acquisitions] other than a direct competitor.” *Id.* at 313. In 1950, Congress deleted the “acquiring-acquired” language of the original text “to make plain that § 7 applied not only to mergers between actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend to lessen competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.” *Id.* at 317; *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 81-1191, at 11 (1949) (the purpose of eliminating the “acquiring and the acquired” language in Section 7 was “to make it clear that the bill applies to all types of mergers or acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substantially lessening competition”).

include, *inter alia*, the nature and purpose of the transaction, barriers to entry,²⁵ whether the merger will eliminate potential competition by one of the merging parties, and the degree of market power that would be possessed by the merged enterprise as shown by the number and strength of competing suppliers and purchasers. *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 353 (citing *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 328-29); *U.S. Steel*, 426 F.2d at 599. This multifactor analysis does not yield a “precise formula[]” for determining whether a vertical merger may lessen competition, *id.*, and the Supreme Court has made clear that not all factors receive equal weight. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 321-22 (merger must be “functionally viewed” in the context of the particular industry); *id.* at 329 (nature and purpose of the transaction a “most important” factor); *Ford Motor Co. v. United States*, 405 U.S. 562, 566-70 (1972) (finding a vertical acquisition unlawful while considering only three factors). The court must examine the market’s “structure, history and probable future” to assess the legality of a transaction. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38.

More recently, courts and enforcers have focused on whether a transaction is likely to increase the ability and/or incentive of the merged firm to foreclose rivals from sources of supply or from distribution outlets. *See, e.g., AT&T*, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 243-45 (assessing the government’s foreclosure theory under an ability and incentive framework); Complaint, *Lockheed Martin Corp.*, Docket 9405, 2022 WL 325951, at *2 (FTC Jan. 25, 2022) (challenging acquisition that would allegedly “provide [the acquirer] with the ability and incentive to foreclose access to, or raise rivals’ costs for,” critical technologies).

Although the *Brown Shoe* and ability and incentive analyses are framed in different terms, they interrelate closely because several of the factors from the *Brown Shoe* line of cases – *i.e.*, the percentage of the market foreclosed, the nature and purpose of the transaction, and especially the degree of market power of the merged firm – provide direct insight into the ability and incentive of the merged firm to harm rivals. A transaction that forecloses a high percentage of the market or that yields a firm significant market power in a setting with few competing suppliers may increase the merged firm’s ability and/or incentive to harm competition.

The ALJ found that Complaint Counsel must not only prove that Illumina would gain the ability and incentive to foreclose or otherwise harm GRAIL’s rivals as a result of the Acquisition, but that they must also prove the additional market facts set forth in *Brown Shoe / Fruehauf*. ID 168-69. The ALJ erred. The Clayton Act requires only proof that the effect of the transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18; *see also AT&T*, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 243-45 (assessing the Government’s foreclosure theory under an ability and incentive framework).²⁶ However, for the sake of completeness, we analyze Complaint Counsel’s case under both the *Brown Shoe* and ability and incentive frameworks. We find that, under either approach, Complaint Counsel have demonstrated a

²⁵ Courts have implicitly looked to barriers to entry by directing attention to what are often key entry considerations. *See, e.g., Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 353 (focusing on capital costs required to enter a market and the market share needed for profitable production).

²⁶ Respondents endorsed the ability/incentive framework in their advocacy. *See, e.g., RB 131* (citing *AT&T* and concluding that “it was Complaint Counsel’s burden to demonstrate that Illumina has the ability and incentive to foreclose during the relevant timeframe”); RRB 53 (same).

reasonable likelihood that the Acquisition will substantially lessen competition in the United States market for the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests.

2. Brown Shoe Standard

Section 7 prohibits vertical mergers that “deprive . . . rivals of a fair opportunity to compete” and thereby act as a “clog on competition.” *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 323-24 (quotation omitted). We find that at least four of the factors identified by *Brown Shoe* or its progeny – likely foreclosure, the nature and purpose of the transaction, the degree of market power possessed by the merged firm, and entry barriers, 370 U.S. at 328-29; *see also U.S. Steel*, 426 F.2d at 599 – support a finding of a violation here. These four factors are sufficient.²⁷ Consequently, we conclude that, pursuant to the *Brown Shoe* factors, Complaint Counsel have met their *prima facie* burden under Section 7.

a. Share of the Market Foreclosed

Brown Shoe identified the “share of the market foreclosed” as an important consideration in evaluating a vertical merger, finding that “[i]f the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated.” 370 U.S. at 328.

Illumina is currently, and for the reasonably near future will remain, the only viable supplier of a critical input: NGS platforms necessary for MCED tests. ID 153, 172. Illumina’s NGS platforms uniquely possess the high throughput, high accuracy, and favorable cost profile that make them the “gold standard” for developing early detection tests. *See supra* Sections II.B and VII.C.2; Conroy Tr. 1580, 1582 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; PX7100 (Chudova Dep.) at 60-61 (*in camera*). Other NGS platforms are inadequate for MCED test development because they do not allow users to sequence an adequate number of cfDNA molecules for test development, cannot run tests at a sufficient scale, or are insufficiently accurate, among other reasons. *See supra* Sections II.B.3, II.B.4, and VII.C.2; PX7110 (Conroy Dep.) at 187 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; PX7111 (Fesko Dep.) at 51-52 (*in camera*) [REDACTED].

Moreover, Illumina’s NGS dominance is sustainable. Respondents point to other NGS platforms in development such as Singular, Element, and PacBio/Omnio as upcoming options for MCED test developers. ID 151. However, those platforms are either inadequate in their specifications for throughput and accuracy, suffer from intellectual property or other entry barriers, or will not adequately be tested and validated within a reasonable time to allow MCED developers to switch. *See, e.g.,* Felton Tr. 2011-13 (*in camera*) [REDACTED].

²⁷ The Supreme Court in *Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 566-70, found a vertical merger unlawful where plaintiff met only three of the *Brown Shoe* factors. In that decision, the Court did not take a point-by-point approach, but instead focused on a subset of factors (the nature and purpose of the acquisition, increased entry barriers, and concentration trends) to find a violation of the Clayton Act. *Id.*

[REDACTED]; IDF ¶¶ 657-71 (MCED developers testified that BGI’s quality, performance, and efficiency do not compare favorably to Illumina’s, deterring them from considering BGI as a supplier); IDF ¶¶ 666, 668, 671 (customers testified to privacy concerns, acknowledged by Illumina, regarding patient data being in the hands of BGI, a Chinese company); IDF ¶ 674 (PacBio does not view its long-read technology as an alternative to Illumina’s short-read technology for MCED test developers and [REDACTED]); IDF ¶ 675 (sequencing ctDNA fragments using PacBio’s long-read sequencing platforms “would cost over ten times more” than using Illumina’s platforms); PX7119 (Lauer Dep.) at 41-42, 46 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; see also *supra* Sections II.B.4 and VII.C.2.

MCED developers’ dependence on Illumina’s NGS platforms renders them susceptible to foreclosure. And mechanisms for foreclosure are clearly available. As described in more detail in Section VII.D.3.a below, Illumina can identify GRAIL’s most threatening rivals by mining competitive intelligence, sales records, and public sources to reveal the level of investment, clinical progress, and sometimes even the technological approach of MCED developer rivals. Having identified these rivals, Illumina can take steps to foreclose them, including by raising their costs.²⁸ For example, Illumina’s pricing practices allow it to price discriminate between MCED rivals and other firms, or even between particular rivals. IDF ¶¶ 766, 768, ID 171. Illumina separately prices its instruments, consumables, and service and support. IDF ¶ 767. It offers a variety of discounts based on factors such as customer type, volume, market segment, and mix of business, with discount tables that can vary based on the customer’s application. IDF ¶¶ 769, 771. Furthermore, Illumina uses customer-specific and discretionary discounts based on a wide variety of criteria. IDF ¶¶ 772-73. Thus, Illumina has

²⁸ Illumina need not cut off MCED developers outright from NGS platforms to cause a “share of the market [to be] foreclosed.” The Acquisition could also increase the likelihood that Illumina would raise the cost of GRAIL’s rivals by increasing their price for, or lowering the quality of, NGS. Foreclosure refers not just to preventing access to a source of supply, but access on competitive terms. *Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, LLC*, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 673; *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 352; *cf. Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 64 (it was no defense to monopolization that the monopolist did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, when it barred them from “the cost-efficient ones”). Limiting access on competitive terms is one instance of a class of conduct known as raising rivals’ costs. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, *ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION* ¶ 1000d (5th ed. 2021) (“The theory of RRC rests on the simple observation that a practice that makes it more costly for a competitor to do business can harm competition even though the firm is not forced out of the market.”); Steven C. Salop, *Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement*, 127 Yale L.J. 1962, 1975 (2018) (“The paradigmatic input foreclosure concern entails the upstream merging firm raising prices or refusing to sell its critical input to one or more actual or potential rivals of the downstream merging firm.”). To the extent that a vertical merger increases the likelihood that an upstream firm will meaningfully raise the costs of its downstream rivals, the transaction risks distorting downstream competition and this weighs in the balance for *Brown Shoe’s* “share of the market foreclosed” element.

the tools to price-discriminate among customers, using the information it obtains about customer end-uses. IDF ¶¶ 746-59, 766-75; *see also*, PX7082 (Cooper Dep.) at 124-25 (“[W]e have to buy fancy reagents in a different-colored box to run an NIPT versus cheap reagents for research use in doing [product] discovery purposes.”); PX7089 (Naclerio Dep.) at 198-200 (*in camera*)

[REDACTED]. Illumina could use these tools to selectively increase its prices to MCED competitors that threaten GRAIL.²⁹

Illumina can also harm MCED test developers through non-price means, such as by withholding or degrading access to supply, service, or new technologies. GRAIL’s rivals depend heavily on Illumina for critical inputs such as high-quality service, continuity of supply, and cooperation on FDA regulatory efforts. As one customer explained, Illumina’s instruments are “not like a washing machine . . . [T]hey frequently stop working and you need to call an Illumina technician to come out and help find out what’s wrong with it and get it up and running again.” Conroy Tr. 1583-84. Sequencing instruments do “break down, and when they do, . . . you need a service engineer to be able to respond and restore that instrument in a timely manner.” PX7094 (Nolan Dep.) at 277-78. Interrupted supplies can interfere with a competitor’s ability to process patient samples. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Illumina could, if it chose, impede GRAIL’s competitors’ business and inhibit their R&D efforts by reducing the quality or quantity of supplies or service. IDF ¶¶ 795-804; [REDACTED]

Illumina could also withhold, delay, or limit access to new or improved NGS products. IDF ¶¶ 780-90. Illumina regularly releases new sequencers, reagents, and upgrades to its NGS technology. IDF ¶ 780. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IDF ¶ 783 (*in camera*). [REDACTED] IDF ¶ 784 (*in camera*). When customers seek to upgrade their NGS instruments, Illumina will send a technician to get the new instruments “up and running and to assist in troubleshooting matters.” IDF ¶ 787 (quoting PX7082 (Cooper Dep.) at 87). Illumina’s new products typically reduce the cost of sequencing and increase throughput, IDF ¶ 789, so it would harm MCED competitors’ competitiveness if Illumina were to withhold, reduce, or degrade their access to new technologies.

Besides affecting service or supply of NGS platforms, Illumina could also delay, withhold, or impose excessive costs on the cooperation that MCED test providers need to pursue certain regulatory approvals for their tests. Goswami Tr. 3188-89 (to develop a kitted version of

²⁹ Respondents argue that Complaint Counsel’s foreclosure theory fails because NGS costs represent a small and shrinking portion of downstream revenues, rendering vertical foreclosure not a concern. RAB 5, 10. Respondents’ claim falters because (1) the proportion of NGS costs says nothing about Illumina’s ability to foreclose MCED developers by withholding or slowing access to essential NGS technology and services, and (2) the fact that MCED rivals could absorb a price increase by accepting lower profits does not show that they are not harmed.

an MCEd test, the developer needs an IVD agreement with Illumina); Getty Tr. 2509 (Guardant relies on Illumina to support interactions with the FDA); PX7040 (Getty IHT) at 88 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]. Even Illumina acknowledged that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PX7063 (Berry (Illumina) IHT) at 95 (*in camera*).³⁰

Moreover, Illumina has an enormous financial incentive to place a thumb on the scale in GRAIL’s favor by withholding access to NGS platforms on competitive terms. As we discuss in more detail in Section VII.D.3.b.ii below, Illumina stands to earn substantially more profit on the sale of GRAIL tests than it does by supporting rival test developers. The integrated Illumina will have every reason to keep rival test developers from the competitive race or to slow their progress so that they do not take sales from GRAIL. Illumina’s ample mechanisms for effecting foreclosure give it multiple ways to act on that incentive. Consequently, the share of the market that may be foreclosed is very substantial, and this factor weighs in favor of a *prima facie* case.

We next examine the remaining economic and historical factors, such as the nature and purpose of the transaction, entry barriers, and the degree of market power that the merged firm would possess. *Id.*; *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 353. We find that they, too, support Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* case.

b. Nature and Purpose of the Transaction

The *Brown Shoe* line of cases counsels us to evaluate the “nature and purpose” of the transaction in evaluating its legality. *Brown Shoe*, 370 U.S. at 329; *U.S. Steel*, 426 F.2d at 599. Here, the nature of the transaction is a sole-source supplier taking full ownership of a downstream customer in which it had held only a small share immediately prior to the acquisition. Illumina’s [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PX2151 (*in camera*). Illumina projected that the “net margin profit pool” in 2035 would be [REDACTED] for clinical testing services compared to [REDACTED] for instruments and core consumables and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for library preparation and assays. PX2488 at 009. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] PX2465 at 006-008 (*in camera*). As set forth in its 2021-2025 strategic plan, Illumina sought to [REDACTED]

³⁰ See also PX7049 (Bailey IHT) at 42-43 (*in camera*) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. As one Illumina customer who relies on NGS for cancer monitoring tests put it, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PX7075 (Stahl Dep.) at 59-60 (*in camera*).

[REDACTED] PX2169 at 045 (*in camera*).

[REDACTED] PX2465 at 003 (*in camera*). Illumina's plan to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] places in the crosshairs those MCED developers whose success could constrain GRAIL and stand between Illumina and its planned, [REDACTED]. We find that the nature and purpose of the Acquisition tend to support a likelihood of anticompetitive effects, and that this element of the *Brown Shoe* analysis favors Complaint Counsel.

c. Degree of Market Power Possessed by the Merged Firm

The Second Circuit in *Fruehauf* identified the degree of market power that would be possessed by the merged enterprise, and the number and strength of competing suppliers and purchasers, as factors that influence the analysis of a vertical merger. 603 F.2d at 353. We find that these factors favor a *prima facie* case here. Complaint Counsel have already established that MCED developers have no meaningful alternative to Illumina for upstream NGS platforms, a fact that confers upstream market power on Illumina both pre- and post-Acquisition. *See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.*, 468 U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984) (NCAA had market power in college football broadcasts because it completely controlled them and there were no available substitutes.) At the downstream level, GRAIL is currently the only seller of MCED tests. GRAIL stands to directly benefit from foreclosure by its parent firm of other developers with whom it is currently engaged in R&D and pre-commercial competition. Competing developers are vulnerable to this conduct as described in Section VII.D.2.a above, raising the risk that performance in the relevant market “would cease to be competitive.” *Fruehauf*, 603 F.2d at 353. This factor, too, favors a *prima facie* case.

d. Entry Barriers

Courts have held that the presence of entry barriers weighs in favor of blocking a vertical merger. *Fruehauf* included capital costs and scale economies among the factors to be considered, 605 F.2d at 353, and *U.S. Steel* explained that such barriers can include “possible reliance on suppliers [*sic*] from a vertically integrated firm with whom he is also competing.” 426 F.2d at 605; *see also Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 568-71.

Barriers to developing and marketing an MCED test are significant and will likely become higher as a result of the Acquisition. MCED competitors are investing [REDACTED] to develop their tests, IDF ¶¶ 274, 373, 403-04, 498, a process that takes years. *Cote Tr.* 3785-86 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]. Competitors must undertake costly, time-consuming clinical studies to validate their tests in the face of uncertainty about whether they will be successful. *See, e.g., Chudova Tr.* 1204 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; IDF ¶¶ 216-17 (GRAIL's CCGA study enrollment took three years); IDF ¶¶ 301-02 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]. To achieve wide-scale commercial acceptance, the tests must undergo a rigorous and costly PMA approval process with the FDA. IDF ¶¶ 169, 176-78.

The Acquisition will increase barriers to entry for MCED test developers because, to offer a viable product, they will have to rely on Illumina's supply of NGS instruments and reagents while also competing against Illumina in MCED tests. As Exact's Conroy concluded,

[REDACTED]

also PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 171 (explaining that rivals' investments are based on the anticipated level of cooperation from Illumina; if prices rise or cooperation is reduced, GRAIL's rivals may fail to launch products).³¹ In sum, Illumina's acquisition of GRAIL increases the risks to GRAIL's competitors of doing business with Illumina, the only viable alternative for NGS for MCED developers, thereby increasing barriers to entry at the downstream level of the market.

Accordingly, we find that, under the vertical merger framework of *Brown Shoe*, Complaint Counsel have made out a *prima facie* case. We proceed to analyze Complaint Counsel's showing under the distinct but overlapping ability and incentive framework.

3. Ability and Incentive Framework

As discussed below, Complaint Counsel demonstrated that Illumina has the ability, as a dominant provider of NGS, to hamper the R&D and commercialization efforts of GRAIL's rivals' products. Further, Complaint Counsel also proved that the Acquisition will increase Illumina's incentive to do so. They thus have made out a *prima facie* case of likely harm to competition from the Acquisition.

a. Illumina's Ability to Harm GRAIL's MCED Rivals

Illumina is currently the dominant provider of NGS, a necessary input for MCED test development, and Illumina's MCED test developer customers have no viable alternative to Illumina's NGS in the reasonably near future. ID 171; Sections II.B.3, II.B.4, VII.C.2, and VII.D.2.a above. We find that Illumina has a variety of tools through which it can hinder the

³¹ Dr. Fiona Scott Morton is highly qualified to offer economic opinions for this case. Dr. Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management where she teaches courses on competitive strategy and conducts research in empirical industrial organization. PX6090 ¶ 1. Dr. Scott Morton possesses a Ph.D in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where she supervised economists analyzing the competitive effects of organizations' behavior. PX6090 ¶¶ 1, 3. Dr. Scott Morton has published dozens of scholarly articles with a concentration in empirical studies of competition among companies and firms and the role of market structure. PX6090 ¶¶ 5, 6.

progress of GRAIL’s MCEd test developer rivals, including through increases in price and degradations to service and supply. ID 171.

A first and important step is that Illumina has the ability to identify rivals to GRAIL. Illumina gains insight directly from customers about the products they intend to use and the panel types they intend to run. IDF ¶¶ 746-48. Illumina can glean information about customers’ end uses from their purchase history of consumables, because certain Illumina consumables are better suited for certain applications. IDF ¶ 749. Purchase patterns can also reveal details about a test developer’s progress: for example, an increase in the volume of reagents purchased may indicate that a customer is pursuing a clinical trial or commercializing a product. IDF ¶ 751. Illumina can also identify customers that are purchasing its products for oncology tests through public information available through company websites and regulatory filings. IDF ¶ 753 (citing Berry Tr. 655-56). Indeed, Illumina’s competitive intelligence assets give it the ability to identify and target the firms that pose the most serious competitive threat to GRAIL. GRAIL’s R&D team tracks the clinical trials of other companies that are developing MCEd tests, Della Porta Tr. 583, and GRAIL tracks investment activity in those companies. deSouza Tr. 2392. Ordinary course of business documents confirm that GRAIL closely observes development efforts of rival MCEd test developers, scanning the horizon for competitive threats. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And for IVD customers, Illumina learns about the customer’s development plans including when it plans to commercialize its test. IDF ¶ 759.

Armed with knowledge of MCEd competitors’ capabilities and plans, Illumina can take a variety of steps to slow or harm the development efforts of key competitors, including by raising their costs. As discussed above in Section VII.D.2.a, Illumina uses complex pricing tools that allow it to price-discriminate against individual customers by end-use. By raising a key competitor’s costs, Illumina could reduce that competitor’s ability to process large volumes of samples and thereby to run clinical studies, scale its test for the marketplace, or otherwise compete. Illumina also possesses the ability to diminish, withhold, or degrade supply, service, or technical cooperation that customers need for regulatory approvals. *See* Section VII.D.2.a. MCEd test developers are entirely dependent on Illumina for the main platform on which their tests rely, which makes them vulnerable to strategies that would raise their costs or otherwise harm their ability to compete. As a Guardant executive testified, “there’s a symbiotic relationship” between Guardant and Illumina, Getty Tr. 2509; in fact, Illumina is so omnipresent in Guardant’s development efforts that “the Illumina logo could be placed on the lab.” The relationship is such that, “[w]ithout [Illumina], Guardant doesn’t exist.” PX7040 (Getty IHT) at 190. As an executive from Exact put it, “[W]e are totally dependent upon Illumina as a supplier, and we need a true partnership with them to know that we can get a high-quality product at a good price with incredible support.” IDF ¶ 795 (quoting PX7058 (Conroy IHT) at 174-77); *see*

also, Gao Tr. 2947-48 (Illumina is “obviously the 800-pound gorilla in the room,” in that it “control[s] the supply chain for all the NGS-based early cancer detection technology, not only for Singlera, but for other companies, too.”) The evidence proves that Illumina has the ability to use its control as a dominant provider of NGS to foreclose MCED test developers in a variety of ways.

Although the ALJ correctly found that Illumina possesses the ability to harm its MCED test developer rivals, he found such proof to be less significant in this case than Complaint Counsel suggest because, he found, these abilities existed before the Acquisition and are not a function of it. ID 171. This analysis is flawed. While Complaint Counsel must demonstrate that both ability and incentive exist, it need not prove that the merger created both. To harm competition, a merger need only create or augment *either* the combined firm’s ability or its incentive to harm competition. It need not do both. Requiring a plaintiff to show an increase to both the ability and the incentive to foreclose would *per se* exempt from the Clayton Act’s purview any transaction that involves the acquisition of a monopoly provider of inputs to adjacent markets. Rather than fulfilling the Clayton Act’s purpose of arresting in its incipiency the substantial lessening of competition that may result from an acquisition, *du Pont*, 353 U.S. at 593, it would perversely make the very severity of the threat to competition a reason for questioning its significance. This Acquisition increases Illumina’s incentive to foreclose, as discussed in the next section; the fact that Illumina was already entrenched as a must-have supplier only reinforces, and does not diminish, the significance of this fact.

b. Illumina’s Increased Incentive to Harm GRAIL’s MCED Rivals

The Acquisition has substantially increased Illumina’s incentive to ensure that GRAIL wins the innovation race. It now stands to reap enormous downstream benefits in the MCED test market by tilting the playing field to disadvantage GRAIL’s rivals.

i. Illumina’s Pre-Acquisition Incentives

Before the Acquisition, Illumina held a 12% share of GRAIL. Illumina thus was positioned to derive a small share of any profits earned by GRAIL on sales of MCED tests³² and would have received a small positive contribution from sales diverted to GRAIL by a foreclosure strategy. Weighed against the benefit of diverting sales to GRAIL would be the costs to Illumina of foreclosing the rivals, including the loss of NGS revenue if a rival’s MCED business were to shrink. Consequently, the combination of costs and benefits left Illumina with, at most, a small foreclosure incentive.

ii. Illumina’s Post-Acquisition Incentive to Foreclose Competitors

Economic Motivations: Upon fully reacquiring GRAIL, Illumina’s incentives changed radically. Post-merger Illumina will directly benefit from tilting the innovation race in favor of GRAIL, the MCED provider that it now 100% owns. Putting this in financial terms, Illumina now stands to profit substantially more from the sale of a GRAIL MCED test than it does from

³² Pre-Acquisition, Illumina earned revenues from its NGS price per-test, plus a royalty due from GRAIL to Illumina. PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 194 Table 2; Section II.C.2.

the sale of a rival MCED test, because on the GRAIL MCED test it will earn a margin from NGS sales plus GRAIL's margin from the test itself, while on the rival's test it will earn just the margin on NGS sales. PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 169.³³ Because Illumina will now earn much more from the sale of a GRAIL test than from the sale of a rival's test, Illumina will have a substantially increased incentive to favor GRAIL over its rival MCED test developers and to shift future MCED sales from those rivals to GRAIL. PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 169; PX7138 (Scott Morton Trial Dep.) at 48, 57. It will thus have a significantly greater incentive to foreclose those rivals rather than to keep them on a level playing field with GRAIL.

The enormous size of the projected MCED market amplifies Illumina's incentive to favor GRAIL now that Illumina wholly owns it. As discussed in Section VII.D.2.b above, the potential profits available to Illumina from GRAIL's early cancer detection business are enormous, representing a [REDACTED] market opportunity. PX2151 at 005 (*in camera*). In contrast to the clinical testing business, Illumina projects its current "core business" of NGS sequencers and consumables to [REDACTED] PX2488 at 008 (*in camera*); deSouza Tr. 2378. Illumina's 2021-25 Strategic Plan projected that "[a]s testing evolves, the clinical testing services component of the value chain in NGS applications becomes substantially larger than other components" and noted that Illumina's then-current strategy did not focus on direct participation in the clinical testing services segment. IDF ¶ 818. [REDACTED]

Documents and Testimony: Not only does economic analysis support the notion that Illumina now has a strong incentive to foreclose rivals, but the documentary and testimonial evidence also overwhelmingly point in that direction. Illumina is well aware that vast downstream profits await the winner of the MCED innovation race and is fully cognizant of the need to position itself to capture those profits. In its 2021-2025 Strategic Plan, [REDACTED]

³³ Based on Illumina's deal model and historic sales, Illumina's gross profit per GRAIL test sold would increase from [REDACTED] pre-merger to [REDACTED] post-merger, while Illumina's post-merger profits on sales of rivals' tests would remain static at [REDACTED]. PX6090 (Scott Morton Expert Report) ¶ 194 and Table 2 (*in camera*); PX7138 (Scott Morton Trial Dep.) at 354-56.

Although the ALJ denigrated the probative value of Dr. Scott Morton's analysis because of what he saw as an unwarranted inclusion of a royalty payment from the third-party MCED test developers to Illumina, ID 174-5, eliminating the \$42-\$60 royalty on rivals' sales included in Dr. Scott Morton's calculations would have no effect on the gross profit earned by Illumina on sales of GRAIL's tests. It would not change the [REDACTED] increase in gross profit per GRAIL test sold attributable to the Acquisition. Eliminating the royalty assumption would make the rivals less profitable to sell to, but the merger would still drastically increase the profitability of a sale through GRAIL to Illumina and create the same incentive problems. See PX6090 at ¶ 194, Table 2 and PX7138 (Scott Morton Trial Dep.) at 355-56. In any case, Dr. Scott Morton had good reason to include the disputed royalties in her calculations. Even under the Open Offer, designed to alleviate concerns about the Acquisition (see Sections VII.D.5 and VII.E.1), participating customers would pay a revenue share of 6% on kitted tests. PX6090 Table 2; PX 6091 (Scott Morton Rebuttal Report) ¶ 108 n.225 (listing customers planning or considering a kitted test).

[REDACTED] PX2169 (*in camera*). In connection with the Acquisition, Illumina planned to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX2465 at 003 (*in camera*).

In the absence of anticompetitive interference, alternative MCED tests are being developed that pose a challenge to these plans and can reasonably be expected to constrain GRAIL by threatening to take share from it. GRAIL's internal documents reveal its belief that its R&D rivals pose competitive threats, *see, e.g.*, IDF ¶¶ 261, 263-66, PX4250 at 003, PX4450 at 240-41, PX4318, PX4616 at 017, IDF ¶¶ 321-23, 326-31. Such documents also reflect GRAIL's concern that rival MCED tests, such as Exact/Thrive, could receive FDA approval before GRAIL. PX4288. Because FDA approval is generally necessary for widespread commercialization and reimbursement of an MCED test, a competitor that beats GRAIL to FDA approval could hold a significant commercial advantage. IDF ¶ 169; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Given the massive profits that await the winner, Illumina has every reason to ensure that no firm beats GRAIL to full commercialization, and that no firm catches up if GRAIL is first. Illumina thus has a powerful economic incentive to use its control over the NGS platform to hamstring GRAIL's competitors as they pursue commercialization and eventual FDA approval.

As discussed in Sections VII.A.1.f and VII.A.2.b, other industry players share Illumina/GRAIL's understanding that rivals could take share from GRAIL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *See, e.g.*, PX7100 (Chudova Dep.) at 15-16; PX7094 (Nolan Dep.) at 252-53; PX8392 (Exact) at 002 (*in camera*); PX7051 (Lengauer IHT) at 27-29 (*in camera*). MCED test developers testified that they are competing with GRAIL today and plan to compete with GRAIL going forward across a variety of metrics including price, number of cancers, sensitivity, specificity, and method of determining tumor location. ID 164-65; IDF ¶ 507 (Singlera considers GRAIL, Freenome, and Thrive as its top competitors and expects to compete with GRAIL on additional innovation); Conroy Tr. 1616-18 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. MCED test developers are investing [REDACTED] to innovate and compete against GRAIL and each other to develop and commercialize MCED tests. IDF ¶¶ 274, 373, 403-4, 498. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ofman Tr. 3303-05; Nolan Tr. 2756-59 (*in camera*); Getty Tr. 2537-39; Conroy Tr. 1615 (*in camera*); PX7121 (Otte Dep.) at 29-31 (*in camera*). Some developers are beginning with multiple cancer panels and others are starting with one cancer with plans to expand. IDF ¶¶ 278, 298; 358-60; 388, 395, 461, 483, 494. Regardless of approach, these are credible rivals, actively undertaking large-scale efforts to launch an MCED test that will compete with GRAIL.

The more closely these competitors approach GRAIL in the competitive race, the greater will be Illumina's incentive to hamper their progress. Rival test developers testified that post-Acquisition Illumina will have the incentive to exercise its ability to hamper their efforts to bring these life-saving tests to American patients. PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 68-69; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; Gao Tr. 2947-48, 2951; PX0155 at 40 (Natera 10-K, Feb. 25, 2021) (acknowledging that Illumina's acquisition of GRAIL might add to the risks associated with having Illumina as its sole supplier of sequencers and reagents).

The documents and testimony of record thus confirm the economic analysis showing that post-Acquisition the rewards to Illumina of a foreclosure strategy would be great. Complaint Counsel have demonstrated that the Acquisition markedly increased Illumina's incentive to use its control of NGS platforms to foreclose or otherwise raise the costs of GRAIL's rivals.

iii. Illumina's Past Behavior Illustrates and Confirms Its Anticompetitive Incentives

Real-world evidence of Illumina's past behavior reinforces the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition here. Illumina gave GRAIL special pricing and other benefits while it was wholly owned by Illumina. RAB 22 (acknowledging such practices); PX2553 at 062 (Illumina gave deep discounts to GRAIL when it was wholly owned). Then, when Illumina reduced its ownership of GRAIL in 2017 from a controlling stake to a minority stake, IDF ¶ 40, the deeper discounts that Illumina provided GRAIL "went away." deSouza Tr. 2207.³⁴ An Illumina Q&A document explained how the change "leveled the playing field" for Illumina's MCED customers by allowing GRAIL and other large customers to access Illumina's technology on the "same terms," PX2406, as opposed to providing GRAIL with preferential access and pricing of technology. Illumina further explained that reducing its ownership to a minority stake and "level[ing] the playing field" would "accelerate the liquid biopsy market for all." *Id.*

The ALJ downplayed this evidence, asserting that at the time of GRAIL's formation, no other oncology testing companies were developing liquid biopsy screening tests, and that sequencing costs have since come down. ID 183 n.61. This conclusion misses the mark: Illumina's belief at the time of GRAIL's formation that other firms had not yet turned to cancer screening meant that Illumina's motive for foreclosure would not have yet developed. But eventually competitors did arise who aimed at the same target as GRAIL. deSouza Tr. 2202 (by 2017, other companies were beginning to get interested in developing liquid biopsy tests). Illumina's statement that leveling the playing field would "accelerate the liquid biopsy market for all" acknowledges the existence of competition, and competitors testified to their concerns that an increase to sequencing costs would affect their profitability and impair their ability to innovate or compete. PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 32-33, 72-73; PX7042 (Gao IHT) at 130; [REDACTED].

Respondents claim that the absence of evidence of foreclosure during the time that Illumina had full or partial ownership of GRAIL shows that foreclosure will not happen post-Acquisition. RAB 22-23. But any pre-Acquisition incentive to foreclose GRAIL's rivals was

³⁴ Illumina reduced its ownership interest in GRAIL during a Series B financing, at which time it limited the discounts it provided to GRAIL. deSouza Tr. 2202, 2207.

minor compared to the incentive that prevails following the Acquisition. *See supra* Sections VII.D.3.b.i and b.ii. Moreover, as noted above, at the time of GRAIL’s formation, Illumina believed that ctNA companies were focused on therapy selection and “not yet pursuing screening,” PX2554 at 014. After that situation changed, Illumina’s recognition that reducing its ownership from 100% to a minority stake “leveled the playing field” for its MCED customers implicitly concedes that reacquiring a 100% ownership share re-tilted that playing field against the interests of GRAIL’s MCED rivals.

Other Illumina actions highlight the danger of foreclosure. When Illumina vertically integrated into therapy selection tests (which, like MCED tests, require NGS), it considered the competitive threat posed by its customers when deciding whether to enter into in-vitro diagnostic agreements (necessary for FDA approval) with them. Illumina’s TSO-500 therapy selection test³⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX7043 (Gunn (Roche) IHT) at 38, 54 (*in camera*); PX7112 (Bailey Dep.) at 33, 35; PX7040 (Getty IHT) at 56, 99 (*in camera*). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX7052 (Leite IHT) at 52, 211 (*in camera*); PX7049 (Bailey IHT) at 43, 102-03 (*in camera*); PX7112 (Bailey Dep.) at 37. When Illumina negotiated with oncology therapy selection test providers regarding IVD rights, Illumina’s former Vice President of Business Development, John Leite, testified, he and his colleagues took the strength of competitors into account when determining whether to support them with a partnership:

[T]he value of inclusion of partners that were developing solutions close to ours. We considered a term called “cannibalization” – in other words, what would be the sales of Illumina TSO-500 in the absence of these partners versus the presence of these partners – to try and decide at least a framework for summing up what the value of that partnership would be.

Leite Tr. 2085; *see also* 2081-83 (describing IVD negotiations). As Illumina explained in a 2018 presentation discussing its therapy selection test strategy and whether to continue to partner with other therapy test providers, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX2095 at 002 (*in camera*). This history shows that Illumina as an integrated NGS and test provider rationally acted on its incentives in determining the amount of cooperation it would provide to downstream competitors. It is real-world evidence that Illumina can be expected to similarly limit support for MCED rivals after this Acquisition.

c. Counter-Arguments Lack Merit

Notwithstanding the strong evidence presented above, the Initial Decision rejected the conclusion that Illumina’s ability and increased incentive to foreclose GRAIL’s rivals established a likelihood of harm to competition. In addition to downplaying the significance of

³⁵ [REDACTED] PX7063 (Berry IHT) at 25-27 (*in camera*).

Illumina’s ability to foreclose because it existed before the Acquisition, discussed above, the ALJ rejected any concern with increased incentives, finding that (1) the MCED tests of GRAIL’s rivals were too dissimilar from Galleri and too far from commercialization to support any concern that foreclosure would induce diversion from the rivals’ products to Galleri; (2) a foreclosure strategy would harm Illumina’s reputation, diminishing its NGS revenues and rendering the strategy unprofitable; and (3) profits from MCED test sales were too far in the future to support current foreclosure strategies. ID 173-77. Respondents defend each of these positions. See RAB 10, 15-21. As shown below, all three claims lack merit.

i. Harm to MCED Rivals’ Ability to Compete Will Result in Diversion of Sales to Illumina/GRAIL

The ALJ determined that other MCED tests would be unable to win sales from GRAIL, and that Illumina therefore could not benefit from foreclosing other test developers. ID 175-77. If other MCED tests do not provide meaningful competition to GRAIL, the theory goes, Illumina would not expect to benefit from foreclosure tactics because such tactics would not result in a shift of sales from other tests to Galleri. Respondents support the ALJ’s findings. *See, e.g.*, RAB 10, 15-19. Complaint Counsel challenge the ALJ’s diversion rulings on appeal. *See, e.g.*, CCAB 20-26. As discussed below, we find MCED tests in development likely will be able to take sales from Galleri; Complaint Counsel’s position is both factually and analytically superior.

To begin with, the ALJ erred in finding that the tests in development by rivals are so inferior to Galleri as to render them poor substitutes and therefore make diversion of sales to Illumina/GRAIL following foreclosure unlikely. The ALJ focused on the number of cancers detected, ID 145, 177, the ability to identify the tissue of origin, ID 146-7, 176, and the likely timing of commercialization, ID 143-45, 148-49, 176. We examine each in turn.

Regarding the number of cancers detected, based on the PATHFINDER study, the Galleri test has been shown to detect seven types of Stage I-III cancer in an asymptomatic screening population, while Thrive’s CancerSEEK test has been shown to detect eight. RX3041 at 005; Cote Tr. 4000-01; RX3419 at 006-07. As discussed in Section II.F above, GRAIL’s claim that Galleri can “detect 50 cancers” does not undermine substitutability or defeat diversion because Galleri has not been demonstrated to detect 50 cancers in a screening setting in asymptomatic patients, which is the target population for an MCED test. Cote Tr. 4000-02; Ofman Tr. 3435, 3294-95; Abrams Tr. 3620.³⁶ In any event, even rival tests that do not match Galleri feature-for-feature could still take sales from it, for example if the seller prices them lower. The elimination or crippling of such tests by Illumina through foreclosure would reduce consumer choice and harm competition.

³⁶ As discussed in Section II.F, the CCGA study on which GRAIL’s 50-cancer claim is based was a case-control study that included patients already diagnosed with cancer. RX3409 at 001; Ofman Tr. 3294-95. GRAIL readily acknowledges the limitations of the CCGA study. Ofman Tr. 3294-95; RX3409; PX4609 at 016 [REDACTED]

More fundamentally, the ALJ’s characterization of GRAIL’s competitors as planning to test for two or three cancer types, *e.g.*, ID 145, apart from ignoring Exact/Thrive, disregards evidence that multiple firms are working to develop tests designed to detect more than two or three cancers. IDF ¶¶ 284, 359, 395, 433; Lengauer Tr. 159-60; Conroy Tr. 1650 (*in camera*); PX7111 (Fesko Dep.) at 27-30; PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 13-14 (*in camera*); Chudova Tr. 1200; PX7121 (Otte Dep.) at 17-18, 22; Nolan Tr. 2709, 2751-52; PX7102 (Gao Dep.) at 94-95; Gao Tr. 2881; PX8517 at 001; PX8655 at 021, 031 (*in camera*). But the harm to competition operates by foreclosing current, competing R&D efforts that are pointed toward eventual commercialization. By thwarting rivals’ current R&D, the challenged foreclosure deprives the market not just of 2-3 cancer tests that might be commercialized today but, more importantly, the more extensive screening tests that are under development. If today’s foreclosure wipes a rival off the post R&D playing field, it fosters diversion from what would have been the rivals’ ultimate product to Galleri.

The ALJ also distinguished some competitive screening tests because they require diagnostic imaging to determine the location of cancer, while GRAIL’s test purports to use molecular methods to predict the cancer’s tissue of origin or TOO (sometimes also called “cancer signal of origin” or CSO). IDF ¶¶ 140, 136, 146. The ALJ’s approach ignores the fact that GRAIL’s own website states that its MCED test “requires confirmatory diagnostic evaluation” through follow-up procedures such as imaging. PX0063 at 002. GRAIL’s former CEO, Hans Bishop, admitted at trial that certain patients may have to undergo a body scan following a positive Galleri test to identify the cancer signal of origin. Bishop Tr. 1387. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX4207 at 040 (*in camera*). Indeed, interim results from GRAIL’s PATHFINDER study indicate that additional imaging testing was required 90 percent of the time after a patient received a cancer screening test result that indicated “Signal Detected.” RX3041 at 003; RPF ¶ 395.³⁷

The ALJ further argues that most of the competing tests are too underdeveloped to compare with Galleri. *See, e.g.*, ID 145. But the record contains evidence that contradicts this assertion: Exact/Thrive is competing closely with Galleri in the development of an MCED test, in that both have undergone a prospective, interventional clinical trial, IDF ¶ 239, RX3419-1; both have multiple published studies on their respective MCED tests, IDF ¶¶ 215, 228, 282; both are [REDACTED] IDF ¶ 260 (*in camera*); Conroy Tr. 1559-63, 1565; [REDACTED] Freidin Tr. 3042;

³⁷ The ALJ cited a signal of origin (CSO) accuracy of 88.7% for Galleri in the CCGA-3 study. IDF ¶ 231. But as discussed in Section II.F.1 above, CCGA-3 included many known cases of cancer, including Stage IV cancers, and did not reflect the intended use of early-stage detection in an asymptomatic population. Moreover, GRAIL’s reported success ratio for cancer signal of origin in the CCGA-3 study does not actually mean that Galleri was universally successful across 50 cancers. For example, one of the CSO “categories” grouped together cancers from twelve different CCGA cancer classes spread throughout the body, so a “correct” prediction was not actually a specific tissue of origin prediction at all. RX3773 at 031. The CCGA-3 authors acknowledge this, stating that CSO predictions that fall into this category “may require a whole-body computed tomography (CT) or positron emission tomography (PET)-CT scan to localize the primary tumor.” RX3409 at 009.

PX7051 (Lengauer IHT) at 141 (*in camera*). The fact that GRAIL, but not Exact/Thrive, chose to launch LDT-based sales, despite their limited marketing opportunity, is not a sound basis for ignoring foreclosure of Exact/Thrive. To the extent that other MCED test developers will require further development efforts to match the status of GRAIL and Exact/Thrive, that is all the more reason to protect those companies' access to the essential input of NGS on competitive terms. Absent valid intellectual property protections, if a first-mover can block its rivals' R&D efforts in situations where rivals need the R&D to compete effectively, the protection afforded competition by the antitrust laws in a world dependent on technological advance will be critically undermined. The harm to R&D competition is current and immediate, not speculative, although the effects on commercialized sales may not be felt immediately.³⁸

³⁸ More than a month after oral argument on Complaint Counsel's appeal, Respondents moved to reopen the record to admit two exhibits consisting of presentations and responses to questions at a J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference held on January 9, 2023. Respondents' Mot. to Reopen the Record to Admit Add'l Exhs. and Req. for Official Notice (Jan. 19, 2023) ("January 19 Motion"). One proffered exhibit comprises the presentation and responses to questions by Kevin T. Conroy, Chairman and CEO of Exact Sciences Company. The other comprises the presentation and responses by Steven Leonard Chapman, CEO, President, and Director of Natera, Inc.

In analyzing a motion to reopen the record the Commission considers "(1) whether the moving party can demonstrate due diligence (that is, whether there is a bona fide explanation for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial); (2) the extent to which the proffered evidence is probative; (3) whether the proffered evidence is cumulative; and (4) whether reopening the record would prejudice the non-moving party." *Polypore Int'l, Inc.*, 150 F.T.C. 586, 830 (2010). The Commission has explained that reopening the record to admit supplemental evidence after oral argument "should only be done in compelling circumstances." *Rambus, Inc.*, 139 F.T.C. 591, 593 (2005).

Respondents argue that the Exact Sciences exhibit should be received because it contains relevant evidence concerning the timeline for launch of Exact's MCED test and regarding Exact's decision to forgo an LDT launch. Respondents contend that the Natera exhibit should be admitted because it contains relevant information concerning Natera's expenditures on MCED research and its likely timing for commercialization. Respondents also maintain that the exhibits undermine the credibility of prior testimony from Exact and Natera witnesses.

We have determined to deny the request for reopening. Admitting evidence of this nature at this stage of a proceeding is potentially highly prejudicial to Complaint Counsel, who would have no opportunity for cross-examination. For example, Respondents emphasize Mr. Conroy's statement that "[t]here's a lot unknown about what the time lines look like . . . [s]o we're talking about a number of years before this market develops." January 19 Motion at 2. Without cross-examination, Respondents would be free to offer their own speculation as to the meaning of this vague wording and its relationship to Exact's R&D progress; Complaint Counsel could complain that the proffered evidence has been cherry picked, but would be unable to probe its meaning. Similarly, without cross-examination, Complaint Counsel cannot identify the meaning and reach of Mr. Chapman's expenditure estimates (*e.g.*, do they include research simultaneously relevant both to MCED development and other objectives? do they reflect just current or past or expected future expenditures?).

In this instance, however, the statements at issue would not change our analysis, which rests on harm to current, ongoing R&D efforts, rather than the precise timing or nature of any firm's commercialization of an MCED test. And they would not support an attack on witness credibility. Acknowledgment that

Finally, Respondents argue that without 100% diversion from rival tests to Galleri, foreclosure would be irrational. RAB 18. This criticism is wholly misplaced. Certainly, the greater the diversion, the greater the foreclosure concerns, but there is no basis to hold that 100% diversion is necessary.

The above evidence, combined with the extensive evidence described in Sections VII.A.2.b, VII.A.1.f, and II.G above showing that GRAIL and other MCED rivals view each other as competitors, is more than enough to demonstrate that, at the commercialization phase, diversion from other tests to Illumina/GRAIL is likely if rivals are foreclosed. *See Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 354 (“[W]e need not conclude that, without question, the Quattro would have cut into the C-Leg’s sales or induced Otto Bock to improve the C-Leg. The requirements of Section 7 are satisfied when a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown.”). If Illumina stymies GRAIL’s rivals, the sales those rivals would have made are likely to be diverted to GRAIL, the sole remaining competitor.

ii. Reputational Harm Will Not Constrain Illumina

The ALJ erred in finding Illumina unlikely to harm MCED customers because doing so would assertedly result in the loss of Illumina’s NGS sales for both MCED and non-MCED applications. ID 173-74. First, as the ALJ acknowledged, Illumina possesses detailed insight into how its NGS customers are using its products. IDF ¶¶ 746-59. It also has tools available to price discriminate among customers based on those uses. IDF ¶¶ 766-778 and Sections VII.D.2.a and VII.D.3.a above. Thus, Illumina can readily target MCED customers while

“[t]here’s a lot unknown” about timelines and a general, ambiguous reference to “a number of years before this market develops”, January 19 Motion at 2, do not contradict a [REDACTED]. Conroy Tr. 1628 (*in camera*). Mr. Conroy’s recent statement that “[w]e don’t believe” that an LDT approach “is the way that we’ll probably think about making the test available” updates, but suggests no falsity in, his 2021 testimony that [REDACTED], *id.* at 1557 (*in camera*); indeed, within the confines of the [REDACTED] estimate, Mr. Conroy expressly stated that [REDACTED]. *Id.* at 1559 (*in camera*). As to Natera, ambiguities already noted regarding Mr. Chapman’s expenditure estimates would dissuade us from drawing any adverse inferences about the credibility of other Natera witnesses. In any case, this Opinion does not rely on the LDT marketing of Exact’s MCED tests, Natera’s expenditure figures, or the timing of a Natera launch.

The January 19 Motion asks in the alternative that the Commission take official notice of statements Respondents describe as contained in the exhibits: that “Exact’s timeline to launch its MCED test is ‘unknown’ and that it does not intend to launch as an LDT” and that “Natera has invested only \$5 million annually in early cancer detection and is awaiting the results of an initial case control study to determine whether to pursue MCED development.” *Id.* at 8-9. The Commission may take official notice of “any material fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either generally known within the Commission’s expertise or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(f). Here, where Respondents ask that notice be taken not for the purpose of establishing that statements at an investment conference have been made, but rather for establishing the truth of the statements, and where the “facts” to be noticed are Respondents’ characterizations rather than the executives’ statements, official notice is not appropriate.

preserving its relationships with non-MCED customers. And even if Illumina did lose some NGS sales due to reputational harm, it could readily recoup those losses because, as discussed in Sections VII.D.2.b and VII.D.3.b.ii, *supra*, Illumina now expects [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. Finally, Illumina’s MCED customers lack alternative sources of NGS supply, which limits the losses that Illumina would incur. *See* Sections II.B.3, II.B.4, and VII.C.2.

Second, contrary to the ALJ’s unsupported conclusion that other customers can learn of Illumina’s targeted behavior, which in turn would affect Illumina’s reputation, the close relationship between NGS platform provider and MCED customer gives Illumina myriad ways to quietly and without fanfare undercut those MCED customers that pose the greatest threat to GRAIL. For example, foreclosing behaviors could be as subtle as making late deliveries, discriminating against key rivals on timing of supplies or services, or simply reducing the level of service to which a rival is accustomed. PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 69-71 (“They [Illumina] could also, you know, one day turn around and . . . say simple things like, you know, ‘We can’t get a technician out to your sequencers until next Friday’ or ‘the Friday after,’ and that could create challenges around turnaround time and disappoint customers and therefore hurt us competitively.”); *see also* PX7113 (Rabinowitz Dep.) at 277 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; PX7058 (Conroy IHT) at 174-77 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Given that a supplier can always craft innocent explanations for subtle degradations to service or supply, a campaign of “death by a thousand cuts” may even leave the target of the behavior unable to show that Illumina was deliberately undercutting it. *See* Herbert Hovenkamp, *Antitrust Policy After Chicago*, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 275 (1986) (“[O]ne of the greatest advantages of pursuing a strategy of raising rivals’ costs is its subtlety.”). In light of Illumina’s ability to target GRAIL’s rivals and to engage in forms of discrimination that are difficult to detect, we find that the fear of harm to its reputation is unlikely to constrain Illumina.

iii. Timing of Profits Does Not Undermine Illumina’s Incentive

The ALJ found projected future profits unlikely to affect Illumina’s incentives to foreclose because Illumina expects to initially lose money on the GRAIL acquisition, beginning to earn profits only in [REDACTED]. ID 173. This conclusion is erroneous for several reasons. First, considering the scale of the projected profits available to the winner of the competitive race, [REDACTED] to profitability is not a very long time. The ALJ’s approach also ignored that a foreclosure strategy that reduces losses would benefit Illumina earlier.

Most importantly, the ALJ’s reasoning ignores the incentives that Illumina has today to stifle current R&D competition in order to ensure that GRAIL wins the race to broad commercial acceptance of its MCED test. As the ALJ found, GRAIL and its rivals are “*presently* competing to develop the best performing cancer screening test.” ID 163 (emphasis added). GRAIL’s

rivals are *currently* striving to innovate and improve their tests to compete with GRAIL. *See, e.g.,* PX7051 (Lengauer IHT) at 139-40 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED];
PX7042 (Gao IHT) at 99-101 (Singlera expects to compete with GRAIL on future innovation to continuously improve the accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity of the test; “[w]e have to innovate to survive.”). As Complaint Counsel’s economic expert Dr. Fiona Scott Morton explained, the Acquisition will harm current innovation competition by giving Illumina the incentive to foreclose GRAIL’s rivals and anoint GRAIL the winner, creating an unlevel playing field. PX7138 (Scott Morton Trial Dep.) at 30-32. In the words of Guardant’s Mr. Getty, Illumina is “in a position where they could take significant advantage by kneecapping our ability to run our lab, which would of course flow through to our ability to compete.” PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 68-69.

4. Use of Foreclosure Strategies by Illumina Would Cause Competitive Harm.

Use of the above-described foreclosure strategies by Illumina would cause harm to competition and consumers. An increase in the cost of or a degradation in access to NGS platforms by GRAIL’s rivals would make it more difficult for them to invest in R&D, eventually to earn a profit, and ultimately to compete. Increasing the price of NGS devices or reagents would reduce the ability of competitors to conduct the R&D essential for developing innovative tests. [REDACTED]; *see also* PX7042 (Gao IHT) at 130;

[REDACTED]. Harm to MCED competitors could reduce MCED investment. [REDACTED]; PX7040 (Getty IHT) at 147;

[REDACTED]. As a declarant from the American Cancer Society made clear, “If development costs increase, companies that would otherwise have worked towards developing these tests may struggle to carry their ideas forward to where they can become a reality for doctors and patients.” PX8398 (Cance (American Cancer Soc’y) Decl.) ¶ 12. Without access to Illumina’s latest technology, MCED providers would not be able to offer patients the best performing or lowest cost test. PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 74-75. Reduced technical support would slow down a developer’s ability to ready its test for a clinical trial. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. At a basic level, depleted supplies can interrupt a competitor’s ability to process patient samples, and delayed service can hamper a competitor’s ability to compete. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; PX7105 (Getty Dep.) at 58, 69-71; Gao Tr. 2901-02.

[REDACTED] Fiedler Tr. 4498 (*in camera*). Reduced innovation, lower quality, or lower availability of competing MCED tests would harm U.S. patients, depriving them of the ability to detect more early-stage tumors before they spread.

Consumers would lose the benefit of multiple competitors pursuing diverse scientific approaches in an effort to design the best performing product. PX7138 (Scott Morton Trial Dep.) at 30-32. As Dr. Vogelstein testified, “[t]he greater the number of teams of researchers

working with [NGS] sequencing technologies such as Illumina’s to identify cancer-specific differences in nucleic acids in the blood, the greater the chances of new discoveries that lead to more accurate, more effective, and more cost-effective earlier detection tests being developed.” PX7101 (Vogelstein Dep.) at 71. Respondents’ expert agrees that different approaches are beneficial: as Dr. Richard Abrams put it, “if there are multiple laboratories and companies developing better and better products, that would be a great advantage to me as a physician and, most importantly, to my patients.” PX7137 (Abrams Dep.) at 73. Even GRAIL’s former CEO, Hans Bishop, agreed that “having a multitude of different approaches is a good thing” as everyone works to reach the same goal – “to get to the highest-performing technology.” PX7069 (Bishop IHT) at 154-56.

Indeed, Illumina recognized the value of such innovation competition pre-Acquisition. Before the Acquisition, Illumina told investors that it spun out GRAIL to encourage investment into many different NGS-based cancer detection companies to have “as many shots on goal as possible.” deSouza Tr. 2204; PX2561. It recognized that reducing its ownership share in GRAIL would “level[] the playing field” and “accelerate the liquid biopsy market for all.” PX2406. And Illumina’s CEO Francis deSouza stated in June 2017:

There are 70-plus players now in the liquid biopsy space. We want to encourage them to look at all different avenues because this is important and the outcome’s terrific for mankind. There are different points of view And to be honest, I think people are approaching it slightly differently and the market will sort of determine where the biology is and what the right answer is.

PX0376 at 007 (Illumina, Inc. at Goldman Sachs Global Healthcare Conference, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Conference Call Transcript, June 13, 2017). Yet undermining GRAIL’s rivals would give Illumina – rather than competition on the merits – the ability to pick the winner of the race to FDA approval and broad commercialization of MCED tests.

In sum, to the extent that the Acquisition impairs Illumina’s incentive to support credible MCED developers in their innovation efforts and increases its incentive to foreclose, it is *prima facie* likely to cause harm to competition and consumers.

Respondents would have us ignore all of this because Galleri is the only MCED test that has yet launched even for LDT purposes, and, they assert, no competing test will exist soon, *see, e.g.*, RAB 3, 17, 19; *see also*, ID 143-45. However, the antitrust laws protect innovation competition even when products have not yet launched. *See United States v. Anthem*, 855 F.3d at 361 (a “threat to innovation is anticompetitive in its own right”); *see also Actavis*, 570 U.S. at 136 (recognizing anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist with respect to potential entrants); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 352 (holding that acquiring a firm poised to launch a product that would “intensify” competition was a “likely harm to competition”); *Union Carbide Corp.*, 59 F.T.C. 614, 656 (1961) (finding it particularly important to arrest monopoly “in an infant industry which appears destined for far greater expansion and growth[,]” because “[s]trong and vigorous competition is the catalyst of rapid economic progress”). And as discussed further in Sections VII.A and VII.D.3.c.i, the competing MCED test developers are credibly providing a competitive constraint to GRAIL, as GRAIL’s documents themselves acknowledge. We hold that likely

substantial harms to current, ongoing innovation competition in nascent markets are sufficiently “probable and imminent” to violate Section 7. *United States v. Marine Bancorp.*, 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 (1974) (quotation omitted). A contrary rule would exempt from the Clayton Act’s purview acquisitions in nascent markets marked by significant research and development and the potential for rapid technological advances. The antitrust laws contain no such gap in coverage. *See Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 79 (“[S]uffice it to say that it would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will – particularly in industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts.”).

5. The Open Offer

Respondents contend that Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* showing of anticompetitive effects is deficient because it fails to account for their Open Offer, a long-term supply agreement that Illumina has made available to its for-profit U.S. oncology customers. *See* RAB 27-28; IDF ¶¶ 876-77. The Open Offer seeks to address concerns about the Acquisition’s effects on competition and evolved alongside Respondents’ effort to settle the FTC’s merger challenge. *See* PX0064; Respondents’ Mot. for Conference to Facilitate Settlement at 3-4 (July 13, 2021); IDF ¶ 878. The Open Offer’s terms are discussed in more detail in Section VII.E.1.a below, but broadly, it sets out certain commitments by Illumina regarding pricing of, access to, and support for its sequencing products, among other things.

The Supreme Court addressed the treatment of proposed merger remedies in *U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (du Pont)*, 366 U.S. 316 (1961). The district court in that case adopted a modified version of a remedy proposed by the acquiring company, rather than divestiture as requested by the Government. On appeal, the Court found this alternative remedy inadequate and ordered a complete divestiture instead. Addressing the argument that the record contained no evidence the parties would violate Section 7 under the proposed remedy as entered by the district court, the Court stated: “The burden is not on the Government to show de novo that [the proposed remedy as entered] would violate § 7. It need only appear that the decree entered leaves a substantial likelihood that the tendency towards monopoly of the acquisition condemned by § 7 has not been satisfactorily eliminated.” *Id.* at 331-32.

Accordingly, courts have held that defendants proposing a merger remedy “bear the burden of showing that any proposed remedy would negate any anticompetitive effects of the merger[.]” *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*, 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 137 n.15 (D.D.C. 2016); *accord Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 376; *see also United States v. Aetna, Inc.*, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 60 (D.D.C. 2017) (requiring defendant to show that the proposed divestiture would replace the competitive intensity lost as a result of the merger); *accord FTC v. Sysco Corp.*, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2015).

Despite this, Respondents disclaim their burden to show that their Open Offer would eliminate the unlawful effects of the Acquisition. Instead, they assert that Complaint Counsel must account for the Open Offer in their *prima facie* case because, Respondents claim, the Open Offer is not a proposed remedy but an “economic reality.” RAB 27-28. We disagree.

That the Open Offer is a proposed remedy is evident on its face. The very first sentence of the Open Offer states that it is provided “[i]n connection with Illumina’s proposed acquisition of GRAIL . . . to allay any concerns relating to the Transaction, including that Illumina would disadvantage GRAIL’s potential competitors.” PX0064 at 001; *see also id.* (“To address these concerns, these terms will be offered...”). The Open Offer was also conditional on the closing of the Acquisition. *Id.* Thus, the Open Offer was not some pre-existing market condition or “economic reality” but a remedial effort crafted in anticipation of legal concerns about the Acquisition.

Not only was the Open Offer cobbled together well after the Acquisition was announced,³⁹ but Illumina continued to modify the Open Offer after consummating the Acquisition, as trial in this matter was proceeding.⁴⁰ Moreover, even the original version of the Open Offer was far from fully implemented when Illumina and GRAIL merged. At the time Illumina and GRAIL consummated the Acquisition, on August 18, 2021, [REDACTED] MCED test developer had signed the Open Offer, and only [REDACTED] had entered into supply agreements with Illumina that incorporated [REDACTED] the Open Offer’s terms. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. For these reasons as well, the Open Offer cannot be said to be part of the economic conditions or market reality of the challenged transaction.

Nor does the fact that [REDACTED] signed the Open Offer [REDACTED], raising to [REDACTED] the total number of GRAIL’s rivals who have agreed to some version of the Open Offer’s terms, IDF ¶ 989 (*in camera*), affect Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* burden. Piecemeal application of Illumina’s proposed fix to just some of GRAIL’s rivals does not undermine Complaint Counsel’s showing of likely competitive harm. The agreements of parties that have acceded to the Open Offer’s terms afford no protection to non-parties. Even for covered firms, the agreements suffer from the deficiencies discussed in Section VII.E.1.b. Porous protection against just a subset of foreclosure mechanisms for just a subset of GRAIL’s rivals does not justify foisting on Complaint Counsel an evolving burden to disprove the adequacy of Respondents’ proffered remedy.

Respondents make much of the fact that the Open Offer is a “binding contractual commitment,” RAB 28, but it applies only to customers who actually sign the agreement and only after they sign it. PX0064 at 001. Illumina has agreed to enter into a consent decree that would make the Open Offer’s terms binding on Illumina for all of its for-profit oncology customers regardless of whether they signed the Open Offer. RAB 33. But the fact that a

³⁹ Illumina announced the Acquisition on September 21, 2020. IDF ¶ 59. Illumina made the Open Offer available on its website on March 30, 2021, the same day the Commission issued its Complaint. IDF ¶ 876.

⁴⁰ Illumina and GRAIL consummated the Acquisition on August 18, 2021. IDF ¶ 60. The evidentiary hearing commenced on August 24, 2021. Illumina modified the Open Offer on September 8, 2021, making significant changes to existing terms and adding new ones. RX3935; IDF ¶ 886.

Commission order would likely be required to ensure that the Open Offer applies fully across the market underscores that it is a proposed remedy.

In any case, that the Open Offer may be binding does not make it any less of a proposed remedy, just as a divestiture is no less a proposed remedy even when the parties have executed an agreement with the intended buyer. *See Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 21 (requiring defendants to show that the divestiture would fully restore competition where, “[d]uring the FTC’s investigation, and with the hope of gaining regulatory approval” the defendants entered into a divestiture agreement with a third party); *Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (requiring defendants to show that the divestiture would fully restore competition where, in the weeks following the government’s complaint, the defendants entered into a divestiture agreement with a third party). The Supreme Court has instructed that merger remedies must “restore competition” and “eliminate the effects of the acquisition.” *Ford Motor Co. v. United States*, 405 U.S. 562, 573 & n.8 (1972) (quotation omitted). Merging parties cannot avoid this requirement simply by deeming their proposed remedies “irrevocable” or “binding.”

Respondents cite *United States v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc.*, No. 1:22-CV-0481 (CJN), 2022 WL 4365867 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2022) and *United States v. AT&T, Inc.*, 916 F. 3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) as support for their argument that Complaint Counsel must account for the Open Offer as part of their *prima facie* burden. Oral Argument Tr. 63 (identifying Respondents’ “strongest cases”). Neither of those cases compels such a holding here.

In *UnitedHealth Group*, the district court in dictum expressed its view that the government should account for defendants’ proposed divestiture in its *prima facie* case, but the court acknowledged that this diverged from holdings in other cases. *See UnitedHealth Grp.*, 2022 WL 4365867 at *8-9. The district court made no mention of the Supreme Court’s holding in *du Pont*, which directly contradicts the district court’s position regarding remedy burdens. And, the court ultimately applied the standard advocated by the government, under which the defendant must prove that the divestiture would restore the competition lost by the merger. *UnitedHealth Grp.*, 2022 WL 4365867 at *10, 11. This case does not require us to treat the Open Offer any differently.

In *AT&T*, the court upheld a district court’s denial of an injunction barring a merger between Time Warner (a video programmer) and AT&T (a video distributor). 916 F. 3d at 1032, 1035. The government argued that the merged firm would use its control of Time Warner’s programming to threaten other distributors with long-term “blackouts,” thereby increasing the merged firm’s bargaining leverage and enabling it to raise prices. *Id.* at 1034-35. The judge below had determined that, for various reasons, the government failed to show that the merger would substantially lessen competition. It also noted that the government’s failure to account for the defendants’ offer of an arbitration agreement with a no-blackout commitment was “extra icing on a cake already frosted.” *Id.* at 1038. On appeal, the court accepted that the arbitration agreements would prevent blackouts, and it determined that this supported the district court’s conclusion that competitive harm was unlikely. *Id.* at 1041-42. But the court of appeals itself did not squarely consider the question of which party must carry the burden to show the effectiveness of defendants’ remedial offers. The *AT&T* court did not grapple with competing

arguments regarding burden. We therefore do not find the *AT&T* decision reason to ignore case law, including *du Pont*, and our own precedent that spoke to the matter more directly.

The Supreme Court has instructed that “all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in [the government’s] favor,” *du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 334. Respondents’ position would turn that instruction on its head. It would require deference to Respondents’ remedy by forcing the government to show that the Acquisition would be anticompetitive even if Respondents’ fix were implemented. But it is Respondents’ burden to show that their offered remedy would actually be effective. Putting the burden on Complaint Counsel would create a perverse incentive for merging parties to propose so-called fixes that leave some portion of competitive harm unremedied, requiring the government to keep up with shifting proposals that change, as this one did, in the midst of litigation, and forcing the public to live with partial remedies that do not fully restore competition.

Accordingly, we find that Complaint Counsel have met their *prima facie* burden to show that the Acquisition will likely have anticompetitive effects.

Having determined that the Open Offer is a proposed remedy inappropriate for consideration at the *prima facie* stage, we next consider whether the Open Offer would “restore competition,” “eliminate the effects” of the Acquisition, and replace the lost competitive intensity. *Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 573 & n.8 (1972) (“The relief in an antitrust case must be effective to redress the violations and to restore competition,” i.e., to “restor[e] the status quo ante.”); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 378-79; *Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 60; *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 72-73. Prior Commission decisions following the *Baker Hughes* framework have consistently reached the question of remedy only after determining that the proposed transaction is unlawful.⁴¹ The weight of federal court decisions also supports that view, though some courts have engaged in this inquiry at the rebuttal stage, rather than at the remedy stage. *See Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 60; *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 72-73. Our view is that the approach most faithful to the law is to consider the Open Offer, a proposed remedy, at the remedy stage, following a finding of liability.⁴² But even if, mirroring the approach taken by *Aetna* and *Sysco*, we consider the Open Offer at the rebuttal stage, Respondents fail to rebut Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* showing. Because it does not change the ultimate analysis or outcome in this instance,⁴³ we

⁴¹ *See e.g.*, *Polypore Int’l, Inc.*, 150 F.T.C. 586, 638-39 (2010); *Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.*, 138 F.T.C. 1024, 1158 (2004), *aff’d*, 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008).

⁴² *See Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 378-85 (assessing proposed divestiture at the remedy stage); *United States v. Quad/Graphics, Inc.*, No. 1:19-cv-04153, Dkt. No. 46 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2019) (bifurcating merger trial to first address liability issues and then consider defendants’ proposed remedies). Remedy may properly be considered only after finding a violation. *See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania*, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982) (“remedial powers of the federal courts . . . could be exercised only on the basis of a violation of the law”); *accord United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc.*, 402 U.S. 549, 556 (1971) (courts do “not reach the question of remedy” if there is “no violation of § 7”); *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 130, 141 (1969) (court must find “actual or threatened violation of the antitrust laws” to “justify [an] injunction”).

⁴³ *Compare Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 378 (assessing whether proposed remedy would “restore

assess Respondents' proposed remedy at the rebuttal stage. Regardless of whether we evaluate the Open Offer at the remedy stage or in rebuttal, Respondents bear the burden to show that the Open Offer would restore the pre-Acquisition level of competition.

E. Rebuttal

Because Complaint Counsel have established a *prima facie* case of competitive harm, the burden shifts to Respondents to rebut Complaint Counsel's showing. *AT&T*, 916 F.3d at 1032; *cf. Baker Hughes*, 908 F.2d at 982-83. Here, we consider Respondents' proposed Open Offer as well as their claims regarding ease of entry and efficiencies. *E.g.*, RAB 3, 7, 24-25, 33-37.

1. The Open Offer

a. Key Terms of the Open Offer

The Open Offer is a supply agreement, effective for 12 years after the Acquisition (until August 18, 2033), available to Illumina's for-profit U.S. oncology customers. IDF ¶¶ 876-77, 885, 888. The Open Offer purports to provide customers with a variety of protections on service, supply, pricing, intellectual property, and confidentiality, with several provisions purporting to provide parity with GRAIL. *See generally* PX0064. The offer is publicly available on Illumina's website, IDF ¶ 887, and we describe some of its key terms here.

According to the Open Offer, signatories to the agreement would have access to purchase the same sequencing instruments and core consumables as provided to GRAIL or any other for-profit entity. IDF ¶¶ 896, 898; PX0064 at 006; RX3935 at 002. They would also have access to the same related services to which GRAIL or any other for-profit entity has access, or to which the customer had access before the Acquisition. IDF ¶ 890; PX0064 at 006. Further, Illumina would be prohibited from discontinuing any supplied product so long as a customer continued to purchase it. IDF ¶ 905; PX0064 at 006. Illumina would be required to distribute supply equitably without favoring its affiliates over other customers. IDF ¶ 908; PX0064 at 009.

Regarding service pricing, the customer would have access to the same volume-based pricing to which GRAIL has access for the equivalent level of service, or to which the customer had access before the Acquisition, at the customer's option. IDF ¶ 890; RX3935 at 002. Regarding product pricing, a customer who signed the Open Offer could elect "Grandfathered Pricing," which refers to pricing that the customer received before the Acquisition closed. IDF ¶¶ 915-16; PX0064 at 006. Alternatively, the customer could opt for "Universal Pricing," which refers to a grid that contains list prices and volume-based discount tiers for currently available products. IDF ¶ 918; PX0064 at 007. A customer who chose Universal Pricing would receive most favored nation price protection relative to GRAIL or other equivalent customers on a volume-based net price basis. IDF ¶ 920; PX0064 at 008. Further, Illumina would commit not to increase prices beyond inflation for the term of the agreement. IDF ¶ 926; PX0064 at 007. If Illumina were to release a new version of a product, it would commit not to increase prices from the previous version unless the new version results in a material improvement in performance or

competition" at the remedy stage) *with Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 72-73 (assessing whether proposed remedy would "restore competition" at the rebuttal stage) *and Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (same).

capability. IDF ¶ 927; PX0064 at 007. Illumina would also commit to reducing by 2025 the per gigabase price of sequencing on its highest throughput sequencing instrument by at least 43% from the inflation-adjusted volume-based net price of using NovaSeq. PX0064 at 007.

The Open Offer also provides that, for 6 years after closing of the Acquisition (until August 18, 2027), customers can enter into co-development or collaboration agreements with Illumina to develop IVD kits for use on Illumina’s platform. IDF ¶ 941, 945; PX0064 at 008. Such agreements are necessary to run an IVD test on Illumina’s diagnostic instruments and to distribute the IVD test to third-party labs. IDF ¶¶ 939-41. Further, the Open Offer requires Illumina to enter into development agreements, at the customer’s request, to design or modify Illumina’s products to optimize interoperability with the customer’s test. IDF ¶ 910; PX0064 at 006. Customers who sign the Open Offer would also receive certain intellectual property rights to use Illumina’s products. IDF ¶¶ 965; PX0064 at 009. Illumina would commit to maintaining firewalls to protect customer information from disclosure to GRAIL. PX0064 at 009-010.

To monitor compliance with the Open Offer, Illumina would be subject to a biannual audit. IDF ¶ 978; PX0064 at 010; RX3935 at 003. In addition, Illumina would need to engage an auditor if a customer had a good faith basis for alleging that Illumina is in breach of its Open Offer commitments. IDF ¶ 980; PX0064 at 010; RX3935 at 003. In the event of a dispute not involving intellectual property rights, the parties would be required to commit to a dispute resolution process and binding confidential arbitration. IDF ¶¶ 978, 984-85; PX0064 at 010. If the arbitrator determined that Illumina had breached any part of its agreement, the arbitrator could order “any relief necessary to restore the status quo prior to Illumina’s breach, including monetary and/or injunctive relief.” IDF ¶ 987; RX3935 at 003.

b. Adequacy of the Open Offer

As noted above, “[d]efendants bear the burden of showing that any proposed remedy would negate any anticompetitive effects of the merger[.]” *Staples, Inc.*, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 137 n.15. Thus, Respondents must show that the Open Offer would restore the pre-Acquisition level of competition. *See, e.g., Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 573; *Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 60; *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 72. Restoring competition requires replacing the competitive intensity lost as a result of the merger. *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 72. The Open Offer does not meet this standard and is likely to result in less vigorous competition than existed before the Acquisition.

At the outset, we note that behavioral remedies have long been disfavored in merger cases. The default remedy for a Section 7 violation is a full stop injunction of the merger or, where the parties have consummated the transaction as they have here, an undoing of the acquisition.⁴⁴ In instances where the Commission has determined that a remedy short of

⁴⁴ *ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC*, 749 F.3d 559, 573 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[O]nce a merger is found illegal, ‘an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy’” (quoting *du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 329)); *see also du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 331 (divestiture “should always be in the forefront of a court’s mind when a violation of § 7 has been found”); *California v. Am. Stores Co.*, 495 U.S. 271, 280–81 (1990) (“[I]n Government actions divestiture is the preferred remedy for an illegal merger or acquisition.”). Conduct remedies “go against Congress’s policy judgment that divestiture is ‘the remedy best suited to redress the

blocking the merger outright would restore the pre-Acquisition level of competition, both the Commission and courts have preferred structural remedies. As the Commission has explained, “in general, a remedy is more likely to restore competition if the firms that engage in pre-merger competition are not under common ownership.” *Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp.*, 144 F.T.C. 1, 520 (2007). Behavioral remedies provide only temporary protection, allowing the threat inherent in the merger to persist. *Steves and Sons*, 988 F.3d at 720. Behavioral requirements also usually impose greater monitoring costs than divestiture remedies. *ProMedica Health Sys.*, 153 F.T.C. 458, 556 (2012); *Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.*, 778 F.3d 775, 793 (9th Cir. 2015). The Open Offer embodies these and other shortcomings.

As previously discussed, an integrated Illumina will have a strong incentive to favor GRAIL to the detriment of its rivals. Illumina’s MCED test developer customers are dependent on it in myriad ways. They rely on Illumina not just for their purchases of NGS instruments and consumables but also for service and support, access to new technology, and regulatory approval; from initial provision of the NGS platform to the development and commercialization of an assay using the platform, Illumina is a critical partner in ensuring its customers’ success.⁴⁵ To serve as a plausibly effective remedy, the Open Offer would need to foresee and foreclose all possible ways Illumina could harm GRAIL’s competitors. But as FMI’s former CEO, Cindy Perettie, testified, [REDACTED] PX7068 (Perettie (FMI-Roche) IHT) at 97 (*in camera*); see also PX7085 (Harada (Exact) Dep.) at 185-86 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]. Even Illumina’s own executive, Nicole Berry, testified that it is difficult to predict every situation that could arise over a twelve-year period. Berry (Illumina) Tr. 694. Respondents nevertheless suggest that the Open Offer will successfully constrain Illumina in every material respect for the duration of the agreement. RAB 25. But even now, many of the Open Offer’s provisions appear ineffective. Below are some examples.

Pricing: Respondents claim that the Open Offer will prevent them from advantaging GRAIL relative to other MCED test developers on price because it includes protection via a most favored nation clause. RAB 26. However, with GRAIL and Illumina operating as a single

ills of an anticompetitive merger.” *Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc.* 988 F.3d 690, 720 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Am. Stores Co.*, 495 U.S. at 285).

⁴⁵ As Illumina’s Vice President and General Manager of the Americas, Nicole Berry, explained, Illumina is a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PX7076 (Berry (Illumina) Dep.) at 179-81 (*in camera*); see also Berry (Illumina) Tr. 672-73 (explaining that Illumina’s NGS platform is not “plug-and-play”). Illumina’s MCED customers echo this. PX7058 (Conroy (Exact) IHT) at 174-77 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; PX7090 (Sood (Guardant) Dep.) at 119-21 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 55-56 (explaining that Guardant is “inextricably tied to Illumina in order to be successful or to run our lab,” including through the supply of critical instruments and reagents, servicing of the technology, and optimization of the products to Guardant’s tests).

business, Illumina’s “prices” to GRAIL are merely transfer prices that will be completely in Respondents’ control to adjust at will. As Respondents’ expert explained, “GRAIL doesn’t technically pay a price. If you want to make up a scenario in which you force GRAIL to ‘pay some price’ and you call that a transfer price . . . I’m happy to make that assumption.” RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 141; *see also* PX 7077 (Chahine (Helio) Dep.) at 114-15 (“Illumina would be GRAIL, so I don’t know what giving GRAIL a price actually means in this context”); PX7094 (Nolan (Freenome) Dep.) at 213 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Further, although Illumina commits not to increase price from the Open Offer pricing and for some products even ostensibly decrease it over time,⁴⁶ that does not mean that the guaranteed price would be no higher than prices in the absence of the Acquisition. Indeed, some customers reported that the Open Offer’s pricing or terms are worse than what they had been negotiating prior to the Acquisition.⁴⁷ Further, the Open Offer does not allow for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁴⁸ Merger remedies must fully restore the competitive intensity lost as a result of the merger, but price assurances are an inadequate substitute for a competitive market. *See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc.*, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 64-65 (D.D.C. 1998) (“The Defendants’ promise not to raise prices fails to ensure that prices will continue to fall after these mergers—or fall by the amount they would have absent the mergers.”).

Service and Support: As discussed in Section VII.D.3.a above, Illumina possesses tools by which it can identify which of its customers pose the biggest competitive threat to GRAIL. Illumina can target those customers for reduced service and support in ways that are difficult to detect or remedy. Illumina contends that such behaviors would breach the Open Offer’s requirement that customers have access to the same services for purchase as GRAIL or any other for-profit entity. PX0064 at 006; RB 155. But it could easily give plausible-sounding explanations for missed deadlines or service failures, and customers would be none the wiser.

⁴⁶ Of note, Illumina’s commitment to reduce the price of the highest-throughput instrument available by 2025 concerns price per gigabase. However, price per gigabase does not necessarily correlate with price per read, which is what drives MCED test developers’ cost. *See* [REDACTED]. In some cases, [REDACTED]. *See* Complaint Counsel’s Post-Trial Reply Proposed Finding of Fact No. 1094 (*in camera*) (providing example).

⁴⁷ For instance, at one point Illumina offered [REDACTED]. But then Illumina changed course and [REDACTED]. The Open Offer provides for only a 17% discount for NovaSeq consumables at annual spend of \$50 million and a 20% discount at an annual spend over \$75 million. PX0064 at 012. Additionally, [REDACTED]. *Cf.* Berry (Illumina) Tr. 926 (testifying that some of Illumina’s customers have negotiated lower pricing than what is contemplated in the Open Offer).

⁴⁸ [REDACTED]

See PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 69-71 (“They [Illumina] could also, you know, one day turn around and . . . say simple things like, you know, ‘We can’t get a technician out to your sequencers until next Friday’ or ‘the Friday after,’ and that could create challenges around turnaround time and disappoint customers and therefore hurt us competitively.”); PX7113 (Rabinowitz (Natera) Dep.) at 278 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁴⁹ A customer may not even realize it has been targeted for delayed or lower quality service because, as Illumina’s Nicole Berry has acknowledged, the customer would not know in real-time how quickly other MCED test developers’ equipment was repaired. PX7076 (Berry (Illumina) Dep.) at 292. Although the Open Offer provides for an audit process, as discussed below, it would be difficult for an auditor to determine whether a service delay or failure at a critical time for a customer was actually a breach of the Open Offer, and in any case at that point the harm would already have been incurred.

Information on New Technology: The Open Offer provides that customers “shall have access to the same information about final product specifications” of any new product “within 5 days of when GRAIL is provided such information,” RX3935 at 002, but *final* product specifications [REDACTED] deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2432 (*in camera*). Nothing would prevent Illumina from sharing with GRAIL information about its plans or products still in development. As Dr. Bert Vogelstein, a cancer researcher at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and co-founder of Thrive, explained, “advanced knowledge of future product developments and refinements . . . could alter the research and development of new or modified tests for the earlier detection of cancer.” PX8400 (Vogelstein Decl.) ¶ 9. The Open Offer would allow GRAIL to benefit from such advance knowledge even as its competitors are deprived of it.

Product Modifications: When Illumina first formed GRAIL, it noted that it could optimize its sequencer so that “[GRAIL] can get better performance than someone who has to use the off the shelf version.” PX2712 at 028. As a combined firm, Illumina could adapt its new technology to give GRAIL a competitive edge. Illumina’s CEO acknowledged that its products can be designed to “take into account modifications that will improve GRAIL’s work flow.” deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2434. And other MCED test developers expressed concern that Illumina would tailor its products to competitively benefit GRAIL’s tests vis-à-vis their tests. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁴⁹ See also PX7094 (Nolan (Freenome) Dep.) at 128-30 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Further, while the Open Offer purports to require Illumina to enter development agreements with customers to optimize the interoperability of sequencers with the customers' tests, IDF ¶ 910; PX0064 at 006, Illumina would have no incentive to extend to GRAIL's rivals the same degree of product development support that it provides to GRAIL. See PX7058 (Conroy (Exact) IHT) at 246 (*in camera*).

Confidential Information: The Open Offer requires Illumina to establish a firewall designed to protect MCED rivals' competitively sensitive information. IDF ¶¶ 969-70. But a merged Illumina has strong financial incentives to breach the firewall, particularly given the difficulty of detecting information-sharing (discussed below). Even setting that aside, a firewall here is unusually porous and inherently flawed. After the Acquisition closed and the firewall presumably went into effect, Illumina dissolved GRAIL's Board of Directors, [REDACTED]. IDF ¶ 64; deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2282 (*in camera*).⁵⁰ As Illumina's former Senior VP and General Manager of the Americas testified, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PX7109 (Daly (Singular Genomics) Dep.) at 15, 110-11 (*in camera*).

Further, as employees switch between Illumina and GRAIL, as many have done in the past, see [REDACTED]; Aravanis (Illumina) Tr. 1819, a firewall will be hard to maintain. See PX7110 (Conroy (Exact) Dep.) at 248-49 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Even without employee switching, maintaining an effective firewall would be difficult, given the close collaboration planned for Illumina and GRAIL post-integration. See deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2284, 2287-88 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Accordingly, MCED test developers have testified that their concerns about the sharing of their competitively sensitive information are not alleviated by a firewall. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; PX7040 (Getty (Guardant) IHT) at 188.

⁵⁰ Illumina also appointed its Chief Operations Officer as CEO of GRAIL; he carries with him the knowledge accrued in his prior position. PX0405. And the fact that various GRAIL executives report to Illumina executives creates additional opportunities for sharing confidential information. For instance, [REDACTED] deSouza (Illumina) Tr. 2282 (*in camera*). Additionally, the account manager for Illumina handling GRAIL's account reports to senior sales leaders at Illumina who have [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PX7076 (Berry (Illumina) Dep.) at 78-81 (*in camera*); Berry (Illumina) Tr. 931-32.

Enforcement: An agreement must be enforceable in order to be effective. The Open Offer’s commitments, however, would be difficult to enforce, as enforcement would require Illumina’s cooperation against its own self-interest.⁵¹

First, some violations may escape detection altogether. MCED test developers are not privy to Illumina and GRAIL’s internal workings and communications and would not know, for instance, whether GRAIL had been provided with advance information about prerelease products, whether it had received better quality service, or whether Illumina shared customers’ competitively sensitive information with GRAIL in breach of the Open Offer.⁵² And although the Open Offer gives customers the ability to request an audit if the customer has a “good faith basis for alleging that Illumina is in breach” of its commitments, it is *Illumina*, not the customer, who gets to decide if a good faith basis exists. Berry (Illumina) Tr. 699-700.⁵³ The Open Offer also provides for bi-annual audits, but such audits would fail to give customers “realtime insight” into Illumina’s conduct to allow for mitigation of the impact of a breach. [REDACTED]. Further, even an audit may not uncover some types of breaches, as it would be difficult for an auditor to confirm compliance with non-quantitative commitments such as those regarding access to information or service quality. For example, if one customer’s service is delayed one week, an auditor would have to understand the cause of the delay, the intent behind the delay, and the impact of the delay. *See* PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 85-86. And, as Respondents’ expert Margaret Guerin-Calvert testified, certain breaches, like breaches of the firewall provision, “may not end up falling to [the auditor] in a form that [is] detectable.” RX6002 (Guerin-Calvert Trial Dep.) at 133.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Indeed, Respondents’ history of non-compliance related to this Acquisition raises doubt about their willingness to abide by an order when it is against their interest. Respondents consummated this Acquisition despite knowing that they were prohibited from doing so due to the European Commission’s review and that, as a result, the European Commission would likely seek to impose a fine of up to 10% of Illumina’s consolidated annual turnover. PX0378 at 004-05 (Illumina Form 8-K, Aug. 18, 2021).

⁵² *See* Berry (Illumina) Tr. 700-01; Getty (Guardant) Tr. 2550, 2559 (*in camera*) [REDACTED].

⁵³ *See also* Rabinowitz (Natera) Tr. 373 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 91 (testifying that he has “no idea” what Guardant would need to show to have a “good faith basis” that Illumina is in breach of a commitment in the Open Offer); PX7085 (Harada (Exact) Dep.) at 203 (*in camera*).

⁵⁴ *See also* PX7135 (Rock Dep.) at 100-103 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; Getty (Guardant) Tr. 2561 (testifying that audits would not resolve Guardant’s concerns about the merger because, if a conversation or information is not provided to an auditor, “there’s no recourse there”).

Even if a possible breach were eventually discovered through the audit process or otherwise,⁵⁵ the Open Offer provides for enforcement through time-consuming and expensive confidential arbitration. RX6002 (Guerin-Calvert Trial Dep.) at 138 (testifying that Illumina’s customers have to bear their own costs of arbitration); PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 93-94. By the time a customer suspects a potential breach, requests and is granted an audit,⁵⁶ receives the auditor’s report or notification regarding potential noncompliance, and proceeds through the pre-arbitration and arbitration dispute resolution processes under the Open Offer,⁵⁷ the merged firm could do substantial competitive damage to GRAIL’s rivals. As Guardant’s William Getty testified, “even in the context that you get over the hurdle defining what good faith means, you then get over the hurdle of being in good enough standing apparently to render that complaint and then, you know, you get over the hurdle of having someone look into that Complaint, you’ve lost the thing you can’t get back, which is time, and potentially cementing of a significant competitive advantage that can’t be undone.” PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 92.

Moreover, the remedial measures available through the arbitration are inadequate. While the Open Offer allows the arbitrator to award monetary or other relief “to restore the status quo prior to Illumina’s breach,” RX3935 at 003, such relief would not remedy, for instance, harm to an MCED test developer’s competitive standing due to an improper disclosure of confidential information or the withholding of product improvements.⁵⁸ And none of the relief would compensate the public for the harm it absorbs if competition is impaired. Furthermore, the results and even existence of the arbitration would be completely confidential, making it possible for Illumina to target GRAIL’s most serious rivals without fear of immediate repercussions. PX0064 at 011 (“Neither party may disclose the existence, content, or results of any arbitration without the prior written consent of both parties, unless required by law.”). Since one of Respondents’ arguments regarding foreclosure concerns was that reputational harm would somehow deter foreclosing behavior, *see* RAB 20-21; *see also supra* at 58-59, the confidential nature of the arbitration in the Open Offer ensures that the Open Offer will patently not deter anticompetitive behavior. The Open Offer’s remedies are therefore unlikely to serve as a significant deterrent given the merged firm’s strong financial incentive to undermine GRAIL’s rivals.

⁵⁵ Respondents’ expert Robert Rock testified that the auditor “would not offer an affirmative opinion of compliance” and “is not going to issue a conclusion that the open offer has been complied with.” RX6003 (Rock Trial Dep.) at 77-79.

⁵⁶ The Open Offer does not provide a limit to how long a decisionmaker has to determine whether a customer’s allegation of a breach has a good faith basis. RX6002 (Guerin-Calvert Trial Dep.) at 131.

⁵⁷ It could take 120 days for Illumina’s customers to resolve a dispute through the Open Offer’s dispute mechanism. RX6002 (Guerin-Calvert Trial Dep.) at 133-34, 144-45.

⁵⁸ PX7058 (Conroy (Exact) IHT) at 245-46 (*in camera*) [REDACTED]; PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 90-91 (testifying that, if Illumina could “turn [a breach] into a significant competitive advantage for GRAIL by advancing their technology ahead of Guardant’s” then “that would be extremely, extremely problematic and perhaps even pushing us to the nonexistence, if you will, over the course of a year”).

The multiple gaps and flaws of the Open Offer show precisely why structural remedies are preferred over behavioral remedies. Contractual measures that attempt to force companies to assist their rivals and act against their self-interest cannot substitute for the incentives of a competitive marketplace. The reactions of Illumina’s MCED test developer customers validate this principle: several have testified that a contractual commitment like the Open Offer does not fully resolve their concerns. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; PX7105 (Getty (Guardant) Dep.) at 78-79. And to the extent there is question about the effectiveness of any Open Offer provision, consumers and the public should not bear the risk. *See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.*, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) (“The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.”).

The ALJ, however, deemed it “significant” that some of GRAIL’s purported rivals had signed the Open Offer, finding that the existence of these agreements undermined Complaint Counsel’s argument that the Open Offer is ineffective at preventing harm. ID 181. This conclusion ignores the fact that the MCED rivals had no choice but to sign supply agreements given their total dependency on Illumina. *See* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Thus, the fact that some of GRAIL’s rivals signed the Open Offer does not persuade us that the Open Offer prevents competitive harm and offers sufficient relief.

We find that the Open Offer would not restore the pre-Acquisition level of competition. Even if the Open Offer limits Illumina’s use of some of the tools at its disposal, it does not eliminate Illumina’s ability to favor GRAIL and harm GRAIL’s rivals, and it does not fundamentally alter Illumina’s incentives to do so. The Open Offer does not replicate the cooperation Illumina would have been incentivized to provide to third-party MCED test developers absent the Acquisition, and it would not replace the competitive intensity that existed before the Acquisition. Therefore, even if considered at the rebuttal stage, Respondent’s proposed remedy fails to overcome Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* showing of harm.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ As noted above, Commission decisions instruct that the proposed remedy should be considered at the remedy stage, following a finding of liability.

2. Entry

To overcome Complaint Counsel’s *prima facie* case, entry to the market must be “‘timely, likely, and sufficient’ enough to replace lost competition from the merger.” *Aetna*, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 52-53 (quoting Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 9); *see also, FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27, 68 (D.D.C. 2018) (entry must “deter or counteract” the competitive effects of the merger); *Staples, Inc.*, 970 F. Supp. at 1086 (entry must “avert anticompetitive effects” from the acquisition) (quoting *Baker Hughes*, 908 F.2d at 987).

Although Respondents argue that imminent NGS entry will constrain Illumina’s ability to implement a foreclosure strategy against GRAIL’s rivals, RAB 41; *see also id.* at 3, entry by alternative NGS platforms is unlikely to avert anticompetitive effects from the Acquisition. As discussed in Sections VII.C.2 and VII.D.2.a above, entry barriers to NGS platforms are formidable. Such platforms require large sums and years to develop with no guarantee of success. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Would-be entrants to NGS platforms face high hurdles in the form of reputational, customer-acceptance, and intellectual property barriers. IDF ¶¶ 723, 727-29; deSouza Tr. 2229-32; PX2822 at 006-007; PX9067 at 017.

Entry will not be available in time to deter or prevent any anticompetitive strategies by a merged Illumina/GRAIL. The platforms that Respondents say will be available in the near future are unlikely to adequately replace Illumina’s NGS due to throughput, accuracy, or other shortcomings. *See, e.g.,* Section VII.C.2 and VII.D.2.a; IDF ¶¶ 681, 694-5, 699-700, 722 (*in camera*). Furthermore, several of the platforms are in an early phase of development and have not been subject to the real-world validation and testing needed for adoption. *See* Section VII.C.2; ID 151-52; IDF ¶¶ 711 (*in camera*), 715 (*in camera*), 719-20 (*in camera*); 723-29.

In sum, Respondents have failed to demonstrate that entry of alternative NGS platforms would constrain Illumina from interfering with the ability of GRAIL’s rivals to innovate their products.⁶⁰

3. Asserted Efficiencies and Procompetitive Benefits

Because the Initial Decision concluded that Complaint Counsel had failed to carry their *prima facie* burden, the ALJ did not rule on Respondents’ claims that the Acquisition would generate major efficiencies. *See* ID 193-94. Respondents assert that the Acquisition will generate enormous procompetitive benefits. RAB 33-37. Complaint Counsel respond that Respondents have failed to meet their burden to substantiate their claims. Reply 17-20. We find that Respondents have failed to establish that asserted efficiencies and procompetitive benefits would offset the likely anticompetitive effects from this Acquisition.

⁶⁰ Nor would entry by new MCED developers overcome the anticompetitive effects of this Acquisition. Respondents themselves argue that there will not be meaningful entry in the MCED market for years. RAB 3. In any event, any entering MCED developer would be subject to the same foreclosure strategies that would disadvantage current MCED test developers.

The law is well-settled that Respondents bear the burden to substantiate efficiencies sufficient to offset and reverse the likely anticompetitive effects from an acquisition. *Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.*, 778 F.3d at 790-91 & n.15 (defendant must “clearly demonstrate” that the proposed merger “enhances rather than hinders competition because of the increased efficiencies”) (quotation marks omitted); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 365 (defendant must show that the acquisition would result in significant economies that benefit competition and, hence, consumers) (quotation omitted).

Courts acknowledge that efficiencies are “inherently difficult to verify and quantify,” *U.S. v. H&R Block, Inc.*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation omitted). Courts and the Commission must “undertake a rigorous analysis of the kinds of efficiencies being urged by the parties in order to ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere speculation and promises about post-merger behavior.” *FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.*, 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 365. The proponent of efficiencies must substantiate each claim “so that it is possible to ‘verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.” *Otto Bock*, Docket 9378, 2019 WL 2118886 (Initial Decision, May 6, 2019), at *50 (quoting *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89). Efficiencies cannot be based on self-serving testimony or the estimates of business executives but must be “reasonably verifiable by an independent party.” *FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA*, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted); *see also FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr.*, 838 F.3d 327, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (must be “verifiable, not speculative”) (quotation omitted); *accord, H&R Block, Inc.*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 91.

Efficiencies must be merger-specific, *viz.* they cannot be achievable by either company alone because, if they can, the merger’s asserted benefits can be attained without the concomitant loss of a competitor. *Heinz*, 246 F. 3d at 721-22; *see also FTC v. Hackensack Meridian Health, Inc.*, 30 F.4th 160, 176 (3d Cir. 2022). In addition to merger specificity, Respondents must also demonstrate that their claimed efficiencies would inure to the benefit of consumers. *Id.* at 177; *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 365, *citing Univ. Health*, 938 F.2d at 1223; *Sysco*, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 82. Finally, to be cognizable, the efficiencies must not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service. *Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr.*, 838 F.3d at 349.

Courts have never held that efficiencies alone immunized an otherwise unlawful transaction. *See St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.*, 778 F.3d at 790; *Anthem*, 855 F.3d at 353; *FTC v. Peabody Energy Corp.*, 492 F. Supp. 3d 865, 913 (E.D. Mo. 2020). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “a merger the effect of which may be substantially to lessen competition is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.” *United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank*, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (internal quotations omitted).

The same principles of scrutiny enunciated above must apply to efficiencies claims in vertical transactions. We cannot simply take managers’ word for efficiencies without independent verification, because then the efficiencies defense “might well swallow the whole of Section 7,” as managers could present large unsubstantiated efficiencies claims and courts would

be hard pressed to find otherwise. *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 91. Only by meeting the above-described requirements of verification, merger-specificity, cognizability, and consumer benefit could efficiencies reverse the likely anticompetitive effects of an acquisition.

Respondents argue that in a vertical merger challenge, Complaint Counsel must account for efficiencies as part of their *prima facie* case. RAB 24-25, 33-34. This would flip the relevant proof burden on its head. Under the *Baker Hughes* framework, once a plaintiff shows that a transaction is likely to be anticompetitive, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence that the *prima facie* case inaccurately predicts the relevant transaction’s probable effect on future competition. *AT&T*, 916 F.3d at 1032.⁶¹ The cases Respondent cites acknowledge this approach. *See, e.g., New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG*, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (treating efficiencies evidence as a “basis to rebut” plaintiffs’ *prima facie* case); *AT&T*, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (defendant may offer evidence of post-merger efficiencies in rebuttal). Requiring plaintiffs to refute unproven efficiencies would require them to prove a negative and would ignore the great body of caselaw holding the opposite. *Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.*, 778 F.3d at 791 and n.15; *Heinz*, 246 F.3d at 720; *Peabody Energy Corp.*, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 913; *Olin Corp.*, 986 F.2d at 1305. Keeping the burden of proof on efficiencies with respondents makes sense given that “where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party is best situated to bear the burden of proof.” *Smith v. United States*, 568 U.S. 106, 112 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also, Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (“[I]t is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims, as much of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *cf. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement*, 127 Yale L.J. at 1981 (“Because the merging parties have better access to the relevant information, they also bear the burden of producing evidence of efficiency benefits, just as they do elsewhere in antitrust.”).

Here, as discussed below, Respondents’ claims of efficiencies and any procompetitive effects are inadequate: they are unverified, not merger-specific and, to the extent they might somehow come to pass, not likely to benefit the public.

a. Research and Development Efficiencies

Respondents claim that “the [Acquisition] will lead to significant R&D efficiencies, through the combination of GRAIL’s expertise in methylation, data science and software development and Illumina’s complementary expertise in sequencing and bioinformatics.” RB 200. Respondents argue that “GRAIL is a relatively small company without the resources to focus on all of the R&D projects that it might otherwise be interested in pursuing and for which its technology may be able to unlock substantial discoveries that improve human health,” whereas “Illumina is a larger company with the financial resources to focus on R&D.” *Id.* Respondents fail to demonstrate that these R&D claims are independently verifiable, and they fail to account for costs necessary to achieve them.

⁶¹ *Baker Hughes* applies to both horizontal and vertical cases. *See Heinz*, 246 F.3d at 715 (horizontal); *AT&T*, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (vertical).

Respondents base their claim on the testimony of their executives and their economic expert Dr. Carlton. RB 200-07. Dr. Carlton acknowledges that R&D efficiencies are “hard to [] predict[]” and “difficult to quantify” but states that they will “probabilistically” increase the number of new health products available to consumers. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 120; RX3864 (Carlton Report) ¶ 127. Dr. Carlton did not attempt to quantify the value or scale of the claimed R&D efficiencies, nor did he independently calculate the costs associated with them. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 120-21; Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (cognizable efficiencies must be assessed net of the costs to achieve them); *see also*, PX7073 (Aravanis IHT) at 60 (as of the date of testimony, “Illumina [had] not attempted to quantify these [claimed R&D efficiencies].”)

Respondents offer broad descriptions provided by their executives of possible areas for further research. For example, Respondents cite Illumina executive Dr. Febbo for his vague assertion that Illumina could improve the Galleri test in unspecified ways using unidentified data.⁶² Respondents highlight Illumina executive Dr. Aravanis’s opinion that the merger could lead to unexplained “novel” discoveries in the broad areas of “fatty liver disease or neurodegenerative disease.”⁶³ They point to testimony from Illumina’s CEO Francis deSouza that the combined firm would try “to identify the genomic biomarkers in blood for other conditions, like fatty liver disease, neurological conditions like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.” RB 202. Respondents bracket these claims with generic assertions about innovation, such as that Illumina “deeply understand[s] the importance of ongoing investment in research and development” and that “when you put brilliant people together like we have at GRAIL and Illumina, sparks fly.” PX7079 (Flatley Dep.) at 31; Bishop Tr. 1416. Reflecting the aspirational nature of the claims, CEO deSouza himself described the alleged R&D project teams as “speculative teams.” PX7107 (deSouza Dep.) at 155.

We are unable to credit Respondents’ claims as offsets to anticompetitive harm under Section 7 because Respondents failed to identify the nature or timing of specific, concrete research advances; to quantify their value; or to account for the likely costs of or barriers to achieving them. *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (proponent of efficiencies must establish, *inter alia*, likelihood, magnitude, costs, and when and how each would be achieved.) Consider, for example, the single issue of cost. Redeploying Illumina and GRAIL personnel from their existing work to new, joint projects means taking them off their existing projects, which would impose opportunity costs and possibly require backfilling of existing personnel. Respondents have not accounted for these costs. PX7140 (Rothman Dep.) at 34. But the disregarded costs are

⁶² *See, e.g.*, RB 202 (citing RPF ¶ 1141.3) (“It also gives you data where you can bring in your biostatisticians and biostatistics reports to me, you can bring in your—you know, your—your medical experts, and together to work with your product development folks that is in core R&D under Alex Aravanis and look at those signals and look at how to improve the test itself, improve the performance, improve the efficiency.”).

⁶³ *See, e.g.*, RB 203 (citing (RPF ¶ 1142.2) (“So our experience, for example, in noninvasive prenatal testing is that when you operate a clinical test as a large service, you will have additional findings. Those could give insights into other types of diseases that GRAIL’s technology could be useful for. For example, fatty liver disease or neurodegenerative disease. Those are other applications Illumina would pursue.”).

determinants of the likelihood and magnitude of the claimed R&D efficiency: they directly affect how many and what types of people the firms have an incentive to redeploy, and for what activities. *Id.* at 35. Indeed, there is a question of whether GRAIL would be able to redeploy anyone, given what Respondents characterize as the high opportunity costs of doing so. PX7107 (deSouza Dep.) at 154-55 (Illumina could not collaborate with GRAIL absent the merger because “[t]hey have to launch a screening product. For the next five years, everything they do is going to be around screening.”). Mere expectations of corporate executives for R&D efficiencies, however well intentioned, do not replace the need for independent verification and concrete detail regarding likely achievements and costs. *Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 73. Respondents have not verified the claimed R&D efficiency, and the claim therefore fails.

b. Market Access Acceleration Efficiencies and “Lives Saved”

Respondents claim that the Acquisition will accelerate Galleri’s widespread commercialization through faster regulatory approval and payer acceptance, with the result that thousands of lives will be saved. RAB 34-37; RB 185-87; RX3864 (Carlton Expert Report) ¶ 115. Respondents value these saved lives at \$37 billion or more. RB 185.

Respondents’ acceleration claims turn on the notion that Illumina is uniquely positioned to unleash GRAIL’s market access abilities as its parent. Of course, any claim that a transaction leads to saved lives requires a close look. But upon scrutiny, Respondents’ claim of market access acceleration turns out to be based on the unsupported and vague assertions of management personnel. Furthermore, evidence shows that standalone GRAIL had the incentive and ability to achieve acceleration through means short of this anticompetitive Acquisition. Respondents thus have not established a credible, objectively verifiable, merger-specific projection for acceleration in the adoption of Galleri, and therefore, Respondents have failed to show that the Acquisition, as opposed to the Galleri test, would save any lives.

Respondents base their claim of lives saved on calculations of their economic expert, Dr. Carlton. RB 185. Dr. Carlton estimated that a one-year acceleration of Galleri would result in “7,429 to 10,441” lives saved. *Id.* However, Dr. Carlton admitted that he did not opine on whether Illumina *could* accelerate FDA or payer approval – he simply relied upon Illumina’s own claims that it could achieve such acceleration. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 96-97; PX7134 (Carlton Dep.) at 190-91, 198. [REDACTED]

PX7134 (Carlton Dep.) at 198.

For the estimate that the Acquisition will accelerate Galleri’s adoption by one year, Respondents in turn rely on the following testimony:

We determined that, in aggregate, these efficiencies will accelerate the adoption and availability of the Galleri test by approximately at least one year.

* * *

In aggregate, we feel that that will improve our regulatory path, it will improve the payers’ speed at which they provide reimbursement, it will improve the

efficiencies in performing the test, and those will shift the availability of Galleri meaningfully forward by a year.

Febbo Tr. 4360-61 (cited in RPF 1122).⁶⁴ Dr. Febbo’s vague assertion does not provide the level of analysis required to “verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of [the] asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.” *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10).

Tellingly, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

An additional problem with Respondents’ acceleration efficiency claims is Respondents’ failure to quantify the costs associated with achieving them. *See* Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (cognizable efficiencies must be assessed net of costs incurred in achieving them.) Here, Illumina’s decision to deploy personnel to GRAIL projects would involve a cost because those individuals would no longer be doing their existing work. PX7140 (Rothman Trial Dep.) at 27. Ammar Qadan, Illumina’s VP and Global Head of Market Access, testified that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PX7084 (Qadan Dep.) at 183-85 (*in camera*).

i. Regulatory Acceleration

Respondents neither project how specific regulatory milestones for Galleri will actually change as a result of the Acquisition, nor explain how and when Illumina’s intervention will change them. Dr. Febbo testified at trial that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Febbo Tr. 4430 (*in camera*).⁶⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Febbo Tr. 4429-30 (*in camera*). Dr. Febbo acknowledges that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁶⁴ Respondents do not identify how much of the alleged acceleration comes from regulatory acceleration versus payer acceptance.

⁶⁵ GRAIL’s former CEO could not quantify at trial how much sooner he expected GRAIL to receive PMA approval with assistance from Illumina versus without, sharing only his “earnest judgment that it will help,” and a “good probability that it will speed things up.” Bishop Tr. 1426.

██████████ These gaps preclude meaningful verification of the likelihood and magnitude of the regulatory acceleration claim. Respondents suggest that they are unable to substantiate their efficiency claims due to limitations on integration planning imposed by the hold-separate. See RPF ¶ 5073; Section II.D. But Respondents put themselves in the position where a hold-separate was required. In any event, any legal or practical impediments to Respondents’ integration planning do not allow us to fill gaps by attempting to guess what the results would be. It is “incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims” so that a court can verify their likelihood, magnitude, and merger specificity. *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quotation omitted). Respondents have failed adequately to substantiate the claimed regulatory acceleration efficiency.

Respondents have also failed to demonstrate that the regulatory acceleration claims are merger specific. The claims rely on broad assertions of GRAIL’s supposedly inferior capabilities compared to Illumina’s. We find that Respondents exaggerate these differences, disregarding GRAIL’s achievements and failing to take account of the tools that GRAIL has at its disposal to obtain market access for Galleri. For example, Respondents contend that GRAIL has “no experience” getting FDA approval and payer coverage. RB 191. However, GRAIL has achieved a breakthrough device designation for Galleri with the FDA and has also obtained an investigational device exemption (IDE) for Galleri in the context of the PATHFINDER study. PX7139 (Navathe Trial Dep.) at 84; Febbo Tr. 4451. GRAIL has developed and published a proposed framework of criteria for evaluating MCED tests which has been well received by regulatory agencies, and has also engaged in “multiple and frequent” conversations with the FDA regarding the PMA for Galleri. Ofman Tr. 3288-91; Bishop Tr. 1426. ██████████

██████████ Ofman Tr. 3390 (*in camera*), which Illumina’s head of market access contends is “important” for the development of clinical utility data. Qadan Tr. 4266-67. Moreover, GRAIL describes its clinical study program as “one of the largest clinical study programs ever conducted in genomic medicine,” RX0694 at 002; it has directly enrolled more than ten times the number of patients that Illumina has directly enrolled in clinical studies. Febbo Tr. 4449.

In any event, Illumina has not demonstrated exceptional PMA expertise that GRAIL could not replicate. The only Class III NGS-based diagnostic test for which Illumina has obtained Premarket Approval is the Praxis therapy selection test. Febbo Tr. 4445-47, 4451. Praxis is not a liquid biopsy test and does not assay cfDNA from blood. Febbo Tr. 4446. Furthermore, a third party, Amgen, sponsored the clinical study on which Illumina’s PMA for Praxis relied. Febbo Tr. 4448. These facts undercut Illumina’s argument that Praxis demonstrates unique expertise that GRAIL can obtain through this Acquisition. Similarly, Illumina’s experience with ██████████

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PX2593 at 001, 002-014 (*in camera*).

Even if GRAIL’s regulatory capabilities were somehow shown to be inadequate, Respondents have failed to demonstrate that GRAIL could not or would not expand its capabilities without the Acquisition. Standalone GRAIL would have a massive incentive to accelerate market acceptance. *See* [REDACTED]. The scale of these profits provides a powerful incentive for GRAIL to find a mechanism short of merger to achieve the requisite acceleration, either by expanding its own capabilities, contracting with other capable firms, or entering into a mutually beneficial agreement with Illumina to the extent that its regulatory capabilities are truly unique. Indeed, GRAIL was already improving its own capabilities before the Acquisition. For 2021 it forecasted to expand its budget by [REDACTED], with [REDACTED] million of that amount driven by spending on [REDACTED]. PX4489 at 028 (*in camera*); Bishop Tr. 1471 (*in camera*). GRAIL could also expand its capabilities through hiring individuals with the requisite regulatory expertise or through utilizing a robust open market of FDA consultants and external advisors. PX6093 (Navathe Expert Report) ¶ 24 (describing FDA and regulatory consulting industry). GRAIL could even hire directly from Illumina, as the evidence shows it did. Friedin Tr. 3165-66. Moreover, there are numerous large companies with PMAs for IVD tests that GRAIL could partner with. *See, e.g.*, RX3217 (FDA PMA Database Product Listing) (identifying, among others, Abbott, Becton Dickinson, Biogenex Laboratories, Epigenomics AG, Invivoscribe, Myriad, Roche, Siemens, and Thermo Fisher).⁶⁷ With so much at stake, and with so much FDA activity already undertaken, Respondents have not demonstrated that GRAIL could not and would not achieve comparable regulatory success in the absence of this Acquisition. *See Heinz*, 246 F.3d at 722 (if efficiencies could be achieved by either company alone, the benefits of the merger can be obtained without the concomitant loss of competition).

ii. Payer Acceleration

Like their claims of regulatory acceleration, Respondents’ claims of payer acceleration are unverified and not merger specific. Respondents rely on vague aspirations that Illumina will

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁶⁷ Respondents point to Illumina’s quality management system (QMS) as a basis to believe that Illumina is uniquely positioned to accelerate GRAIL’s market adoption. RB 194-95. However, many other companies – indeed, any companies that have FDA approval for an IVD test – have QMS that meet the FDA’s requirements. Ofman Tr. 3446. GRAIL could partner with any of these companies and avoid the loss of competition inherent in this Acquisition.

establish reimbursement more quickly due to the “size and scope of the company,” RB 193 (quoting Flatley Tr. 4082), echoed by testimony of a GRAIL official that Illumina’s experience

[REDACTED]. RB192-94 (quoting Ofman Tr. 3371) (*in camera*). [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Respondents’ management aspirations do not provide the verifiable, analytical plan needed to support an efficiency claim. *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (rejecting efficiency based on management judgment that was not otherwise independently verifiable); *Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 73 (“The court cannot substitute Defendants’ assessments and projections for independent verification.”).

Nor are Respondents’ claimed payer acceleration efficiencies merger specific. Illumina claims that standalone GRAIL lacked the experience to obtain coverage from payers and sees its experience with payers as vital to helping GRAIL gain market acceptance. RB 191-92. For example, Illumina touts its risk-sharing agreement with Harvard Pilgrim Health Care regarding NIPT as evidence of its unique skills. RB 196; Qadan Tr. 4123-24. However, Illumina’s reimbursement efforts do not appear impossible to replicate. Of thirteen individuals in Illumina’s market access group as of trial, only two were payer partners with responsibility for the United States. Qadan Tr. 4289, 4292.

Meanwhile, GRAIL is operating its own market access strategy. *See, e.g.*, PX4209 (GRAIL) at 003 (Grail, Market Access Strategy, June 2020) (*in camera*). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RX3867 (Deverka Rebuttal Report) ¶ 112 and Table 6-1 (*in camera*). As of trial, [REDACTED], Ofman Tr. 3372 (*in camera*); Della Porta Tr. 457; PX6093 (Navathe Rebuttal Report) ¶ 65 (*in camera*), and [REDACTED] Ofman (GRAIL) Tr. 3399 (*in camera*). GRAIL was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. PX4381 (*in camera*); PX6093 (Navathe Expert Report) ¶ 67. In addition, GRAIL had signed up roughly 15 concierge medical practices including the two largest representing over 500,000 patents. Della Porta Tr. 464. And in a massive opportunity to generate evidence supportive of Galleri, near the time of trial GRAIL launched a 140,000-person trial with the UK’s National Health Service for the purpose of learning about Galleri’s performance in a real-world clinical practice setting. Ofman Tr. 3293-94; RX 3523; PX7092 (Ofman Dep.) at 123-24.

Moreover, as noted above regarding regulatory acceleration, firms like GRAIL can take advantage of the third-party pool of managerial and other talent to bolster their capabilities. For example, firms can hire consultants who specifically offer value to clients based on their long-term relationships with payers. PX7139 (Navathe Trial Dep.) at 76. Indeed, GRAIL hired its Chief Commercial Officer from Illumina, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Freidin Tr. 3165-66; PX6092 (Rothman Expert Report) ¶ 70 (*in camera*).

In sum, Respondents have failed to substantiate that this Acquisition is likely to yield merger-specific acceleration efficiencies that save lives. Rather than rely on Respondents’ self-serving and ultimately vague and unsupported projections of acceleration, we believe the course that Congress clearly enunciated in the antitrust laws is to let competition spur innovation among MCED test providers and thereby save lives. *See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston*, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2160 (2021) (Sherman Act is predicated on “one assumption alone” – that “competition is the best method of allocating resources in the Nation’s economy”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, Dr. Scott Morton testified that innovation competition could save substantially more lives than those posited by Dr. Carlton based on Galleri’s putative acceleration. *See* PX6091 (Scott Morton Rebuttal Report) ¶¶ 82-84 & 41, Table B (estimating that roughly 27,000 more lives would be saved than under Respondents’ acceleration scenario, if unforclosed rivals were allowed to match Galleri’s market presence and an innovative test were to increase the cancer detection rate by 10 percent); *see also id.*, ¶¶ 85 & 41, Table B (estimating that if an innovative test were to increase the cancer detection rate by 10 percent, rivals would only need to capture one-fifth of the sales made by Galleri for the number of lives saved to match those from Galleri’s putative acceleration). When competition is allowed to flourish, consumers benefit.

c. Reduction in GRAIL Royalty

Respondents claim an efficiency from reducing certain royalties that GRAIL was required to pay Illumina before the Acquisition. RB 207.⁶⁸ Respondents assert that the royalty reduction will generate consumer surplus of [REDACTED] RB 209 (*in camera*).

Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the royalty reduction is merger specific. Before the Acquisition, in early 2020, GRAIL engaged its bankers at Morgan Stanley to run scenarios regarding possible ways to defer, eliminate, or decrease the royalty. Freidin Tr. 2978.

[REDACTED]

Thus, GRAIL itself identified at least two possible ways in which GRAIL could have eliminated the royalty “without the merger.” *See Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 72.

⁶⁸ When it reduced its ownership in GRAIL in 2017, Illumina signed a supply agreement that obligated GRAIL to pay Illumina a royalty calculated as a percentage of GRAIL’s revenues. Freidin Tr. 2975-79. Under the agreement, GRAIL was obligated to pay Illumina a royalty of 7% of all oncology revenues until GRAIL had paid cumulative royalties of \$1 billion, at which point the royalty rate would decline to 5%. IDF ¶ 41. Following the close of the Acquisition, that royalty was eliminated. Freidin Tr. 2977.

Rather, GRAIL abandoned its IPO plan in favor of the Acquisition by Illumina. That in no way invalidates GRAIL's identification of viable alternatives. Thus, Respondents have failed to prove that an independent GRAIL could not have reduced or eliminated the royalty by means short of an anticompetitive merger, and the efficiency claim fails. *Heinz*, 246 F.3d at 722.

d. Elimination of Double Marginalization

Respondents' expert, Dr. Carlton, testified that, according to the deal model, Illumina was charging GRAIL a margin before the Acquisition. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 66-67. GRAIL also projected earning a margin on sales of its own, downstream products. deSouza Tr. 2359-60. Respondents argue that the Acquisition will result in the elimination of this double margin, generating consumer surplus of [REDACTED] for the period 2022-2030. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 65-66, 134 (*in camera*).

But Dr. Carlton conceded that he cannot reliably calculate the value of the elimination of double marginalization (EDM) resulting from the Acquisition. According to Dr. Carlton, the quantification of EDM requires a full vertical model that takes into account many economic factors, including the amount of diversion, the elasticity of demand, and potentially the opportunity cost of serving GRAIL's rivals. PX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 134-35. Dr. Carlton does not offer such a model, acknowledging that his calculations are "intended only to be illustrative," RX3864 (Carlton Expert Report) ¶ 104 n.258, and that they rely on "assumptions" about cost passthrough. *Id.* ¶ 103. This is not adequate substantiation. *Heinz*, 246 F.3d at 721 (requiring "rigorous analysis"); *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. at 89 (substantiation must allow the court to verify *inter alia* the "likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency") (quotation omitted).

e. Supply Chain and Operational Efficiencies

Respondents argue that "[r]euniting Illumina and GRAIL will allow them to achieve significant supply chain and operational efficiencies." RB 215. These claimed efficiencies include GRAIL benefitting from quantity discounts available to Illumina on inputs used by both firms and from Illumina's experience managing laboratories that operate NGS tests at scale. RB 215-18. Respondents value these efficiencies at \$140 million or more over a 10-year period. RB 218-19.

The only quantification that Respondents cite in support of this efficiency is a single spreadsheet from Illumina cited in a footnote of Dr. Carlton's report. RX3864 (Carlton Expert Report) ¶ 104 n.262; PX2613 at 2. The numbers in the sheet are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Without these elements, the estimate of predicted savings fails the test of being "reasonably verifiable by an independent party." *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89, 91 (denying as unverifiable cost savings claims based

on “managers’ experiential judgment” rather than a “detailed analysis of historical accounting data”). The situation here is analogous to that in *Wilh. Wilhelmsen*, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 72-73. In that case, the court denied the efficiencies claims because the defendants failed to provide sufficient information about the bases of the assumptions underlying the estimates and the role of those assumptions in the analysis. This lack of relevant, important information meant that the plaintiff (and therefore the court) could not test the reasonableness of those assumptions, nor verify the defendants’ ultimate determinations of likelihood and magnitude of the efficiencies.⁶⁹

In any event, GRAIL was in the process of improving its operations on its own. Pre-Acquisition, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Similarly, as part of its lab operations planning, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. As GRAIL’s CEO testified at trial, GRAIL built the RTP lab both “to invest in additional test capacity to meet anticipated future demand” and because it is “investing very heavily in new technology, including robotics, to reduce the cost of the test and [] speed up the turnaround time of the test.” Bishop Tr. 1377-78. As a result of these initiatives, GRAIL projected [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Particularly in light of Respondents’ failure to provide detailed assumptions and accounting data as described previously, these achievements make it difficult to tell what incremental value, if any, the Acquisition will provide. This efficiency claim therefore fails.

f. International Expansion Acceleration

Respondents assert that the Acquisition “will accelerate the international expansion of Galleri because it will put Illumina in a position to leverage its significant international resources for GRAIL.” RB 220. Specifically, Respondents claim that “Illumina will dramatically increase GRAIL’s ability to access international markets and to achieve regulatory and payer approvals outside the United States.” RB 221. Respondents fail to demonstrate that this efficiency claim is

⁶⁹ Nor does Respondents’ lay witness testimony suffice to plug the gap in verifiability. Several of Respondents’ witnesses testified that they expected to realize vague scale benefits, but none testified as to the magnitude of such efficiencies or the assumptions necessary to estimate their magnitude. *See, e.g.*, RB at 216-18 (“Grail would enjoy bigger discounts than it gets today”; “the cost of goods for the Galleri test would decrease;” “[w]e also would have the ability to have increased purchasing power,” “scale brings cost benefits”; “operational capabilities are benefits that Grail will enjoy,” *etc.*) These generalized statements do not reveal the underlying assumptions, calculations, or analysis of the alleged \$140 million, and therefore do not support verifiability.

verifiable, merger-specific, or would be passed through to consumers in the relevant, United States market.

First, we note that an anticompetitive merger cannot be justified on the basis of asserted efficiencies outside the relevant market. *See Phila. Nat'l Bank*, 374 U.S. at 370 (rejecting the defendant's proffered justification that the challenged merger would help the defendant compete in areas outside the relevant geographic market.) Here, the relevant geographic market is the United States. ID 161. Benefits from increased "access to international markets" or "regulatory and payer approvals" that fall outside the United States cannot offset competitive harm within the United States.

Respondents also argue that the international expansion acceleration will help improve the Galleri test and accelerate its clinical validation and payer adoption in the United States by providing GRAIL with access to a "more representative and diverse dataset." RB 223. Respondents claim that by accessing the genomes of more patients around the world, the GRAIL test will become more accurate for patients in the U.S. because it is based on a learning algorithm. RB 221 (quoting deSouza Tr. 2375-76). Respondents' effort to link an alleged out-of-market efficiency to the relevant geographic market fails because Respondents do not establish the likelihood, magnitude, or merger-specificity of the claim, nor do they establish any costs associated with achieving it.

Respondents offered no concrete plans regarding countries in which international expansion would occur, how much more quickly the international expansion would occur, how much additional data the international expansion would generate, how much the international efforts would cost, or why such international expansion could only be achieved through a merger with Illumina. These gaps are fatal to the claim. *H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89. Regarding merger specificity, Illumina is not the only company with an international presence with whom GRAIL could partner. And the evidence shows that GRAIL's international expansion was going well: it had already obtained agreement on a three-year, 140,000-person randomized clinical trial with the U.K. National Health Service that would be the largest trial for any cancer screening test, ever. Ofman Tr. 3293-94; RX3523; Freidin Tr. 3161-62. GRAIL negotiated the trial on its own before the Acquisition by Illumina. Freidin Tr. 3161; Qadan Tr. 4263-64. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to conclude that acquisition by Illumina was necessary for GRAIL to achieve timely international expansion.

g. Respondents Have Failed to Show That the Asserted Efficiencies and Procompetitive Benefits Would Be Passed Through to Consumers

Even assuming, counterfactually, that the asserted efficiencies and procompetitive benefits were properly verified and proven to be merger-specific, Respondents have failed to show that they will "offset [the] anticompetitive effects of the merger." *FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr.*, 838 F.3d at 348. Specifically, Respondents have not shown how the alleged efficiencies and procompetitive benefits will be passed on to consumers given the current absence of a commercial alternative to Galleri and the corresponding absence of competitive pressure to force pass-through. For example, Dr. Carlton simply assumes that 100% of the alleged royalty savings will be passed on to customers. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 125-26.

However, Dr. Carlton candidly acknowledges [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RX3864 (Carlton Expert Report) at p.73 n.270 (*in camera*).⁷⁰ Similarly, Dr. Carlton assumes that 100 percent of the purported EDM savings will be passed through to consumers. RX6000 (Carlton Trial Dep.) at 68-69. Yet he readily acknowledges that he would need a model that accounts for the interactions between raising rivals' costs and EDM in order to ascertain the impact on consumers. RX3864 ¶ 97 and n.247.

Respondents' assumptions of passthrough are speculative and do not meet the required level of rigor. Because of this, and because Respondents failed to demonstrate that their claims are verifiable or merger specific, we find that Respondents have failed to demonstrate efficiencies and procompetitive benefits sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition.

F. Constitutional Defenses

Respondents raise a number of constitutional defenses challenging the administrative proceeding. None of them is well-founded or requires dismissal of this case.

1. Article I

Respondents assert that this merger challenge is unconstitutional because it is “a product of the FTC’s improperly delegated legislative power.” RAB 42. Respondents claim that Congress delegated to the FTC the power to bring antitrust actions within the agency instead of in an Article III court without providing an intelligible principle with which to exercise that power. *Id.* This, Respondents contend, violates Article I, which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

Respondents waived this defense by failing to raise it until after trial, presenting it for the first time in their post-trial reply brief. *See LabMD, Inc.*, 160 F.T.C. 1373, 1375-76 (2015) (finding that respondent waived argument that proceeding violates the Constitution by failing to raise the defense until after trial). In any case, Respondents’ non-delegation argument fails.

The non-delegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.” *Gundy v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality) (quotation omitted). The federal government’s prosecutorial enforcement decisions,

⁷⁰ Respondents supplement Dr. Carlton’s assumption with uncorroborated testimony of an Illumina witness that “[i]t is Illumina’s plan to pass 100% of those [royalty] savings on to payers of the test[.]” PX7073 (Aravanis IH) at 27. We must, however, ensure that efficiency claims “represent more than mere speculation and promises about post-merger behavior.” *Heinz*, 246 F. 3d at 721. While we do not doubt Dr. Aravanis’ good faith, his unenforceable statements do not reverse what would otherwise be the merged firm’s incentives to cause anticompetitive harm. *See, e.g., H&R Block*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 82 (“this type of [price] guarantee cannot rebut a likelihood of anticompetitive effects in this case”); *Cardinal Health*, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (finding that, “even with [pricing] guarantees, the mergers would likely result in anti-competitive prices”).

however, do not invoke legislative power. *See United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (prosecutorial decisions are within the “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” of the Executive Branch); *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (“prosecutorial discretion” is the “special province of the Executive”); *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (accord). Just as it is within a prosecutor’s discretion to charge a defendant with violation of one law rather than another when the same conduct violates both laws, *United States v. Batchelder*, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979), so too it is within the prosecutor’s discretion to determine in which tribunal to charge the violation when multiple tribunals are permitted to hear the case. In other words, the decision regarding where to charge the violation, like the decisions regarding whom to charge and what to charge, is fundamentally an executive – not legislative – function. *United States v. I.D.P.*, 102 F.3d 507, 511 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the government’s “authority to decide whether to prosecute a case in a federal forum [is the] type of decision [that] falls squarely within the parameters of prosecutorial discretion”); *Hill v. SEC*, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“When the SEC makes its forum selection decision, it is acting under executive authority and exercising prosecutorial discretion.”), *vacated on other grounds*, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). The non-delegation doctrine therefore does not apply to the Commission’s decision regarding whether to bring its case in federal court or in its administrative tribunal.

Respondents quote *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932), which states that the “mode of determining” matters that may be examined by special tribunals is within congressional control. But Congress has not delegated to the FTC the power to determine which types of matters may be adjudicated administratively; Congress itself made that determination. Congress specified that the FTC’s administrative tribunal, as outlined in the FTC Act, in addition to federal courts, may hear Commission challenges to unlawful mergers. Allowing the Commission to exercise its prosecutorial discretion to select from between these two specified fora does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional legislative powers. *See Batchelder*, 442 U.S. at 125-26 (allowing prosecutor to choose to charge one criminal violation as opposed to another, with identical elements but different penalties, does not “impermissibly delegate to the Executive Branch the Legislature’s responsibility to fix criminal penalties”); *Hill*, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1312 (“Congress has advised the SEC through the enactment of specific statutes as to what conduct may be pursued in each forum. It is for the enforcement agency to decide where to bring that claim under its exercise of executive power. Because the SEC has been made aware of the permissible forums available under each statute, ‘Congress has fulfilled its duty.’” (quoting *Batchelder*, 442 U.S. at 126)).⁷¹

⁷¹ In *Jarkesy v. SEC*, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022), the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the SEC’s choice of whether to bring an action in its own tribunal or in an Article III court is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. *Id.* at 461-62. Respondents do not cite that case in their appeal, but we nonetheless address it. Relying on a single, out-of-context sentence from *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), *Jarkesy* took the position that government actions are “legislative” when they alter “the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch.” *Jarkesy*, 34 F.4th at 461 (quoting *Chadha*, 462 U.S. at 952). The court then concluded that allowing the SEC to select whether to bring a case in an agency tribunal or in federal court was a delegation of legislative power because it would let the SEC decide which defendants should receive legal rights associated with Article III court proceedings and which should not. *Id.* at 462. But prosecutorial decisions regarding what offense to charge or whether to charge one at all – decisions the Supreme Court has squarely held concern executive

Even if the non-delegation doctrine did apply here, it is not violated because, contrary to Respondents’ contention, Congress provided the FTC with an “intelligible principle” governing the determination to bring an action administratively rather than in federal court. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), provides for suit in district court when there is reason to believe a firm “is violating, or is about to violate” a provision of law enforced by the FTC; Section 5(b) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), permits administrative actions when the Commission has reason to believe a firm “has been or is using” unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Construing this language, the Third Circuit has held that in certain circumstances only administrative enforcement is available.⁷² Moreover, Congress instructed the Commission to seek administrative enforcement when it “would be to the interest of the public.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). The Commission’s mandate to bring administrative enforcement actions to further the public interest, combined with different requirements for the different proceedings, provides an intelligible principle for exercising the Commission’s authority. *See Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States*, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” require).

For all these reasons, Respondents’ Article I arguments are without merit.

2. Article II

Respondents next argue that the merger challenge runs afoul of Article II, which vests “[t]he executive Power . . . in a President of the United States of America,” who must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; *id.* § 3. Respondents claim that the ALJ’s and Commissioners’ protections from removal prevent the President from adequately overseeing the administrative proceeding to ensure faithful execution of the laws. RAB 42.

With respect to the ALJ, the Commission has previously rejected the argument that his dual-layer removal protections are unconstitutional. *See* Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Disqualify the Administrative Law Judge, *Axon*, No. 9389 (Sept. 3, 2020); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 390-91; *1-800 Contacts, Inc.*, 166 F.T.C. 250, 308-09 (2018). In *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board*, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the double removal protections granted to members of the SEC’s Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, but the Court declined to extend that holding to the

power – also affect defendants’ legal rights. For example, charging a defendant with a petty misdemeanor rather than a felony might deprive the defendant of rights to a jury trial and indictment via a grand jury. *See Baldwin v. New York*, 399 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1970); *United States v. Linares*, 921 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1990). Under *Jarkesy*, however, such charging decisions would constitute exercises of legislative power. *Jarkesy*’s reasoning therefore conflicts with long-established Supreme Court precedent that charging decisions are a matter of prosecutorial discretion. *See Batchelder*, 442 U.S. at 124.

⁷² In *FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc.*, 917 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 2019), the court held that, although Section 5 permits the Commission to bring an administrative action based on an already-concluded violation of law, the Commission may bring a district court action under Section 13(b) only when the defendant is violating or is about to violate the law.

removal protections of ALJs. The Court emphasized that, “unlike members of the Board,” ALJs (1) “perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policy making functions,” or (2) “possess purely recommendatory powers.” *Id.* at 507 n.10. The FTC’s ALJ has both these characteristics.

First, the ALJ has no enforcement or policy role. He does not bring enforcement matters or initiate investigations or cases, and he does not establish agency policies or priorities. Rather, he presides over adjudications in a manner “functionally comparable to that of a judge.” *Butz v. Economou*, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (quotation marks omitted). Second, the ALJ’s adjudicatory decisions are effectively only “recommendatory.” They do not constitute agency action unless the Commission ratifies them, either tacitly or expressly. The Commission reviews both the ALJ’s legal and factual determinations *de novo*, and it may modify or set aside any aspect of the ALJ’s decision. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.54(a)-(b). The Commission “exercise[s] all the powers which it could have exercised if it had made the initial decision.” *Id.* § 3.54(a); *see* 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). The Commission must review an initial decision if either party requests a review, *id.* § 3.52(b), as in the present proceeding. And the Commission may review an initial decision on its own initiative. *Id.* §§ 3.51(a), 3.53. The Commission can also request additional information. 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(c). The Commission maintains control over the case from the investigation to the very end, and it is responsible for all final agency decisions. Accordingly, the ALJ’s removal protections do not interfere with the President’s constitutional duties.⁷³

As for the removal restrictions on the Commissioners, in *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court specifically found those removal restrictions to be constitutional. And, in *Seila Law v. CFPB*, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2199-2200 (2020), the Court expressly declined the petitioners’ invitation to revisit *Humphrey’s Executor*. Respondents suggest that the Commission operates differently today than when *Humphrey’s Executor* was decided, but the Commission has been “empowered and directed to prevent” unfair methods of competition through enforcement in its administrative forum and authorized to issue “cease and desist” orders since the original enactment of the FTC Act in 1914. FTC Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914). In any case, the Court in *Seila Law* distinguished *Humphrey’s Executor* in substantial part because the FTC was a bipartisan, multimember body of experts – which it remains today. *See id.* We are not at liberty to ignore Supreme Court precedents. *Agostini v. Felton*, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).

Regardless, neither the ALJ’s nor the Commission’s removal protections would invalidate this proceeding or the decisions issued in the matter. Even if an officer’s removal restriction violates the separation of powers, that does not necessarily void the actions of that officer if he was properly appointed. *Collins v. Yellen*, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1787-88 & n.23 (2021). The party challenging the unconstitutional removal restriction is not entitled to relief unless that party shows that the removal restriction actually harmed it. *Id.* at 1788-89; *Decker Coal*, 8 F.4th at 1137; *Cnty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd. v. CFPB*, 51 F.4th 616, 631 (5th Cir. 2022); *see also CFPB v. Law Offices of Crystal Moroney, P.C.*, No. 20-3471, 2023 WL 2604254, at *3 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2023) (“[T]o void an agency action due to an unconstitutional removal protection, a

⁷³ In *Jarkesy*, 34 F.4th at 463-64, the Fifth Circuit held that the removal protections enjoyed by the SEC’s ALJs are unconstitutional, but that decision gives insufficient weight to the Court’s discussion of ALJs in *Free Enterprise Fund* and conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that ALJ removal protections are constitutional. *See Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer*, 8 F.4th 1123 (9th Cir. 2021).

party must show that the agency action would not have been taken *but for* the President’s inability to remove the agency head.”). Respondents do not challenge the validity of the Commissioners’ or ALJ’s appointments, nor have they made any argument concerning harm they have suffered from the President’s inability to remove the Commissioners or ALJ. Therefore, even if the removal restrictions were problematic, they would not invalidate this merger challenge.

3. Due Process

Respondents’ next claim is that the Commission’s dual role in the administrative adjudicatory process, in which “the same people who voted out the complaint against Respondents and/or have prosecuted the case against them”⁷⁴ will adjudicate the matter, creates an unconstitutional potential bias that violates due process. RAB 43. The Supreme Court, however, has squarely rejected the proposition that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in and of itself creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication. *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 56 (1975). To the contrary, adjudicators such as the Commissioners are presumed to be unbiased. *Schweiker v. McClure*, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). As the Court explained, it is “very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure . . . does not violate due process of law.” *Withrow*, 421 U.S. at 56. Accordingly, “[t]he combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency has been upheld against due process challenges, both in the context of the FTC and other agencies.” *Gibson v. FTC*, 682 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1982). Moreover, courts have also rejected arguments of bias based on agencies pursuing injunctive relief in federal court and then adjudicating related claims in their own administrative proceedings. *See Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. v. SEC*, 837 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988); *Kessel Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB*, 868 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1989).

Respondents’ citation to *Williams v. Pennsylvania*, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) is inapposite. That case concerned a judge’s refusal to recuse despite having recommended pursuing the death penalty in the case while employed as a district attorney before taking the bench. The case involved specific facts that called the impartiality of the decisionmaker into question. Congress’s assignment of both investigatory and adjudicatory functions to the Commission does not raise similar concerns. Thus, Respondent’s due process arguments are unfounded.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ In fact, the Commission operates under *ex parte* rules that prevent Complaint Counsel from influencing the adjudication other than through communications on the record. *See* 16 C.F.R. § 4.7.

⁷⁵ Respondents have moved to reopen the record to admit hundreds of pages of redacted correspondence between Commission staff and European competition authorities, as well as communications between Commissioner Slaughter, then-Commissioner Chopra, and competition enforcers from the U.K., the latter correspondence dating from January and March of 2021. *See* Respondents’ Mot. to Reopen the Record to Admit Add’l Exhs. and for Expedited Briefing (Mar. 6, 2023) (“March 6 Motion”); RX4070 at 028, 097, 107. Respondents assert that the fact that Commissioners corresponded with foreign antitrust authorities and were presumably aware of staff-level correspondence supports Respondents’ due process claim and shows bias, although they do not explain how. March 6 Motion at 6-8. There is nothing improper about Commission staff corresponding with foreign counterparts. On the contrary, cross-border coordination is

4. Equal Protection

Respondents next take issue, on Equal Protection grounds, with the consequences of allocating merger cases between the Commission and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Respondents claim that parties to a merger challenged by the FTC are treated differently from parties to a merger challenged by the DOJ, citing purported differences in fora, legal standards and policies, processes, and evidentiary rules, among other things. RAB 44. Respondents assert that there is no rational basis for these differences and that, therefore, this merger challenge violates the Equal Protection clause. *Id.* at 8, 44. Respondents’ Equal Protection argument lacks merit.

The Commission and the DOJ share concurrent antitrust enforcement authority, and the Supreme Court recognized long ago that Congress provided the agencies with “*cumulative* remedies against activity detrimental to competition.” *FTC v. Cement Inst.*, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) (emphasis added). The statutory scheme – and thus the shared authority between the Commission and DOJ – was designed “not to confine each of these proceedings within narrow, mutually exclusive limits, but rather to permit the simultaneous use of both types of proceedings.” *Id.* at 694-95. To avoid duplicative investigations and conserve law enforcement resources, including by allowing the agencies to develop or utilize their industry-specific expertise, the agencies have set up a process to allocate cases between them. Respondents claim this is unconstitutional, but “[t]o the extent that the agencies choose to divide their workload, such that one brings an action rather than both doing so, this hardly gives a basis for complaint.” *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 390. And, although Respondents point to what they view as differences between the agencies and their proceedings, apart from claims regarding independence of the fact-finder, discussed above, they have failed to explain how they are adversely affected by these purported differences.

Moreover, even where there are material differences between government agencies with overlapping jurisdiction, regulated entities are not entitled to enforcement by the agency of their choice. Thus, where both state and federal enforcers could prosecute defendants under their

specifically contemplated by international agreements and authorized by Congress. *See, e.g.*, Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities, Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 2, 2020); Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws (June 1998); 15 U.S.C. § 46(1)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 6201 *et seq.*; *see also* Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation §§ 5.1.3, 5.1.4 (2017). Further, contrary to Respondents’ suggestion, there is nothing wrong with the fact that several communications were to or from Commissioners. *See Withrow*, 421 U.S. at 52 (“Our cases . . . offer no support for the bald proposition . . . that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating.”). Nor is there anything improper about the fact that only some of the Commissioners were included in these communications. Commissioners are not required to copy each other on all of their correspondence. Indeed, Commissioners frequently meet with potential respondents without the presence of other Commissioners as part of the process of determining whether there is reason to believe that the company has engaged in anticompetitive conduct warranting issuance of a complaint. Respondents’ proffered materials do not support a due process claim and are not relevant to the issues in this proceeding. Respondents’ motion is denied.

respective laws, courts have rejected equal protection challenges based on the enforcers' election to prosecute in federal rather than state proceedings, even though that subjected defendants to harsher penalties. See *United States v. Moore*, 543 F.3d 891, 897 (7th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Castro*, No. 88-3044, 1989 WL 43903, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1989) (unpublished) (although federal proceedings subject defendant to greater penalties and narrower procedural protections than state proceedings, "[i]t does not follow that equal protection requires the federal government to abdicate the vindication of its laws").

In any case, the agencies' case allocation is permissible because it serves a legitimate governmental purpose. "If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." *Dallas v. Stanglin*, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). An allegedly discriminatory government classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,"⁷⁶ and the burden is on the party challenging the classification to negate any such conceivable rationale. *Heller v. Doe by Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quotation omitted); *Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (accord). Respondents have not carried and cannot carry that burden here. As noted, the agencies' arrangement serves the legitimate purpose of conserving government resources by avoiding duplicative efforts between agencies with concurrent jurisdiction and enabling each agency to develop or utilize industry-specific expertise. See *Holt v. Howard*, 806 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting equal protection challenge where the at-issue classification conserved government resources); *Falls v. Town of Dyer, Ind.*, 875 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that selective enforcement, even on a random basis, is desirable when it conserves resources); *Hess v. St. Joseph Police Pension Fund*, 788 F.2d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing legitimate governmental interest in having more experienced personnel). Therefore, Respondents' Equal Protection defense is unavailing.

To summarize, Complaint Counsel have made out a *prima facie* case of illegality by showing under both the *Brown Shoe* and ability and incentive frameworks that the Acquisition may substantially lessen competition. Respondents have failed to rebut that showing either through their assertions about entry, merger efficiencies, or their Open Offer. Further, Respondents' constitutional defenses lack merit and do not warrant dismissal of the case. Accordingly, we find that Respondents' Acquisition violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.

⁷⁶ Respondents do not allege that they are part of a suspect or quasi-suspect class or that the agencies' case allocation interferes with their fundamental rights like the right to vote, right of interstate travel, or First Amendment right, so rational basis review applies. See *Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.3 (1976); *Davis v. Prison Health Servs.*, 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012); RAB 44 (citing rational basis standard).

VIII. REMEDY

With Complaint Counsel having established that Illumina’s acquisition of GRAIL violated the law, “all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in [the government’s] favor.” *du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 334. The Commission has broad discretion to select a remedy so long as it bears a “reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.” *Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC*, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946).

The purpose of relief in a Section 7 case is to restore competition lost through the unlawful acquisition. *du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 326; *Polypore Int’l, Inc.*, 150 F.T.C. 586, 639 (2010) (citing *inter alia Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 573 n.8). As the Supreme Court has observed, “[c]omplete divestiture is particularly appropriate where asset or stock acquisitions violate the antitrust laws.” *Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 573; *see also du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 329 (“The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy.”). Absent “unusual circumstances,” total divestiture of the acquired assets has long been considered the best means of restoring competition. *RSR Corp.*, 88 F.T.C. 800, 893 (1976), *aff’d*, *RSR Corp. v. FTC*, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979); *see also California v. Am. Stores Co.*, 495 U.S. 271, 285 (1990) (Clayton Act statutory scheme “regards divestiture as the remedy best suited to redress the ills of an anticompetitive merger”). The fact that the parties may have already consummated their transaction does not prevent us from ordering divestiture when otherwise appropriate. *See e.g., ProMedica Health Sys.*, 153 F.T.C. at 473, 556-59 (ordering divestiture in consummated transaction); *Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 385-88 (same); *Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.*, 138 F.T.C. 1024, 1177-78 (2004) (same).

We have already discussed the proposal put forward by Respondents in the form of their Open Offer. *See* Sections VII.D.5 and VII.E.1. As explained, we view the Open Offer as a proposed remedy appropriate for consideration after a finding of liability. For the reasons given in Section VII.E.1, we find that the Open Offer fails to restore the pre-Acquisition level of competition.

Complaint Counsel have submitted a Proposed Order for a complete divestiture. We briefly summarize the Proposed Order below:

- Section I of the Proposed Order defines relevant terms.
- Section II sets out the divestiture requirement and other related obligations to facilitate the divestiture process. Specifically, Section II describes the assets and information that must be divested, how such assets and information are to be divested, and the timing under which they should be divested. Section II also provides for transition services that must be provided to the acquirer of the business, and establishes obligations relating to the retention, recruitment, and employment of employees that are essential to the divested business.
- Section III requires that GRAIL be operated and maintained as a separate and independent business until the divestiture date. It also requires that Illumina take all actions necessary to maintain and preserve the full economic viability,

competitiveness, independence, and marketability of the GRAIL business and assets until the divestiture is completed. As part of these obligations, Section III imposes restrictions on Illumina's use or disclosure of the confidential business information of GRAIL, and vice versa. Section III also temporarily restricts Illumina's ability to transfer, recruit, or solicit GRAIL's workforce.

- Section IV appoints a Hold Separate Manager to oversee the GRAIL business and assets until the divestiture is completed. The Hold Separate Manager would help ensure that GRAIL is operated independently of Illumina and that its viability and competitiveness are maintained during the hold separate period.
- Section V appoints Mazars LLP as Monitor to oversee Respondents' compliance with their obligations.⁷⁷
- Section VI provides for the appointment of a Divestiture Trustee if Illumina fails to divest within the time and in the manner required.
- Section VII provides for Commission prior approval if Illumina seeks to acquire any interest in a business developing, marketing, or selling MCEd tests, or if Illumina seeks to acquire any additional interest in GRAIL.
- Section VIII outlines Respondents' reporting requirements to the Commission regarding compliance with the provisions of the Order.
- Section IX requires Respondents to notify the Commission of any proposed dissolution, acquisition, merger, or consolidation of Illumina, or any other change in Respondents that might affect compliance with the Order.
- Section X requires the submission of information regarding legal actions challenging Illumina's acquisition of GRAIL by a governmental entity other than the Commission.
- Section XI sets out the purpose of the Order.
- Section XII provides that the Order shall terminate 10 years from the date of issuance.⁷⁸

Respondents voice a variety of objections to the Proposed Order. As an initial matter, Respondents argue that divestiture is an extreme and unnecessary remedy, RAB 44-45, but as discussed it has long been held to be the natural and preferred remedy to anticompetitive

⁷⁷ Mazars already serves as the hold separate Monitoring Trustee pursuant to the European Commission's decision implementing interim hold-separate measures related to the Acquisition. *See Monitoring Trustee in Case M.10493 - Illumina/GRAIL (Art. 8(5) procedure)*, European Union Competition Policy (Dec. 16, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases1/202202/M_10493_8109037_452_3.pdf.

⁷⁸ Our discussion of the Proposed Order's provisions, here and in the remainder of this section, necessarily summarizes certain of their features. Unless specifically stated, our discussion is not meant to change or definitively interpret any of the Proposed Order's terms.

mergers. *du Pont*, 366 U.S. at 329 (describing “undoing of the acquisition” as a “natural remedy”); *Am. Stores Co.*, 495 U.S. at 280–81 (“[I]n Government actions divestiture is the preferred remedy for an illegal merger or acquisition.”); *RSR Corp.*, 602 F.2d at 1326 (“Once a violation of Section 7 has been established, divestiture is the usual remedy.”); *ProMedica Health Sys.*, 749 F.3d at 573 (accord); *Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa*, 778 F.3d at 792 (“The customary form of relief in § 7 cases is divestiture.”). Moreover, as we have already held, Respondents’ proposed alternative, the Open Offer, is inadequate.

In addition to their general objection to a divestiture remedy, Respondent make numerous objections to the specific provisions of the Proposed Order. *See* RAB 45. First, Respondents object to the requirement to divest GRAIL, pursuant to a Commission-approved divestiture plan, within 180 days after issuance of the Proposed Order. Respondents argue that this period is shorter than the divestiture period in prior FTC orders and would compel a fire sale, forcing Illumina to incur a substantial loss on its investment. *Id.* A 180-day divestiture period, however, is consistent with other litigated orders. *See, e.g., Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 399 (90 days); *ProMedica Health Sys.*, 153 F.T.C. at 571 (180 days); *Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.*, 138 F.T.C. at 1186 (180 days). Moreover, the Proposed Order allows the Commission to approve, as part of the divestiture plan, a longer divestiture period. *See* Proposed Order II.A. The Proposed Order thus provides an opportunity to extend the divestiture deadline should that be necessary.

Respondents also object to Paragraph II.J of the Proposed Order, which provides that the obligations in Paragraph III.K regarding the confidentiality and use of information are to remain in effect for 5 years following the divestiture date. Respondents state that the five-year period is “impractical and needlessly punitive.” RAB 45; RAB App’x A, note Q. Paragraph III.K requires Illumina and GRAIL to keep their non-public business information separate and prohibits them from obtaining, using, or disclosing the non-public business information of the other, unless such disclosure or use is to comply with certain of Respondents’ contractual or other obligations. This requirement helps ensure that the sensitive GRAIL business information obtained or gleaned by Illumina employees is not shared with others within or outside Illumina, and vice versa. The provision’s timeframe is shortened to 5 years, instead of the 10 years applicable to the Order as a whole, because any sensitive business information is likely to be stale or irrelevant after 5 years. The timeframe is neither impractical nor punitive.

Respondents additionally object to the prior approval requirement in Section VII of the Proposed Order. RAB 45-46. Under that Section, Illumina must obtain prior approval from the Commission if Illumina acquires any interest in a business that in the previous 12 months had engaged in developing, marketing, or selling MCED tests or if Illumina acquires any additional interest in GRAIL. Respondents argue that the provision is unnecessary, harmful to competition, outside the scope of the Notice of Contemplated Relief, and exceeds prior precedent. RAB App’x A, note LL. First, a prior approval provision is consistent with Commission precedent. *See e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp.*, 115 F.T.C. 1010, 1294-95 (1992); *Brunswick Corp.*, 99 F.T.C. 411, 413 (1980); *Beatrice Foods Co.*, 88 F.T.C. 1004, 1005 (1976); *see also Am. Secs. Partners VII, L.P.*, 173 F.T.C. 723, 738 (2022) (consent). Further, a prior approval requirement would facilitate competition by allowing the Commission to prevent unlawful deals, preserve resources, and detect unlawful deals below the HSR reporting thresholds, as explained in the Statement of The Commission on Use of Prior Approval Provisions In Merger Orders at 1-2

(Oct. 25, 2021) (“Prior Approval Policy Statement”).⁷⁹ As for Respondents’ argument that the provision is outside the scope of the Notice of Contemplated Relief, the Notice provides broadly that the Commission “may order such relief against Respondents as is supported by the record and is necessary and appropriate.” Compl. 28. While the Notice also lists certain specific possible forms of relief, it expressly states that it is “not limited to” those remedies. *Id.*; *cf.* Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (a final judgment other than a default judgment “should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”). Moreover, notice was provided in the Prior Approval Policy Statement, which was issued while the matter was still pending before the ALJ.

Respondents object to the Order’s 10-year term, asserting that this length of time is unreasonable and not warranted by evidence in this proceeding. RAB 45; RAB App’x A, note QQ. Ten years from the date of issue is a common timeframe for Commission divestiture orders. *See, e.g., Otto Bock*, 168 F.T.C. at 414. While certain provisions, such as those concerning the divestiture, hold separate, asset maintenance, and transition assistance, would expire before the end of the 10-year term, other provisions, such as the prior approval provision, remain operative throughout the term of the Order. The Order timeframe is reasonable and appropriate. Our findings regarding the challenged Acquisition’s threat to long-term, ongoing R&D efforts add further support to that conclusion.

Respondents also object to the obligation in Section VIII of the Proposed Order to provide annual compliance reports for a period of 9 years, asserting that the period is longer than necessary to effectuate the divestiture. RAB 45; RAB App’x A, note MM. However, as discussed, Illumina would be subject to the Order, including the prior approval provision, for 10 years; the reporting requirements would allow the Commission to monitor Illumina’s compliance with the Order. Prior Commission orders have required similar annual compliance reports. *See, e.g., Polypore*, 150 F.T.C. at 692-93.

Respondents additionally object to the provision requiring Illumina to return to GRAIL any money that Illumina receives when it divests GRAIL above Illumina’s investment in purchasing GRAIL. *See* Proposed Order II.B. Respondents argue, among other things, that this is akin to disgorgement, which the Commission does not have the legal authority to order. RAB App’x A, note J. Adequately remedying consummated mergers, such as this one, may in some cases require that respondents provide assets to the divested entity to ensure its competitiveness; the Commission may order such a remedy where appropriate. *See Chicago Bridge*, 534 F.3d at 441-42; *see also Ford Motor Co.*, 405 U.S. at 575 (upholding remedial provisions “designed to give the divested plant an opportunity to establish its competitive position”). During oral argument, Complaint Counsel asserted that Paragraph II.B is necessary to make GRAIL as competitive as possible. Oral Argument Tr. 73-74. However, they have not pointed to any evidence in the record showing that the divestiture proceeds are needed for GRAIL to remain competitive following the divestiture. Based on the totality of the circumstances reflected in this

⁷⁹ https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1597894/p859900priorapproval_statement.pdf

record, we find that Complaint Counsel have not established the need for this provision here, and we exclude it from the Final Order.⁸⁰

In addition to the above objections, which are specifically raised in Respondents' brief on appeal, Respondents have submitted other objections in the form of an Appendix containing annotations and extensive line edits to the Proposed Order. In that Appendix, Respondents urge modification or deletion of various Proposed Order provisions, including among others certain definitions, requirements to provide transition assistance, provisions regarding employee hiring and confidentiality, as well as provisions concerning the appointment of a Hold Separate Manager and Monitor. Having reviewed Respondents' objections, we are not persuaded to remove these important protections or deviate from the language in the Proposed Order. We find these aspects of the Proposed Order appropriate as written.

In their final argument, Respondents assert, without citation, that the proposed relief is impermissible because Respondents "have not been offered a hearing on the specific relief requested." RAB 46. Respondents had the opportunity to address Complaint Counsel's proposed remedy in two rounds of briefing – one before the ALJ and one before the Commission – and during oral argument before the Commission. They also could have addressed the ramifications of a possible divestiture remedy during the several-week trial. Respondents do not explain what new evidence they would develop at a separate remedy hearing. Under these circumstances, a separate evidentiary hearing is not required. *Chicago Bridge*, 534 F.3d at 442.

We therefore enter the Final Order as proposed, except we have removed the requirement concerning the return of divestiture proceeds (Proposed Order Paragraph II.B), along with related definitions and references, and made conforming and other minor changes consistent with the purposes of the Order's provisions.

ISSUED: March 31, 2023

⁸⁰ Because we are not ordering Illumina to provide GRAIL with any divestiture profits, Respondents' argument that this requirement violates the Seventh Amendment, RAB 44, is moot.