



No-Hire Agreement flowed across workers.” Dkt. 344 at 10; *see also* Dkt. 403 ¶¶ 56–58, 60, 61, 64 & Dkt. 405 ¶¶ 25, 31, 39, 47, 57 (reflecting about a dozen citations by Plaintiffs to Prof. Cappelli’s reports in connection with summary judgment); Dkt. 268 at 2–9, 22, 27–28 (further relying on Prof. Cappelli’s opinions in prior proceedings); Dkt. 344 at 2–8, 10–14 (same); Dkt. 363-1 at 5 (same); Dkt. 371 at 9 (same). And this attempt to walk away from Prof. Cappelli is particularly problematic for Plaintiffs because his assumptions about the transferability of McDonald’s training and supposed wage structures across McDonald’s restaurants undergird the opinions from Dr. Singer that Plaintiffs continue to embrace. Without Prof. Cappelli’s single-brand national labor market, for example, Dr. Singer cannot extend the alleged wage suppression to workers—like the two individual Plaintiffs—whose pay data was not analyzed. *See* Dkt. 329, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 35, 43–52. Regardless, even if Plaintiffs no longer wish to tout Prof. Cappelli, they chose to sponsor his opinions and therefore must shoulder the burden of establishing their admissibility. *Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.*, 561 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2009). They have failed to do so.

First, it is demonstrably untrue that the “rough contours” of the relevant market Prof. Cappelli assumes, and any supposed power McDonald’s holds, are based on his study of “empirical research relied on in labor economics, his expertise, and analysis of record evidence in the case.” Dkt. 328 at 10; Dkt. 426 at 2. As McDonald’s explained in its prior briefs, Prof. Cappelli eschewed established methods for determining whether a market exists in favor of ostensible observations contrary to the record evidence. Dkt. 300-1 at 5–9; Dkt. 337 at 2–11. That failure is even starker in the context of this two-plaintiff case, as Prof. Cappelli made no attempt to define geographic parameters for his market, Dkt. 337 at 5, and his key assumptions about the lack of transferability of McDonald’s training are belied by the two individual Plaintiffs’ lived experiences in their respective metropolitan areas, Dkt. 380 ¶¶ 63–65; Dkt. 418 ¶ 12.

Likewise, Prof. Cappelli’s assumption that wage suppression was the “point” of the alleged No-Hire Agreement, Dkt. 328 at 11, is not grounded in any “study of empirical research” or “analysis of record evidence in the case.” Dkt. 426 at 2. To the contrary, the record is bereft of any evidence supporting his assumption. Indeed, Prof. Cappelli admitted (as McDonald’s previously pointed out) that he formed that opinion without reference to any actual evidence about Paragraph 14’s adoption. Dkt. 337 at 4. Had he in fact obtained and reviewed the relevant materials, he would have seen that undisputed evidence shows wage suppression had nothing to do with the establishment of Paragraph 14. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 380 ¶¶ 12–25; Dkt. 419 ¶¶ 7–8. And, to the extent Plaintiffs suggest the No-Hire Agreement is somehow broader than Paragraph 14, Prof. Cappelli did not consider *any evidence* regarding its purported formation because there is none—not one document, or one piece of testimony, that supports the supposition that there is anything else at work in this case besides Paragraph 14 of the franchise agreement, which is precisely what Plaintiffs’ complaints alleged.

Prof. Cappelli’s other arguments are similarly unmoored from any “empirical research” or “analysis of record evidence.” Dkt. 426 at 2. As but one more example, his opinions about purported wage structures are not only contrafactual, Dkt. 300-1 at 13–15, but also untethered to any evidence in the relevant geographic markets. And as to each of the Plaintiff’s local geographic markets, his opinions are contrary to the undisputed sworn testimony of local franchisees. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 382-3 ¶ 13; Dkt. 382-5 ¶¶ 14–17; Dkt. 382-20 ¶¶ 9–10; *see also* Dkt. 299 at 8–9; Dkt. 300-1 at 14–15. That leaves Plaintiffs with only Prof. Cappelli’s *ipse dixit*, which is neither reliable nor helpful. *See Wendler & Ezra, P.C. v. Am. Int’l Grp.*, 521 F.3d 790, 791 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We have said over and over that an expert’s *ipse dixit* is inadmissible.”).

For each and all of these reasons, and as set forth in the prior briefing concerning Prof.

Cappelli, incorporated herein, this Court properly exercises its gatekeeping function under *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), by excluding Prof. Cappelli's unreliable and irrelevant testimony.

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Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Rachel S. Brass, an attorney, hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed on January 4, 2022 and will be served electronically via the Court's ECF Notice system upon the registered parties of record.

/s/ Rachel S. Brass

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