

\*\*E-Filed 9/7/2011\*\*

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN JOSE DIVISION**

RITZ CAMERA & IMAGE, LLC, a Delaware  
limited liability company, on behalf of itself and  
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANDISK CORPORATION; ELIYAHOU  
HARARI,

Defendants.

Case Number 5:10-cv-02787-JF/HRL  
ORDER<sup>1</sup> GRANTING REQUEST TO  
CERTIFY INTERLOCUTORY  
APPEAL

[Re: Docket No. 64]

In an order dated February 24, 2011, this Court held that Plaintiff Ritz Camera & Image, LLC (“Ritz”) has standing to bring a *Walker Process*<sup>2</sup> fraud claim against Defendants SanDisk Corporation (“SanDisk”) and Eliyahou Harari (“Harari”). Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Dkt. 60. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

<sup>1</sup> This disposition is not designated for publication in the official reports.

<sup>2</sup> *Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (holding that a plaintiff may “strip [a patent-holder] of [his] exemption from the antitrust laws” if his patent has been procured by fraud.).

1 Defendants seek to certify this ruling for interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit.<sup>3</sup> The Court  
 2 heard oral argument on May 6, 2011. For the reasons discussed below, the request for  
 3 certification will be granted.

#### 4 I. BACKGROUND

5 Ritz filed the instant action on June 25, 2010, alleging violations of § 2 of the Sherman  
 6 Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Sherman Act”). Ritz filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”) as  
 7 of right on August 25, 2010. On behalf of a purported class, Ritz asserts claims for  
 8 monopolization of the flash memory market. In particular, Ritz alleges that Defendants have  
 9 monopolized the market for NAND flash memory products<sup>4</sup> through the assertion of fraudulent  
 10 patents. FAC ¶¶ 131-35. It claims that Defendants have reduced competition in the market by  
 11 pursuing unfounded actions for patent infringement and by engaging in retaliatory conduct  
 12 toward consumers who use competing products. *Id.*

#### 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD

14 A district court, in its discretion, may certify an issue for interlocutory appeal under 28  
 15 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if (1) there is a “controlling question of law,” (2) on which there is “substantial  
 16 ground for difference of opinion,” and (3) “an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the  
 17 ultimate termination of the litigation. . .” *See In re Cement Antitrust Litig.*, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026  
 18 (9th Cir. 1982). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, § 1292(b) is to be used “only in  
 19 exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and  
 20

---

21 <sup>3</sup> Proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the Federal Circuit when a *Walker Process* fraud  
 22 theory is at issue. *In re DDAVP*, 585 F.3d 677, 685 (2d Cir. 2009); *See also McCook Metals*  
 23 *LLC v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 249 F.3d 330, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2001) (“while most appeals must be filed in  
 24 the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court is located, . . . only the Federal  
 25 Circuit can hear an appeal when the district court’s jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on  
 26 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which confers original jurisdiction over patent-related claims on district  
 27 courts”) (citations omitted); *See also* 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

26 <sup>4</sup> NAND flash memory is a form of digital storage technology used in consumer  
 27 electronic devices. FAC ¶¶ 1-2. It is available in a “raw” or a “finished” format. *Id.* “Raw”  
 28 flash memory is the basic flash memory wafer that is produced by a fabrication plant or fab. *Id.*  
 “Finished” flash memory products are used in or with various electronic products such as  
 personal computers and digital cameras. *Id.*

1 expensive litigation.” *Id.* at 1026 (citing *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, 437 U.S. 463, 475  
 2 (1978) (holding that “exceptional circumstances [must] justify a departure from the basic policy  
 3 of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment”)); *see also James v.*  
 4 *Price Stern Sloan, Inc.*, 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that § 1292(b) is  
 5 available only “[i]n rare circumstances”).

### 6 III. DISCUSSION

#### 7 A. The Availability of *Walker Process* Standing is a Controlling Question of Law

8 Defendants contend that the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in  
 9 *Walker Process* presents a controlling question of law that is potentially dispositive of all issues  
 10 in the instant action. This Court observed previously that, “each of Ritz’s claims<sup>5</sup> is dependent  
 11 upon the theory that Defendants have engaged in the enforcement of fraudulently-obtained  
 12 patents.” Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended  
 13 Complaint at 4, Dkt. 60. At oral argument, counsel for Ritz asserted that Defendants’  
 14 exploitation of the allegedly invalid patents represents but one of several theories underlying  
 15 Ritz’s antitrust claim, and thus *Walker Process* standing is not essential to the claim. However, a  
 16 plain reading of the FAC contradicts this assertion. In relevant part, Ritz pleads its antitrust  
 17 claim as follows:

18 SanDisk has monopolized the relevant market . . . and maintained that monopoly,  
 19 by fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations in connection with the filing and  
 20 prosecution of the '338 and '517 ‘crown jewel’ patents, by conduct to exploit those  
 21 invalid patents with infringement actions so as to exclude competition, by the  
 [tortious] conversion of . . . technology so as to reduce competition in the relevant  
 market, by threats to competitor customers and the termination of [Ritz], and by  
 an anticompetitive settlement agreement . . .

22 FAC ¶ 132

23 All of Ritz’s allegations in support of its claim are based upon the premise that  
 24 Defendants have engaged in exclusionary patent fraud. *See, e.g., Id.* at ¶ 110 (“SanDisk has  
 25

---

26 <sup>5</sup> The FAC purports to assert claims for conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization of  
 27 the NAND flash memory market. However, the Court has dismissed Ritz’s conspiracy claim  
 28 without leave to amend. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First  
 Amended Complaint, Dkt. 60.

1 threatened . . . class members with the prospect that they will be left holding large quantities of  
2 unusable NAND flash memory products manufactured by [those] . . . that refuse to license  
3 SanDisk’s fraudulent technology . . .); *Id.* at ¶ 111 (By terminating Ritz, “SanDisk seeks to  
4 suppress [Ritz’s] attempt to show that SanDisk has systematically used fraudulent patents and  
5 stolen technology to exclude competition . . .”); *Id.* at ¶ 119 (The settlement with  
6 [STMicroelectronics, Inc. (“STM”)] ensured that “one of [SanDisk’s] most formidable  
7 competitors . . . would pose no further competitive challenge, nor continue to challenge the  
8 fraudulent patents SanDisk has repeatedly used to suppress competition.”). Accordingly, in the  
9 absence of *Walker Process* standing, Ritz has no basis to assert its antitrust claim.

10 **B. There Are Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion on the Issue**

11 Because certification under § 1292(b) is appropriate only in “exceptional circumstances,”  
12 substantial grounds for difference of opinion do not arise merely by virtue of a question’s  
13 novelty. *See, e.g., In re Flor*, 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The mere presence of a disputed  
14 issue that is a question of first impression, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a  
15 substantial ground for difference of opinion.”). Mere disagreement with the Court’s ruling also  
16 is insufficient to create a substantial ground for difference of opinion. *See, e.g., Mateo v. The*  
17 *M/S Kiso*, 805 F. Supp. 792, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“A party’s strong disagreement with the  
18 Court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a ‘substantial ground for difference’; the proponent  
19 of an appeal must make some greater showing.”). However, certification is appropriate where  
20 there is “a dearth of precedent within the controlling jurisdiction and conflicting decisions in  
21 other circuits.” *APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp.*, 297 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2003).

22 Here, the ruling in question falls within the realm of issues suitable for certification  
23 because neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has ruled on a direct purchaser’s  
24 ability to assert *Walker Process* claims. Moreover, there is a difference of opinion among the  
25 courts that have considered the issue. *See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation*, No. 01-1652  
26 (JAG), 2007 WL 5297755, at \*13 (D. N.J. Mar. 1, 2007) (“only a party that has had a patent  
27 enforced against it, or has been threatened with suit, has standing to bring a *Walker Process* or  
28 ‘sham litigation’ claim.”); *In re Netflix Antitrust Litigation*, 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (N.D. Cal.

1 2007) (“Even though *Walker Process* claims are predicated on enforcement of a fraudulently-  
 2 obtained patent, the harm still accrues directly to consumers. . . . Accordingly, if plaintiffs can  
 3 plead the other elements of their *Walker Process* claim, they have standing.”) (citing *Molecular*  
 4 *Diagnostics Laboratories v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.*, 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D. D.C. 2005)).

5 **C. Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance the Termination of the Litigation**

6 Defendants argue that certification of the interlocutory appeal will avoid expensive and  
 7 protracted discovery. The Court agrees that on balance certification would further rather than  
 8 frustrate resolution of the underlying dispute. The standing issue is important not only to the  
 9 parties but also to future litigants who may be similarly situated.

10 **D. Request to Stay Discovery**

11 Defendants request that discovery be stayed or limited pending resolution of the  
 12 interlocutory appeal. “When considering a stay pending appeal pursuant to § 1292(b), the Court  
 13 has broad discretion to decide whether a stay is appropriate to ‘promote economy of time and  
 14 effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” *Asis Internet Services v. Active Response Group*,  
 15 No. C07 6211 THE, 2008 WL 4279695, at \* 3-4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2008) (quoting *Filtrol Corp.*  
 16 *v. Kelleher*, 467 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir.1972) (quotations and citations omitted)). *See also*  
 17 *Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp.*, 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1983) (“A  
 18 trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the  
 19 parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which  
 20 bear upon the case.”). In light of the well-documented cost of discovery in cases arising from or  
 21 related to intellectual property disputes, the Court finds that a stay is warranted here.

22 **IV. ORDER**

23 Good cause therefor appearing, Defendants’ request to certify the Court’s *Walker Process*  
 24 standing ruling for interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit is GRANTED. Discovery is stayed  
 25 pending resolution of the appeal or until further order of the Court.

26 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

27 DATED: September 6, 2011

28   
 JEREMY FOGEL  
 United States District Court