MERGER ANTITRUST LAW

Unit 14: Potential Competition Mergers

Class 21

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Georgetown University Law Center
Fall 2022

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Steris/Synergy Health

STERIS

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News Release

STERIS to Acquire Synergy Health for $1.9 Billion in Cash and Stock

Combination Creates a Global Leader in Infection Prevention and Sterilization

Allows Company to Further Invest in the U.S. and Accelerate International Growth

Conference Call with Senior Management at 8:30 a.m. EDT

MENTOR, OHIO AND SWINDON, U.K. - October 13, 2014 - STERIS Corporation (NYSE:STE) and Synergy Health, plc (LSE:SYR) today announced that STERIS is commencing a "recommended offer" under U.K. law to acquire Synergy in a cash and stock transaction valued at £19.50 ($31.35) per Synergy share, or a total of approximately $1.9 billion, based on STERIS's closing stock price of $56.38 per share on October 10, 2014.

Upon closing, the combined business (New STERIS) will have approximately $2.6 billion in annual revenues from over 60 countries, approximately 14,000 employees, and will bring together geographically complementary businesses. For medical device manufacturers, STERIS's Isomedix and Synergy's Applied Sterilization Technologies (AST) will create a leading global supplier to best serve medical device Customers with a network of 58 facilities covering 18 countries. For hospitals, the combination of STERIS's Infection Prevention and Services businesses with Synergy's Hospital Sterilization Services will strengthen the breadth and depth of the offering, accelerating the development of hospital sterilization outsourcing worldwide.

"Synergy's focus on achievement, accountability, integrity and innovation has enabled it to deliver remarkable growth for its Customers, people and shareholders since its founding," said Walt Rosebrough, President and CEO of STERIS Corporation. "We have great respect for the performance that Dr. Richard Steeves and his people have achieved, and look forward to welcoming them to the STERIS team. Together, we create a balanced portfolio of products and services that can be tailored to best serve the evolving needs of our global Customers. Once the transaction is completed, New STERIS will be a stronger global leader in infection prevention and sterilization, better-positioned to provide comprehensive solutions to medical device companies, pharma companies, and hospitals around the world."

"Synergy shares STERIS's commitment to growth for all of its Customers and partners, and this acquisition joins two great companies that share a similar set of values and a strategic vision," said Dr. Richard Steeves, CEO of Synergy Health. "The combined entity brings together the strengths of both businesses, allowing New STERIS to accomplish much more than either one of us could separately."

New STERIS will be incorporated in the U.K., while its operational and U.S. headquarters will remain in Mentor, Ohio. Walt Rosebrough, current President and CEO of STERIS, will be the CEO of New STERIS. Mr. Rosebrough, along with New STERIS CFO Michael Tokich and most members of senior management, will reside in Northeast Ohio.

STERIS plans to expand the New STERIS Board to thirteen members, of whom ten will be the current STERIS Directors and three will be current members of Synergy's Board of Directors. Included in the three new Directors will be Synergy CEO, Dr. Richard Steeves. New STERIS is expected to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker STE. The Boards of Directors of both companies have unanimously recommended the transaction.

Financial Highlights

STERIS has agreed to pay approximately $1.9 billion in cash and stock to acquire Synergy. In fiscal 2014, Synergy generated revenue of approximately $604 million and adjusted earnings before interest expense, income taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of approximately $161 million.[1]

Upon completion of the transaction, each outstanding share of Synergy will be converted into the right to receive £4.39 ($7.06) in cash and 0.4308 of a share of New STERIS. The per-share consideration represents a premium of 39% to Synergy's closing stock price on October 10, 2014, the last trading day prior to the announcement, a 32% premium to the thirty trading day volume weighted average price, and a 27% premium to the 52-week high of Synergy. At closing, STERIS shareholders will exchange each share of stock they own in STERIS for one share of stock in New STERIS. STERIS shareholders will retain ownership of approximately 70% of New STERIS and Synergy shareholders will own approximately 30%. The transaction is expected to be taxable, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, to shareholders of STERIS.

The proposed transaction represents compelling value to both Synergy and STERIS shareholders through participation in the future growth prospects expected to result from the combination through their ownership of the combined company.

The transaction is not expected to impact STERIS's adjusted earnings per diluted share until closing. The transaction is anticipated to be significantly accretive to New STERIS's adjusted earnings per diluted share beginning in fiscal 2016.

The transaction is expected to result in total annual pre-tax cost savings of $30 million or more, which will be phased in 50% in fiscal year 2016 and 100% thereafter, from optimizing global back-office infrastructure, leveraging best-demonstrated practices across plants, in-sourcing consumables, and eliminating redundant public company costs. In addition, as a result of incorporating New STERIS in the U.K., STERIS anticipates that the effective tax rate of New STERIS, beginning in fiscal 2016, will be approximately 25%.

The transaction is subject to certain customary closing conditions, including approvals by STERIS and Synergy shareholders as well as regulatory approvals in the U.S. and U.K., and is anticipated to close by March 31, 2015. In conjunction with the transaction, STERIS obtained a 364-Day Bridge Credit Agreement. Bank of America Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan and KeyBank provided committed financing in conjunction with the transaction in the amount of approximately $1.6 billion.

Lazard acted as financial advisor and Wachtell, Lipton, Rose & Katz and Jones Day acted as legal advisors to STERIS in connection with the acquisition. Investec Bank plc acted as financial advisor and DLA Piper acted as legal counsel for Synergy.

For more information about the transaction, please go to www.steris.com/synergy (http://www.steris.com/synergy) beginning at 7:00 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time today.

Boilerplate omitted

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
PROTECTING AMERICA'S CONSUMERS

FTC Challenges Merger of Companies That Provide Sterilization Services to Manufacturers

Merger of Steris Corporation and Synergy Health plc Would Harm Competition for Contract Radiation Sterilization Services

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FOR RELEASE

May 29, 2015

TAGS: Bureau of Competition | Competition

The Federal Trade Commission today issued an administrative complaint charging that Steris Corporation's proposed $1.9 billion acquisition of Synergy Health plc would violate the antitrust laws by significantly reducing future competition in regional markets for sterilization of products using radiation, particularly gamma or x-ray radiation.

The Commission also authorized agency staff to seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in federal court to maintain the status quo pending an administrative trial on the merits.

According to the FTC's complaint, Steris, headquartered in Mentor, Ohio, and United Kingdom-based Synergy both provide contract sterilization services for companies that need to ensure their products are free of unwanted microorganisms before they reach customers. Implanted medical devices and human tissue products, for example, must meet stringent requirements for sterilization. For most companies, in-house sterilization is not a viable alternative. Instead, these customers bring their products to sterilization service facilities on a contract basis, typically within 500 miles of the companies' manufacturing or distribution facilities to minimize shipping costs.

Today, gamma radiation, generated by the radioactive isotope Cobalt 60, is considered the only feasible method of sterilizing large volumes of dense and heterogeneously packaged products. Only Steris and one other company, Sterigenics, provide contract gamma sterilization services in the United States, according to the complaint. At the time the proposed merger was announced, Synergy was implementing a strategy to open new plants that would provide contract x-ray sterilization services. These services – which currently are not available in the United States – would provide a competitive alternative to gamma radiation, according to the complaint. Because it uses electricity rather than Cobalt 60, x-ray does not raise many of the environmental and regulatory issues associated with gamma sterilization. According to the FTC, it is unlikely that new competitors in the market for contract radiation sterilization services would replicate the competition that would be eliminated by the merger. The Commission alleges that the challenged acquisition would eliminate likely future competition between Steris's gamma sterilization facilities and Synergy's planned x-ray sterilization facilities in the United States, thus depriving customers of an alternative sterilization service and additional competition.

The Commission vote to issue the administrative complaint and to authorize staff to seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in federal district court was 5-0. The administrative trial is scheduled to begin on October 28, 2015.

NOTE: The Commission issues an administrative complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the law has been or is being violated, and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. The issuance of the administrative complaint marks the beginning of a proceeding in which the allegations will be tried in a formal hearing before an administrative law judge.

The FTC’s Bureau of Competition works with the Bureau of Economics to investigate alleged anticompetitive business practices and, when appropriate, recommends that the Commission take law enforcement action. To inform the Bureau about particular business practices, call 202-326-3300, send an e-mail to antitrust{at}ftc{dot}gov, or write to the Office of Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room CC-5422, Washington, DC 20580. To learn more about the Bureau of Competition, read Competition Counts. Like the FTC on Facebook, follow us on Twitter, and subscribe to press releases for the latest FTC news and resources.

PRESS RELEASE REFERENCE:
FTC Dismisses Complaint against Steris and Synergy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,	)	**CASE NO. 1:15 CV 1080**
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	**JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER**
	)	
vs.	)	**OPINION AND ORDER**
	)	
STERIS CORPORATION, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

On May 29, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Steris Corporation (Steris) and Synergy Health plc (Synergy). (Doc #: 1.) The FTC asked the Court to grant immediate injunctive relief under Section 13(b) of the Clayton Act to prevent Steris from acquiring its alleged potential competitor, Synergy, on June 1, 2015. The parties agreed to maintain the status quo pending an expedited hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and the Court's ruling. An administrative proceeding on the merits is scheduled to begin on October 26, 2015.

I.

Defendants Steris and Synergy are the second- and third-largest sterilization companies in the world, the largest provider being Sterigenics International LLC (Sterigenics). Sterilization of many healthcare and healthcare-related products is a critical final step in their manufacture; it is required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to eliminate microorganisms living on or within the manufacturers' products before those products are distributed to end-users in the United States. Foreign regulatory bodies require sterilization of these same products when sold in foreign countries. Only a small number of manufacturers sterilize their own products: the bulk of sterilization is contracted to suppliers like Steris,[1] Synergy and Sterigenics.

Three primary methods of contract sterilization are currently used in the United States: gamma radiation, e-beam radiation, and ethylene oxide gas (EO). Customers choose sterilization methods based on their products' physical characteristics and packaging. Gamma sterilization, which sterilizes by exposing products to the radioactive isotope Cobalt-60, is the most effective and economical option for most healthcare products because of its penetration capabilities. It is the only viable option for dense products (e.g., implantable medical devices) and products packaged in larger quantities. E-beam sterilization, a second type of radiation sterilization, does not penetrate as deeply as gamma radiation, though it can be effective for low-density products sterilized in low volumes. It represents only 15% of all contract radiation sterilization in the United States. EO is a non-radiation form of sterilization that exposes products to gas to kill unwanted organisms. It is effective only if gas diffuses freely through packaging and makes contact with all product surfaces requiring sterilization.

Steris, with twelve gamma facilities across the country, is one of only two U.S. providers of contract gamma sterilization services. Sterigenics, the other gamma provider, operates fourteen U.S. gamma facilities and two U.S. e-beam facilities. Together, these two firms

[1]In 1997, Steris acquired a medical sterilization company called Isomedix. (Hr'g Tr. 152 (Steeves).) Today, Steris' contract sterilization business is often referred to as Steris Isomedix.

account for approximately 85% of all U.S. contract sterilization services. Synergy, a British company, is the largest provider of e-beam services in the United States,[2] but operates more than thirty-six contract sterilization facilities, primarily gamma facilities, outside the United States. Of particular note are Synergy's two contract sterilization facilities located in Daniken, Switzerland (Daniken): a gamma facility and an x-ray facility. The Daniken x-ray sterilization facility is the only facility in the world providing x-ray sterilization services on a commercial scale.

The FTC alleges that, prior to the proposed merger announced on October 13, 2014, Synergy had been planning to enter the U.S. with an emerging x-ray sterilization technology it hoped would disrupt the current duopoly in the U.S. contract sterilization market, competing directly with Steris' and Sterigenics' gamma sterilization services. According to the FTC, x-ray sterilization is a competitive alternative to gamma sterilization because it has comparable, "and possibly superior," depth of penetration and turnaround times. (Compl. ¶ 4, Doc #: 1.) The FTC claims that, if consummated, the merger would allow Steris to insulate itself against competition with its gamma business. Synergy's planned x-ray sterilization facilities would have targeted Steris' and Sterigenics' gamma sterilization customers, providing them with options for contract sterilization and resulting in lower prices and improved quality.

After months of investigation, the FTC filed this case several days before the proposed merger was to close, contending that the acquisition of Synergy by Steris would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers "the effect of [which] may be substantially to lessen

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[2]Synergy acquired its U.S. contract sterilization facilities from BeamOne LLC in April 2011. (Tr. 148.)

competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 45. The FTC sought injunctive relief under Section 13(b), which authorizes the Court to grant preliminary relief if, after considering the FTC's likelihood of success on the merits and weighing the equities, such relief would serve the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

On June 1, 2015, the Court held a teleconference with counsel to determine how to proceed most efficiently in this matter. As a result of discussions, the parties agreed to file a Stipulation and Order wherein Defendants agreed not to consummate the proposed merger until at least four business days after the Court rules on the FTC's motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc #: 7.) The parties also agreed to provide the Court with a joint proposed expedited schedule for litigating that motion, which the Court issued. (Doc #: 24.)

The Court held a three-day hearing beginning August 17, 2015, during which the following witnesses testified: Joyce Hansen, Vice President of Sterility Assurance at Johnson and Johnson (J & J); David Silor, Principal Sterilization Associate at Zimmer Biomed Orthopedics (Zimmer); Dr. Richard M. Steeves, founder and CEO of Synergy; Andrew McLean, Synergy's CEO of Applied Sterilization Technologies (AST) & Laboratories; Constance Baroudel, one of the outside directors on Synergy's PLC Board; Gaet Tyranski, Synergy's President, AST for the Americas; Gavin Hill, CFO of Synergy; and Walter Roseborough, CEO of Steris. The parties filed simultaneous post-hearing briefs and response briefs. (Doc ##: 77, 78, 80, 81.) The Court, having listened to the evidence and reviewed the briefs, issues this ruling.

(Continued on next page)

II.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that

> No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the county, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

15 U.S.C. § 18. Section 13(b) of the Clayton Act provides that

> [u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, . . . a preliminary injunction may be granted . . . .

15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

"Section 7 is 'designed to arrest in its incipiency . . . the substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition by one corporation of the whole or any part of the stock' or assets of a competing corporation." *United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc.*, 426 F.3d 850, 858 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957)). In enacting this statute, Congress was concerned with probabilities, not certainties. *Id.* (citing *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962)). As District Judge David A. Katz recently explained,

> The "only purpose of a proceeding under Section 13[(b)] is to preserve the status quo until the FTC can perform its function." *FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc.*, 539 F.2d 1339, 1342 (4th Cir. 1976). The ultimate determination as to a Section 7 violation of the Clayton Act is an "adjudicatory function [ ] vested in the FTC." *Id.*

FTC v. Promedica Health System, Inc., No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *53 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (alteration in original). Under 15 U.S.C. § 25, the FTC is authorized to seek an injunction to enforce Section 7, and it carries the burden of proving a Section 7 violation by a preponderance of the evidence. *See, e.g., U.S. v. H&R Block, Inc.*, 833 F.Supp.2d 36, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 25).

To show a likelihood of success under Section 13(b), the FTC must "raise questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance, and ultimately by the Court of Appeals." *F.T.C. v. Promedica*, 2011 WL 1219281, at *53, (quoting *FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.*, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996), *aff'd*, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997)).

According to the FTC, the "actual potential entrant" doctrine specifically addresses this factual scenario: where a potential entrant (i.e., Synergy) merges with a firm already competing in the market (i.e., Steris) and the effect lessens future competition. The FTC asserts that the acquisition of an actual potential competitor violates Section 7 if (1) the relevant market is highly concentrated, (2) the competitor "probably" would have entered the market, (3) its entry would have had pro-competitive effects, and (4) there are few other firms that can enter effectively. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. 6 n.40, Doc #: 5-1.)

Defendants challenge the actual potential entrant doctrine, arguing that it has long been disfavored by numerous courts including the Supreme Court. However, the FTC has clearly endorsed this theory by filing this case, and the administrative law judge will be employing it during the proceeding beginning October 26. Accordingly, in deciding the likelihood of success on the merits, the Court will assume the validity of this doctrine.

Prior to the August 2015 hearing, the Court directed counsel to focus their attention at the hearing on the second prong of the actual potential entrant doctrine, i.e., whether, absent the acquisition, the evidence shows that Synergy probably would have entered the U.S. contract sterilization market by building one or more x-ray facilities within a reasonable period of time. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the FTC has failed to carry its burden.

III.

In 2000, Dr. Richard M. Steeves, a biochemistry doctor with a business background, purchased a facility with a controlled environment for the purpose of manufacturing products to prevent surgeons from acquiring HIV. (Hr'g Tr. 188-89 (Steeves).)[3] In 2007, Dr. Steeves acquired a small business in medical device sterilization, which became Synergy. (Id.) Synergy quickly grew from a privately held company with an annual revenue of £750,000 to a publicly traded company with an annual revenue of approximately £440,000,000 today. (Id. at 189.)

The first time Dr. Steeves came across x-ray sterilization technology was at an international radiation conference in 2011. (Hr'g Tr. 194.) Daniken, the only company in the world providing x-ray sterilization services on a commercial scale, made a presentation on this new technology that piqued Dr. Steeves' interest. (Id.) He found that the technology worked, but generally dismissed it "because all the talk at the conference was this was an expensive white elephant." (Id.)

In 2012, Leoni Studer, the company that owned Daniken, put it up for sale. (Hr'g Tr. 194 (Steeves).) Dr. Steeves had one of his senior directors conduct due diligence to determine whether the business would be worth acquiring. (Id. at 194-95.) He learned that Daniken had

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[3]Citation to "Hr'g Tr." refers to the August 2015 Hearing Transcript, Doc #: 72.)

two components: a gamma facility and an x-ray facility. (Id. at 195.) At that time, Daniken's gamma facility was running at 75% capacity, while the x-ray facility was running at 22%. (SH-00968554; PX00423-030.) Synergy reached a valuation the directors thought workable based on the gamma business supporting the x-ray business and, "importantly, what we were expecting in terms of a change in interest in x-ray." (Id. at 195.) This predicted increase in customer interest in x-ray was based on the fact that J & J, one of the world's leading manufacturers of medical devices, pharmaceutical and consumer packaged goods, was about to begin the process of making the change from gamma to x-ray sterilization for one of its products (i.e., Surgicel, a blood-clotting agent) at the Daniken facility—setting what Dr. Steeves believed would be "an industry trend" away from gamma and towards x-ray sterilization. (Id.) At the same time, the directors understood that they faced three significant obstacles in bringing this new technology to the U.S. market: lowering the capital costs, understanding the regulatory hurdles involved in transitioning from gamma to x-ray sterilization, and convincing gamma customers to accept and, more importantly, *support* this new technology. (Id. at 195-96.) Based on forecasts predicting the x-ray facility would reach 52% capacity by fiscal year 2015 and 64% by fiscal year 2016, Synergy decided to purchase Daniken. ((SH-00968554; PX00423-030; Hr'g Tr. 653-55 (Hill).)

Synergy's management hierarchy consists of two main boards. (Hr'g Tr. at 148, 190 (Steeves).) The Senior Executive Board (SEB) runs the day-to-day operations, generates business strategies, and makes decisions on investments up to £10,000,000 (approximately $15.5 million). (Id.) As a publicly traded company, Synergy also has a PLC Board of Directors that represents the shareholders, defines the company's business and investment strategies, and ensures that the company's operational and financial performance respects the shareholders' interests. (Hr'g Tr. 446 (Bouradel), 645 (Hill).) The PLC Board consists of 4 outside directors and 3 inside directors. (Id. at 150 (Steeves).) Together, they have responsibility for governance, signing off on strategy developed by the SEB, and investments over £10,000,000. (Id. at 190.)

At the annual meeting of the combined SEB and PLC boards held in October 2012, Dr. Steeves made a presentation on x-ray technology and Synergy's recent acquisition of Daniken. (Hr'g Tr. 151-55 (Steeves).) Dr. Steeves observed that Synergy could not compete in the U.S. market for contract sterilization services with its gamma, e-beam and EO services, given that Steris and Sterigenics held 83 % of the radiation market and 90% of the EO market. (Id. at 152-53.) He believed that Synergy could only compete with Steris and Sterigenics in the U.S. market by introducing its new x-ray sterilization technology, acquired via its acquisition of Daniken. (Id. at 153.) He pointed out that there were five main hubs in the United States where radiation sterilization is performed, and he hypothesized that Synergy could build a facility in each of those hubs with the prospect of taking more than $120 million of revenue away from Steris and Sterigenics. (Id. at 154.) He recommended that Synergy endeavor to reach an exclusivity agreement with IBA, the only manufacturer of x-ray equipment in the world that could make a machine powerful enough to sterilize medical devices on a commercial scale, to build up to five facilities in the U.S. (Id. at 155.)

Dr. Steeves made a similar presentation to the top Synergy leaders in a conference held in April 2013. (Hr'g Tr.155-56 (Steeves).) Two days later, he hired Andrew McLean to lead the design and project teams for the AST division, beginning in June 2013. (Id. at 157; PX00095-001.) In a letter to McLean dated May 15, 2013 (before McLean came onboard), Dr. Steeves updated McLean on the status of various AST businesses. (PX00095-001.) With regard to x-ray at Daniken, Dr. Steeves noted his concern over “slow customer conversions.” (Id.) However, Dr. Steeves considered x-ray at Daniken to be a “potential game changer” in the U.S. contract sterilization market. (PX00095-002; Hr’g Tr. 157 (Steeves), 274 (McLean).) Although Synergy hadn’t run the numbers on x-ray in the United States, he commented that “intuitively I think it could be lower cost than gamma, and would beat the gamma service on every other operating metric. This is one of the key projects I would like you to lead through the design team.” (PX00095-002.) In April 2014, McLean was promoted to CEO of AST and Laboratories. (Hr’g Tr. 156 (Steeves).)

McLean was tasked with presenting the U.S. x-ray team’s strategy to the combined boards at the November 2013 meeting. (Hr’g Tr. 211 (Steeves).) McLean never made that presentation, however, as it was around that time that Nordion, the world’s leading supplier of Cobalt-60 (the energy source for gamma radiation sterilization) and one of only two Cobalt-60 suppliers in North America, became available for acquisition. (Id. at 211-12 (Steeves), 461-62 (Bouradel).) Both Steris and Sterigenics participated in a bidding war for Nordion beginning in the fall of 2013 that culminated in an announcement, on March 31, 2014, that Sterigenics entered into a definitive agreement to acquire Nordion.

Now concerned about Cobalt-60 supply in the hands of Sterigenics and motivated by his belief in x-ray technology, Dr. Steeves decided to explore fully the concept of commercial x-ray sterilization in the U.S. and other parts of the world. (Hr’g Tr. 213 (Steeves).) He directed Andrew McLean to “redouble his efforts and do everything he could to try and get this to work, sort out the three issues that he needed to address in order to allow [Synergy] to bring it in the

United States.” (Id.) Those issues are the same impediments Synergy faced when it purchased Daniken: (1) developing a business plan requiring significantly less capital than the 18 million euros it cost Leoni Studer to build Daniken, (2) overcoming customer reluctance to switch sterilization modalities, and (3) obtaining revenue commitments from a base load of customers in the form of take-or-pay contracts. (See also Hr’g Tr.195-197, 202-203 (Steeves).)

Synergy’s corporation has three businesses: AST, hospital sterilization services, and a linen business. (Hr’g Tr. 646-47 (Hill).) Synergy has an annual maintenance budget of $40 million, and a discretionary budget of $25 to $40 million for investment purposes. (Id. at 650.) The competition for discretionary cash among the businesses has led Synergy to establish a formal process for deciding which projects to fund.

The first phase of the process is aspirational; a Synergy business (e.g., AST) will come up with an idea for a capital project, and do the research to determine whether it can make a business case that supports the investment of discretionary capital. (Hr’g Tr. 678 (Hill); see also 206 (Steeves) (“[M]ost of the ideas I think probably come from me and my team.”).) The project team enters the results of its research into a template, designed by Synergy CFO Gavin Hill, which outputs numbers, or metrics, commonly used by corporations when deciding whether to invest significant capital. (Hr’g Tr. 660-61 (Hill).) The project team will present the business case to the SEB for approval, and may return to the SEB several times before the concept is approved. Once the SEB approves the business case, but before it is submitted to the PLC Board, the business model must undergo a rigorous review by Hill and his corporate finance team, known within the corporation as the “black hat” review. (See generally Hr’g Tr. 206-08, 221 (Steeves); 412-13, 418 (McLean); 446-450 (Bouradel); 678-682 (Hill).) When the business case is sufficiently “robust,” the black hat review commences. (Id. at 681 (Hill).)

The black hat process “is a management term for a two-part review.” (Hr’g Tr. 648 (Hill).) The first component is the financial review of “the assumptions underpinning the business case.” (Id. at 678-79.) According to Hill, the project team needs to understand what underpins the revenues, benchmark the costs against other facilities, consider the return on sales, and, generally, make sure that the team has thoroughly done its homework and put together a comprehensive business model. (Id. at 679-680.) The second part of the review is the commercial review. It covers a number of areas such as the contracts underpinning the revenues (e.g., take-or-pay contracts, termination clauses, penalty payments) and all aspects of risk (e.g., pension, insurance). (Id. at 680-81.) The black hat review must conclude, and the SEB must approve, the business model before it is presented to the PLC Board. (Id. at 681, 707).

There are a series of metrics, or “hurdle rates,” that Hill’s team uses to evaluate and compare the expected financial performance of proposed capital projects—measures commonly used by corporations when ranking investments. (Hr’g Tr. 652 (Hill).) Among the metrics is the internal rate of return (IRR), which Synergy targets as 15%. (Id. at 656-675; JDX2859-001, Synergy Group Policies and Governance Manual ¶ 9.3.2.) The IRR is the expected rate of growth from a project over a period to time (Hr’g Tr. 656 (Hill).) It is the cash that is left over after the taxes and operating costs have been removed, which can then be reinvested in the business. (Id. at 659) Synergy considers a project’s IRR over a period of seven to ten years maximum, because investors typically have a short-term perspective, with a three-year horizon. (Id. at 659-661.) That a project has an IRR of 15% does not guarantee that it will be approved by the PLC Board. (Id. at 661.) Just as important is the risk profile. (Id. at 662.) Hill testified that the risk profile is especially important where, as here, Synergy would be considering a capital expenditure (CAPEX) that would consume the company's entire annual discretionary budget. (Id.) Any financial impact from that investment would have a reportable effect on the company's earnings. (Id.)

Another metric is the return on capital employed (ROCE), which Synergy targets at 15%. (JDX2859-002 ¶ 9.3.3; Hr'g Tr. 664 (Hill).) It is the ratio of operating profit to shareholder funds and long-term debt, or a measure of how well the company converts invested capital into profit. (Id.) While the IRR looks at future cash flows, ROCE is a single figure calculation in a single year. (Hr'g Tr. 664 (Hill).) Hill testified that he looks at ROCE as "one of the most important measures for the business . . . as there is an extremely strong correlation between [ROCE] and a company's share price." (Id. at 665.) Under Gavin Hill's five-year leadership, Synergy's ROCE has increased from 10% to 12.4%. (Id. at 669-671.) His short-term goal for Synergy is to reach 15%, and then 20%. (Id. at 668.) To get to 15% ROCE at a company level, Hill requires the businesses, such as AST, to deliver a 30% ROCE. (Id. ("Once you take account of regional costs that are in the business, central overhead that is part of running the business, and good will, we have a large amount of good will on our balance sheet, you then get to 15 percent.").)

Another metric is cash payback, which is the period of time it takes for the operating cashflows of the investment to repay the initial capital outlay. (JDX2869-002 ¶ 9.3.4.) Synergy's target cash payback on all investments is 5 years. (Id.; Hr'g Tr. 667-68 (Hill).)

And last, but certainly not least, Synergy requires revenue commitments from customers who will use the facilities. (Hr'g Tr. 201-02 (Steeves), 680-81 (Hill).) These commitments typically take the form of take-or-pay contracts in which the customer agrees to provide a volume of products for Synergy to sterilize at some point in the future. (IH Hr'g Tr. 62 (Baran).)[4] In the event the customer does not provide those products, it still has to pay for the services. (Id.) These agreements verify that there is a demand for the services, and support the business cases seeking PLC Board approval. (Hr'g Tr. 208-09 (Steeves), 680-81 (Hill).)

Even if a business model satisfies all the metrics, there is no guarantee the PLC Board will approve it. As Constance Baroudel testified, "the finances are important, but it is also the overall strategy that is important," along with consideration of "shareholder expectations." (Hr'g Tr. 473 (Baroudel).) Furthermore, the PLC Board may not reach a consensus on approving the project. (Id.) Gavin Hill testified,

> So if you ask me would you potentially consider a project that maybe just didn't quite hit your hurdle rates but it was guaranteed to deliver, I may say yes, . . . because I know exactly where we are going to be, and I would much rather that over a project that had a much higher potential return but there was huge speculation in the assumptions and could actually deliver a negative return.

(Hr'g Tr. 691 (Hill).) Additionally, the size of the project matters. (Id.) In a project as large as the U.S. x-ray business case, little risk would be tolerated as Synergy would have to forego "many other projects." (Id.)

In May 2014, McLean made a presentation to the SEB, updating the board on the progress of the U.S. x-ray project. The minutes from that presentation show that McLean continued to analyze "as agreed in the previous SEB meeting" the building of combined e-beam and x-ray facilities; determined the location of Sterigenics U.S. facilities and identified the products being sterilized there; and narrowed to eight the number of U.S. locations under

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[4]Citation to "IH TR." refers to the Investigative Hearing Transcript.

consideration. (PX00099-012, -013.) Again, he expressed his "concern with proceeding with this course of action, as it would be difficult to guarantee getting take or pay contracts to support the financial model for building these facilities." (Id.) In a subsequent letter dated May 29, 2014 to Synergy's COO, Dr. Adrien Coward, McLean further explained his concerns over the project:

> I know I sound like a broken record on this but the message does not seem to be cutting through. . . . The fact of the matter is that building an x-ray facility today would not guarantee conversions tomorrow. As an example Daniken x-ray is only ~25% capacity utilized after more than 3 years. If we did not force customers to move from Daniken and our other gamma sites, then capacity utilization would be only 10%. These are the facts and if we push ahead and build without a proper baseload customer(s) in the US it is to our peril. And of course we do not have the same footprint in the US that would allow us to "force" customers to convert and cross validate and indeed our competitors would be doing everything possible to stop that occurring, creating further delays and barriers. No one is more enthusiastic about getting an x-ray footprint in the US than myself, however it could be a complete disaster.

(JDX1510-001); Hr'g Tr. 379-385 (McLean).)

A more detailed presentation of the U.S. x-ray strategy was presented to the SEB by McLean's subordinate, Chris Fry, in July 2014. (PX00101.) The minutes of the meeting show, among other things, that McLean again raised his concern over the lack of customer financial backing for the project. (PX00101-013.) He reported that "despite there being a lot of interest from customers about [Synergy] building X-ray facilities in America none had yet given an indication that they would be willing to enter into a long term take or pay contract." (Id.) By way of example, he pointed out that "J & J had declined the opportunity to enter into such a contract despite the fact that they were saving 50% of costs and it was only a two-year payback period for the revalidation costs [due to] concern about the risk." (Id.) With regard to x-ray sterilization of medical devices, he observed that "the big concern was the impact of treatment on the form and function of the device." (Id. See also Hr'g Tr. 214-15 (Steeves).) At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that McLean would present a formal business case at the September 2014 SEB meeting. (PX00101-013.)

Following the July 2014 meeting, McLean tasked Gaet Tyranski, President of AST for the Americas, with preparing the September 2014 presentation. (Hr'g Tr. 511 (Tyranski).) McLean directed Tyranski to generate as many customer letters of interest as possible by the first week in September, to identify two potential U.S. building sites taking into consideration the location of the headquarters, manufacturing, or distribution facilities of the largest medical device manufacturers, and to identify the products manufactured there. (Id. at 504-05.)

In a report circulated to board members prior to the September 2014 meeting, McLean reported that, while a number of major medical manufacturers (J & J, Community Tissue, BD, Stryker Orthopedics, and Bayer) had signed letters of interest in x-ray sterilization services in the U.S., he still had difficulty getting anyone to "bear the risk" of x-ray given that it was new and unproven in the United States. (Hr'g Tr. 307-08 (McLean) (citing PX5771 at 5).) Two days before the September 2014 SEB Meeting, McLean reported to Dr. Steeves and Dr. Coward that he had reached an oral agreement with IBA in which IBA would agree to provide dual x-ray/e-beam sterilization equipment to Synergy exclusively for 10 years for its U.S. operations, provided Synergy would make down payments on the first two x-ray facilities by the end of October 2014.

On September 17, 2014, Tyranski presented the business plan to the SEB. (PX00104-0003 to -00076.) The presentation sought approval for a strategy offering dual x-ray/e-beam sterilization at a network of four to five facilities in the United States. (PX00104-0004, -0027.) Phases 1 and 2 called for the construction of two facilities, one in Indiana and one in Texas, that would be in operation by fiscal year 2016. (PX00104-0007, -0021.) Phase 2 called for the construction of two to three more facilities beginning in fiscal year 2016, with an expected completion date in fiscal years 2017 or 2018. (PX00104-0007.) The presentation contemplated an investment of approximately $20.2 million for each plant— meaning a capital investment of more than $40 million was required for the first phase of the proposed project alone. (Hr'g Tr. 587 (Tyranski); PX00104-0005; JDX2471-016.).

The September 2014 business plan indicated that the first two plants would offer a combined IRR of 6.51%, and a cash pay-back period of 7.7 years. (PX00104-0037.) The revenue assumptions in the plan were based on achieving a target of 15% of the U.S. gamma market after completion of all five plants (i.e., fiscal year 2018). (PX00104-0005, -0007.) The plan assumed that customers would pay a lower cost for x-ray ($2.50 per cubic foot) versus gamma ($3 to $4). (PX00104-0034.) And it assumed that the first two plants would achieve nearly 100% capacity utilization by the end of year 6.

In fact, the only number that was locked down in this business model were the revenues from the volume of products Synergy planned to transfer from its Lima, Ohio e-beam plant to the new plant for e-beam sterilization. (Hr'g Tr. 406 (McLean).) It was later discovered that the revenue from the Lima plant was counted twice. (Id. at 694-95 (Hill).) Correcting this accounting error reduced the IRR from 6.51% to 3%. (Id.) The evidence shows that all the other numbers upon which the business model was based were the product of guesswork and assumptions.[5] Even with an IRR of 6.5%, McLean knew the SEB would not approve the

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[5]Since the team did not have any take-or-pay contracts, they could only guess at the volume of medical devices that might go through the facility. (Hr'g Tr. 405 (McLean).) The 15% market share number was an arbitrary number the team thought Synergy "might" be able to achieve "over a seven-to-ten year time frame." (Id. at 407.) The team plugged in some numbers to show

business model. (Id. at 418 (McLean).) And with an IRR of 6.5% *and* no customer commitments, McLean didn't bother to ask Hill to conduct a black hat review because he knew the model was not ready. (Id. at 418-19.) The business model was never presented to the PLC Board. (Hr'g Tr. 472-73 (Bouradel).)

While the evidence shows that the SEB approved the x-ray/e-beam strategy, the minutes of the meeting reflect considerable concern over the numbers in Tyranski's business model. (JDX2471-018.) Specifically, Gavin Hill commented that "he was surprised . . . the financial model did not look better. The output appeared to be the same as for a gamma facility but given the unproven nature of the technology it was considerably riskier, and it assume[d] that [Synergy] would be able to command a premium price for its services." (Id.) Dr. Steeves advised that he considered the strategy right, but "he had concerns that the economics were not right and that these needed to be looked at again." (Id.) Chris Fry advised that "some of the numbers in the model were guess work." (Id.) Dr. Coward "suggested that rapid work needed to be done to build up the cost base from scratch." (Id.) Yet again, McLean pointed out that "it was difficult to get a base load customer to bear any risk of X-ray given that it is new and unproved in the US." (Id.)

At the PLC Board meeting the next day, outside director Constance Baroudel asked for an update on AST's U.S. strategy. (PX00574-001.) Dr. Coward reported that Daniken, while increasing in capacity utilization, "was also undertaking more work for industrial [non-medical device] customers, as the regulatory process to allow [medical] devices to be sterilised using X-rays was taking longer than originally planned." (PX00574-002.) Dr. Steeves reported that

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that the facility would reach 100% capacity utilization "around year seven or so." (Id. at 411.)

McLean was “working on entering into an exclusivity agreement with IBA to ensure that Synergy was the only outsourced sterilisation provider [that] would supply X-ray equipment in the US.” (PX00574-002.) However, “in order to secure this exclusivity it was likely that deposits of €300k each would need to be placed for two X-ray facilities before the end of the financial year.” (Id.) Dr. Coward made clear that formal approval for the plan involving four facilities “was **not** being sought at this juncture, just for the deposits on two machines.” (PX00574-010.) The PLC Board approved the down payments for the two facilities with IBA. (Id.)

On October 7, 2014, core team members from the United States and Europe attended a kickoff meeting in Florida during which Gaet Tyranski made a presentation he called “Project Endurance.” (Hr’g Tr. 525 (Tyranski).) He noted that the U.S. x-ray strategy was approved by the SEB at the September 2014 meeting. (Id. at 526.) He also noted that the SEB identified key actions to be addressed, including further reduction of CAPEX by at least $1.5 million, further work on the facility locations, and finalizing the exclusivity agreement with IBA. (Id. at 527.) At the August 2015 hearing, Tyranski testified that, although he did not mention in his presentation that customer commitments would be needed in order for Project Endurance to go forward, it was understood based on his experience at Synergy. (Id. at 529.)

Less than one week later, on October 13, 2014, Steris announced its proposed merger with Synergy. Notwithstanding this announcement, evidence shows that work on the U.S. x-ray project continued unabated.

On October 21, 2014, Tyranski sent an email to his x-ray team stating that, with the exception of market development expense (e.g., “a Synergy branded new x-ray logo and campaign when it will likely be Steris in a few months"), the x-ray project was proceeding as planned. (Hr'g Tr. 531-32 (Tyranski).)

On October 30, 2014, McLean reported that he had executed an option contract with IBA giving Synergy until March 31, 2015 (the end of Synergy's fiscal year), to sign purchase agreements with IBA. (Hr'g Tr. 331 (McLean.) McLean testified that, at that time, he was having standing meetings every two weeks with J & J, whose product Surgicel was recently approved by the FDA for x-ray sterilization, prodding them for a take-or-pay contract "or *any* project with J & J for x-ray in the United States." (Id. at 336.) He testified that "the weeks and months drew on and there was nothing." (Id.) Still, he had cause for optimism because J & J continued to express enthusiasm about x-ray, they complained about the sharp increase in prices for Cobalt-60, and there was concern in the industry over Cobalt-60 supply and tightening regulations over disposal of Cobalt-60 and EO residuals. (Id. at 305-07, 339 (McLean).)

On November 4, 2014, Synergy issued its Interim Results for the Six Months Ending 28 September 2014. (PX00580.) On page 4 of the 25-page document, the report provided, with regard to AST,

> We are pleased to announce that we have signed an agreement with IBA for X-ray technology to be deployed in the United States, supplemented by our in-house knowledge and expertise. Our X-ray services are now the fastest growing of our AST technologies, driven by the higher levels of quality, favourable economics and faster processing speed, which helps our customers to reduce their working inventories. Most recently the first FDA approval of a Class III medical device was achieved by one of our major global customer partners, paving the way for further conversions.

(PX00580-004.)

In an earnings call held the next day, Dr. Steeves stated that AST had a really good half year, commenting that

> [t]he strongest growth has been in the Americas along with good growth in Europe from the new facility in Marcoule, France, our x-ray facility in Switzerland and the new capacity acquired with [the Bioster acquisition] . . . Looking forward, there are few further steps we are taking to support growth and including expanding our network in the U.S. as well as expanding the capacity of a number of our facilities around the world. We've also reach an agreement with IBA that will allow us to get started with x-ray in the U.S.

(PX01773-005.)

Meanwhile, Tyranski continued working on locking down numbers for the U.S. x-ray business model, explaining that, if the merger went through, he would just have to re-present his business model to the new combined Steris/Synergy SEB, and that they would probably not build an x-ray facility right next to a Steris gamma facility. (Id. at 532-33, 548-49 (Tyranski).)

The business plan proposed at the September 2014 SEB meeting anticipated that Synergy's e-beam facility in Lima, Ohio would be closed and that the products would be transferred to Synergy's new dual x-ray/e-beam facility. (Hr'g Tr. 539-540 (Tyranski).) On January 19, 2015, Tyranski sent an email to Gavin Hill asking him to sign a lease extension for the Lima facility (to October 2017), so that the new U.S. facility would have base load e-beam revenues while x-ray customers were being developed. (Id.; PX-01265-001.) Hill extended the lease. (Hr'g Tr. 540-41 (Tyranski).)

In November 2014, Tyranski sent Mark Berger, a business development manager, to the Dallas/Fort Worth area to visit numerous proposed locations for an x-ray facility, while Aldo Rodriguez, an accountant, continued discussions over economic incentives that would lower capital costs in building that facility. (Id. at 541-45.) Tyranski testified that the reason for this activity was to nail down costs so that he could present the best business case to the board for approval. (Id. at 545.) Tyranski himself continued discussions with the Miami Valley Research

Park in Dayton, Ohio, regarding incentives and grants that could be offered in locating a facility there—discussions that continued into February 2015. (Id. at 545-49; PX01270.) Tyranski testified that he could not make a decision on committing to a lease until he presented the business case to the SEB again. (Hr'g Tr. 548 (Tyranski).)

The evidence shows that, on October 9, 2014, Tyranski sent an email to his sales staff reminding them to continue to elicit customer letters of interest under the market development strategy and offering $500 bonuses to those who could get a customer to sign up to send their product to Daniken for x-ray testing by November 15, 2014. (Hr'g Tr. 549-551 (Tyranski); PX00244-001.) He subsequently extended the deadline another several months. (Hr'g Tr. 549 (Tyranski).)

The evidence also shows that, despite Synergy's best efforts to advance the x-ray project, news on the economic front worsened. The machine that formed the cornerstone of the September 2014 business plan was IBA's Rhodotron TT300. (Hr'g Tr. 423-28 (McLean); 555-567 (Tyranski).) IBA had represented that its Rhodotron TT300 was a combination x-ray/e-beam machine that could meet Synergy's needs. (Id. at 424 (McLean).) But in late 2014, IBA began expressing a lack of confidence in the TT300, proposing a reconfiguration of the TT1000 with a €250,000 increase in price.[6] (PX00240-003-004. Hr'g Tr. 562 (Tyranski), 422 (McLean).) While the TT300 provided both e-beam and x-ray services, the greater capacity was on the e-beam side. A machine that provided both services was critical to the September 2014 business model because it guaranteed considerable e-beam revenue for years (which would be

[6]The Rhodotron TT1000, the machine that ran x-ray at Daniken, was an x-ray-only machine.

satisfied by the movement of products from the Lima, Ohio e-beam plant to the new facility) while Synergy's U.S. x-ray business developed. (JDX1722-001; JDX1775 at 25, 27.) However, the ultimate goal driving the plan's economics was always the machine's x-ray capacity. (JDX1760-002 (Slide 20).) The machine needed to have more x-ray than e-beam capacity; it required 400 kW and 7 MeV for x-ray, and 100 kW and 10 MeV for e-beam. (JDX1920-001.) The TT300 could not achieve the 400kW power level, and there was no dual-purpose machine in existence capable of reaching those power levels. (Hr'g Tr. 582, 615 (Tyranski).) The evidence shows that the business plan with a 300kW machine would produce 25% less revenue than the TT1000 with 400kW. (PX00240-004.) According to McLean, the one thing he thought "should have been relatively simple just became more and more complex and more and more costly." (Hr'g Tr. 422-23.)

The uncertainty culminated in a meeting in January 2015 attended by principals from Synergy and IBA, during which IBA told Synergy that the price of the systems was "going up." (Hr'g Tr. 426 (McLean).) Tyranski testified that, at the time of that meeting, IBA's price for a TT1000 with 400kW capacity was €5.304 million and the cost of the machine constituted more than 25% of the capital cost for one facility. (Id. at 577-78 (Tyranski).)

In response to a question at the August 2015 hearing, whether IBA gave Synergy an estimate as to how long it would take to design, build and test the system, McLean responded,

> Well, that's—that's a question I never asked, because at that point, I'm getting quite frustrated and disillusioned with the whole thing. It is going nowhere. And in my point of view, if they have never built one, never tested one, did we want to be the guinea pig?
>
> And I remember discussions with my team saying, you know, do we want to be the experiment here in the U.S. and persuade and influence J & J and other top tier customers to come over to us and then have a failure? It had to work."

(Hr'g Tr. 426-27 (McLean).) When the Court asked Tyranski to gauge, in February 2015, his confidence level that IBA could produce the machine at the required power level, he responded, "Their story kept changing so I was skeptical. I was probably more than 50 percent confident that they could ultimately get there *over time*, but there were no guarantees." (Id. at 577 (Tyranski) (emphasis added).) It is undisputed that there is no machine in existence today that is capable of providing both x-ray/e-beam sterilization at the 400kW power level. (Id. at 425 (McLean), 577 (Tyranski).)

On February 24, 2015, McLean sent a declaration to the FTC stating that he was terminating Synergy's U.S. x-ray project, and listing the reasons for doing so. (JDX2655.) He described his team's "top-down, full-court" efforts, and failure, to solicit customer commitments. (Id. at ¶ 2.) He explained that Synergy's sales and marketing efforts began in July 2013, by identifying 185 leading medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers as potential candidates for x-ray. (Id. at ¶ 6.) For those companies, Synergy began its marketing efforts with sales calls made in conjunction with sales of other AST products, explanatory brochures, webinars, live seminars, tours of Synergy plants, tours of Daniken, and phone calls. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Of those companies, Synergy targeted 34 as the best candidates to generate a viable processing volume to underpin the x-ray strategy. (Id. at ¶ 7.) This was necessary to guarantee the revenues needed for the business model to meet the minimum hurdle rates and obtain SEB and PLC Board approval. (JDX2655 ¶ 8.) McLean provided file folders for each of those companies with contemporaneous documentation of those efforts. (Id. at ¶ 9.) In anticipation of presenting a business case to the SEB in September 2014, the project team continued its efforts to obtain some form of customer commitment to support the business model. (Id. at ¶ 11.) All they were able to obtain were around six nonbinding letters of interest. (Id.) Following the September 2014 SEB meeting, the project's marketing team continued efforts to obtain customer commitments, to no avail. (Id. at ¶ 12.) As no significant U.S. customers remained to be contacted, McLean concluded that "there [was] no reasonable prospect of customer acceptance for Synergy's X-ray project." (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Attached to McLean's declaration are emails from five of Synergy's top customers stating that they have no present intention of using x-ray sterilization: Covidien/Medtronics ("Although x-ray is interesting to the team, it is not a modality the Covidien Group with Medtronic is actively investigating today."), Boston Scientific ("Xray simply has not proven to have any significant benefit over the big three forms of sterilization to warrant real interest."), J & J ("Per our conversation today, the Business Case for J & J to support transfer of its U.S. gamma processed products (done by 3rd Parties) into a new xray facility near Memphis TN (J & J Distribution Center) does not appear to be compelling."), and Becton Dickinson ("The risk to reward ratio remains stubbornly favorable toward Co60 and Ebeam. . . . The costs in labor, material testing, submissions, reviews, etc., to switch to Xray could approach $400K per product family. Multiplied out by 100s, if not 1000s, for different designs and product families and the investment costs are staggering.") (Respectively, JDX2852, JDX2853, JDX2854, JDX2855.) McLean solicited these communications following his meeting with the FTC on February 17, 2015, when asked for evidence showing that customers had refused to back x-ray *in writing*. (Hr'g Tr. 399 (McLean).) McLean testified that if these customers had said they were really committed to x-ray in the United States, he would not have terminated the project.

> So I wanted to make sure. Remember that myself and my team had put a lot of time and effort, hard work into this, so I wanted to be sure. I asked a direct

question and I got a direct answer.

(Id. at 400.)

That same day, Gaet Tyranski sent an email to his team leaders. (PX00863-003.) Noting that “the FTC inquiry was going down a rat-hole,” Tyranski advised, “I do think it’s prudent to stop further spend on X-Ray Americas.” (Id.) When asked at the August 2015 hearing what he meant by “going down a rat-hole,” Tyranski responded, “[The FTC inquiry] was bogging the entire team down. It was burdensome.” (Id. at 570.)

Tyranski, who had only been President of AST for the Americas since August 2014, was dealing with numerous other capital projects at the same time he was working on the business case for the U.S. x-ray project (i.e. building a facility in Saxonburg, Pennsylvania, working to obtain approval to build a facility in Northern California, and preparing a business case for greenfield sites in the Carribean). (Hr’g Tr. 585 (Tyranski).) Consequently, he spent no more than 30% of his time on the U.S. x-ray project. He testified that, in discussions with McLean over whether to terminate the project, they knew they were reaching the point where the budget for fiscal year 2016 needed to be set. (Id. at 575.) They were concerned about devoting millions of dollars to the U.S. x-ray project, considering customer interest had not advanced much, there were only a couple of customers sending product to Daniken for testing, and the cost base for the September 2014 business model was not improving. (Id.) They were also mindful that the $40 million investment for phase 1 of the project would consume Synergy’s entire discretionary budget for the year. (Id. at 587.)

Today, Daniken’s x-ray facility is running at only 25% capacity, and there is no dual x-ray/e-beam sterilization machine in existence that operates at a 400kW capacity.

IV.

The FTC contends that Synergy was poised to enter the U.S. market in Fall 2014 by constructing one or more x-ray facilities, and that the merger with Steris caused Synergy to abandon the effort. As a corollary, the FTC argues that documents created and testimony given after the merger was announced should be viewed with a high degree of suspicion. If the FTC is correct, the evidence should show that if the merger does not go through (either because the parties abandon it or a permanent injunction is issued), Synergy is likely to revive its plans and build one or more x-ray facilities in the U.S. in the near future.

In fact, the evidence shows the opposite in at least three ways. One, while Synergy's PLC Board had endorsed the concept of U.S. x-ray in September 2014, the business plan had not been approved and there were significant obstacles that McLean and Tyranski knew they needed to overcome in order to win approval. Two, the announced merger with Steris in October 2014 had no significant impact on Synergy's plans for U.S. x-ray. McLean and Tyranski continued to mobilize the employees under their direction to try to obtain customer buy-in, to try to bring down the cost of the new facilities, and to work with IBA to develop a dual-capability machine of sufficient power to meet Synergy's needs. Three, it was McLean, and not CEO Steeves, who made the decision in February 2015 to discontinue the U.S. x-ray project after he concluded that there was little to no likelihood of obtaining SEB approval, let alone approval from a combined Synergy/Steris board.

The evidence shows that, at the conclusion of the September 2014 SEB meeting, all that the SEB approved was the U.S. x-ray strategy. The SEB did not have the authority to approve discretionary capital expenditures of more than 10 million pounds. Nor did the PLC Board, which *does* have the authority to approve discretionary capital expenditures over 10 million pounds, approve the September 2014 business plan. In fact, no business plan was presented to the PLC Board for approval. (Hr'g Tr. 221 (Steeves); PX00574-010.) All that Dr. Steeves requested, and the PLC Board approved, was the expenditure of 300,000 pounds each for down payments on the first two facilities, as that is what IBA demanded in order to enter an exclusivity agreement with Synergy.[7] (Hr'g Tr. 223 (Steeves); (PX00574-010.).)

In order to obtain injunctive relief, the FTC has to show a likelihood of proving at trial that, absent the merger, Synergy probably would have entered the U.S. contract sterilization market by building one or more x-ray facilities in the U.S. within a reasonable period of time. The Court concludes, for the following reasons, that the FTC has not met its burden.

A. Customer Commitments

The evidence at the hearing revealed that the most significant reason Synergy opted to discontinue the U.S. x-ray project was lack of customer commitment. According to the FTC, there is no documentation that Synergy solicited customer interest throughout 2014, and in any event, customers continue to be "interested in x-ray sterilization in the United States." (Doc #: 81 at 9.) The Court disagrees.

The evidence shows that Synergy's corporate practice is to secure take-or-pay contracts from customers before making significant capital investments, and this was certainly a significant capital investment. The first phase of the project alone required the expenditure of Synergy's entire annual discretionary budget ($40 million). Despite considerable effort on

[7]Bouradel testified at the August 2015 hearing that the PLC Board didn't even have to approve the down payments, as the total expenditure was less than 10 million pounds.

Synergy's part, as shown by the evidence and described in concise detail in McLean's declaration, not a single medical device customer would sign a take-or-pay contract, and only about 6 of the 185 customers Synergy initially targeted in its sales and marketing campaign would sign even a nonbinding letter of interest.

The evidence, in the form of minutes, emails and testimony, shows that McLean knew he had to obtain take-or-pay contracts or some form of financial commitments in order to support the U.S. x-ray business model; otherwise, the business model underpinning the x-ray strategy would not be approved by the SEB or the PLC Board. In fact, the evidence shows that McLean *repeatedly* raised his concern over the inability to obtain financial backing in any form at every SEB meeting at which the U.S. x-ray strategy was discussed, and expressed his frustration in correspondence with Dr. Coward. The evidence shows that, despite the level of interest expressed by a handful of healthcare products manufacturers in x-ray technology, Synergy could not identify a single customer who would provide the financial commitment required to build x-ray sterilization facilities in the United States. Absent the ability to demonstrate a demand for this service, McLean knew that any business model the x-ray team presented to the SEB or PLC Board would not have been approved. Indeed, McLean testified that he didn't bother to ask Gavin Hill to commence a black hat review of the model because the model just wasn't ready.[8]

[8]Not only does the FTC challenge that a black hat review of the September 2014 business model would have ended the x-ray strategy, the FTC challenges whether Synergy really has a "black hat" process for reviewing business models at all. However, all of Synergy's witnesses who were questioned about the process testified consistently, if in varying detail, about how the corporate finance team conducts its review of proposed capital projects. (Hr'g Tr. 221 (Steeves); 412-13, 418 (McLean); 448-450 (Bouradel); 678-682 (Hill).) Even the FTC conceded that there is documentary evidence referencing the process. (See Doc #: 81 at 2 n.5.) Regardless of what the corporate financial team's review process is called, there cannot be serious dispute that the type of financial review the team conducts (and the metrics it uses) to evaluate capital investments is not standard business practice in the industry.

McLean knew that the September 2014 model, with one exception, was not based on anything more than assumptions (e.g., premium pricing, revenues, market share). (Hr'g Tr. 406-418 (McLean).)

The testimony of the FTC's own witnesses, Joyce Hansen of J & J and David Silor of Zimmer, demonstrates that their interest in x-ray sterilization in the United States was primarily academic. As Hansen testified, she preferred to remain "totally noncommittal" to Synergy until a laundry list of factors were resolved: a decision on where the x-ray facilities would be located in the United States, what machine would be used, which J & J products might benefit from x-ray sterilization, the volume of those products, the completion of functionality studies, and the approval of regulatory agencies in all countries where the x-ray-sterilized products would be sold.

The evidence shows that after McLean asked Hansen for something in writing to support the business model he was preparing to present to the SEB in September 2014, Hansen submitted a letter expressing, *at best*, lukewarm interest. (JDX1188-022.) After articulating a few reasons why x-ray sterilization is "of interest" to J & J, she explained that the primary barrier in transitioning from gamma to x-ray sterilization is "the additional work required to support the physical / functional product testing, regulatory authority submissions, and personnel time and resources for these activities." (Id.) She concluded that "this letter of interest is intended to be a means of communicating our interest in pursuing the use of X-ray processing *in the future*, and is not intended to commit J & J to processing a volume of product in a facility with Synergy Health." (Id. (emphasis added).)

The evidence shows that Hansen well knew how take-or-pay contracts work and the need for volume commitments before building new facilities. When asked about J & J's Albuquerque, New Mexico gamma sterilization facility, Hansen agreed that, in evaluating whether it made sense to build a new facility, J & J would have to consider how much volume would be put through the facility before building it, otherwise it would not be a good use of J & J's capital. (Hr'g Tr. 71-72 (Steeves).) Furthermore, the evidence shows that J & J had previously entered into a $2.8 million take-or-pay contract with Synergy to build an e-beam sterilization facility in Ireland. (Id. at 204-05.) By the time the plant was completed, another medical device company had apparently built a better device than the product J & J intended to put through the facility, and J & J wrote off the entire investment, leaving Synergy empty-handed. So, Synergy had to rely on the $2.8 million to support its investment until it could bring in additional customers. (Id.)

David Silor, Principal Sterilization Associate at Zimmer, testified that he had discussed x-ray sterilization in the U.S. with Synergy for the past two years. (Hr'g Tr. at 116.) But shortly after Zimmer had agreed to conduct a feasibility study at Daniken, Zimmer initiated a major quality remediation project at the FDA's request. (Hr'g Tr. at 119.) Consequently, its resources were shifted to support those efforts and, to this day, Zimmer has been unable to conduct any x-ray feasibility studies at all. (Hr'g Tr. at 119.)

B. Why No Take-Or-Pay Contracts: Customer Concerns

The evidence shows that the problem obtaining customer commitments had nothing to do with the merits or benefits of x-ray sterilization. Sterilization represents only about 3% of the cost of the medical device. (Hr'g Tr. 381.) This means that even if Synergy could promise a customer a 30% price savings over gamma sterilization for a product, the conversion would only reduce the product's cost by 1%. On the other side of the ledger was the significant cost of conversion, estimated to be $250,000 to $500,000 per product. (Id. at 438.) The product would need to be tested, then the conversion would need to be approved by the FDA and the foreign counterpart in any foreign country where the product would be sold, then the site would have to be qualified; and then product would have to be put through the facility for validation. As J & J found out, this conversion process could take several years. And if a manufacturer of a medical device had been on the market for ten to forty or more years, it is likely that the regulatory standards for testing and approving these products would have gotten tighter, and the product may no longer be in compliance. (Hr'g Tr. 371-72 (McLean).) Furthermore, any x-ray facilities built in the United States would need contingency processing options, i.e., other qualified facilities where products could be sterilized if the facility needed repair. (Id. at 361.) There are no existing x-ray sterilization facilities in the United States; Synergy's would be the first. A problem in Synergy's facility could leave a customer with no readily-available alternative for sterilizing its products, and any mistake could jeopardize a manufacturer's business reputation and, consequently, its business.

In fact, the documentary evidence shows that on February 24, 2015, despite the considerable efforts of McLean and his team to obtain some kind of customer support endorsing the U.S. x-ray business model, not one customer was willing to do so. There are four emails from leading manufacturers of medical and pharmaceutical products (Covidien/Medtronics, Boston Scientific, J & J, Becton Dickinson) expressing their reasons for not signing up for the U.S. x-ray project, e.g., there is no significant benefit in x-ray sterilization over the other sterilization modalities, the risk-to-reward ratio favors the other modalities, and the cost of transitioning multiple products from gamma to x-ray is staggering. This was correspondence McLean solicited following his meeting with the FTC on February 17, 2015, when asked for documentary evidence showing that customers had rejected x-ray.

At the August 2015 hearing, the FTC made much of the fact that McLean had solicited J & J's email and had asked Vic Baran, who wrote the email, to go back and look at the numbers again because they did not reflect the numbers McLean had previously discussed with Joyce Hansen regarding the costs involved in obtaining validation, product stability, product functionality and regulatory filings. Vic Baran then sent McLean an email with revised numbers. McLean testified that the costs in the email accurately reflected his discussions with Joyce Hansen and the FTC never called Vic Baran to the stand. In any event, the FTC did not challenge the other emails which clearly showed a lack of interest on the part of industry leaders in backing x-ray sterilization of their products at this time.

The evidence shows that Synergy itself had previously undertaken the black hat process for building a new x-ray sterilization facility in Bradford, U.K. When the Bradford gamma sterilization facility was running out of capacity, Synergy's AST team decided to present two business models to the SEB: one for building a gamma facility and one for building an x-ray facility. (Hr'g Tr. 372 (McLean.) The business models showed that the gamma financials were superior to the x-ray financials, and the project team could not drum up one customer who was willing to back the x-ray business model. (Id. at 373.) In the end, because Synergy had to do "the right thing by [its] shareholders," it built a new gamma facility with higher capacity at the Bradford site. (Id.)

Synergy's experience at Daniken only added to these concerns for several reasons. First, the predicted growth in medical product x-ray sterilization (i.e., 52% capacity by fiscal year 2015) never materialized. Today, Daniken's x-ray facility runs at 25% capacity utilization. Second, most of Daniken's x-ray business is processing non-medical products, and the non-medical business is not the business Synergy prefers to attract. (Hr'g Tr. 385 (McLean) (Synergy's core competence is working "in a highly regulated environment, where you have to deliver an exceptional quality," and the volume is stable with guaranteed revenues.) The evidence shows that over 80% of the product going through Daniken's gamma facility is medical; in contrast, only 5 to 6% of the product going through Daniken's x-ray facility is medical. (Id.) Furthermore, the medical device x-ray business at Daniken is paltry; the $100,000 generated represents only about 2% of Daniken's overall x-ray business. (Id. at 389-393.) The evidence shows that Synergy was unsuccessful in getting its existing gamma customers to convert to x-ray. When Synergy tried to leverage this conversion by telling its Daniken gamma customers that there was little or no remaining capacity at the gamma facility, the customers responded by threatening to go to a competitor's gamma facility. (Id. at 383.) McLean testified, "at one point, we were sterilizing soil, earth, at Daniken x-ray to get product through. That's not what we want." (Id. at 385.)

There was nothing McLean and Tyranski could do to change this paradigm. And of course, any further price reduction Synergy might offer to incentivize its customers would result in lower profit margins and IRR for Synergy.

C. Capital Costs

The evidence shows that, despite Synergy's best efforts, it was unable to harness the capital costs to build x-ray facilities in the United States. Synergy has only $25 to $40 million per year to spend on capital projects. The cost of building two x-ray facilities was estimated to be well over that budget. Because this investment would consume the entire annual discretionary capital budget, little risk could be tolerated. It was clearly incumbent on the project team to lock down real numbers, obtain customer commitments, and lessen capital costs. In short, this particular investment, given its enormity, was a "bet the farm" proposition for Synergy.

As the effort to develop a financial model that more accurately represented the economic realities advanced, the numbers got worse instead of better. The evidence shows that, from the September 2014 board meetings, shortly before the merger was announced, until late February 2015, when the project was abandoned, Synergy's estimates on the cost of building the facilities increased by $2.5 million once actual proposals from contractors were considered. (Invest. Hr'g Tr. 198-199 (Fry); SH00483971 at 10.) By early 2015, it became clear IBA had lost confidence that the TT300, the dual x-ray/e-beam machine on which the team's September 2014 business model was based, would deliver the required 400kW capacity. And the TT1000 with dual x-ray/e-beam technology had never been designed, built, tested or priced. The only certainty about the proposed machine was that it would cost considerably more than the initial business model estimates.

The evidence also shows that the September 2014 business model failed every one of the metrics Synergy uses to rank capital investments. With a few exceptions, the PLC Board generally will not approve funding a discretionary capital investment without an IRR of 15%.[9] The September 2014 business model showed a 6.51% IRR—a number that included a significant accounting error that reduced the projected IRR to 3%. The erroneous IRR was reached by double-counting revenues from the Lima, Ohio plant, and it was the only number in the business model that was not the product of guesswork and assumptions. The evidence also shows that Synergy's target for ROCE was 15%. To reach this goal, the business seeking discretionary funds (e.g., AST) would have to show a ROCE of 30%. The business model presented at the September 2014 meeting would not hit the target until year 7, lowering the current company ROCE from 12.4% to 11.8%: a reportable consequence that, though seemingly small, would raise red flags for shareholders. (Hr'g Tr. 688, 698 (Hill).) Another metric the model failed to meet was cash payback. Synergy's target cash payback for all investments is no longer than five years. The September 2014 business model reflected a cash payback period of 7.7 years.

D. The Prospect of Building X-ray Facilities in the United States

According to the FTC, the current "interest" that a few customers have expressed in x-ray technology, plus the fact that some healthcare products manufacturers have recently sent a few products to Daniken for testing, shows that Synergy was poised to build x-ray sterilization facilities in the United States in the foreseeable future. The evidence of the FTC's own witnesses shows otherwise.

Hansen was asked at the hearing, if Synergy opened an x-ray sterilization facility in the U.S. tomorrow, would J & J send Surgicel to that facility for sterilization? (Hr'g Tr. 77

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[9]The evidence shows that this standard could be relaxed where necessary for health and safety, to meet regulatory requirements, or to prevent the potential loss of a customer. (Hr'g Tr. 701 (Malaysia); 702- 703 (China facility); 703 (health and safety, regulatory).)

(Hansen).) Her response was that both parties would have to go through another series of hoops before doing so, i.e., J & J would have to get regulatory approval for the site, Synergy would have to go through installation and operational qualification, and J & J would have to put its product through the facility and conduct validation testing before sterilizing Surgicel there. (Id.)

Silor testified that Zimmer has not evaluated the potential use of x-ray as a sterilization method for the products it manufactures, it has not performed any feasibility testing with x-ray sterilization, it has not evaluated whether x-ray performs better than gamma for its products, it has not discussed pricing for x-ray sterilization with anyone at Synergy, and it has not analyzed the cost of switching to from gamma to x-ray sterilization in any formal way.

Silor testified that, in order to use a new technology for sterilizing medical devices that does not exist here today, Zimmer would have to do a dose mapping study, a dose setting validation, get the subdose verification level, perform sterility testing on the product, modify the manufacturing routers to indicate that the company is using x-ray instead of gamma, make the FDA submissions on Class 3 medical devices, and perform material shelf-life studies and packaging shelf-life studies. (Hr'g Tr. 130 (Silor).) He acknowledged that evaluating an alternative sterilization modality is a long-term project. (Id. at 131.)

E. The September 2014 Minutes

Much examination and cross-examination at the hearing was devoted to the accuracy of the September 2014 SEB meeting minutes. It is undisputed that Jonathan Turner, who was responsible for taking the minutes, did not transcribe the part of those minutes pertaining to the x-ray presentation until March 2015, when Dr. Steeves was preparing to meet with the FTC over the proposed merger, and he realized that the portion of the September 2014 meeting minutes addressing the x-ray team's presentation was missing.

The evidence shows that Turner kept his minutes in a 195-page notebook, which he used to transcribe the minutes. The FTC challenged the credibility of the minutes because they were not taken verbatim from Turner's notes. However, as Dr. Steeves pointed out during his testimony, the entire SEB board was there, along with one of Synergy's outside directors, and there is no doubt that the presentation was given, the discussion took place, and the minutes that are contained in the middle of Turner's handwritten book "exist and are real." (Hr'g Tr. 246 (Steeves).) In addition, the presentation of the September 2014 SEB meeting is part of the record, and the testimony solicited at the hearing corroborated the minutes.

F. The November 2014 Earnings Call and Interim Report

The FTC contends that the following statements Synergy reported in November 2014 effectively show that Synergy had publicly committed to building two x-ray facilities in the U.S.: "We are pleased to announce that we have signed an agreement with IBA for X-ray technology to be deployed in the United States, supplemented by our in-house knowledge and expertise," "the first FDA approval of a Class III medical device was achieved by one of our major global customer partners, paving the way for further conversions [of products from gamma sterilization to x-ray]," and "[o]ur X-ray services are now the fastest growing of our AST technologies, driven by the higher levels of quality, favourable economics and faster processing speed." (Pl. FTC's Post-Hr'g Br. at 6-7. Doc #: 78.) However, the fact that they were reported after the merger was announced shows that no one at Synergy viewed the proposed merger with Steris as an impediment to its U.S. x-ray strategy. (Hr'g Tr. 225 (Steeves) (noting, three weeks after the announcement, that he was trying to support the x-ray team and drum up some enthusiasm for the team's efforts "to get customers aligned with what we were trying to do in the United States." (Id.)

G. Timing

The FTC contends that it is the FTC's investigation—and not the numerous business reasons just articulated and supported by evidence—that caused Synergy to "kill" x-ray in the United States. The Court disagrees.

The timing of the decision to pull the plug on the U.S. x-ray project may actually be the best evidence that it was done for legitimate business reasons, as opposed to anti-competitive ones. If the merger with Steris was going to prevent Synergy from entering the U.S. market, Synergy would have stopped working on the U.S. x-ray project as soon as the merger was announced in mid-October 2014. Instead, following the September 2014 meetings, Synergy, led by McLean and Tyranski, continued to go all out to try to win SEB support for the business plan, and ultimately PLC approval,. The x-ray team continued to court customers, signing them up to get their products tested at Daniken. The team continued their detailed discussions with IBA on the appropriate machine. They made road trips to scout out sites, soliciting incentives from the various cities. The evidence demonstrates that this was not a sham to convince the FTC that Synergy wanted to enter the market; it was legitimate effort by Synergy employees who really wanted the project to succeed, but recognized the hurdles they needed to overcome to win approval. The fact that McLean and Tyranski decided to terminate the project in February 2015, four months after the merger was announced and in the midst of the FTC's investigation, supports the conclusion that this was a decision reached by the project managers after serious consideration of all the business factors involved.

More likely, the last thing Synergy would have done, if the Steris merger was driving its U.S. x-ray strategy, would have been to pull the plug immediately after meeting with the FTC staff in January 2015 and hearing their objections to the merger, as Synergy had to know that doing so would only have solidified the FTC's position that the merger was driving the decision. Synergy could have kept its x-ray efforts going in order to convince the FTC that the merger with Steris was not going to prevent its entry into the U.S. market.

If Synergy had terminated the U.S. x-ray project when it entered talks with Steris, or when the merger was announced in October 2014, the Court might view this scenario differently. However, the evidence shows that the negotiations between Steris and Synergy had no effect whatsoever on the work of Synergy's U.S. x-ray team. The team continued to seek take-or-pay contracts from customers and there is evidence that Synergy incentivized that effort financially. The team continued to crunch the numbers in the business model, to negotiate concessions with states where they considered building the facilities, and to work diligently with IBA on the machine that would meet Synergy's needs.

In the end, the evidence unequivocally shows that the problems that plagued the development of x-ray sterilization as a viable alternative to gamma sterilization in 2012, when Dr. Steeves purchased Daniken, were the same problems that justified termination of the project in 2015: the failure to obtain customer commitments and the inability to lower capital costs.
(Continued on next page)

V.

Because the Court finds that the FTC has failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is likely to succeed on the merits in the upcoming administrative trial, its Motion for Preliminary Injunction (**Doc #: 5**) is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Dan A. Polster   September 24, 2015
Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge

Visa/Plaid

Visa To Acquire Plaid

1/13/2020

SAN FRANCISCO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Jan. 13, 2020-- Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) today announced it has signed a definitive agreement to acquire Plaid (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Fplaid.com%2Fwhat-is-plaid%2F&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=Plaid&index=1&md5=0702cb3c4f748ec52c86c62ebfd83c55), a network that makes it easy for people to securely connect their financial accounts to the apps they use to manage their financial lives. Visa will pay total purchase consideration of $5.3 billion to acquire Plaid.

Plaid's products enable consumers to conveniently share their financial information with thousands of apps and services such as Acorns, Betterment, Chime, Transferwise and Venmo. Consumers rely on these apps and services to help plan their spending, increase their savings and monitor their investments. For example, when a user sets up a Venmo account, it is Plaid that enables the user to link their bank account to their Venmo account.

Connectivity between financial institutions and developers has become increasingly important to facilitate consumers' ability to use fintech applications. 75 percent of the world's internet-enabled consumers used a fintech application to initiate money movement in 2019 versus 18 percent in 2015[1]. Plaid has been a leader in enabling this connectivity at scale. Today, one in four people with a U.S. bank account have used Plaid to connect to more than 2,600 fintech developers across more than 11,000 financial institutions.

"We are extremely excited about our acquisition of Plaid and how it enhances the growth trajectory of our business," said Al Kelly, CEO and chairman of Visa. "Plaid is a leader in the fast growing fintech world with best-in-class capabilities and talent. The acquisition, combined with our many fintech efforts already underway, will position Visa to deliver even more value for developers, financial institutions and consumers."

"Plaid's mission is to make money easier for everyone, and we are excited for this opportunity to continue delivering on that promise at a global scale," said Zach Perret, CEO and co-founder of Plaid. "Visa is trusted by billions of consumers, businesses and financial institutions as a key part of the financial ecosystem, and together Visa and Plaid can support the rapid growth of digital financial services."

Visa's acquisition of Plaid represents both an entry into new businesses and complementary enhancements to Visa's existing business. First, Plaid's fintech-centric business opens new market opportunities for Visa both in the U.S. and internationally. Second, the combination of Visa and Plaid provides the opportunity to deliver enhanced payment capabilities and related value-added services to fintech developers. Finally, the acquisition will enable Visa to work more closely with fintechs through all stages of their development and drive growth in Visa's core business.

"This acquisition is the natural evolution of Visa's 60-year journey from safely and securely connecting buyers and sellers to connecting consumers with digital financial services," said Kelly. "The combination of Visa and Plaid will put us at the epicenter of the fintech world, expanding our total addressable market and accelerating our long-term revenue growth trajectory."

Once closed, the combination of Visa and Plaid is expected to provide significant benefits to developers, financial institutions and consumers.

"We have strong relationships with both Visa and Plaid. The combination of Plaid's capabilities with the security and scale of Visa's global network will provide us with exciting opportunities to enhance our products," said Dan Schulman, president and CEO, PayPal.

"We believe Visa's acquisition of Plaid is an important development in giving consumers more security and control over how their financial data is used. Protecting customer data and helping them share that information safely has long been a top priority for Chase. We look forward to partnering with Visa to continue building a great experience for our shared customers," said Gordon Smith, co-president, JPMorgan Chase and CEO of Consumer and Community Banking.

The transaction is subject to regulatory approvals and other customary closing conditions. Visa will fund the transaction from cash on hand and debt issuance at the appropriate time. This transaction will have no impact on Visa's previously announced stock buyback program or dividend policy. The transaction is expected to close in the next three to six months.

Webcast and Conference Call Information

Visa's executive management team will host a live audio webcast beginning at 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time (2:30 p.m. Pacific Time) today to discuss the announcement. All interested parties are invited to listen to the live webcast at http://investor.visa.com (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com%2F&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com&index=2&md5=2c1237ed2e1fbbe3538e6e2ba3b769d4). A replay of the webcast will be available for 30 days. Investor information, including supplemental financial information, is also available at http://investor.visa.com (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com%2F&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com&index=3&md5=e68f031d0902fd21f1b0bc8b03f7669a).

About Visa Inc.

Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) is the world's leader in digital payments. Our mission is to connect the world through the most innovative, reliable and secure payment network - enabling individuals, businesses and economies to thrive. Our advanced global processing network, VisaNet, provides secure and reliable payments around the world, and is capable of handling more than 65,000 transaction messages a second. The company's relentless focus on innovation is a catalyst for the rapid growth of digital commerce on any device, for everyone, everywhere. As the world moves from analog to digital, Visa is applying our brand, products, people, network and scale to reshape the future of commerce. For more information, visit About Visa (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Fusa.visa.com%2Fabout-visa%2Four_business.html&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=About+Visa&index=4&md5=f0fa998a65724c25e8d825fc2c02cd3a), visa.com/blog (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Fusa.visa.com%2Fvisa-everywhere%2Fblog.html&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=visa.com%2Fblog&index=5&md5=acdfb0c93b5a7f5bc3d90680c4415447) and @VisaNews (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2FVisaNews&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=%40VisaNews&index=6&md5=3eb4089111ff487f225751d36e77e6e4).

About Plaid

Plaid is a data network that powers the fintech tools millions of consumers rely on to live healthier financial lives. Plaid is used by thousands of digital financial apps and services like Acorns, Betterment, Expensify, and Venmo, and by many of the largest banks to make it easy for consumers to connect their financial accounts with the apps and services they want to use. Plaid connects with over 11,000 financial institutions across the U.S, Canada and Europe. The company was founded in 2013 by Zach Perret and William Hockey and is headquartered in San Francisco, CA.

Forward-Looking Statements

This release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements generally are identified by words such as "will," "is expected," and other similar expressions. Examples of forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements we make regarding the timing and likelihood of closing, Plaid's future success, the impact of the acquisition on Visa's growth, and the other benefits to Visa, developers, financial institutions and consumers.

By their nature, forward-looking statements: (i) speak only as of the date they are made; (ii) are not statements of historical fact or guarantees of future performance; and (iii) are subject to risks, uncertainties, assumptions or changes in circumstances that are difficult to predict or quantify. Therefore, actual results could differ materially and adversely from Visa's forward-looking statements due to a variety of factors, including the timing and outcome of the regulatory approval process, shifts in the regulatory and competitive landscape, Plaid's maintenance of relationships with sources of data, cyber incidents, the pace and success of integration, Plaid's success in international expansion, and various other factors, including those contained in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2019, and our other filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

You should not place undue reliance on such statements. Except as required by law, we do not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise.

[1] Source: https://www.ey.com/en_us/ey-global-fintech-adoption-index (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ey.com%2Fen_us%2Fey-global-fintech-adoption-index&esheet=52158071&newsitemid=20200113005921&lan=en-US&anchor=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ey.com%2Fen_us%2Fey-global-fintech-adoption-index&index=7&md5=fde5a4310f5aab30c2284fe0525aa920)

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JUSTICE NEWS

Department of Justice

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Thursday, November 5, 2020

Justice Department Sues to Block Visa's Proposed Acquisition of Plaid

Acquisition Would Eliminate Nascent Competitor Plaid and Prevent Disruption of Visa's Monopoly in Online Debit

Today, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust lawsuit to stop Visa Inc.'s $5.3 billion acquisition of Plaid Inc. Visa is a monopolist in online debit services, charging consumers and merchants billions of dollars in fees each year to process online payments. Plaid, a successful fintech firm, is developing a payments platform that would challenge Visa's monopoly.

"American consumers and business owners increasingly buy and sell goods and services online, and Visa – a monopolist in online debit services – has extracted billions of dollars from those transactions," said Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. "Now, Visa is attempting to acquire Plaid, a nascent competitor developing a disruptive, lower-cost option for online debit payments. If allowed to proceed, the acquisition would deprive American merchants and consumers of this innovative alternative to Visa and increase entry barriers for future innovators."

According to the complaint, Plaid powers some of the most innovative fintech apps. Plaid's technology allows developers to plug into consumers' various financial accounts, with consumer permission, to aggregate spending data, look up balances, and verify other personal financial data. Plaid connects to 200 million consumer bank accounts and 11,000 U.S. banks. Because it accesses data on behalf of so many fintech app customers, Plaid has become the leading financial data aggregation company in the United States. Plaid is planning to leverage its connections to build a bank-linked payments network that would compete with Visa. Plaid's money movement platform would allow consumers to pay merchants directly from their bank accounts using bank credentials rather than a debit card. Plaid's established connections and technology uniquely positions it to enter the payments market and disrupt Visa's monopoly.

The complaint alleges that Visa's CEO viewed the acquisition as an "insurance policy" to protect against a "threat to our important US debit business." This acquisition is the second-largest in Visa's history, with an extraordinary price tag of $5.3 billion. Visa's CEO justified the deal to Visa's Board of Directors as a "strategic, not financial" move, and noted that in part because "our US debit business i[s] critical and we must always do what it takes to protect this business." Unless acquired, Visa feared that Plaid "on their own or owned by a competitor [was] going to create some threat" with a "potential downside risk of $300-500M in our US debit business" by 2024. If Plaid remained free to develop its competing payment platform, then "Visa may be forced to accept lower margins or not have a competitive offering."

Millions of American consumers and merchants depend on debit services to transact business online. The complaint alleges that Visa has dominated online debit for years and has protected its monopoly with exclusionary tactics that have prevented rivals, including Mastercard, from expanding or entering. The lawsuit alleges that Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid is a violation of both Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Department filed its lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

Visa Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Foster City, California. Visa is a global payments company that operates the largest debit network in the United States. Visa's 2019 revenues were approximately $23 billion.

Plaid Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Francisco, California. Plaid is a financial services company that operates the leading financial data aggregation platform in the United States. In 2019, Plaid earned approximately $100 million in revenues.

Attachment(s):
Download Filed Visa Plaid Complaint

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Antitrust Division

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Plaintiff* v. VISA INC. and PLAID INC., *Defendants*.	Case No.: **COMPLAINT**

Visa seeks to buy Plaid – as its CEO said – as an "insurance policy" to neutralize a "threat to our important US debit business." Visa is a monopolist in online debit transactions, extracting billions of dollars in fees annually from merchants and consumers. Plaid, a financial technology firm with access to important financial data from over 11,000 U.S. banks, is a threat to this monopoly: it has been developing an innovative new solution that would be a substitute for Visa's online debit services. By acquiring Plaid, Visa would eliminate a nascent competitive threat that would likely result in substantial savings and more innovative online debit services for merchants and consumers. For the reasons discussed below, the proposed acquisition violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and must be stopped.

INTRODUCTION

1. Visa is "everywhere you want to be."[1] Its debit cards are accepted by the vast majority of U.S. merchants, and it controls approximately 70% of the online debit transactions market. In 2019, there were roughly 500 million Visa debit cards in circulation in the United States. That same year, Visa processed approximately 43 billion debit transactions, including more than 10 billion online transactions. In 2019, Visa earned over $4 billion from its debit business, including approximately $2 billion from online debit.

2. American consumers increasingly make purchases online, attracted by the convenience of being able to shop any time, from anywhere, with fast delivery. In recent years, online transactions have experienced "explosive" growth, a trend that has only been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, with online sales growing more than 30% between the first and second quarters of 2020.

3. American consumers use debit cards to purchase hundreds of billions of dollars of goods and services on the internet each year. Many consumers buying goods and services online either prefer using debit or cannot access other means of payment, such as credit. Because of its ubiquity among consumers, merchants have no choice but to accept Visa debit despite perennial complaints about the high cost of Visa's debit service.

4. Visa's monopoly power in online debit is protected by significant barriers to entry and expansion. Visa connects millions of merchants to hundreds of millions of consumers in the United States. New challengers to Visa's monopoly would thus face a chicken-and-egg quandary, needing connections with millions of consumers to attract thousands of merchants and needing thousands of merchants to attract millions of consumers. Visa's Chief Financial Officer has acknowledged that building an extensive network like Visa's is "very, very hard to do" and

[1] https://usa.visa.com/.

"takes many years of investment," but "[i]f you can do that, then you can have a business [like Visa's] that has a relatively high margin." He explained that entry barriers are so significant that even well-funded companies with strong brand names struggle to enter online debit.

5. Mastercard, Visa's only longstanding rival in online debit services, has a much smaller market share of around 25%. For years, Mastercard has neither gained significant share from Visa nor restrained Visa's monopoly. Mastercard's participation in the online debit market has not translated into lower prices for consumers, and this appears unlikely to change. For example, Visa has long-term contracts with many of the nation's largest banks that restrict these banks' ability to issue Mastercard debit cards. Visa also has hamstrung smaller rivals by either erecting technical barriers, or entering into restrictive agreements that prevent rivals from growing their share in online debit, or both.

6. These entry barriers, coupled with Visa's long-term, restrictive contracts with banks, are nearly insurmountable, meaning Visa rarely faces any significant threats to its online debit monopoly. Plaid is such a threat.

7. Plaid is uniquely positioned to surmount these entry barriers and undermine Visa's monopoly in online debit services. Plaid powers some of today's most innovative financial technology ("fintech") apps, such as Venmo, Acorns, and Betterment. Plaid's technology allows fintechs to plug into consumers' various financial accounts, with consumer permission, to aggregate spending data, look up balances, and verify other personal financial information. Plaid has already built connections to 11,000 U.S. financial institutions and more than 200 million consumer bank accounts in the United States and growing. These established connections position Plaid to overcome the entry barriers that others face in attempting to provide online debit services.

8. While Plaid's existing technology does not compete directly with Visa today, Plaid is planning to leverage that technology, combined with its existing relationships with banks and consumers, to facilitate transactions between consumers and merchants in competition with Visa. Like Visa's online debit services, Plaid's new debit service would enable consumers to pay for goods and services online with money debited from their bank accounts. With this new

online debit service, Plaid intended to "steal[] share" and become a "formidable competitor to Visa and Mastercard." Competition from Plaid likely would drive down prices for online debit transactions, chipping away at Visa's monopoly and resulting in substantial savings to merchants and consumers.

9. Visa feared that Plaid's innovative potential – on its own or in partnership with another company – would threaten Visa's debit business. In evaluating whether to consider Plaid as a potential acquisition target in March 2019, Visa's Vice President of Corporate Development and Head of Strategic Opportunities expressed concerns to his colleagues about the threat Plaid posed to Visa's established debit business, observing: "I don't want to be IBM to their Microsoft." This executive analogized Plaid to an island "volcano" whose current capabilities are just "the tip showing above the water" and warned that "[w]hat lies beneath, though, is a massive opportunity – one that threatens Visa." He underscored his point by illustrating Plaid's disruptive potential:



10. Several months later, Visa had the opportunity to acquire Plaid. While conducting extensive due diligence, Visa's senior executives became alarmed to learn about Plaid's plans to add a "meaningful money movement business by the end of 2021" that would compete with Visa's online debit services. This prompted Visa's CEO to conclude that Plaid was "clearly, on their own or owned by a competitor going to create some threat to our important

US debit business" and to tell his CFO that purchasing Plaid would be an "insurance policy to protect our debit biz in the US."

11. In making the case to buy Plaid to Visa's Board of Directors, Visa's senior leadership estimated a "potential downside risk of $300-500M in our US debit business" by 2024 should Plaid fall into the hands of a rival. Visa understood that could create an "[e]xistential risk to our U.S. debit business" and that "Visa may be forced to accept lower margins or not have a competitive offering."

12. On January 13, 2020, Visa agreed to acquire Plaid in part to eliminate this existential risk and protect its monopoly in online debit. Visa offered approximately $5.3 billion for Plaid, "an unprecedented revenue multiple of over 50X" and the second-largest acquisition in Visa's history. Recognizing that the deal "does not hunt on financial grounds," Visa's CEO justified the extraordinary purchase price for Plaid as a "strategic, not financial" move because "[o]ur US debit business i[s] critical and we must always do what it takes to protect this business."

13. Monopolists cannot have "free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will." *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Acquiring Plaid would eliminate the nascent but significant competitive threat Plaid poses, further entrenching Visa's monopoly in online debit. As a result, both merchants and consumers would be deprived of competition that would drastically lower costs for online debit transactions, leaving them with few alternatives to Visa's monopoly prices. Thus, the acquisition would unlawfully maintain Visa's monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

14. Visa's proposed acquisition also would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which was "designed to arrest the creation of monopolies 'in their incipiency,'" *United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.*, 415 U.S. 486, 505 n.13 (1974), and similarly prohibits a monopolist from bolstering its monopoly through an acquisition that eliminates a nascent but significant competitive threat. The Supreme Court has explained that an acquisition can violate Section 7 when "the relative size of the acquiring corporation ha[s] increased to such a point that its advantage over its competitors threaten[s] to be 'decisive.'" *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*,

370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962). Visa already has a decisive market position through its online debit monopoly, and would unlawfully extend that advantage by acquiring Plaid. For the reasons set forth in this Complaint, the proposed acquisition must be enjoined.

JURISDICTION

15. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C § 25, and Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, to prevent and restrain Visa from violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and Defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C § 25, Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337.

16. Defendants Visa and Plaid are engaged in interstate commerce and in activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. Visa and Plaid sell online debit and data aggregation services throughout the United States. They are engaged in a regular, continuous, and substantial flow of interstate commerce, and their sales have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Both Visa and Plaid are corporations that transact business within this District through, among other things, their sales of online debit transactions and data aggregation services.

VENUE

18. Venue is proper in this district under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Both Defendants are headquartered and transact business in this judicial District.

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

19. Assignment to the San Francisco Division is proper. This action arises in San Francisco County because a substantial part of the events that gave rise to the claims occurred in San Francisco. Plaid's headquarters and principal place of business is located in San Francisco. Visa's headquarters are in San Mateo County; Visa has offices in San Francisco and is building new headquarters in San Francisco.

DEFENDANTS AND THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION

20. Visa Inc. is a Delaware company headquartered in Foster City, California. Visa is a global payments company that operates the largest debit network in the United States. Visa provides a two-sided transactions platform that authorizes, clears, and settles debit transactions between businesses, consumers, and banks. Visa reported revenues of approximately $23 billion in fiscal year 2019, including $10.3 billion in the United States.

21. Plaid Inc. is a Delaware company headquartered in San Francisco, California. Plaid operates the leading financial data aggregation platform in the United States. Its technology allows consumers to connect their bank account information to fintech apps, which enables fintechs to aggregate consumer spending data, look up account balances, and verify other personal financial information with consumer permission. Plaid's revenues have been growing rapidly and were almost $100 million in 2019.

22. On January 13, 2020, Defendants announced that Visa would acquire all of Plaid's voting securities for consideration valued at approximately $5.3 billion.

BACKGROUND

23. A debit transaction involves a multi-step process that results in the transfer of funds from a consumer's bank account into a merchant's bank account using the consumer's bank account credentials. When a consumer makes an online purchase using their debit card credentials (i.e. a debit card number, expiration date, and CVV/CVC number on the back of a debit card), a debit transaction withdraws funds from the consumer's bank account. The online merchant uses the consumer's credentials to send a request to the merchant's bank (the "acquiring" bank or "acquirer"), which in turn uses the debit network to send a request to the consumer's bank (the "issuing bank" or "issuer") to confirm whether the issuer will authorize the transaction. The issuer will typically authorize the transaction if there is a sufficient account balance to fund the transaction. If the transaction is authorized, the consumer's bank places a hold on the consumer's funds.

24. Debit networks – Visa, Mastercard, and a handful of smaller networks – operate the systems that transmit these messages. Once the consumer's issuing bank authorizes the transaction, the debit network also guarantees the funds to the merchant. Debit networks typically do not issue cards directly to consumers or establish card-accepting services with merchants. The debit networks typically contract with the acquiring and issuing banks, which in turn contract with merchants and consumers, respectively. The debit network also clears and oversees the interbank settlement process by aggregating all transactions each day for each bank in its system, netting out applicable fees, and providing daily settlement reports to the banks. With few exceptions, the debit networks are not themselves banks and do not move money; rather, the networks' settlement reports are used by the banks to transfer funds among themselves, typically using a wire service available only to banks.

A. Visa is a Monopolist in Online Debit Services

25. Visa is a monopolist among providers of online debit services, with a durable market share of approximately 70%.

26. Visa's next closest rival is Mastercard, which is around one-third the size of Visa in online debit. Mastercard has not constrained Visa's monopoly power by forcing it to lower prices to merchants and consumers. Merchants that accept debit payments have no choice but to accept Visa. In contrast to credit cards, most consumers carry only one debit card. A consumer with a Visa debit card cannot use a Mastercard debit card to withdraw funds from the same checking account.

27. Visa has secured long-term contracts with many of the largest financial institutions in the United States, fortifying the barriers that help maintain its monopoly. These contracts limit these financial institutions' ability to issue debit cards from Mastercard, Visa's only meaningful competitor for card issuance. Visa understands that Mastercard has little ability

to displace Visa's relationships with those financial institutions and consequently little ability to grow its share of consumers' wallets.

28. Merchants are charged two types of fees by Visa and its partner banks, both set by Visa: the "network" fees Visa collects to process the transaction, and the "interchange" fees that Visa compels merchants to pay the banks that issue Visa-branded debit cards. Taken together, the debit network and interchange fees that Visa and its partner banks collect cost U.S. merchants and consumers more than $6 billion per year.

29. While consumers do not pay Visa directly to use its payment network – and relatively few earn significant rewards on Visa debit transactions – consumers indirectly pay for Visa's transaction fees in the price of the goods and services they buy from merchants. In this way, Visa's excessive debit fees operate as a tax on merchants that is passed on to consumers and burdens the entire economy.

30. Recognizing the burden imposed by high debit fees and the barriers to competition in the market for debit transactions, Congress sought to "correct the market defects that were contributing to high and escalating fees" with the Durbin Amendment of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Durbin Amendment aimed to reduce high fees charged by debit networks with a regulatory cap and increase the number of meaningful debit competitors.

31. But the Durbin Amendment caps only interchange fees that accrue to Visa's large issuing banks, and does not regulate the network fees that accrue to Visa. As a result, Visa has responded by imposing new fees on merchants that undermine the effectiveness of the Durbin Amendment's fee caps. Even after enactment of the Durbin Amendment, Visa estimates that it earns an 88% operating margin from its network fees on debit payments, illustrating its durable monopoly power.

32. The Durbin Amendment also requires Visa and Mastercard debit cards to include a feature that allows merchants to process transactions using one of the so-called "PIN" debit networks. These smaller PIN networks, such as Accel, Star, NYCE, and Pulse, have some meaningful presence for in-person debit transactions, but have yet to overcome the barriers to

entry for online transactions. This is in part because Visa has erected technological barriers (such as Visa's tokenization service, which withholds essential data from PIN networks) and entered into restrictive agreements that disincentivize the use of PIN networks. As a result, merchants do not use PIN networks in any significant volume to process online transactions, and instead pay higher fees to use Visa and Mastercard networks.

B. Pay-by-Bank is a New Form of Online Debit Service that Threatens Visa's Monopoly

33. For the first time in many years, a new type of payments service is poised to take share away from Visa's online debit business. Pay-by-bank is a form of online debit that uses a consumer's online bank account credentials (i.e. a consumer's online banking username and password) – rather than debit card credentials – to identify and verify the user, bank, account number and balance, and facilitate payments to merchants directly from the consumer's bank account.

34. Pay-by-bank debit services are already widely available in other countries. A pay-by-bank platform facilitates consumer-to-business payments by providing equivalent end-to-end functionality as the Visa debit network: it authorizes payment from a consumer's bank account, facilitates communications with the consumer's bank to clear the transaction, and provides settlement services by initiating a payment to the merchant's financial institution. Pay-by-bank debit services can complete this final transfer of funds using Automated Clearing House ("ACH") or another low-cost alternative to Visa's debit network.

35. ACH enables settlement of transactions through money transfers over a network managed by two utility-like operators, one run by the Federal Reserve and the other operated by The Clearing House, which is owned by a consortium of banks. A pay-by-bank debit transaction using ACH settlement is usually much less expensive than a debit transaction processed by a card network like Visa.

36. Banks typically charge merchants flat rates ranging from two ($0.02) to twenty-five cents ($0.25) for ACH transactions, whereas Visa debit transactions typically cost twenty-two cents ($0.22) plus a percentage of the overall value of the transaction, which can be

significant. For example, merchants and consumers typically pay roughly thirty-nine cents ($0.39) to process a $60 debit transaction (the average online debit transaction size) through Visa's network, compared to as little as two cents ($0.02) through ACH, a 95% savings. By harnessing these savings using its best-in-class technology and existing relationships with banks and consumers, Plaid stands to save merchants and consumers hundreds of millions of dollars per year in debit fees.

C. Plaid is Uniquely Situated to Challenge Visa

37. Plaid's technology currently provides an easy interface for fintech apps to collect consumers' financial data, with consumer permission. When a consumer signs up with a Plaid-supported fintech app and provides her bank log-in credentials, Plaid uses those credentials to access the consumer's financial institution and obtain the consumer's financial data, which it transmits back to the fintech app. The data Plaid retrieves ranges from basic identifying information, such as account and routing numbers, to detailed transaction history and close to real-time account balance information. This data allows fintech apps to offer personal financial management tools, manage bill payments or other expenses, support loan underwriting, and transfer funds, among other uses. Plaid's services can also be used to reduce fraud by verifying the consumer's identity and account balance, examining the consumer's bank account history, assuring that a transaction is bona fide, and confirming that there are sufficient funds to cover a transaction at the time of payment.

38. Plaid is uniquely positioned to offer a pay-by-bank debit service that would compete with Visa's online debit services. Plaid already supports over 2,600 fintech apps, including 80% of the largest such apps in the United States, and has a network of more than 11,000 U.S. financial institutions. Plaid also connects to over 200 million consumer bank accounts through its existing services. Plaid's extensive existing connections with banks and consumers gives Plaid a substantial competitive advantage that cannot be easily replicated by other firms. It also helps Plaid surmount the chicken-and-egg barrier faced by potential entrants to online debit: Plaid already connects with millions of consumers' debit accounts, making them

an attractive partner for merchants looking for an alternative payments provider that has already built scale among consumers.

39. According to Visa, Plaid "has created a leading position of strength in the business of connecting financial institutions in the United States" and is "the preferred connector company by developers." Plaid is regarded by the industry as the best of breed among companies that provide similar services; no Plaid competitor provides the same high-quality connections to such a large number of fintech customers or financial institutions. Plaid's fintech customers are likely to stick with Plaid because they face substantial switching costs once they integrate with Plaid.

40. Plaid plans to build on the success of its current services by creating an "end-to-end payments network that enables instantly-guaranteed money movement" in a system "similar to Visa and Mastercard, but focused on bank-linked payments." Plaid's online pay-by-bank debit service would compete against Visa's online debit services. Plaid's service would give Plaid and other fintechs the capability to make a seamless pay-by-bank debit transaction, by providing a fraud risk score service, bank transfer service, and a consumer-facing interface allowing a consumer to easily switch from a debit card to pay-by-bank debit services during the online checkout process. Plaid has seen "strong interest from the field" for its fraud risk score and bank transfer services and is piloting them with multiple fintech customers.

41. Plaid's development of its own end-to-end pay-by-bank debit service directly threatens Visa's online debit business. Once deployed, Plaid's service would provide a reliable, less-expensive method of online debit payments by enabling consumers and merchants to transact for goods and services.

D. Visa Intends to Buy Plaid to Extinguish this Threat and Protect its U.S. Online Debit Monopoly

42. Visa made an initial investment in Plaid in early 2019. Through that investment, Visa executives learned more about Plaid and came to understand that Plaid posed a significant threat to Visa's debit business. Several months later, in September 2019, one of Plaid's co-founders telephoned Visa's President to inform him that Plaid was putting itself up for sale and

that Visa should expect to pay around $5 billion if it wanted to acquire Plaid. Visa saw that it had to act or risk Plaid falling into the hands of a rival that could use Plaid to compete against Visa in online debit.

43. Visa set to work verifying what makes Plaid a unique competitive threat. It identified Plaid's particular strengths through due diligence, spending thousands of hours reviewing all aspects of Plaid's business. Visa also confirmed that no other firm was in a position to replicate or displace Plaid. As Visa's Chief Product Officer explained, Plaid "has a head start in a network business and have been a highly compelling and attractive developer value proposition with 40% of American banks accounts enrolled – in the US they have a network moat." This view was shared by Visa's CEO, who described Plaid as "by far the best player in the space" with "a huge lead in the connector business."

44. As Visa learned more about Plaid's efforts to launch its own pay-by-bank debit service that would directly compete with Visa, its executives grew increasingly alarmed. During an early November 2019 meeting involving executives from both firms, Plaid's co-founder explained how Plaid's nascent technology would allow merchants to shift transactions easily from traditional forms of online debit to Plaid's pay-by-bank debit service. This prompted a senior Visa executive to report internally that Plaid's co-founder had "described the service with the joy of someone who forgot we had 70% share." Ultimately, Visa recognized that the best course of action for its business was to eliminate Plaid as a competitive threat by purchasing Plaid itself. In internal documents, a Visa executive observed that "[t]he acquisition is in part defensive, not just for Visa but also on behalf of our largest issuing [bank] clients, whom we believe have a lot to lose if [pay-by-bank transactions] accelerate as the result of Plaid landing in the wrong hands. It is in our collective interest to manage the evolution of these payment forms in a way that protects the commercial results we mutually realize through card-based payments."

E. Visa Has a History of Impeding Entry and Expansion into Online Debit Services

45. Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid fits within an established pattern of Visa trying to thwart others from challenging its monopoly power. Specifically, Visa has a long history of protecting its monopoly in online debit by entering into contracts that forestall entry and coopt would-be rivals with lucrative partnerships. In addition to locking up many of the largest U.S. financial institutions with long-term, restrictive contracts that limit these banks' ability to issue debit cards from Visa competitors, Visa has entered into a number of "partnerships" that benefit Visa at the expense of merchants and consumers. This conduct has prevented cheaper, more efficient online debit options from gaining traction.

46. For example, in 2016, PayPal sought to divert business from traditional online debit providers like Visa by using lower-cost payment methods that moved money via ACH. In response, Visa publicly threatened to target PayPal "in ways people have never seen before." After issuing its threats, Visa induced PayPal to stop promoting alternative payment methods and to instead promote Visa debit in exchange for significant financial benefits. As Visa's Senior Vice President and Head of Product for North America explained, PayPal has been less of a threat to Visa's online debit business in recent years because "Visa and PayPal have figured out a way to be partners, as opposed to, sort of, direct competitors" and have found "ways to work together, as opposed to not work together."

47. In another example, Visa induced a major technology company to agree not to "build, support or introduce payment technologies that disintermediate Visa" in exchange for substantial fee reductions. In current negotiations to renew this ongoing agreement, Visa is demanding that the technology company continue to abide by Visa's exclusionary practices, including not encouraging customers to use less expensive payment methods and prohibiting "marketing to non Visa options during payment checkout."

48. Similarly, Visa recently pushed a large payment processor to limit its use of alternative payment methods because of the "strategic risk" those alternative payment methods present to Visa.

49. In addition, Visa has inhibited the adoption of alternative lower-cost networks for online debit by disincentivizing banks from enabling the use of alternative debit networks. Visa has also tied up merchants' abilities to select less expensive alternative networks for processing debit payments through restrictive rules and agreements, thereby helping Visa grow and maintain its monopoly in online debit.

50. Each of these actions has protected Visa's online debit monopoly from the threat of disruptive entrants, at the expense of merchants and consumers.

RELEVANT MARKET

A. Product Market

51. *Online debit transactions ("online debit").* Providers of online debit transactions serve as intermediaries between consumers and merchants, operating two-sided transactions platforms that facilitate online transactions between merchants and consumers from their respective bank accounts. Online debit payments are made from funds that are already present in a consumer's bank account instead of relying on a line of credit. Visa's traditional card-based debit network facilitates the transfer of funds between merchants and consumers by relying on a bank-issued debit credential to identify the consumer. Plaid provides an alternative mechanism to facilitate payments between consumers and merchants that uses a consumer's online bank login credentials to identify the consumer and facilitate payments via ACH.

52. The online debit market includes traditional online debit services and emerging pay-by-bank debit services. Both the traditional online debit services and new pay-by-bank debit services enable consumers to pay for goods and services directly from the funds in their bank accounts and merchants to accept payments drawn from consumer bank accounts.

53. Online debit in the United States constitutes a relevant product market under the antitrust laws. Few merchants or consumers would find alternative payment services to be a suitable substitute for online debit. Thus, there are no reasonable substitutes for online debit, and a firm that was the only seller of online debit services would be able to maintain prices above the level that would prevail in a competitive market.

54. In-person debit payments, known as “card present” payments, are not reasonably interchangeable because, unlike an online debit payment, the consumer must be physically present in a store or using a physical debit card at a payment terminal to make a card-present debit payment.

55. Credit card payments also are not reasonably interchangeable with online debit because debit payments draw from funds already in a consumer’s bank account, rather than drawing from a line of credit. The distinction between credit and debit is widely accepted in the payments industry. Visa and other card networks have different pricing systems for debit and credit transactions, and the Durbin Amendment’s limitations on transaction fees apply only to debit. Many consumers do not qualify for credit cards or have a strong preference for paying out of their existing funds rather than taking on debt to make purchases using a line of credit, which can be financially risky.

56. Payments made through basic ACH transfers offered by The Clearing House or the Federal Reserve are often used for disbursements, paychecks, interbank settlements, and recurring fixed payments like mortgage and tuition payments. A basic ACH transfer is not reasonably interchangeable for most online debit transactions. ACH transfers are inconvenient for consumers because they require a burdensome onboarding process in which the consumer must enter her bank account and routing information for each merchant, and then take steps to verify her account, which requires additional input and can take several hours or even days. ACH transfers are inconvenient for merchants because it takes two to three days to determine whether a payment is successful, and such transfers are more subject to fraud.

57. Cash payments are not reasonably interchangeable for online debit transactions because cash cannot be used for online payments. Checks are not reasonably interchangeable for online debit transactions because, like cash, checks are physical tokens that cannot readily be used for online payments.

58. Online debit transactions platforms are two-sided transactions platforms that exhibit a high degree of interdependency between consumers on the one side and merchants on the other. Consumers get more value from a network that connects to more merchants and

merchants get more value from a network that connects to more consumers. The online debit market is a two-sided market for transactions between merchants and consumers. The price for an online debit transaction takes both sides into account.

B. Geographic Market

59. The United States is the relevant geographic market. Both Visa and Plaid treat the United States as a distinct geographic market, as demonstrated in part by Visa's separate rules governing merchant acceptance in the United States and its separate pricing of online debit payments services to merchants in the United States. Federal laws and regulations that govern online debit transactions operate on a national level. A firm that was the only seller of online debit in the United States would be able to maintain prices above the level that would prevail in a competitive market.

ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

60. Visa has monopoly power in the online debit market, with a durable market share of approximately 70% that is protected by high barriers to entry.

A. Visa's Proposed Acquisition of Plaid Would Result in Higher Prices for Online Debit Transactions

61. Plaid's entry into online debit services as a pay-by-bank debit service would erode Visa's monopoly power by giving merchants and consumers a cheaper, more innovative alternative to Visa's online debit services. This would likely result in lower prices for online debit transactions and a higher volume of online debit transactions.

62. Because pay-by-bank fees to merchants are considerably lower than Visa's online debit fees, many merchants would likely seek to move online transactions from Visa's debit service to Plaid's pay-by bank debit service at the point of sale. Most consumers have only one debit card. Thus, when a consumer is making an online purchase directly from her bank account, she cannot switch between Visa debit and Mastercard debit using the same bank account – but she could switch to Plaid's pay-by-bank debit service during the checkout process. Consumer ability to switch payment options at the point of sale is one of the reasons why Plaid's pay-by-bank debit service poses such a significant threat to Visa even at its nascent stage. To minimize

losses to Plaid and defend its online debit volume, Visa would likely reduce the prices it currently charges for online debit transactions.

63. Indeed, Plaid recognizes that pricing for its pay-by-bank debit service "needs to be highly competitive with debit card pricing." Plaid has considered introducing certain components of its pay-by-bank debit service at a "50% reduction" compared to traditional debit and anticipates that merchants could save millions of dollars a year in fees by making it easier for consumers to switch away from card-based online debit. Plaid was upfront with Visa about its plans to undercut Visa's online debit prices. After meeting with Plaid executives in December 2019, Visa's Vice President of Corporate Development and Head of Strategic Opportunities expressed concern that if Visa did not buy Plaid "they will clearly come after the 'high prices' of interchange as they said several times yesterday and offer alternate payment methods."

64. Thus, as Visa itself has recognized, competition from Plaid would mean that prices for online debit transactions would fall. This would benefit merchants and ultimately consumers, who would pay less for goods and services as merchants pass on their savings. Consumers may also benefit from rewards or other incentives that merchants offer to induce switching to Plaid's pay-by-bank debit service.

65. But Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid would forestall this competition, allowing Visa to maintain its monopoly position and supracompetitive prices for online debit.

B. Visa's Proposed Acquisition of Plaid Would Result in Less Innovation

66. Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid also would eliminate a disruptive and innovative competitor. Visa viewed Plaid as a "threat . . . across multiple vectors of our business, including . . . as a potential payment network." If the acquisition were enjoined, Plaid – on its own or in combination with a company other than Visa – would continue to act as a disruptive competitor, developing and launching new, innovative solutions in competition with Visa. In the hands of Visa, this would change dramatically.

67. In contrast to an independent Plaid, Visa would have the incentive to raise the price of, degrade, delay, or shelve altogether Plaid's nascent pay-by-bank debit service because

such a service would cannibalize Visa's profitable online debit business. Indeed, Visa's CEO has already acknowledged that Visa has no intention of introducing Plaid's pay-by-bank debit service for consumer payments to merchants in the United States. Since inking the deal with Visa, Plaid has slowed its plans to pilot its pay-by-bank debit service with prospective merchant customers.

C. Visa's Proposed Acquisition of Plaid Would Raise Entry Barriers

68. As a monopolist with an approximately 70% market share in online debit, Visa has a strong incentive to continue to suppress entry by prospective rivals. It stands to lose more than any other participant in the online debit market from entry or expansion because any new pay-by-bank service is likely to compete away Visa's lucrative online debit transaction volume. As a result, Visa has a greater incentive than any other player in online debit to prevent or delay the emergence of potential competitors.

69. Acquiring Plaid would give Visa the ability to raise the already high entry barriers faced by competitors seeking to enter or expand into online debit payments, further entrenching Visa's monopoly power in online debit.

70. Through its ownership of Plaid, Visa would have a "[f]ront row seat to what is happening in the [f]intech world (e.g. which apps are growing, at what velocity and where)." With this insight into which fintechs are more likely to develop competitive alternative payments methods, Visa could take steps to partner with, buy out, or otherwise disadvantage these up-and-coming competitors. Plaid's current services "sit at the 'decision chokepoint' for many future payment flows." Owning Plaid would position Visa to insulate itself from competition, for example, by buying out or partnering with other fintechs before they can gain traction.

71. Further, Visa would be able to leverage its close relationships with issuing banks to disadvantage other would-be entrants. Both Visa and issuing banks profit from online debit payments. If the proposed transaction is not enjoined, Visa is likely to incentivize issuing banks to refuse to connect with competitors of Plaid, preventing other would-be entrants from threatening the profits that both Visa and issuing banks earn from high online debit transaction fees. Indeed, Visa has already communicated to U.S. banks that "[i]t is in our collective interest

to manage the evolution of these payment forms in a way that protects the commercial results we mutually realize through card-based payments."

72. Acquiring Plaid would also give Visa access to Plaid's enormous trove of consumer data, including real-time sensitive information about merchants and Visa's rivals. Consolidation of this data in Visa's hands could further raise barriers to entry and expansion. Visa could use that data to make it more difficult for others to enter or compete against Visa in online debit or to deter pro-competitive initiatives from rivals.

73. Overall, merchants and consumers stand to benefit from the lower cost of online debit transactions enabled by Plaid's innovative pay-by-bank debit service. Visa acquiring Plaid would diminish or eliminate those benefits, eradicate Plaid as a competitive threat, and raise entry barriers for future competitive threats, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

LACK OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS

74. Although Defendants have claimed that the proposed acquisition would generate synergies by combining the operations of Visa and Plaid, any cognizable efficiencies will not outweigh the merger's harm to competition in the relevant market. Visa concedes that there is "very little" about the deal that leads to cost synergies and "[i]n fact, it has cost dissynergies associated with it." Further, Visa's CEO has acknowledged that Visa has no plans to launch Plaid's pay-by-bank debit services for consumer payments to merchants.

75. Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid would not result in verifiable, transaction-specific efficiencies in the relevant market sufficient to outweigh the transaction's likely anticompetitive effects. The proposed acquisition would harm competition overall in the relevant market. Moreover, the anticompetitive effects of Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid outweigh any procompetitive benefits in the relevant market, and any procompetitive benefits can be achieved through less restrictive means.

VIOLATIONS ALLEGED

76. If allowed to proceed, Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid would eliminate the nascent competitive threat that an independently owned Plaid poses to Visa's monopoly power

and unlawfully maintain Visa's monopoly power in the online debit market. The proposed acquisition constitutes monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

77. In addition, if allowed to proceed, the effect of Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" in the online debit market in the United States in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

78. Among other things, the transaction would:

(a) maintain Visa's monopoly power, giving Visa the power to raise prices and increase barriers to entry;

(b) eliminate nascent competition between Visa and Plaid;

(c) likely cause prices of online debit transactions to be higher than they would be otherwise; and

(d) likely reduce quality, service, choice, and innovation.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

79. The United States requests:

(a) that Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid be adjudged to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2;

(b) that Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid be adjudged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;

(c) that the Defendants be permanently enjoined and restrained from carrying out the proposed acquisition of Plaid by Visa or any other transaction that would combine the two companies;

(d) that the United States be awarded costs of this action; and

(e) that the United States be awarded such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: November 5, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEY ATTESTATION

I hereby attest, pursuant to Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), that the concurrence in the filing of this document has been obtained from the signatory indicated by the "conformed" signature (/s/) of John R. Read within this e-filed document.

/s/ John R. Read
John R. Read

Visa and Plaid Announce Mutual Termination of Merger Agreement

1/12/2021

SAN FRANCISCO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Jan. 12, 2021-- Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) and Plaid today announced that the companies have terminated their merger agreement and agreed with the Department of Justice to dismiss the litigation related to the proposed transaction. The proposed transaction was first announced on January 13, 2020.

"We are confident we would have prevailed in court as Plaid's capabilities are complementary to Visa's, not competitive," said Al Kelly, Chairman and CEO of Visa Inc. "We believe the combination of Visa with Plaid would have delivered significant benefits, including greater innovation for developers, financial institutions and consumers. However, it has been a full year since we first announced our intent to acquire Plaid, and protracted and complex litigation will likely take substantial time to fully resolve."

Mr. Kelly added, "We are focused on accelerating our business by advancing our broader strategy and continuing to drive Visa's three growth pillars: consumer payments, new flows, and value added services. We have great momentum to build upon. Over the past year, our Visa Direct solution moved money around the world using multiple card, ACH and RTP networks, growing nearly 70 percent. In addition, our value added services revenue has grown in the mid-to-high-teens. We have great respect for Plaid and the business they have built and look forward to our continued partnership."

"This past year saw an unprecedented uptick in demand for the services powered by Plaid, and our priority is to support the hundreds of millions of people who now rely on fintech," said Zach Perret, CEO and co-founder of Plaid. "We made great strides last year, growing our customers by more than sixty percent and adding hundreds of banks to our platform. While Plaid and Visa would have been a great combination, we have decided to instead work with Visa as an investor and partner so we can fully focus on building the infrastructure to support fintech."

Webcast and Conference Call Information

Visa's executive management team will host a live audio webcast beginning at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time (2:00 p.m. Pacific Time) today to discuss the announcement. All interested parties are invited to listen to the live webcast at http://investor.visa.com (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com%2F&esheet=52360777&newsitemid=20210112006080&lan=en-US&anchor=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com&index=1&md5=f372670deaa8d4b3a9bb06a42077ee2a). A replay of the webcast will be available for 30 days. Investor information is also available at http://investor.visa.com (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com%2F&esheet=52360777&newsitemid=20210112006080&lan=en-US&anchor=http%3A%2F%2Finvestor.visa.com&index=2&md5=d0db6efb8a615d26fc335098506a5987).

About Visa Inc.

Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) is the world's leader in digital payments. Our mission is to connect the world through the most innovative, reliable and secure payment network - enabling individuals, businesses and economies to thrive. Our advanced global processing network, VisaNet, provides secure and reliable payments around the world, and is capable of handling more than 65,000 transaction messages a second. Our relentless focus on innovation is a catalyst for the rapid growth of digital commerce on any device, and a driving force behind the dream of a cashless future for everyone, everywhere. As the world moves from analog to digital, Visa is applying our brand, products, people, network and scale to reshape the future of commerce. For more information, visit usa.visa.com/about-visa.html (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%2Fusa.visa.com%2Fabout-visa.html&esheet=52360777&newsitemid=20210112006080&lan=en-US&anchor=usa.visa.com%2Fabout-

About Plaid

Plaid is a data network that powers the fintech tools millions of people rely on to live healthier financial lives. Plaid works with thousands of fintech companies like Venmo, SoFi, and Betterment, several of the Fortune 500, and many of the largest banks to make it easy for people to connect their financial accounts to the apps and services they want to use. Plaid's network covers 11,000 financial institutions across the US, Canada, UK and Europe. Headquartered in San Francisco, the company was founded in 2013 by Zach Perret and William Hockey.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Plaintiff* v. VISA INC. and PLAID INC., *Defendants*.	Case No.: 4:20-cv-07810-JSW **JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL**

In view of Visa Inc.'s and Plaid Inc.'s decision to terminate their Agreement and Plan of Merger dated January 12, 2020, that was the subject of this litigation, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Parties file this stipulation of dismissal, signed by all parties that have appeared, stipulating and agreeing to dismissal of this action without prejudice.

SO STIPULATED:

Dated: January 12, 2021

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I, John R. Read, am the ECF user whose identification and password are being used to file the JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL. In compliance with Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that all signatories hereto concur in this filing.

/s/ John R. Read
JOHN R. READ

Meta/Within

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
PROTECTING AMERICA'S CONSUMERS

For Release

FTC Seeks to Block Virtual Reality Giant Meta's Acquisition of Popular App Creator Within

Agency Alleges that Meta and CEO Mark Zuckerberg are Attempting Illegal Acquisition to Expand Virtual Reality Empire

July 27, 2022

Tags: Competition | Bureau of Competition | Merger | Horizontal | Internet commerce | Technology

The Federal Trade Commission is seeking to block virtual reality giant Meta and its controlling shareholder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg from acquiring Within Unlimited and its popular virtual reality dedicated fitness app, Supernatural. Meta, formerly known as Facebook, is already a key player at each level of the virtual reality sector. The company's virtual reality empire includes the top-selling device, a leading app store, seven of the most successful developers, and one of the best-selling apps of all time. The agency alleges that Meta and Zuckerberg are planning to expand Meta's virtual reality empire with this attempt to illegally acquire a dedicated fitness app that proves the value of virtual reality to users.

"Instead of competing on the merits, Meta is trying to buy its way to the top," said FTC Bureau of Competition Deputy Director John Newman. "Meta already owns a best-selling virtual reality fitness app, and it had the capabilities to compete even more closely with Within's popular Supernatural app. But Meta chose to buy market position instead of earning it on the merits. This is an illegal acquisition, and we will pursue all appropriate relief."

The virtual reality industry offers a uniquely immersive digital experience and is characterized by a high degree of growth and innovation. Unlike content on a tablet, phone, or monitor, virtual reality gives users the perception of being completely surrounded as they move. Users typically engage with the virtual reality experience through a headset with displays in front of each eye to place them in a fully rendered, three-dimensional environment. Software and studio companies develop virtual reality apps that run on headsets and are distributed in online app stores. These apps run the gamut of genres from rhythm games to e-sports to creation and exploration and more.

Meta, the global technology behemoth that owns Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp, is the largest provider of virtual reality devices, and also a leading provider of apps in the U.S. The complaint alleges that under the leadership of Zuckerberg, the company began its campaign to conquer virtual reality with the acquisition of headset manufacturer Oculus VR, Inc. Fueled by the popularity of its top-selling Quest headsets, Meta's Quest Store has become a leading U.S. app platform with more than 400 apps available for download.

In a publicly reported email to executives, Zuckerberg said that it was critical for the company to also be "completely ubiquitous in killer apps," which are apps that prove the value of the underlying technology. As part of its app expansion, Meta purchased seven of the most successful virtual reality development studios, and now has one of the largest first-party virtual reality content catalogues in the world. The acquisition of the Beat Games studio gave Meta control of the wildly popular app Beat Saber.

Within Unlimited is an independent virtual reality development studio that designed and built Supernatural, a popular app in the dedicated fitness virtual reality app market. Supernatural offers a variety of high-quality workouts set to music, including tracks from A-list artists like Katy Perry, Imagine Dragons, Lady Gaga, and Coldplay, and virtually located in striking, photorealistic locales, like the Galapagos Islands. The agency's complaint notes that according to Within's co-founder and CEO, "Fitness is the killer use case for VR."

The complaint alleges that Meta is a potential entrant in the virtual reality dedicated fitness app market with the required resources and a reasonable probability of building its own virtual reality app to compete in the space. But instead of entering, it chose to try buying Supernatural. Meta's independent entry would increase consumer choice, increase innovation, spur additional competition to attract the best employees, and yield other competitive benefits. Meta's acquisition of Within, on the other hand, would eliminate the prospect of such entry, dampening future innovation and competitive rivalry.

The complaint further alleges that the mere possibility of Meta's entry has likely influenced competition in the virtual reality dedicated fitness app market. If Meta is allowed to buy Within, that competitive pressure will slacken. That lessening of competition violates the antitrust laws, according to the complaint.

The complaint also alleges that when viewed against the broader backdrop of the market for all virtual reality fitness apps, Meta's proposed acquisition of Within is also illegal. Meta already participates in this broader market with its Beat Saber app, as does Within with its premium rival app Supernatural. The two companies currently spur each other to keep adding new features and attract more users, competitive rivalry that would be lost if this acquisition were allowed to proceed.

The Commission vote to authorize staff to seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was 3-2. Commissioners Noah Joshua Phillips and Christine S. Wilson voted no. A federal court complaint and request for preliminary relief has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to halt the transaction.

The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers or file an antitrust complaint. For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social media, subscribe to press releases and read our blog.

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Meta

The FTC's Attempt to Block Meta's Acquisition of Within Is Wrong on the Facts and the Law

July 27, 2022
By Nikhil Shanbhag, VP and Associate General Counsel, Competition and Regulatory

Takeaways

- Meta's acquisition of Within would be good for people and developers and would spark further interest in fitness as a growth area in VR.
- This deal brings more competition and innovation to VR more generally.
- The FTC is wrong on the facts and the law.

Today, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a lawsuit seeking to block Meta's planned acquisition of Within, the company behind the VR fitness app *Supernatural.*

The FTC's case is based on ideology and speculation, not evidence. The idea that this acquisition would lead to anticompetitive outcomes in a dynamic space with as much entry and growth as online and connected fitness is simply not credible. By attacking this deal in a 3-2 vote, the FTC is sending a chilling message to anyone who wishes to innovate in VR. We are confident that our acquisition of Within will be good for people, developers and the VR space.

There is No Merit to the FTC's Case

Under US law, the FTC is required to prove that an acquisition would "substantially lessen competition" in order to successfully block a deal. We believe it's clear that neither the evidence nor the well-established law will support such a result.

It's always been clear that our acquisition of Within will inject new investment into the VR fitness space, improve the Quest platform to better support all fitness apps and expand the VR ecosystem as a whole – all to the benefit of people and developers alike. The FTC rests its arguments on a number of flawed premises and unsupported assumptions that do not stand up to scrutiny.

First, they allege that *Supernatural* competes closely with Meta's *Beat Saber* app, which is a music and rhythm game, and that people would be harmed by bringing them together. But this position misunderstands the nature of the space entirely and ignores the market realities. *Beat Saber* is a game people play to have fun and it has many competitors. *Supernatural* couldn't be more different. It is a subscription-based virtual exercise service that offers boxing, flow, meditation and stretching workouts in the context of trainer-led sessions for a full body and wellness experience.

Supernatural competes far more closely with the many other fitness-specific VR apps (like *FitXR*, *Liteboxer*, and *Les Mills Body Combat*) and connected fitness more broadly (such as Peloton and many others). In reality, *Beat Saber* and *Supernatural* are fundamentally different products with different user bases, different use cases and different competitive dynamics. And this is not just our take – Within's leadership team strongly believes its competitors are the Pelotons and other established fitness brands of the world, not *Beat Saber* or other casual VR games.

Second, the FTC asserts, seemingly based on little more than Meta's size, that we would either build a fitness-specific service like *Supernatural* from scratch or somehow convert *Beat Saber* into such a service. But given the vastly different uses and audiences for these apps, and the fact that many other well-established brands like Apple and Peloton are far better positioned than Meta to bring their existing fitness products and content to VR, doing so wouldn't make any sense. Indeed, we looked into building a fitness-specific service and decided we simply weren't in a position to do so.

Third, the FTC believes that just the possibility that we might eventually develop our own VR fitness app somehow keeps existing participants in check and is reason enough to block this deal. But this ignores the reality that fitness-specific app developers, including *Supernatural*, don't see us as their current or future competition and are focused on the strong existing players in the space, the well-positioned recent actual entrants and the far more likely future entry from established online and connected fitness brands.

The FTC also insinuates that Meta is trying to buy VR apps in an effort to "control" the VR ecosystem. To the contrary: We have spent nearly a decade and invested billions of dollars in expanding the VR space, supporting and growing a viable and sustainable ecosystem for developers. With over a thousand apps having been built for Quest and the number earning over a million dollars in revenue having doubled year over year, it is clear that the ecosystem we are building is creating meaningful innovation opportunities. Unlike many of our competitors, we don't force developers or users into our store. We offer options like sideloading, linking to play VR content from PC, and App Lab, because we want to foster choice and competition in the VR ecosystem.

Finally, and maybe most importantly, VR is a rapidly growing and evolving space, and the fact that there are so many firms developing hardware and software shows that there is widespread belief in the promise of the technology. We've always recognized that success for the entire industry depends on having a vibrant and interconnected hardware and developer community. In such a world, the FTC has no answer to the most basic question — how could Meta's acquisition of a single fitness app in a dynamic space with many existing and future players possibly harm competition?

The FTC's Burden

The FTC must prove that our deal violates the law and that people and competition will be harmed. We don't believe their case can withstand the required scrutiny. The FTC has had nine months to investigate and we've cooperated throughout, including by producing millions of documents and reams of data in response to the FTC's Second Request, plus hundreds of pages of written responses. We also postponed the closing date of this transaction to August 1, 2022 at the FTC's request to give them even more time to consider this matter.

We are confident this transaction does not reduce competition in any way, will bring countless benefits to people and VR developers, and should therefore be allowed to proceed. At the end of the day, attempting to bar Meta from making acquisitions at all benefits *no one* — especially if the goal is to encourage innovation and competition. If this deal is allowed to go forward, we intend to invest significant resources in growing *Supernatural* to bring more innovation to a new and rapidly developing space, with room for many participants.

Categories:
Competition and Innovation, Meta, Public Policy

Tags: Virtual Reality

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July 7, 2022

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. **META PLATFORMS, INC., et al.**, Defendants.	Case No. 5:22-cv-04325-EJD **AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 13(B) OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT** **REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED**

Plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"), by its designated attorneys, petitions this Court for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc., and its subsidiaries (collectively "Meta") from consummating its proposed acquisition (the "Acquisition") of Within Unlimited, Inc. ("Within"). The Commission seeks this relief pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Absent such relief, Meta and Within (collectively, "Defendants") have represented that they would be free to consummate the Acquisition after 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time (or 8:59 p.m. Pacific Time) on December 31, 2022.

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the Commission, whenever it has reason to believe that a proposed merger is unlawful, to seek preliminary injunctive relief to prevent consummation of a merger until the Commission has had an opportunity to adjudicate the merger's legality in an administrative proceeding. Preliminary injunctive relief is imperative to preserve the *status quo* and to protect competition while the Commission adjudicates whether the Acquisition is unlawful. The Commission initiated the administrative proceeding on the legality of the Acquisition under antitrust law, pursuant to Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by filing an administrative complaint on August 11, 2022. Pursuant to FTC regulations, the administrative trial will begin on January 19, 2023. Allowing the Acquisition to proceed would harm competition and consumers and undermine the Commission's ability to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition if the Commission issues an administrative complaint and the Acquisition is found unlawful after a full administrative trial on the merits and any subsequent appeals.

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. Meta, one of the largest technology companies in the world and the leading provider of virtual reality ("VR") devices and applications ("apps") in the United States, seeks to acquire Within, a software company that develops apps for VR devices, including the highly popular and rapidly growing fitness app "Supernatural." If consummated, the Acquisition would

substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, in the relevant market for VR dedicated fitness apps. That lessening of rivalry may yield multiple harmful outcomes, including less innovation, lower quality, higher prices, less incentive to attract and keep employees, and less consumer choice.

2. A global technology behemoth, Meta reaches into every corner of the world through its "Family of Apps"—Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp—with more than three billion regular users. Seeking to expand its empire even further, Meta in recent years has set its sights on building, and ultimately controlling, a VR "metaverse." One need look no further than the rebranding of the company from Facebook to "Meta" in 2021 to understand its vision—and its priorities—for the future. And Meta is serious about its goals: it has become the largest provider of VR devices and apps to customers in the United States.

3. Meta's campaign to conquer VR began in 2014 when it acquired Oculus VR, Inc., a VR headset manufacturer. Since then, Meta's VR headsets have become the cornerstone of its growth in the VR space: its current generation headset, the Meta Quest 2, is by far the most widely used VR headset today, with a significant majority of headset sales in 2021 and 2022. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has publicly stated that Meta subsidizes its VR devices or sells them at cost in order to attract users.

4. And Meta's Quest Store (formerly Oculus Store) has become the leading distribution platform for VR software apps in the United States, connecting app developers and VR users in an online marketplace through which developers can offer their products to users for download onto their individual VR devices. Meta controls the wildly popular app Beat Saber, which it acquired by purchasing Beat Games in November 2019. Beat Saber [redacted] In addition to Beat Games, Meta owns a number of other VR apps, some of which it developed in-house but most of which it acquired by rolling up other app studios.

5. Meta has thus become a key player at each level of the VR ecosystem: in hardware with its Meta Quest 2 headset, in app distribution with the Quest Store, and in apps with Beat Saber and several other popular titles. This is not by accident; Meta has an explicit strategy of harnessing strong network effects in VR to ensure its leading status in this growing industry. Meta could have chosen to try to compete with Within on the merits; instead, Meta decided it preferred to simply buy the [redacted] in a vitally important, [redacted]

6. As Meta fully recognizes, network effects on a digital platform can cause the platform to become more powerful—and its rivals weaker and less able to seriously compete—as it gains more users, content, and developers. The acquisition of new users, content, and developers each feed into one another, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that entrenches the company's early lead. This market dynamic can spur companies to compete harder in beneficial ways by, for example, adding useful product features or hiring additional employees. But it can also make anticompetitive strategies more attractive.

7. Meta seeks to exploit the network-effects dynamic in VR. Indeed, Mr. Zuckerberg has made clear that his aspiration for the VR space is control of the *entire* ecosystem. As early as 2015, Mr. Zuckerberg instructed key Facebook executives that his vision for "the next wave of computing" was control of apps *and* the platform on which those apps were distributed, making clear in an internal email to key Facebook executives that a key part of this strategy was for his company to be "completely ubiquitous in killer apps"—i.e., in significant VR apps that prove the value of the technology. In that same email, Mr. Zuckerberg told his executives that Facebook should "us[e] acquisitions opportunistically."

8. The proposed acquisition of Within would be one more step along that path toward dominance. According to Within's co-founder and CEO, "Fitness is the killer use case for VR." But instead of choosing to compete on the merits through its own VR dedicated fitness app, Meta has resorted to proposing this unlawful acquisition.

9. If Meta is able to proceed with this proposed acquisition of Within, the merger poses a reasonable likelihood of substantially lessening competition in the market for VR dedicated fitness apps, where Supernatural is [redacted]

10. Having simply bought up the [redacted] Meta would no longer have any incentive to develop its own competing app from scratch, add new features to Beat Saber or other existing Meta apps to compete with Supernatural on the merits, or acquire a small generalist studio that could supplement Meta's considerable existing resources and VR know-how to develop an app to compete with Supernatural. Instead of adding a significant new rival to the mix, the Acquisition would simply let Meta assume total control of the [redacted] overnight. That lessening of competition violates the antitrust laws.

11. Moreover, a company poised on the edge of a market may exert competitive pressure on existing participants. Regardless of whether such a company actually intends to enter, the possibility that it may do so can spur other companies already in the market to proactively ramp up their own competitive efforts. Meta, poised on the edge of the VR dedicated fitness app market with its popular Beat Saber app, and with all its vast resources and unique strategic advantages, exerts such an influence. That pressure spurs the market leader, Within, to add new features, retain employees, continue innovating, and generally compete harder in order to stay a step ahead of Meta in the event it decides to enter. The Acquisition would eliminate that incentive for market participants to compete, again in contravention of the antitrust laws.

12. Accordingly, this Acquisition poses a reasonable probability of eliminating competition. That lessening of competition may result in reduced innovation, quality, and choice, less pressure to compete for the most talented app developers, and potentially higher prices for VR dedicated fitness apps. And Meta would be one step closer to its ultimate goal of owning the entire "Metaverse."

13. The Commission voted to file this Complaint seeking preliminary relief pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The Commission is entitled to preliminary

relief in this Court because of its likelihood of success on the merits and the weight of the equities. To succeed on the merits, the FTC must prove that the Acquisition violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." For the reasons described below, the FTC is likely to succeed in proving an antitrust violation, and the equities weigh strongly in favor of enforcing the antitrust laws.

14. On August 11, 2022, the Commission found reason to believe that the Acquisition would substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. On August 11, 2022, the Commission commenced an administrative adjudication proceeding to determine whether the Acquisition is unlawful. An administrative trial before an Administrative Law Judge, is scheduled to begin on January 19, 2023. The ongoing administrative trial provides a forum for all parties to conduct discovery, followed by a merits trial with up to 210 hours of live testimony. *See* 16 C.F.R. § 3.41. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is subject to appeal to the full Commission, which, in turn, is subject to judicial review by a United States Court of Appeals.

15. Preliminary injunctive relief restraining Defendants from proceeding with the Acquisition is necessary to prevent interim harm to competition during the pending administrative proceeding. Absent preliminary relief, Defendants can close the Acquisition and combine Meta's and Within's operations. Allowing Defendants to consummate the Acquisition before any administrative proceeding has concluded is likely to cause immediate harm to competition and consumers and would undermine the Commission's ability to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition if it is found unlawful after a full trial on the merits and any subsequent appeals.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A. Jurisdiction

16. This Court's jurisdiction arises under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1345. This is a civil action arising under Acts of

Congress protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies and is brought by an agency of the United States authorized by an Act of Congress to bring this action.

17. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), provides in pertinent part:

> Whenever the Commission has reason to believe—
>
> (1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, and
>
> (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the public—
>
> > the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond. . . .

18. Defendants and their relevant operating entities and subsidiaries are, and at all relevant times have been, engaged in activities affecting "commerce" as defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, and Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12.

B. Venue

19. Venue in the Northern District of California is proper under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c). Defendants are found, reside, and/or transact business in this state and district, and are subject to personal jurisdiction therein.

C. Intradistrict Assignment

20. Assignment to the San Francisco Division is proper. This action arises in San Mateo County because a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred in San Mateo County, where Defendant Meta is headquartered.

<u>THE PARTIES AND PROPOSED ACQUISITION</u>

21. Plaintiff, the Commission, is an administrative agency of the United States government, established, organized, and existing pursuant to the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 *et seq.*, with its principal offices at 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580.

The Commission is vested with authority and responsibility for enforcing, *inter alia*, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

22. Defendant Meta is a publicly traded company organized under the laws of Delaware with headquarters in Menlo Park, California. Meta develops and sells VR and other extended reality hardware and software through its "Reality Labs" division. Reality Labs has been growing at breakneck speed: it generated revenues of $2.274 billion in 2021, which reflected a 127% jump from 2019 and a 100% increase since 2020. Meta's best-selling VR hardware product to date is the Meta Quest 2, while its best-selling VR software product is the wildly popular Beat Saber, which was initially released by Beat Games, a studio that Meta acquired in 2019. Meta continues to add new downloadable content to Beat Saber; for example, it recently added a "Lady Gaga Music Pack" available for a $12.99 add-on fee.

23. Defendant Within is a privately held virtual and augmented reality company organized under the laws of Delaware with headquarters—and its principal business—in Los Angeles, California. Founded by Chris Milk and Aaron Koblin, Within's flagship product is Supernatural, a VR subscription fitness service. Supernatural offers over 800 fully immersive VR workouts, each set to music and located in a virtual setting like the Galapagos Islands or the Great Wall of China. Through deals with major music studios, Supernatural continues to grow its catalog, which includes songs from A-list artists like Katy Perry, Imagine Dragons, Lady Gaga, and Coldplay. Supernatural's workouts are fitness classes that customers can access by paying a monthly subscription fee of $18.99, or a yearly subscription fee of $179.99. Supernatural is presently only available on the Meta Quest and Quest 2 and is sold in the United States and Canada.

24. On October 22, 2021, Meta and Within signed an Agreement and Plan of Merger, pursuant to which Meta would acquire all shares of Within in a transaction valued at [redacted]

INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

25. The VR industry is currently characterized by a high degree of innovation and growth. Global sales are predicted to more than double in just three years, from $5 billion in 2021 to more than $12 billion in 2024.

26. Users typically engage with the VR experience through a headset with displays in front of each eye to place a user in a fully rendered, three-dimensional environment. Cutting-edge VR technology creates an immersive digital experience like no other. VR users can instantly be transported anywhere in the world, backward or forward in time, into outer space or fictional lands—all from the comfort and safety of their own homes. Unlike a game, video, or app on a tablet, phone, or monitor, the three-dimensional VR environment creates the perception of completely surrounding the user, allowing the user to move around in the projected space. As Mark Zuckerberg explains, "you're right there with another person or in another place and that's very different from every experience of technology that we've had before. . . ."

27. Meta's Quest 2 is the best-selling VR headset and has been since shortly after its launch in 2020. In 2020, Meta shipped more than 62% of all VR headsets sold worldwide. That percentage surged to 78% in 2021, when industry sources estimate that Meta sold more than 8.7 million Quest 2 headsets.

28. The majority of users get apps for VR headsets from online app stores, which distribute products for use on individual VR devices. Meta controls its own app store called the "Meta Quest Store," with more than 400 apps available for download. Meta also offers the "App Lab," a Meta-produced tool that allows third-party developers to distribute apps not present in the Meta Quest Store directly to consumers. Other VR app stores include Valve's Steam Store and SideQuest, but the Meta Quest Store is the leading VR app store in the United States.

29. VR software and studio companies like Within develop the apps that run on VR headsets. These apps run the gamut of genres from rhythm games to shooters to e-sports to creation and exploration and more.

30. [redacted] Meta's Beat Saber, an enormously popular rhythm game "where you slash the beats of adrenaline-pumping music as they fly towards you, surrounded by a futuristic world." Meta acquired control of Beat Saber through its purchase of Beat Games [redacted] in November 2019.

31. Since its acquisition of Beat Games, Meta has continued to acquire a series of studios behind many popular VR apps, and now boasts one of the largest first-party VR content organizations in the world:

a. In January 2020, Meta acquired Sanzaru games, maker of the fantasy Viking combat game Asgard's Wrath.

b. In May 2020, Meta acquired Ready at Dawn Studios, maker of Lone Echo II, a zero-gravity adventure game, and Echo VR, an online team-based sports game.

c. In April 2021, Meta acquired Downpour Interactive, maker of Onward, a team-based first-person shooter.

d. In May 2021, Meta acquired BigBox VR, maker of Population One, a multiplayer first-person arena shooter.

e. In June 2021, Meta acquired Unit 2 Games, the maker of Crayta, a collaborative platform that allows users to create and play their own games.

f. And, in November 2021, Meta acquired Twisted Pixel, a studio that makes various games, including Path of the Warrior (a fighting game), B-Team (a first-person shooter), and Wilson's Heart (a mystery noir thriller game).

32. In addition to the aforementioned acquisitions, Meta has developed and released its own VR apps. These include:

a. Horizon Worlds, a Massively Multiplayer Online game that allows users to build, share, and interact in virtual worlds;

b. Horizon Workrooms, a productivity app that lets teams of people share their computer screens, collaborate on virtual whiteboards, and more;

c. Horizon Venues, a live-events app that lets users experience concerts, sporting events, and more; and

d. Horizon Home, a social-space app that lets users hang out with their friends, watch videos together, and join multiplayer VR games together.

33. Among VR apps, dedicated or deliberate fitness is [redacted] As Within's co-founder and CEO puts it, "Fitness is the killer use case for VR." [redacted] platform-level tools such as Oculus Move, a calorie and time counter that runs in the background of other Quest apps and displays to users data about their activity levels while in VR. [redacted]

THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET

34. The Acquisition would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the relevant antitrust market for VR dedicated fitness apps in the United States ("VR Dedicated Fitness App market").

A. The VR Dedicated Fitness App Market

35. The VR Dedicated Fitness App market is the relevant product market. The market consists of VR apps, like Within's Supernatural app, that are designed so that users can exercise through a structured physical workout in their own homes.

36. [redacted]

37. Dedicated fitness apps offer distinct functionality when compared to other VR apps, including apps, such as rhythm and active sports games, that provide an incidental fitness benefit ("incidental fitness apps"). For example, they may feature adjusting difficulty so that users never "fail" a workout; they may feature workouts designed by trainers or fitness experts; they are designed to maximize exertion and physical movement for the purpose of exercise; and they may feature classes or other active coaching.

38. VR Fitness App market participants distinguish VR dedicated fitness apps from VR incidental fitness apps like rhythm and sports games that offer fitness benefits simply because they require users to move and physically exert themselves while engaging with the app. Dedicated fitness apps typically entail a higher degree of physical exertion than incidental fitness apps. According to the Virtual Reality Institute of Health and Exercise, which rates energy expenditures during VR app usage, Within's Supernatural currently has the highest energy expenditure, at 12–13 calories per minute.

39. VR dedicated fitness apps are also typically offered using a distinct, subscription-based pricing model. Industry participants recognize that this is a distinguishing characteristic of dedicated fitness VR apps when compared to other VR apps, including incidental fitness apps.

40. [redacted]

41. The VR Dedicated Fitness App market does not include other products that are neither close substitutes for, nor offered under similar competitive conditions as, VR dedicated

fitness apps. For example, it does not include non-VR at-home smart fitness solutions, such as digitally connected exercise bikes, treadmills, weight machines, mobile phone apps, video games, or workout videos.

42. Functional, practical, technological, and price differences show that non-VR at-home smart fitness solutions and at-home exercise products are distinct from VR dedicated fitness apps.

43. VR offers a level of immersion that other at-home fitness experiences do not, and cannot, offer. VR technology allows users to exercise from the comfort, privacy, and safety of home with the feeling and visuals of being somewhere else—atop a mountain, on a tropical island, in a futuristic world, virtually anywhere. The sensors in a VR headset and controllers also allow for a degree of tracking, adjustment, and feedback that non-immersive exercise programs cannot match. As Within's co-founder and CEO explained, "[W]orking out in Supernatural feels like you're a champion of a sport from the future. I love that and haven't felt that sense of athleticism ever on a treadmill or an exercise bike."

44. There also tend to be substantial price differences between VR fitness and smart at-home fitness products. Most smart at-home fitness solutions have much higher up-front costs and much higher ongoing costs than current VR fitness apps. A Peloton smart bicycle, for example, costs over $1,000, with an additional $44 per month subscription cost, compared to the cost of a $299 Meta Quest 2 plus $18.99 per month for Supernatural. It also weighs 135 pounds.

45. In addition to Supernatural, other apps in the VR Dedicated Fitness App market include FitXR, Holofit from Holodia, VZFit from Virzoom, and Les Mills Body Combat from Odders Lab.

46. [redacted] Other than Supernatural and FitXR, [redacted]

B. The Relevant Geographic Market

47. The relevant geographic market in which to analyze the competitive effects of the Acquisition is the United States. While VR app suppliers may be located outside the United States, customers in the relevant markets affected by the Acquisition are located in the United States. The availability of VR apps and headsets for consumers varies by country, and VR consumers in the United States can only buy headsets and apps that are available in the United States. Industry participants recognize the United States as a market.

MARKET CONCENTRATION

48. The VR Dedicated Fitness App market is highly concentrated.

49. Market concentration within a properly defined relevant antitrust market is a useful indicator of the competitive effects of a merger. The 2010 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines") measure market concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ("HHI"). The Merger Guidelines outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policy of the FTC and Department of Justice with respect to mergers involving competitors. Though the Merger Guidelines are not binding on the courts, courts frequently cite the Merger Guidelines as persuasive authority.

50. The HHI for a given market is calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms' market shares. HHIs range from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the case of an atomistic market). A market HHI above 2,500 is classified as highly concentrated.

51. If a merger combines two participants in a relevant market, thereby increasing the HHI by more than 200 points and resulting in a highly concentrated market, it is presumed to enhance market power and is, therefore, presumptively unlawful.

52. The market for VR Dedicated Fitness Apps is highly concentrated, [redacted]

53. Supernatural [redacted]

54. The VR Dedicated Fitness App market HHI has been well above the thresholds for a market to be considered "concentrated" or "highly concentrated" under the Merger Guidelines.

EVIDENCE OF LIKELY ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

55. In addition to this presumption of illegality, additional evidence indicates that the Acquisition may substantially lessen competition in the relevant market for VR dedicated fitness apps.

A. Anticompetitive Effects in the VR Dedicated Fitness App Market

56. The Acquisition would cause anticompetitive effects by eliminating potential competition from Meta in the relevant market for VR dedicated fitness apps. These include eliminating any probability that Meta would enter the market through alternative means absent the Acquisition, as well as eliminating the likely and actual beneficial influence on existing competition that results from Meta's current position, poised on the edge of the market. As the Merger Guidelines explain, "A merger between an incumbent and a potential entrant can raise significant competitive concerns."

1. It Is Reasonably Probable That Meta Would Have Entered the VR Dedicated Fitness App Market Through Alternative Means Absent This Acquisition

57. Meta has the economic characteristics, size, resources, capabilities, advantages, and incentives to enter the VR Dedicated Fitness App market—and it has seriously considered

doing so—by means other than this Acquisition. Meta could have chosen to build a VR dedicated fitness app from scratch, add dedicated fitness functionality to an existing app, and/or acquire a smaller studio that could support and supplement Meta's existing strengths to facilitate its entry.

58. Consistent with its long-term strategy for its VR devices to become a widely used platform that it ultimately will control, Meta has committed tens of billions of dollars to its Reality Labs division, which develops its VR and AR products, including more than $7.7 billion in 2020, $12.4 billion in 2021, and $3.6 billion in the three-month period ending in March 2022. Meta is already well on the way to realizing Mr. Zuckerberg's goals of owning both the dominant platform and the "killer apps" on that platform. Meta already produces the best-selling VR headset in the United States by a wide margin. Meta's Quest Store is the leading distribution platform of VR apps. And Meta is the leading seller of VR apps, with a portfolio that includes Beat Saber, the market-leading VR fitness app, and Horizon Worlds, a massive social app that features its own game-creation tools for users.

59. Meta has the financial resources to develop a dedicated fitness app on its own—either by creating a new app or by adding new features to an existing app such as Beat Saber. It also has more than enough resources to enter the market through acquiring a generalist studio that could supplement Meta's formidable first-party studios group in developing a VR dedicated fitness app.

60. In 2021, Meta had an annual profit of $46.7 billion, and spent more than $12 billion on its Reality Labs division.

61. With its vast financial resources, Meta continues to add features and content to the apps it has already released, and to develop and release new apps. Meta has also developed multiple full-featured VR apps in-house. What's more, the [redacted] it proposes to spend on this acquisition is [redacted] During that time and on that budget, Within built Supernatural from the ground up into the [redacted] VR dedicated fitness app.

62. Meta could build instead of buy within a reasonable period of time if it could not proceed with this Acquisition. Indeed, [redacted]

63. Meta has developed multiple VR apps from scratch before, including the ambitious Horizon Worlds, which allows users to create and explore virtual worlds; Horizon Workrooms, an app that lets Meta test out new use-cases and platform-level features in the emerging VR productivity category and allows users to connect and collaborate in real-time; the Horizon Venues live-events app; and the Horizon Home social-space app.

64. Meta has also developed and released Oculus Move, a platform-level fitness tracker on the Oculus Quest that allows users to track active time and calories burned across apps.

65. Through its string of prior acquisitions, Meta already owns seven of the most successful VR development studios in the world, including Beat Games, the studio behind Beat Saber. And, as of March 2021, Meta had nearly 10,000 employees housed within Reality Labs, its division devoted to virtual reality.

66. Meta's control over the Quest platform also gives it unique access to VR user data, which it uses to inform strategic decisions.

67. In addition, Meta controls which VR apps appear and are featured in its Quest Store. This control guarantees that Meta could reach millions of existing VR users with a built-from-scratch or expanded app through an especially important avenue for consumer discovery.

68. Meta—formerly known as "Facebook Inc."—rebranded its entire business as "Meta" to reflect its focus on VR. Its brands, including Meta and Quest, are well-known to VR users. Meta also has substantial marketing experience as to a wide range of VR apps, including Beat Saber, that it could leverage to enter the VR Dedicated Fitness App market. Indeed, users

already associate Meta's Beat Saber app with incidental fitness. This "name awareness" would facilitate Meta's organic entry into the VR Dedicated Fitness App market, as a dedicated fitness-oriented version of Beat Saber would be in line with users' understanding of the Beat Saber brand.

69. Meta also has incentives to enter the VR Dedicated Fitness App market.

70. [redacted]

71. Meta is well aware that fitness VR apps could enable it to reach new categories of consumers. [redacted]

72. [redacted]

73. [redacted]

74. [redacted]

75. [redacted]

76. [redacted]

77. [redacted]

78. [redacted]

79. Thus, not surprisingly, after Meta's acquisition of Beat Games and immediately prior to the launch of Supernatural, Beat Saber released a new track called "FitBeat," which included virtual "walls" or "obstacles" that users would have to dodge. [redacted] Obstacles also appear on other tracks, forcing users to duck and dodge, but they can be turned off.

80. [redacted] has already included both a 360-degree mode where targets come from all sides and a no-fail mode that allows users to complete tracks despite missing blocks in

recent updates—a feature that fitness-focused users can adopt to ensure an uninterrupted workout.

81. [redacted]

82. [redacted]

83. In fact, Meta's internal codename for the proposed acquisition of Within was "Project Eden," a reference to its belief that Apple was also interested in acquiring Within.

84. Meta also hired away the head of product for Supernatural at Within to work at Meta following the Supernatural launch. That individual's portfolio at Meta included expanding Meta's presence into new verticals, including the VR fitness vertical.

85. [redacted]

86. [redacted]

87. Accordingly, absent this anticompetitive Acquisition, there is a reasonable probability that Meta would have exercised one of its other available options to enter the VR Dedicated Fitness App market.

2. It is Reasonably Probable That Alternative Entry by Meta Would Substantially Deconcentrate the Market and Have Other Procompetitive Effects

88. Meta's entry into the VR Dedicated Fitness App market—whether by adding new features to one of its existing apps or developing a new VR dedicated fitness app from scratch—would have the effect of substantially deconcentrating and increasing competition in the market.

89. Building instead of buying would entail developing additional expertise, undertaking product research and design, hiring more employees, and making other key investments. Meta recognizes that building its own VR dedicated fitness app would require time, additional developer talent, and effort. But such efforts would reflect the very essence of competition, the dynamic that the antitrust laws seek to protect and promote.

90. Alternative entry by Meta would introduce a new competitor into the market with the backing of one of the world's largest, most well-resourced, and most experienced VR industry participants. Such entry would increase consumer choice, increase innovation, spur additional competition to attract the best employees, and yield a host of other competitive benefits. Crucially, it would *also* maintain the independent presence and competitive vitality of the [redacted] VR dedicated fitness app [redacted] Supernatural.

91. The Acquisition would eliminate the probability of such entry, potentially dampening future innovation and leading to a market with less beneficial rivalry and competitive pressure.

3. Within Reasonably Perceived Meta as a Potential Entrant to the VR Dedicated Fitness App Market

92. In light of Meta's economic characteristics, size, resources, capabilities, advantages, and incentives, it would be eminently reasonable for a VR dedicated fitness app market participant to perceive Meta as a potential entrant.

93. As explained in detail above, Meta is a massive, wealthy company with extensive control over and experience in various aspects of the VR industry. It has recently expanded into a variety of VR-related areas, including by acquiring the most popular VR incidental fitness app (Beat Saber) and by internally developing a system-level fitness tracking tool that can run in the background of other apps (Oculus Move). In a recent earnings report, Meta announced that it anticipated spending some $10 billion across its Reality Labs division, which has found its biggest success to date with the Quest 2 Headset and Quest Store, and that it is committed to increasing those investments over the next several years. The VR dedicated fitness app market is especially attractive for a host of reasons, giving Meta a strong incentive to enter it. And Meta internally identified multiple means of entering the VR dedicated fitness app market.

94. [redacted]

95. [redacted]

96. Meta also lured away Within's head of product for Supernatural shortly after Supernatural's launch.

4. Meta's Presence as a Perceived Potential Entrant Likely Influences Competition in the VR Dedicated Fitness App Market

97. [redacted] The Acquisition would eliminate that competitive influence.

98. [redacted]

99. [redacted]

100. [redacted]

101. [redacted]

[redacted]

102. [redacted] That competitive pressure—and all of the benefits it yields—would be eliminated by the Acquisition.

LACK OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS

103. Defendants cannot demonstrate that new entry or expansion by existing firms will be timely, likely, or sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects.

104. There are multiple barriers to entering or expanding in the relevant market, including time, network effects, ongoing development and content creation costs, post-launch support, capital, brand recognition, and the need for consumers to be able to discover the app. Developing a high-quality entrant also requires hiring the "talent needed to create true triple-A VR experiences," talent that Meta acknowledges is increasingly scarce.

105. To be sold on the Quest store, Meta itself must decide to approve an app through a technical review and a curation process by Meta that examines "quality, polish, entertainment, value, and utility." This can be a lengthy process and there is no guarantee any third-party app will ultimately be approved.

106. No other company has the combination of resources, VR know-how, and control over the leading app store and the overall Quest VR experience that Meta has.

107. Once Meta—which also owns the Quest platform and app store—entrenches [redacted] in VR dedicated fitness through the Acquisition, it will effectively raise barriers to entry and expansion as other companies interested in the space will understand that they need to compete with a deep-pocketed platform operator that owns the [redacted] VR dedicated fitness app.

108. Defendants cannot demonstrate cognizable, verifiable, transaction-specific efficiencies that would be sufficient to reverse the strong presumption and evidence of the Acquisition's likely significant anticompetitive effects.

LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS, BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES, AND NEED FOR RELIEF

109. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the Commission, whenever it has reason to believe that a proposed merger is unlawful, to seek preliminary injunctive relief to prevent consummation of a merger until the Commission has had an opportunity to adjudicate the merger's legality in an administrative proceeding. In deciding whether to grant relief, the Court must balance the likelihood of the Commission's ultimate success on the merits against the equities, using a sliding scale. The principal equity in cases brought under Section 13(b) is the public's interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. Private equities affecting only Defendants' interests cannot tip the scale against a preliminary injunction.

110. The Commission is likely to succeed in proving that the effect of the Acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act.

111. Preliminary relief is warranted and necessary. Should the Acquisition ultimately be adjudicated unlawful, reestablishing the status quo would be difficult, if not impossible, if the Acquisition has already occurred in the absence of preliminary relief. Allowing the Acquisition to close before the completion of the administrative proceeding would cause irreparable harm by, among other things, enabling the combined firm to begin altering Within's operations and business plans, accessing Within's sensitive business information, eliminating key Within personnel, changing Within's product development efforts, and preventing Within from raising the funding necessary to continue operations and maintain its growth trajectory. In the absence of relief from this Court, substantial harm to competition would occur in the interim.

112. Accordingly, the equitable relief requested here is in the public interest. The Commission respectfully requests that the Court:

113. Preliminarily enjoin Defendants from taking any further steps to consummate the Acquisition, or any other acquisition of stock, assets, or other interests of one another, either directly or indirectly;

114. Retain jurisdiction and maintain the *status quo* until the administrative proceeding initiated by the Commission is concluded; and

115. Award such other and further relief as the Court may determine is appropriate, just, and proper.

Dated: October 7, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. META PLATFORMS, INC., et al., Defendants.	Case No. 5:22-cv-04325-EJD **DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT** Hearing: February 23, 2023, at 9:00 a.m. Dept.: Courtroom 4 – 5th Floor Judge: Hon. Edward J. Davila

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Meta and Within respectfully request that the Court dismiss with prejudice the Federal Trade Commission's Amended Complaint ("AC") under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court should have no misunderstanding of what is at stake. Vertical acquisitions like this one, by established firms purchasing a target outside the markets in which they compete, are generally lawful and indeed significantly pro-competitive: no existing competition is lost, and the acquirer can bring the benefits of experience and resources to the acquired firm, leading to benefits for consumers – the touchstone of federal antitrust law. *See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.*, 468 U.S. 85, 106-07 (1984) (antitrust laws are a "consumer welfare prescription"). This axiom is particularly true for new products like Supernatural. The government cites no case in which it has successfully challenged such an acquisition of a new business – ever.

Perhaps recognizing that the appropriate legal standard dooms this "potential competition" case, the FTC proposes a novel and untenable legal theory. Its Amended Complaint asserts that Section 7 prohibits virtually any acquisition that involves (1) a new product (as to which a first mover may have a large share of the revenues) and (2) an acquirer that *could* theoretically enter on its own. This standard would likely condemn every new-market acquisition that the government chooses to challenge. But the FTC's purported standard is not the law. *Marine Bancorporation* is the Supreme Court's last and governing word on all "potential competition" claims – and the FTC fails to plead facts that could establish a plausible case under the intentionally rigorous requirements established in that case.

The risk of *harm* from an incorrect decision here cannot be ameliorated by the FTC's bland assurance (at 4) that it seeks no more than an "interim" pause, based on whatever "serious" question it might be able to raise. That is simply not true. This case, before this Court, is the *only* trial this vertical acquisition will ever get. If the Court grants the requested injunction, there is no possibility that the parties will wait for the years it will necessarily take – through an administrative trial, Commission review, and appeal – to find out whether they can combine. Equally wrong is the

FTC's constant incantation of language from a 1984 decision, *Warner*, to the effect that it need only show a "serious question" to get its requested injunction. The controlling statute, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes a preliminary injunction *only* after the FTC has established that it is *likely to succeed on the merits* and that the balance of the equities favors injunction. Nothing in *Warner* or in any other case modifies or eliminates those statutory requirements, which is why, in the nearly 40 years since, not one court has granted an injunction in a potential competition case based on the FTC's proposed standard. On the contrary, courts have recognized their obligation to assess the merits and the equities. The same should happen here.

The reason for the lack of authority supporting the FTC is clear: *Marine Bancorporation* instructed that *no* potential competition claim, of any variety, can succeed in the absence of a dysfunctional, oligopolistic market – as to both structure and behavior – protected by significant entry barriers. The Supreme Court held that a "perceived potential competition" claim requires facts showing that firms in the target market were *actually* restrained from oligopolistic, cartel-like behavior – such as setting price in lockstep – specifically by the fear of entry by the acquiring firm *alone*. The Supreme Court was even stronger in its warning about the inherently speculative "actual potential competition" claim. "Unequivocal proof" is "rarely available" that an acquiring company, absent an acquisition, would have entered a new market on its own, and the Supreme Court pointedly noted that it had never accepted the validity of such a theory, despite opportunities to do so. *United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 602, 624 (1974). The FTC here alleges none of what the Supreme Court requires for resort to this highly questionable legal theory.

Held to the standards of *Marine Bancorporation*, the Amended Complaint fails to state facts meeting each of the required elements, much less facts amounting to a plausible claim as to these elements. Ignoring that authority, the FTC argues that the instant motion is untimely (it is not), that the 1984 *Warner* case controls (it does not even address Rule 12 or *Marine Bancorporation*), and that there is no authority that permits dismissal of a Section 13(b) case (when every case filed in federal court must state a fact-supported, plausible claim under a valid legal theory). On the issues that matter here, the FTC cannot point to any pleaded facts that could satisfy the limited, long-mothballed doctrine it is trying to revive and reconfigure.

ARGUMENT

I. The FTC Cannot Avoid Examination of Its Amended Complaint Under *Twombly*

First, there is no issue of timeliness. *See* Opp. at 21-23. The FTC filed its Amended Complaint on October 7, 2022, after dropping its traditional Section 7 horizontal-merger claim and changing its market allegations. *See* Mot. at 1. Defendants consented to the filing of this amended pleading, but made clear to the FTC that they planned to move to dismiss. *See* Dkt. 101 at 2. Despite having 14 days to "respond," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3), Defendants moved less than one week later. The motion was therefore timely. *See Miller v. Fuhu Inc.*, 2015 WL 2085490, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2015); *see also Adesanya v. INS*, 1993 WL 210801, at *1 (9th Cir. June 16, 1993) (judgment noted at 996 F.2d 1223). The Amended Complaint narrowed the FTC's claim to a legally deficient theory, such that a ruling on the pleadings would obviate the need for any hearing.[1] The FTC cites no case in which a court refused to consider a timely Rule 12(b)(6) motion in these circumstances. *See*, *e.g.*, *Townsend Farms v. Goknur Gida*, 2016 WL 10570248, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (defendants partially moved to dismiss after plaintiff amended to *add* more claims). In all events, the FTC espouses empty formalism because this Court can convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 12(c) motion at any time, where the facial sufficiency of a complaint is challenged.[2] *See Trachsel v. Buchholz*, 2009 WL 86698, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009).

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[1] For the same reason, dismissal with prejudice is proper. *See Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG*, 2022 WL 2644096, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2022) (Davila, J.), *appeal pending*, No. 22-2107 (Fed. Cir.). Indeed, in the case the FTC cites (at 2-3 n.1), this Court *granted* a motion to dismiss *with prejudice*. *See Press Rentals, Inc. v. Genesis Fluid Sols., Ltd.*, 2014 WL 31251, at *3, *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (Davila, J.). A with-prejudice dismissal is particularly warranted because the FTC filed its original Complaint *after* completing an investigation of the proposed transaction.

[2] The case on which the FTC relies (at 22) acknowledges this point. *See Brooks v. Caswell*, 2016 WL 866303, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2016). Rule 12(c) was unavailable there because the defendants had not yet answered. But here the FTC stipulated that Defendants' answers to the

Second, *FTC v. Warner Communications Inc.*, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), says nothing about Rule 12, nor does it, as the FTC suggests (at 2-4), lower the FTC's burden of pleading or proof. *Warner* acknowledged that Section 13(b) requires a determination of the FTC's "likelihood of success," the traditional and statutory standard for preliminary relief. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Deciding whether the FTC has met that statutory burden entails considering whether an FTC win in its own forum is likely to survive review "ultimately by the Court of Appeals." *Warner*, 742 F.2d at 1162; *see also FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp.*, 532 F.2d 708, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J.) (same). *Warner* did not change what it means to establish likelihood of success, nor did it (or could it) amend the controlling language in Section 13(b) itself. *See FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999) (Section 13(b) requires establishing a "likelihood of success on the merits"); *FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd.*, 882 F.2d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). The Supreme Court's decision in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), not *Warner*, controls this motion, while *Marine Bancorporation* controls the substantive requirements the FTC must plead facts to satisfy. And no court has held, or could hold, that Section 13(b) claims are exempt from *Twombly*.

Third, the FTC points (at 2) to the paucity of Section 13(b) potential competition claims – and, likewise, decisions on the pleadings – to make a virtue of its lack of success. The FTC has *never* obtained an injunction under Section 13(b) in these circumstances. It has tried only three times, each a failure. *See generally FTC v. Tenneco, Inc.*, 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977) (denying injunction); *FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); *FTC v. Steris Corp.*, 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (same). No defendant moved to dismiss in those cases. That tactical choice, based on different complaints – and in two instances pre-*Twombly* law on Rule 12(b)(6) – does nothing to support the FTC's argument. No complaint may proceed in federal court unless it alleges *facts* that, taken as true, establish a plausible claim to relief under a valid legal theory. *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. While some potential competition cases have

original Complaint are operative as to the Amended Complaint *and* acknowledged that Defendants might move to dismiss.

failed after trials, courts can resolve facially invalid claims of this nature on the pleadings – and have, repeatedly. *See DeHoog v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV*, 899 F.3d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of Section 7 potential competition claim where complaint failed to include the facts necessary to support the claim); *Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA*, 649 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947-50 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (similar), *aff'd*, 623 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2010).

II. The FTC Fails To State a Claim Under *Twombly* and *Marine Bancorporation*

The motion previously demonstrated that, under controlling authority, *any* potential competition claim must fail in the absence of facts showing a dysfunctional market afflicted by oligopolistic *structure* and *conduct*. The FTC has not even attempted to point to any facts showing oligopolistic behavior, as they are entirely absent from the Amended Complaint; neither has the FTC made plausible allegations showing oligopoly structure. (Point A.) For its "perceived potential competition" claim, it has likewise failed to point to any facts that could establish that fear of Meta entry, and that alone, actually restrained what would otherwise have been oligopolistic conduct by Within or others. (Point B.) And "actual potential competition" does not state a valid legal theory at all, but, if it did, the FTC's facts cannot even satisfy its own construction of what such a claim might look like. (Point C.)

A. The FTC Does Not Allege Oligopolistic Structure or Behavior

Potential entry is of no antitrust significance in markets that are *already* competitive. *See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 602, 630 (1974). The theory can be invoked, if at all, only in mature markets that have few competitors and little or no competition ("oligopoly").[3] The Amended Complaint fails to include any facts sufficient to support a claim that

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[3] *See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (explaining that oligopoly is where "firms in a concentrated market [can] in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions"); *Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.*, 498 F.2d 851, 860 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (describing oligopoly in rejecting potential competition claim).

the alleged "VR Dedicated Fitness App" market is oligopolistic – as to either structure or behavior. Indeed the few facts pleaded suggest the opposite: a vigorously competitive space characterized by innovation and rapid entry. *See* Mot. at 9-15.[4]

1. The FTC Must Plead Facts Establishing a Plausible Claim of Oligopolistic Behavior by Current Market Participants

Because the FTC must concede (at 7) that it has not alleged any facts demonstrating oligopolistic behavior in the "VR Dedicated Fitness App" market, it argues that it need not do so: there is "no authority for this remarkable proposition," it says.

The authority is *Marine Bancorporation*, which states expressly that both oligopolistic structure and behavior are necessary elements. Thus, the Court held that potential competition doctrine "comes into play only where there are [(1)] dominant participants in the target market . . . with the capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods or services" – that is, oligopoly structure – "and" that are (2) "engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior" – that is, oligopolistic behavior. *Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 630; *see* Mot. at 9 (citing this standard). The FTC has no answer to the Supreme Court's plain statement of the legal standard except to ignore it.

The FTC suggests (remarkably) that the Supreme Court took these elements back later in the decision. But it did not. *Marine Bancorporation*'s subsequent discussion of concentration ratios shows that "actual market behavior" remains a prerequisite for liability even where there are high market shares and high barriers to entry. 418 U.S. at 632 n.34. The FTC mistakenly contends (at 7) that *Yamaha* dispenses with this prerequisite – as though lower courts could ignore Supreme Court holdings. But there the oligopoly (eight firms shrinking to five, in the mature U.S. market for

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[4] The FTC does not and cannot plead oligopoly because, *according to the FTC*, competition in "VR Dedicated Fitness" includes not just the five competitors identified in the Amended Complaint but *nine* separate apps – a near doubling in less than three years. *See* FTC's Third Suppl. Resps. & Objs. to Defs.' Interrog. No. 5, at 9-11 (Oct. 25, 2022). The Amended Complaint is silent on the key point, therefore, for good reason.

outboard engines) was conceded by the defendants, and the court had no reason to address this required element. *See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC*, 657 F.2d 971, 978-80 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that defendant argued only that it was "in no position to enter" and that the challenged agreement's anticompetitive effects "were outweighed by the procompetitive effects").

The FTC finally retreats to policy argument – relying on out-of-context quotes from cases that predate *Marine Bancorporation* to suggest that, because Section 7 allows plaintiffs to "'thwart[ ]'" anticompetitive "'practices in their incipiency,'" actual oligopolistic conduct cannot be a requirement. Opp. at 7 (quoting *FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.*, 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967)). But the controlling policy comes from *Marine Bancorporation*, which explains that *potential* competition doctrine – where it exists at all – cannot come into play in the absence of proof that the market is not actually functioning competitively. The *threat* that something might happen in the future is simply not enough. That makes perfect sense: a mere change in ownership of an existing company does not make any market more concentrated or less competitive. *See Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 630-31 (explaining that potential competitors have no effect on already competitive markets). Acquisitions are an important way for companies to invest and innovate – and *Marine Bancorporation*'s threshold requirement of oligopolistic structure *and* behavior guards against regulatory central planning to bad competitive effect.

The Amended Complaint concededly has no facts plausibly showing that "dominant participants in the target market [are] engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior." *Id.* at 630. That is fatal to both claims here.

2. The FTC Fails To Plead Oligopolistic Structure

a. The FTC argues (at 7-10) that all it need allege to establish a plausible claim that its alleged market is oligopolistic in structure is [redacted] for two competitors. *See* AC ¶¶ 52-53. As the Amended Complaint asserts, Supernatural launched less than three years ago; FitXR was allegedly the "[redacted]." *Id.* ¶ 53. Entry has been constant and more is expected – *according to the FTC*. *See id.* ¶ 98 (Within founder Chris Milk stating "[redacted]"). Indeed, the FTC admits throughout its Amended Complaint that this rapid expansion and entry is occurring within a "VR industry [that] is currently characterized by a *high degree of innovation and growth*." *Id.* ¶ 25 (emphasis added); *see also id.* ¶ 5 (alleging that VR is a "growing industry" and fitness is a "fast-growing category"), ¶ 33 ("dedicated or deliberate fitness is the fastest growing category"), ¶ 73 (similar). The FTC cites no authority for the sweeping proposition that high [redacted], for a new product in a rapidly expanding, nascent market, state a plausible claim of structural oligopoly.

That is for good reason. The essential characteristic of an oligopolistic market is that the participants coordinate their conduct to extract high profits without fear of competitive response. *See Missouri Portland*, 498 F.2d at 860; *Brooke Grp.*, 509 U.S. at 227-28 (explaining that the oligopolistic "minuet is most difficult to compose and to perform," "especially in the context of changing or unprecedented market circumstances"); *see also* Mot. at 9-10. Nothing about the alleged structure of the "VR Dedicated Fitness" market states a plausible claim that any firm has done this – no profits are alleged for *any* firm – or *can* do it. In short, the unexceptional finding that the first entrants gain a [redacted] does not support a claim of oligopolistic structure. *See* Mot. at 11.

b. The implausibility of the FTC's claim is confirmed by the absence of facts showing barriers to entry, as well as the FTC's admissions that entry has occurred and is expected to continue. *See* AC ¶¶ 53, 70, 72, 98-100; Mot. at 10. If entry is practicable and occurring, then existing market participants – before and after the challenged acquisition – will have no "capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods or services." *Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 630; *see also United States v. Syufy Enters.*, 903 F.2d 659, 671 n.21 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he lack of entry barriers prevents the government from prevailing on its Clayton Act claim, as Syufy's acquisition of its competitors was not likely to substantially lessen competition.").

i. The FTC first argues (at 8) that it "need not allege any entry barriers to . . . make out a prima facie case" of oligopoly. No case supports this position. The FTC does not identify a single potential competition case – and certainly none since *Marine Bancorporation* – that found liability in the absence of high barriers to entry. The FTC's efforts to claim a *presumption* of oligopoly based on [redacted] is without any support. The only "presumption" in Section 7 cases is based on *increases* in concentration arising from horizontal mergers in mature markets with few competitors ("concentrated" markets). No such presumption is applicable here, where the acquisition does not involve horizontal competitors and does not increase concentration at all.[5]

ii. The FTC next says (at 8-10) that, if it does have to allege barriers to entry, it has done so. But the only supposed "barriers" identified in the Amended Complaint – time and money – are no barriers at all. As the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly explained, neither the fact that it takes *some* time and capital to enter a market (*see* AC ¶ 104), nor fear of competition itself (*see id.* ¶¶ 104-107), can be considered antitrust barriers to entry. *See* Mot. at 11-12 (citing *Syufy*, 903 F.2d at 667; *Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 51 F.3d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995)). The cases cited by the FTC (at 9) are all notable for the presence of *facts* as to actual barriers far different from the vague and unquantified need for time and capital the FTC musters here.

The FTC points (at 8) to allegations that Meta has invested heavily in VR. But that hardly can be claimed as a barrier to others; indeed, the supposedly [redacted] firm in the putative "VR Dedicated Fitness" market is a small startup with none of Meta's resources. The FTC also claims (at 8) that VR talent is supposedly "increasingly scarce," but this conclusory and vague allegation falls far short of pleading facts amounting to a plausible claim that a talent shortage prevents rivals from developing new "VR Dedicated Fitness" apps. As for "network effects," the FTC's brief (at 9-10) says only that network effects are relevant to some undefined category it calls "digital markets," but neither the brief nor the Amended Complaint says anything about why they create

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[5] *See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd.*, 778 F.3d 775, 786 (9th Cir. 2015) (only "[m]ergers that *increase* the HHI more than 200 points *and* result in highly concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market power") (emphases added; internal quotation marks omitted); *United States v. AT&T, Inc.*, 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ("the government cannot use a short cut to establish a presumption of anticompetitive effect through statistics about the change in market concentration" when the "merger[] produce[s] no *immediate* change in the relevant market share") (emphasis added); *FTC v. RAG-Stiftung*, 436 F. Supp. 3d 278, 310-11 (D.D.C. 2020) (holding that, where FTC "failed to show undue concentration" from the transaction, it had not made out "its prima facie case" under Section 13(b)).

some kind of barrier to entry for "VR Dedicated Fitness" apps, *i.e.*, the relevant market alleged here. *Compare* AC ¶ 104 *with id.* ¶¶ 5-7 (alleging that network effects matter to the growth of the Quest *platform*, not to the growth of fitness apps on the platform).

iii. Finally, the FTC speculates (at 8, 10) that Meta may, at some future date[6] and in some unspecified way, make it difficult for other fitness apps to gain a place on Quest. But access to Quest is *not* access to VR more broadly; there are other existing platforms and new platforms are expected imminently. The FTC fails to allege facts showing *either* that there is a current barrier to entry created by Meta's control of its platform *or* that Meta will terminate its current practice of providing distribution to non-Meta apps, just as it provided distribution to Supernatural starting before the acquisition (and still does to FitXR now). The FTC's theory is incoherent as well as fact-free: its Amended Complaint maintains that Meta's incentive as the owner of a nascent VR platform is to bring in as many developers as possible. *See* Mot. at 13. To the extent Meta wishes to give preference to its own products, it would have the same incentives whether it acquires Supernatural or, as the FTC alleges will happen, develops its own "VR Dedicated Fitness" application. Thus, any alleged harm on that theory is agnostic as to the instant acquisition.

B. The "Perceived Potential Competition" Theory Also Fails Because the FTC Does Not Allege Meta's Potential Entry Actually Stopped Oligopolistic Behavior

The Supreme Court stated explicitly that *perceived* potential competition claims depend on facts establishing that fear of Meta entry – Meta entry alone, and not that of other potential entrants – *actually* stopped current competitors from engaging in oligopolistic behavior. *See* Mot. at 15-16. *Marine Bancorporation* demands that "the acquiring firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market *in fact* tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that market." 418 U.S. at 624-25 (emphasis added). If current competitors were not engaging in, e.g., price coordination, there was no dysfunctional market. If the acquiring firm is just one of a number

[6] There is no barrier to entry now – the Amended Complaint admits both that Meta owns "the top-grossing" VR game (Beat Saber), AC ¶ 30, and that hundreds of other non-Meta owned games have entered the market and are distributed on Quest, *id.* ¶ 28.

of potential threats that stopped such behavior, then changing the ownership of one firm makes no difference to competition and can in fact be "a good way to break through the comfortable vices of oligopoly." *Missouri Portland*, 498 F.2d at 860. On both levels, the Amended Complaint states no facts amounting to a plausible claim.

1. The FTC's six paragraphs on fear of Meta, *see* AC ¶¶ 97-102, claim only that Within perceived Meta's existing app (Beat Saber) as one "competitive 'threat'" among others. *Id.* ¶ 99. This is deficient in two fundamental respects: First, there is no factual allegation that Within (or anyone else) had been engaging, or would have been engaging, in oligopolistic conduct – for example, price coordination or output restrictions. Second, there are no facts that make a plausible claim that Within or any other firm stopped such anticompetitive conduct (or decided not to engage in it) solely out of concern that Meta would enter. Yet both are required. *See Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 624-25. The FTC's core claim – that Meta made Within "more competitive," AC ¶ 98 – misses the mark by a mile.

The FTC, recognizing that it has no facts to satisfy the correct legal standard, instead tries (at 17) to rewrite *Marine Bancorporation*, changing it to hold that no more is required than a "likely influence on existing competition" by the potential entrant. But this selective quotation comes not from the Court's holding but rather from its *description* of the lower court's basis for rejecting the perceived potential competition claim. *See Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 640. The FTC's need to mischaracterize the Supreme Court's holding is further evidence that it cannot plead facts to satisfy the holding's requirements. If accepted, the FTC's standard would prevent scores of beneficial acquisitions, because it can *always* be argued that the looming presence of other firms somehow "influences" competition.

2. The FTC resorts notably and primarily to cases (at 18-19) that *predate Marine Bancorporation*. To the extent those cases articulate or apply any looser standards, they do not survive the Supreme Court's subsequent and authoritative articulation of controlling law.

United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973), does not help the FTC. *Marine Bancorporation* specifically clarified that *Falstaff* should be read to demand that "the acquiring firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market *in fact tempered oligopolistic* *behavior* on the part of existing participants." 418 U.S. at 624-25 (discussing *Falstaff*) (emphasis added). Similarly irrelevant are *United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), *aff'd mem. sub nom. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States*, 418 U.S. 906 (1974), and *United States v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.*, 430 F. Supp. 729, 773 (D. Md. 1976) – two district court cases that either precede *Marine Bancorporation* (*Phillips*) or plainly fail to follow it (*Black & Decker*). Moreover, even *Phillips* demanded a showing that the acquisition "eliminated a *substantial* effect upon *competition*" from the specific firm at the edge of the market. 367 F. Supp. at 1234 (emphases added).[7] The Amended Complaint does not plead facts that would rise to the level of even this lower, incorrect standard. And *Black & Decker* (which denied the requested injunction but suggested in *dicta* that actual market response is not required) is simply wrong.

C. The Actual Potential Competition Claim Is Invalid

1. Actual Potential Competition Is Not a Valid Legal Theory

The Supreme Court in *Marine Bancorporation* warned lower courts that, despite more than one opportunity, it had never endorsed an "actual potential competition" theory. Aged decisions that preceded this warning can no longer be relied on, as modern appellate courts have likewise refused to endorse the theory the FTC advances here. *Compare* Mot. at 16-17 *with Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC*, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); *Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC*, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); *Phillips*, 367 F. Supp. 1226; *and United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.*, 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), *aff'd mem.*, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).[8]

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[7] The FTC notes (at 10, 20) that *Phillips* was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Having issued its decision in *Marine Bancorporation* on June 26, 1974, the Supreme Court's summary affirmance (without merits briefing, argument, or opinion) 12 days later cannot be understood to limit the Court's holding in *Marine Bancorporation. See* Stephen M. Shapiro et al., *Supreme Court Practice* § 5.17, at 366 (10th ed. 2013) (precedential effect of summary affirmance is "limited").

[8] The facts also distinguish these pre-*Marine Bancorporation* cases. *See Phillips*, 367 F. Supp. at 1230 (acquirer was one of the eight largest oil companies in the country but had not yet

The sole supposed post-*Marine Bancorporation* case that the FTC cites in an attempt to support its theory is, on careful examination, no support at all. *Yamaha* involved a concededly mature, oligopolistic market (this element was not challenged) with eight competitors shrinking down to five in the years preceding the case. It did not involve the acquisition of a target company producing a new product that the acquirer did not itself produce. Rather, *Yamaha* involved an *agreement* that Yamaha would not sell Yamaha-branded outboard motors in the United States. Yamaha had already twice attempted U.S. entry and would have *actually* returned but for the joint venture. Yamaha was therefore an actual and not a potential competitor (as was Brunswick, the other party to the venture). *See Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 623 n.24 (company that competed in other geographic markets and with "tentative supply contract" in relevant market was an actual, not potential, competitor); *United States v. Aetna Inc.*, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 78 (D.D.C. 2017) (similar). The "situation [wa]s very different" and "considerably more definite" than where the purported entrant "had never produced or sold" the relevant product. *Yamaha*, 657 F.2d at 980 n.12 (distinguishing *BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC*, 557 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1977)).

The FTC gamely suggests (at 20) that *Yamaha* is apposite, because Yamaha had not yet sold "high-horsepower" outboard motors, such that the case involved, at least in part, new product entry. But that is wrong, too. Yamaha's high-horsepower model "was marketed in Japan in 1973 and 1974," and it already had actual "plans to market" another high-horsepower model in the United States. *Yamaha*, 657 F.2d at 978; *see id.* at 979 ("The 55-h.p. motor . . . was actually being marketed in Japan in 1973."). *Yamaha*, if relevant authority at all given the Supreme Court's expressed skepticism of "actual potential competition," is no help to the FTC here.

2. The FTC's Actual Potential Competition Claim Is Fatally Speculative

If actual potential competition can ever be a basis for Section 7 liability, it must necessarily be cabined to cases in which there is "clear proof" that the acquiring firm actually was going to enter the target market. *See In re B.A.T. Indus., Ltd.*, 1984 WL 565384, at *10 (FTC Dec. 17, 1984)

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entered California market); *Schlitz Brewing*, 253 F. Supp. at 138 (the acquirer was an established beer producer that had not yet entered the target geographic market).

("Our review of the legal and economic bases for the actual potential competition doctrine has persuaded us that clear proof that independent entry would have occurred but for the merger or acquisition should be required to establish that a firm is an actual potential competitor."); *see also* *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 569 (holding speculation about potential entry insufficient to maintain Section 1 claim and noting that firms "do not expand without limit and none of them enters every market that an outside observer might regard as profitable"). Considering the speculative endeavor of predicting future competition, and the fact that the "likelihood of injury will fall substantially if independent entry is only reasonably probable," the FTC thus admitted that it could bring these claims only in cases where there was "clear proof," based on its assessment of what the law required. *B.A.T. Indus.*, 1984 WL 565384, at *10. Given the widespread judicial criticism of the entire theory as inherently speculative, *see* Mot. at 16-17, the FTC understandably sought to save this weapon for its arsenal by acknowledging the need for clear proof.

The FTC does not even attempt to argue that it has pleaded facts that make a plausible claim under this "clear proof" standard. In an apparent attempt to disclaim its own precedent, *see* Opp. at 15 n.6, the FTC contends instead (at 11-12) that it need only plead facts establishing a "reasonable probability" that Meta would enter – a standard the FTC considered and rejected in *B.A.T. Industries*. But courts of appeals have repeatedly rejected that lesser standard. *See Republic of Texas Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys.*, 649 F.2d 1026, 1047 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (citing *Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys.*, 638 F.2d 1255, 1268 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981)); *United States v. Siemens Corp.*, 621 F.2d 499, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1980); *Atlantic Richfield*, 549 F.2d at 294-95; *see also B.A.T. Indus.*, 1984 WL 565384, at *9 n.34 ("After initially adopting the 'reasonable probability' standard, the Second Circuit . . . recognized its problems and endorsed the 'clear proof' standard instead.").

Ignoring this precedent, the FTC argues (at 14-15) that, even if it can prevail at trial only with "clear proof" of entry, it nonetheless pleads a valid claim by alleging facts to show far less: a "reasonable probability" of entry. Unsurprisingly, it has no authority for this farfetched proposition, and it is evident that facts reaching the level of "reasonably probable" do not and cannot establish a plausible claim of "clear proof."

Ultimately, the FTC's alleged facts do not make a plausible case under either standard. The FTC points (at 12-13) to allegations that Meta possesses certain advantages (capital, existing studios, access to its own platform) that could make it a possible entrant. Those and other speculative allegations that Meta "could" have entered – an oft-repeated phrase in the Amended Complaint (at ¶¶ 5, 10, 57, 59, 62, 68, 77, 86) – fall short of a plausible showing that Meta would actually enter. *See B.A.T. Indus.*, 1984 WL 565384, at *13 (requiring "concrete internal plans for independent entry"); *Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC*, 689 F.2d 346, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1982) ("interest," "incentive," and "financial resources" to enter only amounted to "unsupported speculation"); *Siemens*, 621 F.2d at 507 ("interest and incentive to enter" was "inadequate to demonstrate the likelihood, much less the certainty," of entry).

The Amended Complaint therefore fails to state a claim in light of the Supreme Court's warning that any actual potential competition claim (if there ever can be one) requires as an element "proof" that "an acquiring firm actually would have entered de novo" but for the acquisition. *Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 624. The FTC's "woulda, coulda, shoulda" does not come close to the necessary facts.

Nor does the FTC allege that Meta's but-for entry would be "imminent." *Id.* at 623 n.22. The FTC asserts (at 16) that it need not allege the timing of Meta's entry, asking the Court once again to defy contrary instruction in *Marine Bancorporation*. As the Second Circuit reasoned, an actual potential competition claim without a showing of alternative entry at "some reasonable temporal estimate related to the near future" is "wholly speculative" and "based largely on 'ephemeral possibilities'" of what could happen at some unknown date. *BOC Int'l*, 557 F.2d at 28-29 (quoting *Marine Bancorporation*, 418 U.S. at 622-23). So too here. This is yet another reason why the FTC's transparent efforts to recast Section 7 as a "no merger" tool to be used against any disfavored acquirer should be rejected here. Its claims have neither legal nor factual support.

CONCLUSION

Because the FTC has provided no basis to conclude that it could solve the defects in its complaint through another amendment, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

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Respectfully submitted,

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