#### Class 16 slides

# Unit 8: Sysco/US Foods

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# Good things come from SSCO



## Five new concepts

- 1. Cluster markets in product market definition
- 2. Targeted customer markets in product market definition
- 3. Use of overlapping draw areas to define geographic markets
- 4. Auction theory of unilateral effects
- "Litigating the fix"

The Background

#### The deal

- Sysco Corporation to acquire US Foods
  - Announced December 8, 2013
  - □ \$3 billion of Sysco common stock (13% of combined company)
  - □ +\$500 million of cash
  - Assumption of \$4.7 billion of USF debt
  - Total transaction value: \$8.2 billion
  - Agreement expires September 8, 2015 (21 months)





#### The parties

#### Sysco

- Publicly traded "broadline" distributor
- Sales = \$44 billion in food distribution sales 2013
- #1 with about 17% of total food distribution sales nationally
- 72 distribution facilities nationwide



#### US Foods

- Privately owned broadline distributor (Clayton, Dubilier & Rice and KKR)
- Sales = \$22 billion in food distribution sales in 2013
- #2 with about 8.6% of total food distribution sales nationally
- 61 distribution facilities nationwide



#### Deal rationale

- 1. Creates a company with \$65 billion in sales
  - Sysco (#1 w/17%) + USF (#2 w/8.6%) = Combined (#1 w/25.6% of total food distribution sales nationally)
    - Number 3: Performance Group (2.4%)
  - □ Would employ over 14,000 sales reps
    - No other company employs more than 1600
  - Would operate over 13,000 trucks
    - No other company operates more than 1600 trucks
- Immediately accretive to earnings
- Annual recurring synergies > \$600 million (after 3-4 years)
  - Eliminate duplicative overhead
  - More leverage to lower costs of goods (COGS)
  - Optimize distribution facilities and logistics
  - Integrate sales force
  - Bigger platform for enhanced innovation and development of exclusive products

- Food service distribution
  - □ Total industry sales nationwide = \$231 billion (2015)
  - Supply a broad range of fresh, frozen, canned and dry food and non-food products to away-from-home food service operations
  - Customers include—
    - Independently owned single location restaurants, regional and national chain restaurants (majority of sales)
    - Hotels, motels, and resorts
    - Hospitals
    - Schools
    - Government and military facilities
    - Retail locations

- Types of food distributors: Product range/channel
  - 1. Broadline
    - "One-stop" shop—carry everything
  - 2. Specialized
    - Meat
    - Seafood
    - Produce
    - Baked goods
  - 3. Systems distributors
    - "Customized" distributors for fast food, casual chain restaurants (e.g., Burger King, Wendy's, Applebees)
    - Small number of SKUs
    - Often proprietary to chain
    - Very small sales forces
  - 4. Cash-and-carry and club stores
    - E.g., Restaurant Depot, Costco, Sam's Club
    - Do not deliver
    - No sales force dedicated to individual customers
    - Typical customer: independent restaurant

- Types of food distributors: Geographical distribution footprint
  - National
  - Regional
  - Local

Largest food distributors in the United States

Distributor	Distribution Footprint	Distribution Centers
Sysco	Nationwide	72
US Foods	Nationwide	61
Performance Food Group	Eastern/Southern U.S.	24
Gordon Food Service	Midwest, Florida, TX	10
Reinhart Foodservice	East, Mideast	24
Ben E. Keith Co.	Texas and bordering states	7
Food Services of Am.	Northwest	10
Shamrock Foods	Southwest, Southern Calif.	4
Local distributors	Local	1-5 each

- Distribution centers
  - Key for broadline distribution



- 28-foot clear-height ceilings
- "Super-flat" insulated floor systems to meet strict temperature control standards
- Zoned to accommodate the storage of both perishable and dry goods

#### Distribution centers

- US Food distribution centers in 2017
  - Only three more centers than in 2013



# The FTC investigation and litigation

- FTC investigated for one year
  - Second request issued on February 18, 2014 (a little over two months after signing)
  - Investigation ended February 20, 2015
- Fix-it-first solution:
  - On February 16, 2015, Sysco signed a deal to sell 11 of 61 USF distribution centers to #3 Performance Food Group
    - Announced Feb. 16, 2015
    - Conditioned on closing main deal
  - The centers to be divested largely located in the western U.S.
    - PFG had only one center in the West
    - PFG had 24 centers in East/South
  - Accounted for \$4.5 billion in sales
    - About 20% of USF premerger sales
    - Would give PFG a total of \$10.5 billion in sales
    - Compare to \$60.5 billion for the combined firm post-divestiture
- FTC rejected the fix and brought suit
  - Joined by 11 states seeking relief under Clayton Act § 16 in their sovereign capacity
  - Parties "litigated the fix"

## FTC complaint

- Plaintiffs:
  - Federal Trade Commission
  - 10 states plus the District of Columbia
- Filed: February 20, 2015
  - 14 months after signing
- Claim: Acquisition, if consummated, would violate Section 7 in—
  - 1. Nationwide foodservice distribution to "national" customers
    - Combined first and second largest broadline foodservice distributions
    - Results in a combined share of 59%-71% share and HHI deltas of 1500-1966 (depending on metric)
    - Auction unilateral effects
  - 2. 32 local markets
    - With combined shares as high as 90.3% and deltas as high as 4123
    - Auction unilateral effects
- Prayer:
  - Preliminary injunction blocking the deal pending a final adjudication of the merits
  - Query: Should the states also have sought a permanent injunction?

#### The District Court

- Tried in the District Court of the District of Columbia
  - Judge Amit P. Mehta
    - Appointed by President Obama
    - Assumed office: December 19, 2014
    - Assigned case: February 20, 2015



 Case was tried with the understanding that the parties would terminate their merger agreement if the PI was entered



# Testifying experts

- FTC: Dr. Mark A. Israel
  - Senior Managing Director, Compass-Lexecon
  - □ Ph.D in Economics, Stanford University (2001)
  - Extensive testifying experience in antitrust cases (especially merger antitrust cases)



- Parties: Dr. Jerry Hausman
  - Professor of Economics, MIT
  - D.Phil, Oxford (1972)
  - Leading academic econometrician
  - Extensive testifying experience in antitrust cases (including merger antitrust cases)



#### The District Court

- Entered the preliminary injunction blocking the deal
  - Relevant markets
    - Nationwide broadline foodservice distribution to national customers
    - Local broadline foodservice distribution to local customers
  - Anticompetitive effects (upward pricing pressure)
    - PNB presumption
    - Unilateral effects in the national broadline customer market
    - Unilateral effects in local broadline markets
  - Defenses insufficient to put the prima facie case into dispute
    - The PFG "fix"
    - Dealing regionally by national customers
    - Entry/expansion
    - Efficiencies
  - Equities favored the entry of a preliminary injunction

PI entered: June 23, 2015

Deal terminated: June 29, 2015

### Parties abandon the merger

- Costs to Sysco
  - □ \$300 million breakup fee to US Foods
  - \$25 million breakup fee to divestiture buyer Performance Food Group
  - \$265 million to redeem financing
  - □ \$258 million on integration planning and advisers
  - \$100 million in historical financing costs, and
  - \$53 million in computer systems integration

Total cost to Sysco: \$1 billion