

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 LUNDBECK INC.,)
)
 Defendant.)
_____)

08-cv-6379 (JNE/JJG)

_____)
STATE OF MINNESOTA,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 LUNDBECK, INC.,)
)
 Defendant.)
_____)

08-cv-6381 (JNE/JJG)

**DEFENDANT LUNDBECK INC.'S [PROPOSED]
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

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