UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THOMAS LAUMANN, FERNANDA GARBER, ROBERT SILVER, DAVID DILLON, GARRETT TRAUB, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated,	No. 12-cv-1817 (SAS)
Plaintiffs,	
V.	
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, et al.,	
Defendants	
FERNANDA GARBER, MARC LERNER, DEREK RASMUSSEN, ROBERT SILVER, GARRETT TRAUB, and VINCENT BIRBIGLIA, representing themselves and all others similarly situated,	No. 12-cv-3704 (SAS)
Plaintiffs,	ECF Cases
V.	
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, et al.,	
Defendants	

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF:

- Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
- Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Dr. Roger G. Noll
- Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Defendants' Expert Dr. Janusz Ordover

Table of Contents

Exhibit	Content	Page Number
	Excerpts from the December 19, 2014	
А	deposition of Dr. Daniel L. McFadden	2
	Excerpts from the October 16 and October	
В	17, 2014 deposition of Dr. Roger G. Noll	19
	Excerpts from the December 11, 2014	
С	deposition of Dr. Janusz A. Ordover	28
	Excerpts from the December 8, 2014	
D	deposition of Dr. Ariel Pakes	64

EXHIBIT A

Daniel McFadden HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL--

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

	I (rayes I to 4)
Page 1	Page 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	¹ APPEARANCES:
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK THOMAS LAUMANN, FERNANDA CIVIL ACTION NO. GARBER, ROBERT SILVER, 12-cv-1817(SAS) GARRETT TRAUB, DAVID DILLON, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated	 ² COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC BY: MATTHEW S. AXELROD, ESQUIRE ⁴ maxelrod@cohenmilstein.com JEFFREY B. DUBNER, ESQUIRE ⁵ jdubner@cohenmilstein.com 1100 New York Avenue NW ⁶ Suite 500 Washington, DC 20005 ⁷ (202) 408-4682 Representing the Plaintiffs
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, NHL ENTERPRISES, L.P., NHL INTERACTIVE CYBER ENTERPRISES, LLC, NEW YORK RANGERS HOCKEY CLUB, NEW YERSEY DEVILS, LLC, NEW YORK ISLANDERS HOCKEY CLUB, L.P., COMCAST-SPECTACOR, L.P., LINCOLN HOCKEY, LLC, LEMIEUX GROUF, L.P., HOCKEY WESTERN NEW YORK, LLC, CHICAGO BLACKHAWKS HOCKEY TEAM, INC., SAN JOSE SHARKS, LLC, DIRECTV, LLC, ROOT SPORTS PITTSBURGH, (Caption continued), Friday, December 19, 2014 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL DEPOSITION OF: DANIEL L. MCFADDEN Kaplan, Leaman and Wolfe 325 Chestnut Street Suite 909 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (800) 295-7571 KapLeaWol@aol.com	 LANGER GROGAN & DIVER, P.C. BY: PETER E. LECKMAN, ESQUIRE (215) 320-0876 pleckman@langergrogan.com 171 Arch Street Suite 4130 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Representing the Plaintiffs SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP BY: PAUL ECKLES, ESQUIRE games.keyte@skadden.com JAMES A. KEYTE, ESQUIRE james.keyte@skadden.com Four Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 735-2578 Representing the Defendants, NHL (except MSG) ALSTON & BIRD BY: ANDREW E. PARIS, ESQUIRE drew.paris@alston.com dema.reznick@alston.com 33 South Hope Street 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 576-1000 Representing the Defendants, DIRECTV Sports Networks, LLC
Page 2	Page 4
 (CAPTION CONTINUED), COMCAST CORP., COMCAST SPORTSNET PHILADELPHIA, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET MID-ATLANTIC, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET CALFORNIA, LLC, COMCAST SPORTSNET CHICAGO, LLC, and MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY FERNANDA GARBER, MARC CIVIL ACTION NO. LERNER, DEREK RASMUSSEN, 12-cv-3704(SAS) ROBERT SILVER, GARRETT TRAUB, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated vs OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, et al. Videotaped Deposition of DANIEL L. McFADDEN, was taken pursuant to Notice at the law offices of COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS and TOLL, 88 Pine Street, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10005 on the above date before DEBRA G. JOHNSON-SPALLONE, CCR, RPR, Delaware CSR, Notary Public in and for the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, and a Federally Approved Reporter of the United States District Court commencing on or about 10:12 a.m. 	 APPEARANCES: (Continued), DAVIS POLK BY: DAVID B. TOSCANO, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4515 david toscano@davispolk.com ANDREW N. DeLANEY, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4294 andrew.delaney@davispolk.com ARTHUR J. BURKE, ESQUIRE arthur.burke@davispolk.com 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 Representing the Defendant, Comcast PROSKAUER ROSE, LLC BY: ADRIAN FONTECILLA, ESQUIRE (202) 416-5863 afontecilla@proskauer.com 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 400 South Washington, DC 20004-2533 Representing the Defendants, Major League Baseball (except New York Yankees) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP BY: WILLIAM Y. DURBIN, ESQUIRE (202) 223-7375 wdurbin@paulweiss.com DAMON C. ANDREWS, ESQUIRE (202) 223-737 dandrews@paulweiss.com 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Representing the Defendants, YES Network and add and add add add

5 (Pages 17 to 20)

		J (FAYES 17 CO 20)
	Page 17	Page 19
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² wit	h?	² Q. Would you agree that Dr. Noll is one
З.,	A. There were junior staff members	³ of the country's leading sports economists?
4 WO	king, basically, under them, and I certainly met	⁴ A. I'd certainly he certainly has
5 with	h all with the entire group.	⁵ that reputation. I'm not quite sure what sport's
6	Q. Do you know approximately how big a	⁶ economics is. It's it's a part of applied
⁷ tea	m of people?	⁷ microeconomics and applied econometrics, and there is
8	A. I think at various times there were	⁸ an issue, actually, what's germane to this case in my
⁹ two	two to four programmers and data analysts.	⁹ Declaration as to what it involves, the the
10	Q. Okay.	¹⁰ institution of sports where I think he has is an
11	I'm going to mark, and show you	¹¹ acknowledged expert, and his work on consumer theory
¹² and	other exhibit.	¹² and and consumer choices where he gets into
13		¹³ general microeconomics and applied econometrics which
14	(At which time Daniel L. McFadden,	¹⁴ is my my specialty.
15	Principal, CV was received and marked as	¹⁵ Q. Sure.
16	Deposition Exhibit 3 for identification by	¹⁶ But when we're talking about the
17	the court reporter.)	¹⁷ business of sports, and even further, the business of
18		¹⁸ sports broadcasting, you would agree that Dr. Noll
¹⁹ CO	NTINUATION	¹⁹ is, you know, one of the country's leading expert in
	MR. AXELROD:	²⁰ that area?
21	Q. So, this is Exhibit-3.	²¹ A. I, I actually don't even know the
22	Take a look at that.	²² list of people who are known as sports economists,
23	I believe Exhibit-3 is a current	²³ but but that's my what you say is what my
²⁴ con	y of your CV.	²⁴ understanding, yes.
25	Is that right?	²⁵ Q. Okay.
	8	
	Page 18	Page 20
1	Page 18 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. It appears to be. This is	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL And and he publishes work in peer
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2 3 mai 4 revi 5 6 7 any	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. It appears to be. This is ntained by staff. So, I haven't I didn't ew this recently myself. Q. Okay. So, you don't know whether there's thing on Exhibit-3 that is missing or needs to be 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL And and he publishes work in peer reviewed journals? A. I believe so. I haven't systematically searched his CV. Q. Okay.
2 3 mai 4 revi 5 6 7 any	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. It appears to be. This is intained by staff. So, I haven't I didn't ew this recently myself. Q. Okay. So, you don't know whether there's 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL And and he publishes work in peer reviewed journals? A. I believe so. I haven't systematically searched his CV. Q. Okay. 7 And one purpose of peer review is to
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2 3 4 7 8 9 10 9 10 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. It appears to be. This is intained by staff. So, I haven't I didn't ew this recently myself. Q. Okay. So, you don't know whether there's thing on Exhibit-3 that is missing or needs to be lated? A. As far as I know, there's nothing, I would have to actually go through it e-by-page to be absolutely sure. Q. Okay. Well, maybe later. We'll switch gears. All right. Are you familiar with Roger Noll's fessional background? A. I am. Q. You're aware that he has published	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 And and he publishes work in peer 3 reviewed journals? 4 A. I believe so. I haven't 5 systematically searched his CV. 6 Q. Okay. 7 And one purpose of peer review is to 8 make sure that published articles reliably apply 9 scientific methods? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And would you agree that as as a 12 general matter, you would expect that articles 13 published in peer reviewed journals are 14 scientifically sound? 15 A. The editing refereeing process is 16 not a perfect process, and tends to sometimes get 17 published that have to be retracted or or 18 shouldn't have been published, but, by and large, 19 yes, that's the purpose of it, and the I think 12 Q. Okay.
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2 3 4 7 6 7 8 9 10 9 10 9 10 11 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 16 17 18 19 20 18 19 20 10 18 19 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. It appears to be. This is intained by staff. So, I haven't I didn't ew this recently myself. Q. Okay. So, you don't know whether there's thing on Exhibit-3 that is missing or needs to be lated? A. As far as I know, there's nothing, I would have to actually go through it e-by-page to be absolutely sure. Q. Okay. Well, maybe later. We'll switch gears. All right. Are you familiar with Roger Noll's fessional background? A. I am. Q. You're aware that he has published merous articles on sports economics? A. Yes. Q. And you're also aware he has bished numerous articles on the economics of	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 And and he publishes work in peer 3 reviewed journals? 4 A. I believe so. I haven't 5 systematically searched his CV. 6 Q. Okay. 7 And one purpose of peer review is to 8 make sure that published articles reliably apply 9 scientific methods? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And would you agree that as as a 12 general matter, you would expect that articles 13 published in peer reviewed journals are 14 scientifically sound? 15 A. The editing refereeing process is 16 not a perfect process, and tends to sometimes get 17 published that have to be retracted or or 18 sports conomics of it, and the I think 19 yes, that's the purpose of it, and the I think 11 Q. Okay. 12 Sports economics is not your area of 13 startist; right?

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

		6 (Pages 21 to 24)
	Page 21	Page 23
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	the empirical and theoretical aspects of that are my	² Some of that involves specific
3	particular specialty.	³ institutional knowledge about those fields, and the
4	Q. And with regard to sports economics,	⁴ parlance that they have and the policy issues that
5	you haven't taught or published in that specific	⁵ arise there, and others involve the general
6	area, have you?	⁶ microeconomic and econometric issues of how you deal
7	A. I have not taught or published on	⁷ with data on consumer behavior on supply and
8	on topics that, I guess, you would classify as sports	⁸ behavior equilibrium in the markets, how
9	economics.	⁹ organizations forms and pacts, equilibrium and so
10	Although, again, I don't know	10 forth.
11	exactly what your definition of sports economics is.	¹¹ Q. Do you see a difference in kind
12	I I don't remember that that's a category that the	 ¹² between classifying something as transportation or
13	AA classifies as a separate category. I think it	 ¹³ energy or environmental economics as opposed to using
14	would be considered part of general applied	¹⁴ the term sports economics?
15	microeconomics.	¹⁵ A. I would say that's a similar
16	Q. Well, what would your definition of	¹⁶ specialization in microeconomics.
17	sports economics be?	17 Q. Okay.
18	A. Well, I understand that there is	¹⁸ So, you'd agree that in the area of
19	there is an industrial organization specialty that	¹⁹ sports economics, Dr. Noll has more experience than
20	deals with the kinds of organizations and ventures	²⁰ you do?
21	that are are are like sports leagues, and	²¹ A. If we're talking about the the
22	that's the IO literature that deals with joint	 ²² industrial organization of sports and the
23	ventures and the question of bargaining between	 ²³ institutions, and yes, he has more specific
24	owners of in joint ventures and all of that.	 knowledge than I do.
25	I view that as part of industrial	²⁵ Q. And with regard to the economics of
	I view that as part of industrial	
	Page 22	Page 24
1	Page 22 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 24
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL organization, that particular niche in industrial	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL television broadcasting, you agree, that's also not
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL organization, that particular niche in industrial organization.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL television broadcasting, you agree, that's also not
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL organization, that particular niche in industrial organization.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL television broadcasting, you agree, that's also not one of your areas of specific expertise? A. I'm I'm hesitant to to give a
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL organization, that particular niche in industrial organization. Q. Do you consider yourself an expert	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL television broadcasting, you agree, that's also not one of your areas of specific expertise? A. I'm I'm hesitant to to give a
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18 (Pages 69 to 72)

	Page 69	Pag	e 71
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
2	THE WITNESS: You know well, your	² But was there discussion within the	
3	your statement is extremely broad, but I would	³ community of economic economists, acader	nic
4	suggest just a matter of empirical fact, industrial	⁴ economists, that you're aware of about this p	
5	organization economists do testify as experts in	⁵ A. I'm not aware of it, but as I say,	
6	anti-trust proceedings where where it's difficult	⁶ there is no basically, no forum where this kind	of
7	or impossible to identify a control.	⁷ thing gets gets communicated in any systemati	
8		⁸ way. So, I simply don't know.	-
9	CONTINUATION	⁹ Q. Would you consider their paper a	
10	BY MR. AXELROD:	¹⁰ significant advance in the field?	
11	Q. And when they do that because it is	¹¹ A. I think it was an interesting paper	
12	difficult to identify a control, they have to use a	¹² that made made some contributions, yes.	
13	model, other than a before and after model; right?	¹³ Q. Significant contributions?	
14	-	¹⁴ MR. KEYTE: Asked and answered.	
15	MR. ECKLES: Same objections.	WIN. KETTE. ASKEU aliu alisweleu.	
16	THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what you	THE WITNESS. TUOIIT KNOW NOW YO	ou
17	mean by modeling in this context, because it's such a	measure significant.	
18	broad question, but use some some other		
19	microeconomic technique, yes.	 innovative aspects to it, and was a useful paper. 	
20	CONTINUATION	²⁰ CONTINUATION	
21	BY MR. AXELROD:	²¹ BY MR. AXELROD:	
22	Q. Okay.	²² Q. And you're familiar with the	
23	You're familiar with the work of	²³ methodology that they used in that paper?	
24	Drs. Gregory Crawford and Ali Yurukoglu?	A. I am.	
25	A. I am.	²⁵ MR. ECKLES: Objection. Vague.	
	A. I dill.	WIR. ECKEES. Objection. Vague.	
	Page 70	Pag	e 72
1	Page 70	-	e 72
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	e 72
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And you're specifically familiar	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² 	e 72
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And you're specifically familiar with a 2012 paper of theirs entitled, quote, "The	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION 	e 72
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And you're specifically familiar with a 2012 paper of theirs entitled, quote, "The Welfare Effect of Bundling in Multichannel Television	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD: 	e 72
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And you're specifically familiar with a 2012 paper of theirs entitled, quote, "The Welfare Effect of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets", unquote?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD: Q. And the model they used in that 	e 72
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27 (Pages 105 to 108)

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	Page 105	Page 107
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Yeah.	² Q. Right.
3	A. Yes.	³ And so, isn't it and if there was
4	Q. And that there's only and that	⁴ a wildly different type of data, you would construct
5	how how whether something is going to function	⁵ a different type of model; right?
6	well as a pH meter doesn't depend on the thing that	⁶ MR. BURKE: Objection.
7	the pH meter is measuring; right?	⁷ Foundation.
8		
9	MR. BURKE: Objection to form.	WIK. KETTE. Incomplete hypothetical.
10	THE WITNESS: Oh, I would say that	THE WITNESS. OKAy.
11	I would say, it certainly could. It could be	i would answer answer in the
12	there is something wrong with the pH meter, that is	tonowing way, you build an econometric model. Say,
	its its function is related to how viscose the	microeconomic model for a specific purpose, and it
13	liquid is.	¹³ may have a limited range of applicability. There
14	I mean, there could be could be	¹⁴ there might be other areas where it cleared. That
15	lots lots of sources of a failure of a piece of	¹⁵ would not be an appropriate model to use.
16	laboratory equipment.	¹⁶ So, the issue really is over the
17		¹⁷ range in which you intend to apply the model over the
18	CONTINUATION	¹⁸ kinds of behavior, the kinds of taste, in this case,
19	BY MR. AXELROD:	¹⁹ that could arise.
20	Q. Sure.	²⁰ Is this model showing the kind of
21	But my point my question is, the	²¹ response that a laboratory instrument that that
22	the pH meters are standard.	²² you you would expect to see?
23	They're standard; right?	And I've not my my view is
24	MR. FONTECILLA: Objection.	that Dr. Noll's model is precisely intending in his
25	Foundation.	²⁵ description to be able to capture the impact of
	Page 106	Page 108
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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32 (Pages 125 to 128)

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	Page 125	Page 127
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	individuals that are attached to particular teams,	² the model; right?
3	and really are interested in the play of those teams.	³ MR. BURKE: Objection. Form.
4	There are individuals who just like to watch	⁴ THE WITNESS: I I actually have
5	baseball, or just like to watch hockey.	⁵ not sat sat down and asked whether there are other
6	So that the caricatures do	⁶ test cases that are in substance more extreme, but I
7	correspond to types of people, which I think is	⁷ would say, in general, there are there are a lot
8	plausible, they do exist in the real world.	⁸ of test cases, and these these are two that are
9	I think in Dr. Noll's declaration he	⁹ were were selected because they are they are
10	he, essentially, says this, that there are	¹⁰ starkly different, and was sufficiently hopeful in
11	there are people with these kinds of tastes.	¹¹ heterogeneity in the in these test extremes so
12		¹² that one can plausibly say what the nature of
13	CONTINUATION	¹³ equilibrium might likely to be.
14	BY MR. AXELROD:	14
15	Q. But in your models your fan of the	¹⁵ CONTINUATION
16	game and teams who prefer models assume you're	¹⁶ BY MR. AXELROD:
17	assuming that not that they are individuals who	¹⁷ Q. Is it a common practice to test all
18	have those preferences, but that everyone has those	¹⁸ logit model by plugging in extreme data that wouldn't
19	preferences; right?	¹⁹ exist in the real world doesn't doesn't exist
20	A. First of all, these are not my	²⁰ in the real world?
21	models.	²¹ (Pause)
22	Q. Sorry.	A. Well, I would say, no. It's not
23	A. These are tests.	²³ common practice, because it it's very unusual to
24	Q. Okay.	²⁴ have a logit model that is that is in fact, is
25	A. Scenarios to test Dr. Noll's model	²⁵ not responsive to to different conditions.
	Page 126	Page 128
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1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and, yes, under those test scenarios you have got	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL But I also want to emphasize here,
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33 (Pages 129 to 132)

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	Page 129	Page 131
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1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	econometric model for prediction, and ask, does it	² terms of error, distributional substance and so
3	does it predict reasonably?	³ forth.
4	And one way you test that is to ask,	⁴ So, you can test those assumptions,
5	does it produce false positives? Does it produce a	⁵ and you would say, if you that is set up for those
6	result which says one thing in a situation where it	⁶ assumptions, that model is violating some of the
7	was fed data where that should not be happening?	⁷ assumptions, that is a problem for the model.
8	And I think that is that's	⁸ You can also look at the predictions
9	that is a common and standard way to test the	⁹ of the model, and you can ask, is it is the model
10	reliable or viability of an econometric model.	¹⁰ producing accurate predictions from given inputs and
11	Q. Now, any publication or other	¹¹ is it is it producing false positives or is it
12	sources you can cite for the proposition that it's	¹² responding in a way that you would expect when it is
13	ordinary practice to test an econometric model with	¹³ fed data where you should see no no
14	plugging in extreme data that wouldn't exist in the	¹⁴ response?
15	real world?	¹⁵ Those are both legitimate ways to
16	MR. KEYTE: Objection.	¹⁶ test a model or a scientific method, and I would say
17	Mischaracterizes his testimony.	¹⁷ that in in general, perfectly legitimate to be
18	THE WITNESS: I can't point to a	¹⁸ to be both the latter as in some sense closer to how
19	single publication, certainly no publication where	¹⁹ the model is going to be used.
20	someone is sitting down and counting models and	²⁰ And so, that's really an acid test
21	what's what kinds of tests are used.	²¹ for whether it's appropriate for the use intended
22	But it's it's what I what I	²² use.
23	just suggested is really just part of the general	²³ Q. Did you test Dr. Noll's model with
24	scientific method. You you you take a model	
25	and you take an instrument which is purporting to	 alternative assumptions that might actually occur in the real world?
	and you take an instrument which is purporting to	the real world?
	Page 130	Page 132
1	Page 130	Page 132
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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43 (Pages 169 to 172)

		45 (lages 105 to 172)
	Page 169	Page 171
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	if the model were scientifically sound?	² MR. KEYTE: Objection.
3	A. Well, I've I've read Dr. Noll	³ Foundation.
4	back and forth in deposition and his Declarations in	⁴ THE WITNESS: I I have no idea.
5	this. So, I think he believes that the Yankees would	⁵ It would depend on what what my early bundle would
6	be able to command a premium price.	⁶ is costing.
7	Q. Okay.	 As far as I'm aware, most minor
8	Any other teams that you would	⁸ minor leagues don't even have television contracts.
9	expect to see in the top ten most expensive if the	 ⁹ It's it's beyond beyond my knowledge.
10	model were scientifically sound?	
11	-	¹¹ CONTINUATION
12	,	CONTINUATION
13	this this list is implausible to me.	DI WIR. AALLKOD.
14	Beyond that, I don't think I have a	Q. Dut II II you believe that
15	strong opinion on it. I'm not basing any information	something that's more popular is likely to be more
	I have personally.	expensive, why wouldn't it be that you would expect a
16	MR. ECKLES: By "this" you are	¹⁶ major league baseball package to be more expensive
17	referring to what is in paragraph 31?	¹⁷ than a minor league package?
18	MR. AXELROD: What's in paragraph	¹⁸ MR. ECKLES: Objection.
19	31. Okay.	¹⁹ Speculation, and incomplete hypothetical.
20	THE WITNESS: The Yankees, Cubs and	²⁰ THE WITNESS: Again, I think the
21	Braves.	²¹ question would be what what what's the affinity
22		²² of fans for the two when you say something is more
23	CONTINUATION	²³ more popular?
24	BY MR. AXELROD:	²⁴ We're talking, I guess in this
25	Q. And also does that apply also to	²⁵ context, always about how to market fans. I think
	Page 170	Page 172
1	Page 170 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 172
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers,	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about the the tele televising of minor league games,
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins? A. The source of the source of this	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about the the tele televising of minor league games, what might be available to an out of market minor
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins? A. The source of the source of this sentence is polling my own staff of hockey	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about the the tele televising of minor league games, what might be available to an out of market minor league fan. Is it using the same number of games?
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins? A. The source of the source of this sentence is polling my own staff of hockey enthusiasts for what are the what are the most	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about the the tele televising of minor league games, what might be available to an out of market minor league fan. Is it using the same number of games?
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins? A. The source of the source of this sentence is polling my own staff of hockey enthusiasts for what are the what are the most popular teams. That's that's the basis on on	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL there are many too many things I don't know about the the tele televising of minor league games, what might be available to an out of market minor league fan. Is it using the same number of games? I don't know anything about it.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL paragraph 31 for hockey, you expect the Rangers, Black Hawks, Penguins, Red Wings, Flyers and Bruins? A. The source of the source of this sentence is polling my own staff of hockey enthusiasts for what are the what are the most popular teams. That's that's the basis on on my belief that experts would expect this. Q. All right. So, your view is that the most popular teams would be the most expensive for standalone channels? A. I think that I think there's a there's a reason to expect that. It's not it's not a logical necessity, but if if, for example, Dr. Noll's model corrected were a good model for this league, it would it would have that implication. Q. Okay. And do you agree that minor league baseball isn't as popular as major league baseball? A. That's my understanding, yeah. Q. So, you would express expect the 	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 there are many too many things I don't know about 3 the the tele televising of minor league games, 4 what might be available to an out of market minor 5 league fan. Is it using the same number of games? 6 I don't know anything about it. 7
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45 (Pages 177 to 180)

Page 177	Page 179
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² I think when we broke I was about to	2
³ ask you to look at Exhibit-5, which is Dr. Noll's	³ THE WITNESS: in the alternative?
⁴ Supplemental Declaration in this case.	⁴ MR. ECKLES: what it says about
5	⁵ Exhibit-5A in the text, you can do that, too.
⁶ (At which time a Supplemental	⁶ THE WITNESS: I may need to if you
⁷ Declaration of Roger G. Noll, was received	⁷ have a question about it. Go ahead and ask it, and I
⁸ and marked as Deposition Exhibit 5 for	⁸ will see if I need to go to the text.
⁹ identification by the court reporter.)	⁹ MR. AXELROD: Sure.
10	10
¹¹ CONTINUATION	¹¹ CONTINUATION
¹² BY MR. AXELROD:	¹² BY MR. AXELROD:
¹³ Q. If I can ask you to turn to	¹³ Q. My question was just; these are the
¹⁴ Exhibit-5A, which I think I've tabbed with a yellow	¹⁴ teams you would expect to have the highest market
¹⁵ sticky in your version.	¹⁵ share; right, the Yankees, the Braves, the Red Sox
¹⁶ MR. AXELROD: And for everyone else,	¹⁶ and the Dodgers?
¹⁷ it's toward the back, I believe.	¹⁷ A. Yes.
¹⁸ Okay.	¹⁸ Q. And if you flip to Exhibit-5C, two
¹⁹ MR. PARIS: Which exhibit?	¹⁹ pages further on, this shows the predicted market
²⁰ MR. AXELROD: It's Exhibit-5A to	²⁰ share for DIRECTV for each of the 30 major league
²¹ Exhibit-5, if that makes sense.	²¹ baseball teams according to Dr. Noll's model; right?
²² Okay.	²² A. Yes.
23	²³ Q. And top four teams by market share
²⁴ CONTINUATION	again are the Yankees and the Braves, the Dodgers and
²⁵ BY MR. AXELROD:	²⁵ the Red Sox; right?
Page 178	Page 180
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² Q. And, Dr. McFadden, this table here,	² A. Correct. I believe so.
³ Dr. Noll's Exhibit-5A shows predicted market share	³ Q. And, again, that's pretty much what
⁴ for Internet streaming for each of the 30 major	⁴ you would expect to see; right?
⁵ league baseball teams according to his model;	⁵ A. Yes. It is, essentially, a
⁶ correct?	⁶ consequence of the real data, I believe.
7 A. Yes.	⁷ Q. Okay.
⁸ Q. And and in this exhibit, the top	8 And if you go to Exhibit-5 5B on
⁹ four teams by market share are the Yankees, the	⁹ page before the page we were just looking at, this
¹⁰ Braves, the Red Sox, and the Dodgers; correct?	¹⁰ Exhibit-5B shows the predicted market share for
¹¹ A. I take it would take me time	 Internet streaming for each of the 30 NHL teams according to Dr. Noll's model; right?
	according to Dr. Noll's model: right?
¹² to scan the column. Let me let me accept your	
 ¹³ description without 	¹³ A. Yes.
 description without Q. Okay. 	 A. Yes. Q. And the top three teams by market
 ¹³ description without ¹⁴ Q. Okay. ¹⁵ A going over the numbers. 	 A. Yes. Q. And the top three teams by market share here, I believe, are the Flyers, the Red Wings
 description without Q. Okay. A going over the numbers. Q. Okay. 	 A. Yes. Q. And the top three teams by market share here, I believe, are the Flyers, the Red Wings and the Penguins; correct?
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 description without Q. Okay. A going over the numbers. Q. Okay. And those are pretty much the teams you would expect to have the highest market share? A. Yes. Now, remind me. This is the market share of Q. Internet streaming. 	 A. Yes. Q. And the top three teams by market share here, I believe, are the Flyers, the Red Wings and the Penguins; correct? A. I will take your I'll take that without being able to check every number. Q. Okay. And if if assuming that is correct, and I hope hope that it is, that's not a surprising result; is it?

48 (Pages 189 to 192)

		48 (Pages 189 to 192)
	Page 189	Page 191
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	was rerun with 500 different values for the seed.	² make a difference the composition of fan tastes is
3	Q. And in your view is that a	³ very important for the question of whether
4	sufficient number of times to rerun it?	⁴ competition between different a la carte packages
5	A. Oh, I think for the demonstration	⁵ would would have any would have any bite or
6	that the original calculation based on a single seed	⁶ not.
7	was unduly responsive to something that shouldn't	7
8	matter, yes.	⁸ CONTINUATION
9	Q. Do you know how many times Dr. Noll	⁹ BY MR. AXELROD:
10	ran the model?	¹⁰ Q. Let me turn to I believe it's
11	A. I believe he ran it a single time	¹¹ your next criticism of Dr. Noll's model concerning
12	from a single seed.	¹² marginal costs.
13	Q. Now, are you aware that Dr. Noll's	¹³ Okay.
14	model contains a simplifying assumption by ignoring	¹⁴ Do you agree well, is it your
15	competition between the RSN selling their games out	¹⁵ opinion that Dr. Noll has made a faulty assumption,
16	of market?	¹⁶ that marginal costs for teams wanting to sell their
17	A. I'm I'm vaguely aware of it, but	¹⁷ games in other markets will be equal to 1/30th of the
18	I haven't studied that part of his analysis because	¹⁸ league's costs for the bundle?
19	that was assigned to Dr. Pakes, and I haven't	¹⁹ A. I I believe that ratio is
20	concentrated concentrated on it.	²⁰ implausible, and I I will give you an example as
21	Q. Would would you agree that it is	²¹ to why I think it's implausible.
22	a conservative assumption?	²² Suppose suppose that one one
23	MR. ECKLES: Objection. Vague, and	²³ of the costs of having subscribed either to the
24	beyond the scope.	²⁴ league bundle or to a team package is a a a
25	THE WITNESS: I don't know if it's	²⁵ credit card charge monthly credit card charge from
	Page 190	Page 192
1	_	
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is conservative and what is not.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a few percent on on that payment.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is conservative and what is not. I think at this point I have no	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a few percent on on that payment. Now, if that payment is is in the
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is conservative and what is not.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a few percent on on that payment. Now, if that payment is is in the order of 15 or \$20.00, then that credit credit
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is conservative and what is not. I think at this point I have no	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a few percent on on that payment. Now, if that payment is is in the order of 15 or \$20.00, then that credit credit card charge of one or two percent is already in the
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conservative. I would have to study the supply side before I would draw any conclusions on what is conservative and what is not. I think at this point I have no opinion.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the subscriber for the for the service. There will be a credit credit card company charge of a few percent on on that payment. Now, if that payment is is in the order of 15 or \$20.00, then that credit credit card charge of one or two percent is already in the
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49 (Pages 193 to 196)

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	Page 193	Page 195
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	the marginal cost of substantially below the league	² THE WITNESS: That that would be
3	- league bundle or not.	³ a typical outcome certainly under competition.
4	So, it's if anytime you have a	 ⁴ Certainly under many models of conduct of rivals in a
5	critical parameter like this which makes a big	
6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	⁵ concentrated industry.
7	difference to the outcome, then I think it's incumbent upon a careful microeconomist to to	
8	*	CONTINUATION
9	determine what they can about that ratio.	DI WIK, AALLKOD.
10	Now, I'm not I'm not suggesting	Q. Anu n you n you turn to
11	that there is a particular set of data that Dr. Noll	Exhibit-1, which is your Declaration in this case, on
12	could have gone to, and he failed to do that, but I	page 10, Figure-1 1 in sorry Exmon-1. Tage
13	am saying that this is this is a critical	To. It's page to. Figure-1 at the bottom there.
14	parameter, and if if it had been my responsibility	1 ou would agree that I ton's model
15	to do this analysis, I would have at least said,	D1. Non's model noids true to the principle that
16	"okay. Here's a parameter I don't know nothing	when marginal costs rise prices rise, right.
17	about. It's critical, and I'm going to vary it. I'm	WIK. TOSCANO. Objection to torni.
	going to tell you what the implication of different	Foundation.
18	values are, and if I have to, I will do something	THE WITNESS. HIS HIS HOUEL US
19	conservative at that point."	¹⁹ imply that if if the relative marginal costs of
20	Q. Do you agree as a general economic	²⁰ the one commodity; mainly the a la carte bundle,
21	principle that when costs to a supplier rise prices	²¹ rises relative to the marginal cost of the of the
22	rise?	team I'm sorry of the league bundle, then the
23	A. The suppliers' prices to the next	²³ relative prices would rise within within his
24	level do you mean?	²⁴ model. That's true.
25	Q. No. I mean the I'm sorry.	25
	Page 194	Page 196
1	Page 194	Page 196
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL The supplier the price to the	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL The supplier the price to the buyer.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD:
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL The supplier the price to the buyer. MR. ECKLES: Objection.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD: Q. Okay.
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2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL The supplier the price to the buyer. MR. ECKLES: Objection. MR. KEYTE: Incomplete hypothetical. THE WITNESS: Well, the answer is	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD: Q. Okay. In your opinion what is an appropriate estimate for a team's the broadcast of
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL The supplier the price to the buyer. MR. ECKLES: Objection. MR. KEYTE: Incomplete hypothetical. THE WITNESS: Well, the answer is that it in a variety of of real situations that	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. AXELROD: Q. Okay. In your opinion what is an appropriate estimate for a team's the broadcast of a single team in baseball?
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52 (Pages 205 to 208)

	Page 205	Page 207
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	consumers?	² behave if it were corrected, and I don't know whether
3	MR. ECKLES: Objection.	³ it would show something that applies to all some
4	Speculation. Incomplete hypothetical.	⁴ kind of effect that is that is common to members
5	THE WITNESS: Oh, I have not	⁵ of a class. I have no idea.
6	MR. KEYTE: Just a very incomplete	6
7	hypothetical.	7 CONTINUATION
8	THE WITNESS: I have not undertaken	⁸ BY MR. AXELROD:
9	any analysis myself of what the impact would be on	⁹ Q. So, as the model stands now you are
10	different classes of consumers as a result of the	¹⁰ saying it's you're saying it's it's useless, it
11	introduction of a la carte teams, and I I have no	¹¹ shows nothing
12		snows nothing
13	position, having not studied it, to offer any any	A. Yes. That's my opinion.
14	opinion whether it would be a common effect or not.	Q as to every plaintin:
	MR. AXELROD: All right.	A. Solly.
15	Maybe we are talking passed each	Q. As to every plaintin?
16	other.	¹⁶ MR. KEYTE: Objection. Lacks
17		¹⁷ foundation. I don't believe the scope of his
18	CONTINUATION	¹⁸ testimony.
19	BY MR. AXELROD:	¹⁹ THE WITNESS: The question is
20	Q. I'm not asking you whether the	²⁰ whether the question I asked, and addressed in my
21	the result as to each consumer would be identical.	²¹ Declaration was whether the demand analysis was done
22	I'm asking you whether Dr. Noll's	²² in such a way that it reliably allows the projection
23	model if it were refined to fix all the flaws you've	²³ of but-for market conditions as a function of what
24	identified, and you agreed that it were	²⁴ consumer taste or the patterns of consumer taste
25	scientifically sound, does that model result in a way	²⁵ might be, and my conclusion is that that model fails
	Page 206	Page 208
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1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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Page 209	Page 211
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form, so it demonstrates nothing. It is useless for	pernaps gotten discounts, pernaps subscribers
demonstrating any impact.	carry subscriber, fate subscriber, and so, he he
WIK. AAELKOD. Tulueistaliu I	ne ignores the fact that there might be some
⁵ understand that's your opinion.	mormation in that about about consumer
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CONTINUATION	Q. And now significant a degree of
DI WIK, AAELKOD.	price variation did you see in the data that D1
Q. My question, though, is, with an	that you say D1. Non ulu ignore:
those naws that you ve luchtheu, understanding	A. I don't remember the numbers, but it
that you think it has haws, just looking at what	is it was substantial.
D1. Ivon ulu, uoes ins naweu mouel show that each	Say, for example, people who
plaintill was liat lieu.	subscribe ind-season and people who subscribe
WIX. KETTE. It's beyond the scope of	carly-season, substantiary unrefer prices.
¹⁵ his opinions. Asked and answered for the seventh	Q. And so, that that that s one
¹⁶ time in a row.	type of price variation that D1 you say
WIN. AAELKOD. TOU can allswel the	D1. Ivon s model ignores, right, the mid-season
¹⁸ question.	pur chase versus someone who pur chased for the entire
¹⁹ MR. KEYTE:	season:
²⁰ THE WITNESS: In its in its	A. Of of discounts if they are
²¹ current form this model is junk science, and it gives	oncrea.
²² a junk science result, which is in favor of the	1 1 all all l lecali is
²³ plaintiffs, but I in the end it's junk.	that there are quite a rew subscribers who paid a
²⁴ It has no value, no scientific value	price, outer than the one that Dr. Non used.
²⁵ in this case, and that it's really it would be	²⁵ Q. Sure.
Page 210	Page 212
Page 210 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 212 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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54 (Pages 213 to 216)

		54 (Pages 213 to 216)
	Page 213	Page 215
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. But it's not your testimony, is it,	² A. I oh, I have not made I have
3	that the model compares the prices paid by the	³ not offered an affirmative opinion on how that should
4	total prices paid by consumers who bought for an	⁴ be done, and I'm not prepared to do so now.
5	entire season with the prices paid by consumers who	⁵ The point is that there is there
6	bought midway through a season; is it?	⁶ is some price variation there, and it's not being
7	COUNSEL: Objection to the form.	7 used.
8	THE WITNESS: Dr. Noll does not take	⁸ O. If Dr. Noll were to refine his model
9	into account any price differences paid by	⁹ so that all of the criticisms you have of it, other
10	subscribers to the bundle, whether they are part	¹⁰ than this one, other than the accounting for
11	season or full season subscribers, early subscribers	¹¹ discounts issue, were fixed, would his failure to
12	and so forth.	¹² account for discounts standing alone render the model
13	So, while there is some variation in	¹³ unsound in your view?
14	monthly price for these different groups, that's	¹⁴ A. No, and on that single point, not
15	that's not currently in his model.	¹⁵ necessarily, no.
16		¹⁶ Q. And standing alone does the failure
17	CONTINUATION	¹⁷ to account for discounts effect the damages
18	BY MR. AXELROD:	¹⁸ calculations?
19	Q. Okay.	¹⁹ A. Let me let me, actually, in
20	But you would agree, the model does	²⁰ answering that also elaborate on my my my
21	measure price monthly as opposed to total price paid	²¹ previous.
22	by the consumer during the year?	²² If discounts influence actually
23	A. That's that's my recollection,	²³ do influence the demand, and it's it's not simply
24	yes.	²⁴ a reflection of a shift in demand caused by things
25	Q. Okay.	²⁵ being sold to different kinds of people with
	·	
	Page 214	Page 216
1	_	_
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL So – so, if – in your view, what	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL different kinds of tastes, then then you can learn
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL So – so, if – in your view, what would be necessary to remove this problem of failure	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL different kinds of tastes, then then you can learn
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL So – so, if – in your view, what would be necessary to remove this problem of failure to account for price variation?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL different kinds of tastes, then then you can learn something about the elasticities of of demand from these data.
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56 (Pages 221 to 224)

		56 (Pages 221 to 224)
	Page 221	Page 223
1		
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	HIGHLI CONTIDENTIAL
3	Q. Got you.	model, which is assigning a preference parameter to a
4	So, am I misunderstanding, or is it,	given team, doesn't rearry match exactly what the
5	essentially, two different ways that you're saying	hature of these data are. The data are data of time
6	Dr. Noll's estimate of consumer demand differs from	spent watching team pairs.
7	that used by C&Y?	I unitk that all alternative, and I
8	A. I would say this is this is a re	aran t entreize min by saying he should do uns, but
9	repeat of the point in paragraph 39, with the	i ullik le le should ullik about it, would be to
	with the second sentence being an additional and	have a taste parameter for for every pair of
10	third component in which he does which he does it	teams. That that would be given given the way
11	differently than C&Y.	his data comes, that would be closer to the way these
12	Q. Okay.	uiese channel alternatives were considered in the
	I want to turn to the next criticism	Cite i papei.
14	which is is on page 19 of your report under the	¹⁴ Q. But is it your view that measuring
15	header of, "Dr. Noll inconsistently counts	¹⁵ preferences for team pairs reflects the way that
16	viewership".	¹⁶ actual consumers choose to watch hockey and baseball
17	Do you see that?	¹⁷ games?
18	A. Yes.	¹⁸ A. I don't know, but reflecting on my
19	Q. And if I have it right, your	¹⁹ own preferences, it's true for me, and I would I'd
20	criticism here is that Dr. Noll engages in double	²⁰ certainly, if I were if I were in Dr. Noll's shoes
21	counting because because he doesn't count, for	²¹ and doing the analysis, I would certainly when asked
22	example, a Bruins/Rangers game as time spent watching	²² the question whether that was a better model.
23 24	both teams.	 Q. And when you people are making purchasing decisions on whether to purchase on out of
24	Do I have that right?	purchasing decisions on whether to purchase an out of
2.5	A. The criticism is not the double	²⁵ market bundle or purchase, at least for now, the home
	Page 222	
	Page 222	Page 224
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL counting, per se. Although, if he had data on which	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team's RSN feed, they're not able to make that
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL counting, per se. Although, if he had data on which feed the consumer was watching, it certainly would	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team's RSN feed, they're not able to make that decision based on individual game pairs; right?
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL counting, per se. Although, if he had data on which feed the consumer was watching, it certainly would have been, I think, better off using it, and it would	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team's RSN feed, they're not able to make that decision based on individual game pairs; right? MR. PARIS: Objection. Foundation.
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59 (Pages 233 to 236)

		59 (Pages 233 to 236)
	Page 233	Page 235
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	extreme data possible?	² MR. ECKLES: Is this measuring the
3	A. Without going back and reviewing my	³ team price or the bundle's price?
4	own study, I don't recall.	4 THE WITNESS: This is not measured
5	Q. Okay.	⁵ against the bundle. This is just the actual price
6	I could ask you to turn the page in	⁶ actual price.
7	Exhibit-1, page 22, and take a look at Table 9.	⁷ MR. AXELROD: Right.
8	Could you tell us what's reflected	8
9	in Table 9?	⁹ CONTINUATION
10	A. Yes.	¹⁰ BY MR. AXELROD:
11	The the first two columns in	¹¹ Q. I thought we established that, as it
12	Table 9 correspond to Dr. Noll's model, S S run,	¹² says in the maybe I misunderstood, but as it says
13	and the results it actually produces, and the next	¹³ right next to where it says Table 9, that it's a
14	two columns are are comparable quantities for this	¹⁴ share-weighted average between telecast price and
15	test alternative in which, when it's in the	¹⁵ total team market shares when the bundle competes
16	simulation assigning an individual consumer to a	¹⁶ against either a favorite or least favorite team's
17	choice of an alter a la carte product, you're now	¹⁷ telecast.
18	offering, like, his least favorite team for the a la	¹⁸ A. That's that's correct, but the
19	carte product.	¹⁹ prices are the a la carte
20	Q. And you would agree what it is	²⁰ Q. Right.
21	measuring overall is the price for the individual	²¹ A average of the a la carte
22	team telecast competing against the bundle, and it	²² price
23	measures whether the whether the individual team	²³ Q. Right.
24	telecast is the consumer's favorite team in one	A and not the bundle.
25	column and whether it is the consumer's least	²⁵ Q. I apologized if I misspoke.
	Daga 224	Dago 226
	Page 234	Page 236
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right?	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 This is but, again, putting aside
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL This is but, again, putting aside the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL This is but, again, putting aside the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL This is but, again, putting aside the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle, than you would
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of the difference	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL This is but, again, putting aside the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle, than you would expect to see for the least favorite team's telecast
2 3 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of the difference Well, strike that strike that.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL This is but, again, putting aside the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle, than you would expect to see for the least favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle?
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of the difference Well, strike that strike that. Let me back up.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 This is but, again, putting aside 3 the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to 4 see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast 5 when measured against the bundle, than you would 6 expect to see for the least favorite team's telecast 7 when measured against the bundle? 8 A. I would expect to see a
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of the difference Well, strike that strike that. Let me back up. Would you agree that this table shows that the favorite team's telecast has a higher price than the least favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle? A. Out of a higher, but very small difference. I think the point is that this is not showing as much price sensitivity and share sensitivity as is plausible if this model were correctly capturing of real real preferences between teams. Q. But putting aside the magnitude of the difference, which I understand, in your view, is that it's too small. Putting aside the magnitude, you	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 This is but, again, putting aside 3 the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to 4 see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast 5 when measured against the bundle, than you would 6 expect to see for the least favorite team's telecast 7 when measured against the bundle? 8 A. I would expect to see a 9 substantially higher 0 Q. Okay. 1 A price. 2 Q. For market share if you look at 13 Table 9, you would agree with me that the market 14 share for the individual team's telecast competing 15 against the bundle is higher if it's the favorite 16 team's telecast; correct? 18 A. I - I agree that that's the 19 direction, and, again, my expectation for a plausible 19 model is that this would make a huge should make a 19 model is that are strong fans of the Yankees 20 and simply don't care about the San Diego Padres, and 21 vice versa.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL favorite team in the other column; right? A. That's correct. Q. Okay. So, putting aside the magnitude of the difference Well, strike that strike that. Let me back up. Would you agree that this table shows that the favorite team's telecast has a higher price than the least favorite team's telecast when measured against the bundle? A. Out of a higher, but very small difference. I think the point is that this is not showing as much price sensitivity and share sensitivity as is plausible if this model were correctly capturing of real real preferences between teams. Q. But putting aside the magnitude of the difference, which I understand, in your view, is that it's too small. Putting aside the magnitude, you would expect to see the favorite team's telecast	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 This is but, again, putting aside 3 the magnitude of the difference, you would expect to 4 see a higher price for the favorite team's telecast 5 when measured against the bundle, than you would 6 expect to see for the least favorite team's telecast 7 when measured against the bundle? 8 A. I would expect to see a 9 substantially higher 0 Q. Okay. 1 A price. 2 Q. For market share if you look at 13 Table 9, you would agree with me that the market 14 share for the individual team's telecast competing 15 against the bundle is higher if it's the favorite 16 team's telecast; correct? 18 A. I - price. 19 against the bundle is higher if it's the least favorite 16 team's telecast; correct? 18 A. I - I agree that that's the 19 direction, and, again, my expectation for a plausible 10 model is that this would make a huge should make a 19 difference if if if, in the real world,<

EXHIBIT B

	Page
	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
	DMAS LAUMANN; FERNANDA GARBER; BERT SILVER; GARRETT TRAUB;
	/ID DILLON and PETER HERMAN,
-	presenting themselves and all
otł	ner similarly situated,
	Plaintiffs,
	,
vs.	CA No. 12-1817(SAS)
ר ע זע	TIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE,
	al.,
eι	Defendants.
	/
न्त्रन	RNANDA GARBER; MARC LERNER;
	REK RASMUSSEN; ROBERT SILVER;
	RETT TRAUB, and PETER HERMAN,
	presenting themselves and all
-	her similarly situated,
0.01	ier bimilarry bicaacca,
	Plaintiffs,
vs.	CA NO. 12-3704(SAS)
OFF	FICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
	SEBALL, et al.,
	Defendants.
	/
	/
	VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROGER G. NOLL, Ph.D.
	PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA
	THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2014
	INONODAL, OCTODEN 10, 2014
BY	: ANDREA M. IGNACIO, CSR, RPR, CCRR, CLR ~ 9830
<u> </u>	JOB NO. 85783

	Page 102	Page 103
1	if if that assumption is valid by by 11:47	¹ that 1/30th of the decision 11:48
2	ascertaining whether it's profitable to do so. 11:47	2 Q Right. 11:48
3	Q Okay. And you don't other than the 11:47	3 A about the bundle is each team. But the 11:48
4	testimony you just gave, you don't have any other 11:47	⁴ when it's 1/30th, the that's a tiny number. And 11:48
5	reason to say it would be profitable? 11:47	⁵ usually when the number of participants in the 11:48
6	A Other than I calculated whether it's 11:47	⁶ decision is that large, we assume that their 11:48
7	profitable, I have no reason to say whether it's 11:47	⁷ individual behavior essentially ignores it. And 11:48
8	profitable? That that doesn't make sense to me. 11:47	⁸ that's what we're doing. 11:48
9	Q No. I'm saying other than the testimony you 11:47	⁹ Q Okay. Because certainly, you would agree 11:48
10	gave, you have nothing 11:47	¹⁰ that these are not independent competitors, which is 11:48
11	A Yeah, yeah, yeah. 11:47	¹¹ assumed in the model? 11:48
12	Q further to say? 11:47	¹² A Right. 11:48
13	A Yeah, right. 11:47	¹³ And if there were three teams in the league, 11:48
14	Q Okay. The second sentence there, you say: 11:47	¹⁴ that would be a a problematic assumption. 11:48
15	"The idea is that consumer choices are 11:47	¹⁵ Q Okay. Well, you're familiar with unilateral 11:48
16	expanded to include unbundled as well as bundled 11:47	¹⁶ effects analysis? 11:48
17	services, and that each of these services is priced 11:47	¹⁷ A Right. 11:48
18	independently." 11:47	¹⁸ Q Upward pricing pressure in these things? 11:48
19	Do you see that? 11:47	¹⁹ A Right. 11:48
20 21	A Yes. 11:47	²⁰ Q You would agree that if you participate in a 11:48 ²¹ venture that you are going to behave differently if 11:48
22	Q Is that the idea of the model or some other 11:47 idea? 11:47	 venture, that you are going to behave differently if 11:48 you get profits from that venture? 11:49
23	A That is the economic idea that underpins the 11:47	²³ A Yes. And the and how differently you 11:49
24	model. That's what the model is about. That's 11:48	²⁴ behave depends on the stakes you have in the joint 11:49
25	that now, the and the the the reality is 11:48	 venture versus the stakes you have in your individual 11:49
	Demo 104	
	Page 104	Page 105
1	venture. 11:49	Page 105 ¹ but not enough to have your model account for it? 11:50
2	venture. 11:49 Q And so here, you say that just so I 11:49	 but not enough to have your model account for it? 11:50 A No, the the that's not quite right. 11:50
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	Page 453	Page 454
1	DirecTV and by Comcast is Fox Sport South which	¹ looks it's focusing only on the incremental
2	carries the Braves; does that sound right to you?	² addition of the other RSNs without blackout games to
3	A I think that's right, but	³ the list of options available in a metropolitan area.
4	Q So I guess the question I want to get	⁴ Q Let's see.
5	clarification. I think we got this last time.	⁵ Dr. Noll, if you have your report, your
6	Your view is that that would not be unbundled	⁶ second report still, I wanted to direct you to Exhibit
7	in this model. That would continue to be part of the	⁷ No. 4, which shows the marginal cost estimates for
8	Expanded Basic package in the but-for world that you	⁸ models in dollars.
9	model?	⁹ A Yes.
10	A The way I modeled it is what the	¹⁰ Q Okay. And what I'm trying to compare are
11	in-markets the way the in-market product is	¹¹ the the margins across the three options, MLB TV,
12	currently distributed and sold wouldn't change. That	¹² NHL Game Center Live, and DirecTV, and I we did the
13	doesn't mean it wouldn't change in a way that would	¹³ math, and it seems like what you're projecting is that
14	have an even greater affect on the bundle price which	the margin is the same across all three of the the
15	is the goal of the analysis.	¹⁵ percentage margin is the same across all three; is
16	Q Again, what I'm trying to understand is	¹⁶ that is that right?
17	exactly what the model does. I totally understand	¹⁷ A This is actually a prediction from the model,
18	that there are many, many other contingencies, other	¹⁸ and the model predicts the same percentage because the
19	ways the world may evolve.	¹⁹ data we have on marginal cost went into the model.
20	A Right.	²⁰ This is a table to demonstrate that the model
21	Q But the model assumes that the Braves are	²¹ accurately predicts the assumptions which is a one
22	unlike all the other teams, are not sold as a	²² way to verify the accuracy of the model so that the
23	stand-alone stream; is that right?	the the underlying data about margins has built
24	A Well, they the model assumes no change in	²⁴ into it the cost data. And so then the question is,
25	the way things are currently done, yes. It's it	²⁵ if you run the model and produce estimates of prices
	Page 455	Page 456
1	and quantities from that that that result, in	¹ common phenomenon is they pay a fixed key fee that is
1 2	and quantities from that that that result, in terms of prices and quantities, makes a prediction	
		¹ common phenomenon is they pay a fixed key fee that is
2	terms of prices and quantities, makes a prediction	 ¹ common phenomenon is they pay a fixed key fee that is ² based on an expectation of subscribers, that if they
2 3	terms of prices and quantities, makes a prediction about what marginal cost is, and what this shows is that the model predicts the the from the equilibrium prices, the marginal costs that were used	 common phenomenon is they pay a fixed key fee that is based on an expectation of subscribers, that if they do a good job promoting themselves, they don't face the fee increase until the next time around. So this does not include that phenomena.
2 3 4 5 6	terms of prices and quantities, makes a prediction about what marginal cost is, and what this shows is that the model predicts the the from the equilibrium prices, the marginal costs that were used to construct the model to begin with. So it's a	 common phenomenon is they pay a fixed key fee that is based on an expectation of subscribers, that if they do a good job promoting themselves, they don't face the fee increase until the next time around. So this does not include that phenomena. This is this is based upon the distribution cost
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	Page 457	Page 458
1	higher the tier, the more they pay per pop of those on	¹ So the analog here is more like how does MLB
2	the tier. That's the way most channels are.	² price Extra Innings, and how does the NFL price Sunday
3	But nationwide distribution, things like the	³ Ticket, and how does the NHL pack price its nationwide
4	bundle, typically are not negotiated in that way. And	⁴ package.
5	the reason for it is to avoid affecting marginal	⁵ Q Doesn't ESPN charge MVPDs on a per-subscriber
6	decisions by MVPDs.	6 basis?
7	Q So your model assumes that MVPDs will not	⁷ A Yes, it does, but that's not that's not
8	negotiate a per subscriber cost for RSNs outside of	⁸ they there are things that they include that aren't
9	their footprint?	⁹ that way, but that's not the model here. The model is
10	A The model assumes that there is a negotiation	¹⁰ a different one than than ESPN. It's a the
11	of that division of the rents between them, and	¹¹ model is premised on the way the national packages are
12	it's again, it's it's focused on the bundle, not	¹² priced.
13	the RSN/MVPD relationship; all right. It's it's	¹³ Q And doesn't NFL Network charge on a
14	there's a certain margin which is then divided.	¹⁴ per-subscriber basis?
15	That's the assumption of the model as opposed	¹⁵ A Yes, it does.
16	to there's a posted price per pop of the sports	¹⁶ Q And MBA TV does as well?
17	channel.	¹⁷ A Yes, they do.
18	Q But in the real world isn't that, in fact,	¹⁸ Q And MLB, their network does as well on a
19	the way sports channels are priced?	¹⁹ per-subscriber basis?
20	A That's the way that local sports channels	²⁰ A Yes, they do.
21	frequently are priced, but it's not the way national	²¹ Q And broadcast networks, when they carry
22	distribution of sports are priced; all right. And	²² sports, they also are priced on a per-subscriber
23	we're looking at the latter when we talk about	²³ basis, ABC, et cetera?
24	elimination of territorial restrictions	²⁴ A Yes, to mostly, yes.
25	restrictions.	²⁵ Q Okay. So I'd like to go back now to some
	Dogo 450	
1	Page 459	Page 460
1	questions about the C&Y model.	¹ of the way you get from the existing data to a demand
2	questions about the C&Y model. Do you mind if a call it just the C&Y model?	 of the way you get from the existing data to a demand curve for each of the teams and for various bundles of
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	Page 461		Page 462
1	not applied here is because that's not what we're	1	power than, say, the top 50 cable networks; is that
2	dealing with here. We're dealing with a relatively	2	fair?
3	homogenous set of products; namely, regional sports	3	A Well, not all the top 50 cable networks have
4	networks that differ simply only with respect to the	4	a lot of bargaining power. The results in the
5	teams they have.	5	their their model differ according to the channel.
6	That's enough to produce heterogeneity and	6	So ESPN is much more important than the
7	produce it per the competition, but it's much less	7	History Channel; all right. So there's variation in
8	heterogeneity than you than one observes from the	8	them. The most of most of the bang you get from
9	top ten or so cable networks that are offered by	9	their model comes from the top channels on the list.
10	MVPDs.	10	You know, I don't know if they did this in
11	Q Is there any other reason that you're not	11	the published version. But one version in the paper
12	applying the supply-side bargaining model of C&Y in	12	actually rank ordered them in terms of what the
13	this case, or is that the principal or only reason?	13	what the consequences of unbundling was for their
14	A No. I mean, we can we can attempt I	14	price.
15	mean, we know we can apply it, because they did it to	15	Q Right.
16	a much more difficult case. So we could we	16	But I'm focusing on why RSNs are supposedly
17	could use you could use the bargaining model here	17	different from at least the most important major cable
18	as well as the one we did. We we picked this one	18	networks.
19	because we thought it was more accurate, but you could	19	A Yes.
20	do the other one.	20	Q And I think I heard you say that's because
21	Q Right.	21	they're homogenous, and they have less market power.
22	But I it sounds to me, I just want to make	22	A Right.
23	sure I understand, that the reason you're not applying	23	CNN is a less perfect substitute for ESPN
24	the bargaining model of C&Y in this case is because	24	than Comcast Bay Area is a substitute for Comcast
25	RSNs are more homogenous and they have less market	25	Northern California.
	Page 463		Page 464
1	Q So the reason that we're not applying the C&Y	1	differences
2	model is because of the RSN's market power or lack	2	A Yeah.
3	thereof; is that fair?	3	Q is that fair?
4	A Well, yeah. The less it the greater	4	A Yes.
5	degree of the competition among them than would be the	5	Q Why did you do that?
6	case for the entire list of the top cable channels.	6	A Have having discussions with Ali and Greg
7	Q Now, that's not the reason you gave in your	7	about what the right way to model it was, and they
8	original report for declining to apply the bargaining	8	thought the Bertrand model was better, and I agreed
9	model of C&Y isn't that right?	9	with them.
10	A Well, the very first one, yeah. We were just	10	Q Why does that change the explanation for
11	using something simple, yes. And then the issue was,	11	applying declining to apply the bargaining model?
12	should I add the bargaining model, and I did and we	12	Because you didn't apply the bargaining model in
13	decided not to do it.	13	either case.
14	Q Well	14	A No, that's right. The first case we were
15	A It was not worth it.	15	it's it's one step at a time. Remember, when we
16	Q Well, you didn't apply the bargaining model	16	were doing the first model, we were facing a world
17	in either your first report	17	where it took 20 to 50 hours to solve the model, and
18	A No.	18	so it didn't that that you know, adding the
19 20	Q or your second report; right?	19 20	bargaining model, given the coding we had then, would
21	A You're you're referring to the explanation	20	have required still more 20- to 50-hour runs, and that
22	of the differences in the first report.	22	was the main reason. It was simplicity then. The main reason now is because we actually
23	Q Right. So you	23	think the Bertrand model is better. Now we've got the
24	A And	24	runtime way down.
25	Q changed your explanation for the	25	Q Can we go to your first report
			2 Curl we go to your instruption

	Page 489		Page 490
1	DirecTV.	1 s	some of the same subjects, so bear with me.
2	Q But it's still, in some areas, faces telco	2	You gave some testimony yesterday, and I want
3	competition, and in other areas doesn't face telco	3 t	o ask you about that. You said, and I want to ask
4	competition; right?		you if this is your assumption, that the league will
5	A To some degree, yes.		price the bundle in a way that maximizes league
6	Q And in some areas it might face an		profits, but taking into account the relationship to
7	overbilled, like RCN, in other areas it might not face		he profitability of the teams arising from the
8	an overbilled		RSNs
9	A To some degree	9	A Right.
10	Q like	10	Q is that your assumption?
11	A but that's minor.	11	A Yes. Well, I yes, it is an assumption
12	Q And your model doesn't take any of that into	12 a	bout how the league would behave if it were rational,
13	account?		/es.
14	A Nope.	14	Q And does your model do that?
15	MR. BURKE: Okay. I'm I'm done. I'm	15	A The the model takes account only of the
16	going do hand this off. Thank you.	¹⁶ c	competition in the out of market it's it
17	going to name this one. Thank you.		hat's why the implicit assumption in the model is
18	EXAMINATION BY MR. PARIS		what's going on with respect to the way that the
19	MR. PARIS: Q. Good morning, Dr. Noll.		n-market RSNs are offered is held constant. Because
20	A Good morning.		whatever the accounting of protecting the markets for
21	Q I'm Andrew Paris, I represent the DirecTV		he RSNs within their home market, that's reflected in
22	defendants. I have some additional questions. I'm		heir current pricing.
23	keenly aware that I'm the fifth examiner to ask you	23	Q Okay. All I'm asking is whether or not when
24	these questions, and I'm going to do my best to not	24 i	n the but-for world that you're of your model, is
25	tread on old ground, but we're probably going to hit		he bundle a combination of the is the is the
	Page 491		Page 492
1	Page 491 league maximizing the profits but taking into account	1 s	Page 492 such that that is the profit max whatever they
1 2	-		_
	league maximizing the profits but taking into account	² c	such that that is the profit max whatever they
2	league maximizing the profits but taking into account the profitability of the teams arising from the RSNs,	² c ³ c	such that that is the profit max whatever they currently charge is the profit-maximizing price based
2 3	league maximizing the profits but taking into account the profitability of the teams arising from the RSNs, as you testified yesterday?	² c ³ c	such that that is the profit max whatever they currently charge is the profit-maximizing price based on whatever their considerations are that go outside
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Page	505
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Page 5	0	6
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	rage JUJ		rage 500
1	A I don't know what the price you have access	1	prices.
2	to the Angels in Anaheim is	2	Q Okay. You didn't read the deposition
3	Q Okay.	3	testimony of any DirecTV witnesses; did you?
4	A because that's not pertinent to the	4	A I don't remember sitting here. I can't I
5	question I'm addressing, which is what is the price to	5	don't know whether I've read any of the deposition
6	the out-of-market teams.	6	testimony of any DirecTV witness.
7	Q Okay. So this price only applies outside of	7	Q Well, I'll
8	the current home territory for the Angels; that's your	8	A I didn't I don't think I relied on it. I
9	testimony?	9	don't think it's in my list of things I relied upon,
10	A Yeah, this well, it is what is the price	10	no.
11	for customers that live outside of market; all right.	11	Q Okay.
12	And who that's that's what determines the the	12	A But I don't know whether I looked at it and
13	distribution of viewing and the price of the MLB.TV	13	didn't use it.
14	service.	14	Q Okay. So it wasn't important to you to have
15	Q Do you believe that in the but-for world, the	15	the testimony taken into account of Patrick Crum, the
16	current Angels RSN is going to have the nationwide	16	president of DirecTV Sports Network?
17	Internet streaming rights?	17	A Well, I said what is there about I don't
18	A The the implicit assumption in the model	18	recall what I was thinking a year ago about what I
19	is that they do, in fact, acquire the out-of-market	19	chose to read and what I did read? I don't remember
20	rights along with the in-market rights in negotiations	20	whether I even looked at it or not. I know I
21	with the team, yes.	21	didn't I know it does
22	Q Are they going to have one price for	22	Q I thought you said
23	nationwide and another price in market?	23	A before
24	A Most likely that would be the result, yes,	24	THE REPORTER: One at a time, please.
25	that the prices we're estimating are out-of-market	25	THE WITNESS: Would you like to stop
20	that the prices were estimating are out-or-market	20	THE WITNESS. Would you like to stop
			Dama E00
	Page 507		Page 508
1	interrupting me and continue your question? I mean,	1	The testimony from witnesses at at
2	go ahead. Ask your question, and I'll stop talking so	2	DirecTV, you may have read and considered not relevant
3	you can ask more questions.	3	to the to your opinions?
4	MR. PARIS: Q. I thought you said you didn't	4	A Perhaps, but I just don't know. I mean,
5	rely on it.	5	remember, this is about class certification, and what
6	A I said all are you done? I don't want to	6	I would what I'll write the next time around, I
7	interrupt you. Are you done?	7	don't know. But for what the purposes of this point
8	Q Go ahead, sir.	8	we are now, I don't recall the anything said there
9	A Okay. What I said is, I do not recall	9	was relevant or if I even read it.
10	whether I read it. I don't think it's on the list of	10	I mean, I it probably would be more useful
11	things I relied on, but that doesn't mean I didn't	11	to say, is there something that I didn't take into
12	read it; all right. I'm just saying I don't remember	12	account that you think is really cool, because I can
13		1 2	
	whether I ever read it or not.	13	tell you what I thought about it or if I remember even
14	Q Okay. So there there are things that	14	thinking about it.
15	Q Okay. So there there are things that that you you read and then choose not to rely on,	14 15	thinking about it. Q You were asked some questions by Mr. Burke
15 16	Q Okay. So there there are things that that you you read and then choose not to rely on, and those are those are not disclosed?	14 15 16	thinking about it. Q You were asked some questions by Mr. Burke this morning about DirecTV Sports Pack product; do you
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	Page 525	Page 526
1	Basically, you're saying maybe I should have	¹ it was worth it to them; all right.
2	adjusted it down even more, but that's not going to	² So the the main the main
3	change the relative distribution of viewing time among	³ modeling consequence of some sort of assumption that
4	the teams.	⁴ they watch half as much as we measured would simply be
5	What it what it you know, if I just	⁵ to change the marginal utility of viewing to make it
6	say, okay. They watched the Internet 75 time	⁶ be higher so that it would still be an equilibrium
7	percent as much as they watched DirecTV. The relevant	⁷ that 3.6 percent of the population would subscribe to
8	amounts of viewing is still going to be the same. I	⁸ MLB.TV.
9	don't see there's any principal reason to expect that	⁹ MR. DIVER: Drew, do you have just a couple
10	ML the the impact of Internet of Kansas City	¹⁰ more? It's 12:30.
11	fans is different than the impact of the Internet	¹¹ THE WITNESS: We're getting close.
12	that's on Minnesota fans, which is the only thing that	¹² MR. DIVER: We got to
13	would matter is if I observed not just that there was	¹³ MR. PARIS: Q. Are you assuming the league
14	less, but that the relative proportions of viewing	¹⁴ bundles will carry all 30 teams throughout the
15	time somehow got shifted on the Internet versus	¹⁵ United States?
16	versus DirecTV.	¹⁶ A Yes, but the what we're modelling is the
17	Q So if if if the average duration of	¹⁷ incremental value of the out-of-market teams, right.
18	viewing on MLB.TV was .2 hours instead of .4 hours,	¹⁸ The price that we're estimating is the incremental
19	that you're saying that wouldn't make a difference	¹⁹ price of the out-of-market teams, all right. Because
20	in your predicted but-for world price for MLB.TV?	that's what they currently carry.
21	A The way the model works is the relative	²¹ So we're not whether they actually carry
22	distributions. What if you if the average	²² the in-market stuff or not is irrelevant, because
23	viewing time across the board just goes down, the	that's already available to people. And what we're
24	implicit value of viewing time just goes up to	²⁴ doing is what's the value added of the out-of-market
25	compensate, because we know they paid the price. So	team. Because that's all you can get from the current
	Page 527	Page 528
1	_	
1 2	Page 527 data is willingness to pay for access to out of market.	
	data is willingness to pay for access to out of	¹ MR. PARIS: That we have everything there.
2	data is willingness to pay for access to out of market.	 MR. PARIS: That we have everything there. There have been a number of times during the course of
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EXHIBIT C

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

	I (rages I to 4)
Page 1	Page 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² APPEAR ANCES
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK THOMAS LAUMANN, FERNANDA CIVIL ACTION NO. GARBER, ROBERT SILVER, 12-cv-1817(SAS) GARRETT TRAUB, DAVID DILLON, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated vs NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE,	IANGER (RROGAN & DIVER, P.C. BY: HOWARD LANGER, ESQUIRE (215) 320-5661 hanger@langergrogan.com NED DIVER, ESQUIRE (215) 320-5663 ndiver@langergrogan.com 1717 Arch Street Suite 4130 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Representing the Plaintiffs
NHL ENTERPRISES, L.P., NHL INTERACTIVE CYBERENTERPRISES, LLC, NEW YORK RANCERS HOCKEY CLUB, NEW JERSEY DEVILS, LLC, NEW YORK ISLANDERS HOCKEY CLUB, L.P., COMCAST-SPECTACOR, L.P., LINCOLM HOCKEY, LLC, LEMIEUX GROUP, L.P., HOCKEY WESTERN NEW YORK, LLC, CHICAGO BLACKHAWKS HOCKEY TEAM, INC., SAN JOSE SHARKS, LLC, DIRECTV, LLC, ROOT SPORTS PITTSBURGH, (Caption continued), Thursday, December 11, 2014 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL DEPOSITION OF: JANUSZ A. ORDOVER Kaplan, Leaman and Wolfe 325 Chestnut Street Suite 909 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (800) 295-7571 KapLeaWol@acl.com	 KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. BY: ROBERT LaROCCA, ESQUIRE One South Broad Street Suite 2100 Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 238-1700 rlarocca@kahnswiff.com Representing the Plaintiffs SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP BY: SHEPARD GOLDFEIN, ESQUIRE shepard.goldfein@skadden.com Four Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 735-3610 Representing the Defendants, NHL (except MSG) ALSTON & BIRD BY: ANDREW E. PARIS, ESQUIRE drew.paris@alston.com 333 South Hope Street 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 576-1000 Representing the Defendants, DIRECTV Sports Networks, LLC
	Dage 4
 CAPTION CONTINUED), COMCAST CORP., COMCAST SPORTSNET PHILADELPHIA, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET MID-ATLANTIC, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET CALIFORNIA, LLC, COMCAST SPORTSNET CHICAGO, LLC, and MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY FERNANDA GARBER, MARC CIVIL ACTION NO. LERNER, DEREK RASMUSSEN, 12-ev-3704(SAS) ROBERT SILVER, GARRETT TRAUB, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated vs OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, et al. TUTCONT VIENCE AND A GARDER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor, New York, NY 10013-1413 on the above date before DEBRA G. JOHNSON-SPALLONE, CCR, RPR, Delaware CSR, Notary Public in and for the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, and a Federally Approved Reporter of the United States District Court commencing on or about 10:30 a.m. 	Page 4 HGHLY CONFIDENTIAL APPEARANCES: (Continued), DAVIS POLK BY: DAVID B, TOSCANO, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4515 david toscano@davispolk.com ANDREW N. DeLANEY, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4294 andrew.delaney@davispolk.com ATHUR J, BURKE, ESQUIRE arthur.burke@davispolk.com ASD Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 Representing the Defendant, Comcast PROSKAUER ROSE, LLC PROSKAUER RO

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

		3 (Pages 9 to 12)
	Page 9	Page 11
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. Do I know what?	² watch a hockey game?
3	Q. You know the explanations before the	³ A. Maybe once or twice.
4	deposition given to you many times?	4 O. How about baseball?
5	A. Yes, I have heard those explanations	5 A. Little bit more often than it
6	before.	⁶ depends on whether the friends are over or not, and
7	Q. When was the most recent deposition?	 ⁷ they want to watch it. So, maybe five times a
8	A. That was just a few weeks ago.	⁸ vear a season.
9	O. What matter was that?	year a season.
10		⁹ Q. Any baseball team you favor?
11	÷.	A. well, I obviously, given where we
12	alleged price fixing in the Flat Glass. O. Flat Glass case?	are, and everybody tens me now great the Tankees
13		are, then I do lavor the Tankees just as a hatural
14	A. Yes.	preditection.
15	Q. Okay.	Q. Decause you re in New York City of
16	Now, the only thing I just want to	because the lawyer is here who told you should root
17	remind you is that, although we're in Court here	
18	today in terms of the Court, the accuracy of answers,	A. NO. I fately listen to the lawyers.
19	so that if you don't understand any of my questions,	It is because I and in New TOIK. I nived an my
20	please ask me to clarify it.	American me m m new Tork, so
20	Okay. That's good.	Q. wen, mat s strange, because i grew
	A. Absolutely.	up in New TOLK and TTOOLIOT the Micis.
22	Q. And I usually need more breaks than	WIK. TOSCANO. IS LIETE a question?
23	anybody else, but if you need one when I don't need	²³ MR. LANGER: Yes.
24 25	one, just let me know.	
2.5	A. Okay.	²⁵ CONTINUATION
	Page 10	Page 12
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Thanks.	² BY MR. LANGER:
3	Are you a sports fan?	³ Q. Now, is there any hockey team that
4	A. No. I watch sports occasionally,	4 you particularly favor?
5	and I do read sports pages, especially in the	⁵ A. Well, I used to favor the Kennedy
6	Financial Times, on Sunday.	⁶ Lions because I lived for a year in Montreal on
7	Q. Huh-huh.	⁷ Sherbrooke Avenue which is, as you well know, right,
8	A. Saturday, actually.	⁸ that's where the Canadian's arena is, and I had an
9	Q. So, there's no particular team that	⁹ apartment literally 50 yards up the street up or
10	you root for?	¹⁰ down, and so, I also got free tickets from the people
11	A. No. As I say, I like sports as an	¹¹ I rented the room from, and I loved the game. I
12	activity personally, and I like watching it, but I'm	¹² watch enjoyed watching it.
13	not a fan of any particular team.	¹³ Q. So, you used to see Jean Beliveau,
14	Q. Huh-huh.	¹⁴ Maurice Richard and those people?
15	Is there any particular sport you	¹⁵ A. I'm talking well, I don't
16	like to watch?	¹⁶ remember the great names of the great Canadian hockey
17	A. I like to watch Tour De France.	¹⁷ players, but this was in 1977 '67, '68 season.
18	I like to watch soccer.	¹⁸ That's when I lived in Montreal.
19	I watched for a while Australian	¹⁹ Q. Okay.
20	rules rugby. I couldn't understand them, but I like	Now, I take it from your prior
21	to watch the game.	 answers you have never bought any of the packages - sports packages that are at issue in this case?
22 23	I like all athletic pursuits,	sports packages that are at issue in this case.
23	especially the unusual ones.	A. wen, actually, I bought them in
24	Q. Okay.	 connection with trying to familiarize myself with the look and feel when I was retained in this case.
	How often during the year do you	four and feet when I was retained in this case.

	5 (Pages 17 to 20)
Page 17	Page 19
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² Q. Did you read the Court's decision on	² Q. Okay.
³ the Motion for Summary Judgment?	3 A as I sit here.
⁴ A. I think that is the one I have read,	⁴ Q. Okay.
⁵ yes, sir.	⁵ We will get back to Exhibit-1 later.
⁶ Q. Did you read the Court's decision on	⁶ A. Okay.
⁷ the Motion to Dismiss?	7 Q. Okay.
⁸ A. I may have read a portion of it.	⁸ Now, Dr. Ordover, how much does it
⁹ Q. Now, there were many other	⁹ cost an RSN to produce a broadcast of a baseball
¹⁰ Declarations filed of record in the case, other than	¹⁰ game, excluding rights fees?
¹¹ those that you list here that you told me you did not	game, excluding rights lees:
¹² review those other records those other	WIK. TOSCANO. Objection to form.
review mose other records mose other	THE WITNESS. I doint have the
Deciar auons.	precise number, our i nave seen numbers such as high
is that right.	¹⁴ or more.
A. If it was not on the list, then I	
nave not reviewed them, no.	CONTINUATION
Q. Did you review the papers med in	DI WK. LANGER.
¹⁸ support of the Motion for Summary Judgment?	Q. of more:
¹⁹ A. Papers filed by the the	¹⁹ A. Yeah.
²⁰ plaintiffs?	²⁰ Q. Okay.
Q. No. The movements were the	²¹ Up to what?
²² defendants.	A. Up to I don't know the upper
²³ MR. TOSCANO: To the extent that you	²³ amount. It's really within the control of the of
²⁴ know what was filed.	the RSN how much it's willing to pay the announcer,
²⁵ THE WITNESS: I have no idea.	²⁵ how expensive is the product that is surrounding the
Page 18	Page 20
-	-
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² I don't know whether such papers 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL transmission of the game.
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I don't know whether such papers were filed, and assuming that they were, I don't 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL transmission of the game. There's more to it than just the,
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	Page 21	Page 23
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	attempted to estimate the various costs involved,	² the same way that chefs' income varies?
3	whether there are incremental costs, marginal costs	³ A. They vary some other ways.
4	or total costs.	⁴ They vary in response to potentially
5		⁵ other economic factors. The amount that the chef
6	CONTINUATION	⁶ gets paid depends on the location because that, to
7	BY MR. LANGER:	 ⁷ some extent, also determines pricing of the products
8	Q. When you gave me the number	⁸ in the kitchen and in the restaurant, as well as such
9	what were you including in that?	⁹ things as the real estate costs, and so on and so
10	A. I think that's a number that was	¹⁰ forth.
11	mentioned by Professor Noll. So, whatever he	$\begin{array}{c} 11 \\ 11 \\ \mathbf{Q}. \\ \mathbf{Okay}. \end{array}$
12	includes in that number. I would say that's a number	¹² Do you have any sense of the
13	that I have seen. I personally have not set out to	 ¹³ variation that you just described, how great that is?
14	calculate these types of costs.	¹⁴ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
15	Q. Okay.	¹⁵ THE WITNESS: In actual dollar
16	Do you know whether those costs vary	¹⁶ terms?
17	significantly from team to team; that is, the cost of	17
18	an RSN to produce the broadcast?	18 CONTINUATION
19	A. I think that the presumption would	¹⁹ BY MR. LANGER:
20	be they will vary to some extent in part because the	²⁰ Q. Between the most expensive broadcast
21	talent that is retained to provide the commentary to,	²¹ and the least expensive broadcast of the baseball
22	you know, interview the players. All of those things	
23	probably differ from whether we're talking about the	²² game. ²³ A. No.
24	talent that works with the with the Kansas City	
25	Royals or the Yankees.	 As I said once before, I can repeat as many times as you want me to, I have not set out
	Royals of the Tankees.	as many times as you want me to, I have not set out
	Page 22	Page 24
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Do you have any idea whether the	² to undertake an intensive or extensive study of the
3	talent that the Royals uses more or less cost than	 various types of costs in hockey and baseball.
4	the Yankees?	4 Q. So, you would have no idea of the
5	A. I don't. I would think that what I	
		Q. 50, you would have no luca of the
6		⁵ difference in cost to an RNS to broadcast a Houston
6 7	know from labor economics, I would say that there are	 difference in cost to an RNS to broadcast a Houston Astros game as compared to a New York Yankees game?
	know from labor economics, I would say that there are geographic variations in labor costs. That we know.	 difference in cost to an RNS to broadcast a Houston Astros game as compared to a New York Yankees game? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
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7 (Pages 25 to 28)

		/ (Pages 25 to 20)
	Page 25	Page 27
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	the baseball and hockey markets.	² must receive in revenue to warrant broadcasting a
3	Q. What would the highest one be in	³ game?
4	baseball?	⁴ A. A particular game?
5	A. Again, I'm sorry to disappoint you,	⁵ Q. Yes.
6	sir, but I have not set out to learn or actually to	⁶ A. Well, I think that is linked to the
7	memorize whatever I had learned about these types of	⁷ costs properly calculated that the RSN would avoid by
8	differences.	⁸ not broadcasting the game. That number, I don't
9	I believe that there's likely to be	⁹ know.
10	a substantial variation as between the top team and	¹⁰ There are different costs that would
11	those may vary from year-to-year to the teams that	¹¹ be a bigger pool of costs that would be avoided if
12	happen to be at the bottom of the rankings.	¹² the RSN cancelled or failed to or chose to not to
13	Q. Which teams are at the top of the	¹³ produce more than one game.
14	rankings?	¹⁴ Q. And your answer would be the same
15	MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to form of	¹⁵ for baseball and hockey?
16	the question.	¹⁶ A. As I said, it all depends on it
17	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.	¹⁷ is all gauged in economics by a concept called
18	MR. GOLDFEIN: I object to the form	¹⁸ avoidable costs, and but I have not set out to
19	of the question.	¹⁹ calculate these avoidable costs for either sports.
20		²⁰ Q. And you have no sense at all as to
21	CONTINUATION	²¹ what those costs would be?
22	BY MR. LANGER:	²² MR. TOSCANO: Objection.
23	Q. The witness just said that there's	²³ Mischaracterize the witness's
24	the variation between the teams at the bottom and top	²⁴ testimony.
25	of the rankings.	²⁵ MR. LANGER: In terms of absolute
	Page 26	Page 28
1		
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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8 (Pages 29 to 32)

		8 (Pages 29 to 32)
	Page 29	Page 31
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form	² down to to calculate those in the context of this
3	of the question. Asked and answered.	³ assignment, no.
4	THE WITNESS: As I sit here, I don't	⁴ Q. Do you know how the cost of
5	have those numbers in my memory because I have not	⁵ producing a baseball game compares with the cost of
6	set out to calculate them.	 ⁶ producing a situation comedy on television?
7		⁷ A. No. I've seen some very high
8	CONTINUATION	⁸ numbers for situation comedies, including the
9	BY MR. LANGER:	⁹ salaries to the so-called talent, but I have not set
10	Q. Now, when a game is shown on	¹⁰ out to analyze those thoroughly across time and
11	television, okay, who gets the revenue for the	¹¹ across various situation comedies.
12	advertising, the RSN or the MVPD?	¹² Some, of course, are very costly.
13	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	¹³ Others are likely to be much less costly. Much
14	THE WITNESS: I think there are	¹⁴ depends on the sets, the talents, and all of the
15	agreements as between the RSN and the MVPD's to	¹⁵ considerations.
16	divide the advertising revenues according to the	¹⁶ Q. Let me understand.
17	contractual terms which they have reached.	¹⁷ Do you have any idea what a
18		¹⁸ situation comedy is considered, as you put it, less
19	CONTINUATION	¹⁹ costly would cost per episode?
20	BY MR. LANGER:	²⁰ A. Again, I don't believe that there's
21	Q. Do you have any sense of how that	²¹ any particular number one can quote. There may be
22	division what that division represents?	²² averages, and it is also the case, as you know, that
23	MR. TOSCANO: Object to form.	²³ situation comedy, tragedy or whatever it is, that is
24	THE WITNESS: What do you mean by	²⁴ not covering its incremental costs or forward looking
25	"what division represents"?	²⁵ costs, it is going to get cancelled. Some of them
	Page 30	Page 32
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	_	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go for a couple of years, so
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL It represents a division of the revenues.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go for a couple of years, so Q. Again I'm asking; you have no idea
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL It represents a division of the revenues.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go for a couple of years, so Q. Again I'm asking; you have no idea what the range of costs actually is
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL It represents a division of the revenues.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go for a couple of years, so Q. Again I'm asking; you have no idea what the range of costs actually is MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL It represents a division of the revenues. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: 0. What by that I meant what percentage of the revenues the advertising revenues would go to the RSN, and what percentage go to the MVPD? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I would first of all, I think it is a subject of negotiation as between the RSN and the MVPD, and I'm not aware of there being any particular fixed percentage that goes to one or the other. It's a matter of negotiation, like other terms of the contract, between the RSN and the MVPD. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: 0. And and I take it from your last answer you have no idea of what those ranges would	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go 3 for a couple of years, so 4 Q. Again I'm asking; you have no idea 5 what the range of costs actually is 6 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 7 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 8 dollars? 9 MR. TOSCANO: Asked and answered. 10 THE WITNESS: I have no such idea. 11 All I know is that many some 12 cases, these situation comedies or other types of 13 television programming gets cancelled because of the 14 incremental basis. They can simply cannot sustain 15 MR. LANGER: Right. 17 18 CONTINUATION 19 BY MR. LANGER: 20 Q. Now, is Comcast one of the entities 21 that has retained you in this matter? 22 A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL It represents a division of the revenues. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: 0. What by that I meant what percentage of the revenues the advertising revenues would go to the RSN, and what percentage go to the MVPD? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I would first of all, I think it is a subject of negotiation as between the RSN and the MVPD, and I'm not aware of there being any particular fixed percentage that goes to one or the other. It's a matter of negotiation, like other terms of the contract, between the RSN and the MVPD.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 get cancelled after two episodes. Others likely go 3 for a couple of years, so 4 Q. Again I'm asking; you have no idea 5 what the range of costs actually is 6 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 7 MR. TOSCANO: Asked and answered. 8 dollars? 9 MR. TOSCANO: Asked and answered. 10 THE WITNESS: I have no such idea. 11 All I know is that many some 12 cases, these situation comedies or other types of 13 television programming gets cancelled because of the 14 incremental basis. They can simply cannot sustain 15 themselves. 16 MR. LANGER: Right. 17 18 CONTINUATION 19 BY MR. LANGER: 20 Q. Now, is Comcast one of the entities 21 that has retained you in this matter? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Do you know that Comcast owns NBC?

9 (Pages 33 to 36)

	9 (Pages 33 to 36)
Page 33	Page 35
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² Q. Can you compare the profit to	² Over the past ten I have taught
³ Comcast as a producer of its most popular sitcom to	³ mostly two subjects at the graduate and undergraduate
⁴ its profit per hour of its most popular Flyer's game?	⁴ level; one being industrial organization economics
⁵ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	⁵ industrial organization economics.
⁶ THE WITNESS: Why would I want to do	⁶ The other being international trade.
⁷ such a calculation in the context of my assignment?	⁷ Q. Have have there been any subset
⁸ I cannot imagine undertaking it.	⁸ of courses that you've taught under the under the
9	⁹ industrial economics industrial organization
¹⁰ CONTINUATION	¹⁰ economics?
¹¹ BY MR. LANGER:	¹¹ I'm sorry.
¹² Q. Okay.	¹² A. At NYU?
¹³ So, you don't know?	¹³ Q. Yes.
¹⁴ A. I cannot I don't know, that's	¹⁴ A. I have been teaching both
¹⁵ true. I have not undertaken such an assignment, and	¹⁵ undergraduate and graduate courses, the MA, MB level
¹⁶ I was not tasked to undertake such an assignment.	¹⁶ in industrial organization economics as a
¹⁷ Q. I take it from your prior answers	¹⁷ field subject.
¹⁸ that you have no idea what the broadcasting revenue	¹⁸ Q. So, what courses have you taught
¹⁹ of any baseball team is.	¹⁹ this last semester?
²⁰ Is that correct?	²⁰ A. Well, this semester I'm not
²¹ MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	²¹ teaching, but the last semester of the prior academic
²² Mischaracterizes the witness's	²² year I taught undergraduate industrial organization,
²³ testimony.	²³ MA industrial organization, an MA level course in
²⁴ THE WITNESS: Of any team?	²⁴ international trade.
²⁵ MR. LANGER: Yes.	²⁵ Q. So, you're not teaching this
Page 34	Page 36
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² THE WITNESS: You mean, how much	² semester.
³ they receive from the sale of their rights?	³ Is that you are on sabbatical?
⁴ MR. LANGER: Yes.	⁴ A. I am on a sabbatical for this year,
⁵ THE WITNESS: Not as I sit here, no.	⁵ yes, sir.
	6 Q. And are you doing any particular
CONTINUATION	research during that sabbatical?
⁸ BY MR. LANGER:	⁸ A. I'm spending a lot of time catching
Q. And that would be the same for	 ⁹ up on the literature, thinking about economic issues ¹⁰ that I would like to write about.
¹⁰ hockey.	¹¹ I have written several short papers
11 Is that right? 12 MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	¹² which will be likely to be well, two of them or
¹³ THE WITNESS: I have not undertaken	¹³ three of them already been accepted for publication,
¹⁴ to to familiarize myself with these numbers, no.	¹⁴ and they have appeared already, but my focus is
15 No, sir.	 ¹⁵ entirely on antitrust aspects of industrial
16	¹⁶ organization economics.
¹⁷ CONTINUATION	¹⁷ Q. Have you been overseeing any
¹⁸ BY MR. LANGER:	¹⁸ graduate students during your sabbatical?
¹⁹ Q. Now, you're a professor at NYU.	¹⁹ A. No. I try not to work at NYU during
²⁰ Is that correct?	²⁰ my sabbatical.
²¹ A. Yes.	Q. You said you were retained in this
Q. What courses have you taught?	²² case about a year ago.
A. Over the past 43 years?	²³ A. I think so.
²⁴ Q. Well, let's take over the last ten.	²⁴ Q. Can you describe the circumstances
²⁵ A. Okay.	²⁵ of your retention?

11 (Pages 41 to 44)

		II (Pages 41 to 44)
	Page 41	Page 43
¹ HIGHL	Y CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² your Declaration,	, "I have been asked by counsel for	² I was contacted and retained, I was asked then to be
³ Defendants in the	above-captioned cases to assess	³ to focus on the classification issues, and in
	c perspective whether it is more	⁴ connection with that task I was was made I was
⁵ likely than not or	virtually all"	⁵ told or I was informed instructed that the kind of
	me. I got to reread that.	⁶ assignment that I was thinking about undertaking
	en asked by counsel for the	 ⁷ would involve the type of determination that I
	above-captioned cases to assess	⁸ summarize in the beginning of paragraph five.
	c perspective, whether it is more	9
	at all or virtually all of the	¹⁰ CONTINUATION
	nembers suffered economic injury from	¹¹ BY MR. LANGER:
	enged by the plaintiffs."	$\begin{array}{c} 12 \\ 12 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ $
	SCANO: Doctor, would it be	¹³ Now, you say that was around last
	have a copy of your Declaration in	¹⁴ December?
¹⁵ front of you?		¹⁵ A. I didn't say
	TNESS: I was going to ask for	¹⁶ Q. You said that it was about a year
¹⁷ a copy of my Decla		¹⁷ ago. It is now December.
	NGER: Yeah, I'll give it to	¹⁸ A. Right. Maybe I don't believe it
	te, but let me ask you as, I was	¹⁹ was wintertime. I think it may have been maybe the
 just asking you 	c, but let life ask you as, I was	²⁰ Fall or thereabouts.
	SCANO: But you had some	
	I'm not sure it came across.	²¹ Q. Fall of last year? ²² A. Yes.
-	NGER: Yeah. I will let you	
²⁴ look at my copy he	-	²³ Q. Okay. ²⁴ And what were the first things you
look at my copy ne	ng with paragraph five.	 And what were the first things you did?
Deginini	ig with paragraph live.	
	Page 42	Page 44
	Page 42	Page 44
_	HLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² MR. 7	-	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir.
² MR. 7 ³ mark it now?	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir. But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints.
² MR. ⁷ ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir. But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. I looked at whatever other documents
² MR. 7 ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm go	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir. But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. I looked at whatever other documents may have been available at that time.
² MR. 7 ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm gc ⁶ minutes.	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir. But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. I looked at whatever other documents may have been available at that time. I met at some point with the
² MR. 7 ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm gc ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause)	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. We touched upon that already, sir. But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. I looked at whatever other documents may have been available at that time. I met at some point with the counsel.
² MR. ⁷ ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm go ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I ⁸ THE	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause) WITNESS: Right.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. We touched upon that already, sir. 3 But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. 4 I looked at whatever other documents 5 may have been available at that time. 6 I met at some point with the 7 counsel. 8 So, that's what I did.
² MR. ⁷ ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm go ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I ⁸ THE	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause)	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. We touched upon that already, sir. 3 But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. 4 I looked at whatever other documents 5 may have been available at that time. 6 I met at some point with the 7 counsel. 8 So, that's what I did. 9 Q. And going back to Exhibit-1 –
² MR. ⁷ ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm gc ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I ⁸ THE ⁹ I read ¹⁰	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause) WITNESS: Right. that sentence.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. We touched upon that already, sir. 3 But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. 4 I looked at whatever other documents 5 may have been available at that time. 6 I met at some point with the 7 counsel. 8 So, that's what I did. 9 Q. And going back to Exhibit-1 – 10 A. Got it. Yep.
² MR. ⁷ ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm gc ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I ⁸ THE ⁹ I read ¹⁰ - ¹¹ CONTINUATI	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause) WITNESS: Right. I that sentence.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. We touched upon that already, sir. 3 But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. 4 I looked at whatever other documents 5 may have been available at that time. 6 I met at some point with the 7 counsel. 8 So, that's what I did. 9 Q. And going back to Exhibit-1 – 10 A. Got it. Yep. 11 Q when did you receive the bulk of
 ² MR. 7 ³ mark it now? ⁴ MR. 1 ⁵ I'm go ⁶ minutes. ⁷ (I ⁸ THE ⁹ I read ¹⁰ - ¹¹ CONTINUATI ¹² BY MR. LANC 	HLY CONFIDENTIAL TOSCANO: Any reason not to just LANGER: Yeah. bing to mark it in a few Pause) WITNESS: Right. that sentence.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. We touched upon that already, sir. 3 But so, what I did, I looked at the Complaints. 4 I looked at whatever other documents 5 may have been available at that time. 6 I met at some point with the 7 counsel. 8 So, that's what I did. 9 Q. And going back to Exhibit-1 – 10 A. Got it. Yep. 11 Q when did you receive the bulk of 12 the items and documents that are shown on Exhibit-1
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12 (Pages 45 to 48)

		12 (14965 45 66 46)
	Page 45	Page 47
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	don't have the capacity of storing that amount of	² MR. TOSCANO: So, you are
3	paper and maintaining that amount of paper in my home	³ representing that?
4	office.	⁴ MR. LANGER: Yes.
5	Q. So, what, would you retrieve it from	⁵ THE WITNESS: Representing that, but
6	Washington as you reviewed all of these materials?	⁶ I will take your representation, but I will verify
7	A. I would talk to my team and ask for	⁷ it.
8	some specific documents or documents that are	⁸ MR. LANGER: Okay. Please do.
9	specifically are a particular set of issues, and just	⁹ My head for dates and numbers is atrocious. That's
10	my usual procedure just because I don't have a local	¹⁰ why I wrote it down here. Okay.
11	office from which I work.	¹¹ THE WITNESS: Makes two of us.
12	Q. You said that you considered all of	¹² MR. LANGER: Yes.
13	these documents that are shown here.	¹³ Well
14	A. Right.	¹⁴ MR. TOSCANO: Your question also
15	Q. What do you do with them after they	¹⁵ misstates his Declaration.
16	were sent to you from the Washington office?	¹⁶ MR. LANGER: Whose Declaration?
17	A. I would generally return them or	¹⁷ MR. TOSCANO: Mr. Ordover's.
18	maintain some of them, but not all of them.	¹⁸ MR. LANGER: Misstates.
19	At some point some of them were put	¹⁹ Well, I'm sorry. I didn't know I
20	on the stick. So, I had a thumb drive on which these	²⁰ was even referring to it.
21	documents at this point I would have all of those	
22	documents on the thumb drive.	22 CONTINUATION
23	Q. Okay.	²³ BY MR. LANGER:
24	Now but you don't recall when you	²⁴ Q. But have you reviewed the bulk of
25	started first reviewing them, other than the initial	²⁵ these documents on Attachment 2 before receiving
	-	
	Page 46	Page 48
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL documents that you told us counsel gave you?	IIIGHLI CONFIDENTIAL
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2 3	documents that you told us counsel gave you? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. THE WITNESS: I don't have the right	 ² Dr. Noll's supplemental Declaration? ³ A. As I said, there's a continuous ⁴ process was ebbs and flows, and I reviewed them at
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13 (Pages 49 to 52)

		13 (Pages 49 to 52)
	Page 49	Page 51
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	differently.	² document with the Bates number MLB0007212-0007224.
3	unreichtly.	³ How would I remember that?
4	CONTINUATION	⁴ MR. LANGER: Okay.
5	BY MR. LANGER:	⁵ THE WITNESS: I don't even know
6	Q. Had you reviewed the bulk of the	⁶ by looking at it I don't even know what the document
7	documents on Attachment 2 before September 19th,	⁷ is.
8	2014?	⁸ MR. LANGER: Okay.
9	A. You know, you're testing my memory	⁹ THE WITNESS: So, show me a
10	for for reasons that are alluding me, but those	¹⁰ document. We'll talk about the document.
11	are your questions. You have the right to ask me	¹¹ MR. LANGER: Okay.
12	anything you want.	¹² THE WITNESS: That's what you want
13	What I'm trying to tell you is that	¹³ to do.
14	I'm not keeping mental track of all of the tasks that	¹⁴ MR. LANGER: That is fine with me.
15	I did in preparation, and then in writing the report.	¹⁵ Okay.
16	So, I'll be guessing as to the	¹⁶ Let's let me ask you this.
17	timing, and I would be guessing as to what you mean	17
18	by "bulk" in this context.	¹⁸ CONTINUATION
19	Q. Well, let me ask you this.	¹⁹ BY MR. LANGER:
20	Since it's only since September,	²⁰ Q. You said that you worked with the
21	which of the documents here did you review since last	²¹ staff in Washington.
22	since September, 2014?	²² A. Yes, sir.
23	MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	²³ Q. How did you work I mean, how
24	I think he's told you what his	²⁴ how was this Declaration prepared?
25	answer is to this whole line of examination.	²⁵ What was the process?
	Page 50	Page 52
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	I think it's time to move on.	² A. Well, I have a number of people
3	MR. LANGER: The question is	³ involved in my team in Washington, and I work with
4	pending.	⁴ them the way I work on all of my matters which is,
5	THE WITNESS: I certainly reviewed	⁵ when I get retained I try to find, in our offices
6	the documents that came in after that, but which	⁶ throughout the United States, the people that I would
7	those documents are which are those documents, I	⁷ find congenial to the particular and informed
8	just cannot tell you, other than the Declaration,	⁸ about a particular set of issues.
9	because they have actual dates attached to them.	⁹ Not everybody is good for
10	All of the other documents, of which	¹⁰ everything. So, I formed a core team. I spent time
11	there are numerous, I don't know when they were	¹¹ with a stenophonic person in Washington. Most of all
12	actually reviewed by me, reviewed by my staff under	¹² of the people, as far as I can tell, are residing in ¹³ our Washington DC office
13	my direction or any of it.	our washington, DC, office.
15		50, I would meet with them during my
16	CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:	 visit to DC. I will meet with the lead person on this case, Dr. Ezrielev.
		this case, DI. Ezherev.
17	O So you don't recall which of them	
17 18	Q. So, you don't recall which of them	Q. Could you spen that for us:
	you reviewed in the last three months?	¹⁸ A. Can you?
18	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point	18 A. Can you? 19 MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V.
18 19	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point you're starting to harass the witness. He told you	 ¹⁸ A. Can you? ¹⁹ MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V. ²⁰ MR. LANGER: E-Z-R
18 19 20	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point you're starting to harass the witness. He told you that he doesn't have the timing memorized. This is	18 A. Can you? 19 MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V. 20 MR. LANGER: E-Z-R 21 MR. TOSCANO: I-E-L-E-V.
18 19 20 21	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point you're starting to harass the witness. He told you	18 A. Can you? 19 MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V. 20 MR. LANGER: E-Z-R 21 MR. TOSCANO: I-E-L-E-V.
18 19 20 21 22	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point you're starting to harass the witness. He told you that he doesn't have the timing memorized. This is not relevant to anything related to his report.	18 A. Can you? 19 MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V. 20 MR. LANGER: E-Z-R 21 MR. TOSCANO: I-E-L-E-V. 22 THE WITNESS: I am hampered in this
18 19 20 21 22 23	you reviewed in the last three months? MR. TOSCANO: I think at this point you're starting to harass the witness. He told you that he doesn't have the timing memorized. This is not relevant to anything related to his report. THE WITNESS: I don't mind being	18 A. Can you? 19 MR. TOSCANO: E-Z-R-I-E-L-E-V. 20 MR. LANGER: E-Z-R 21 MR. TOSCANO: I-E-L-E-V. 22 THE WITNESS: I am hampered in this 23 because there is no spelling in Polish, which is my

14 (Pages 53 to 56)

		11 (14965 55 66 50)
	Page 53	Page 55
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	But, anyway, so, Dr. Jay Ezrielev	² I'm sorry to say that.
3	was my primary resource and contact, and I would meet	³ Q. So, you wouldn't know who Robert
4	with him a few times in New York for various lengths	⁴ Bowman is?
5	of time discussing the issues, discussing the the	⁵ A. I know that I spoke to several of
6	evolution of our approach, and my approach, and the	⁶ these people and but not all.
7	outline, and as the documents began flowing in and as	⁷ For example, I didn't speak to Bud
8	I was gaining an understanding of the case, a deeper	⁸ Selig, even though I know who he might be, but as
9	understanding, I would interact with him for the	⁹ I sit here I have no ability to cross what between
10	purposes of producing an outline, and then once the	¹⁰ those folks and their job descriptions, so
11	outline was more or less finalized, I would go off	¹¹ Q. Who does Michael Biard work for?
12	with Jay, and then additional members of the team to	¹² A. As I just said, I have no I would
13	start drafting the actual report.	¹³ have to go back to their Declarations and remind
14		¹⁴ myself of the job titles and their employers.
15	CONTINUATION	¹⁵ Q. You don't know whether he works for
16	BY MR. LANGER:	¹⁶ the National Hockey League or Major League Baseball.
17	Q. Okay.	¹⁷ Is that right?
18	Now, what's does Dr. Ezrielev	¹⁸ MR. TOSCANO: Objection.
19	have any specialty?	¹⁹ Asked and answered.
20	A. Well, he's an industrial	²⁰ THE WITNESS: As I sit here I don't
21	organization economist with many years of expertise	²¹ remember. I knew that, because I think I talked to
22	in matters of anti-trust, but I don't recall what his	²² him, but I did not take notes and titles as I was
23	Ph.D. was in. He actually was at New York University	²³ discussing the matter with those, yes.
24	as a graduate student.	24
25	Q. Do you have who else was on the	²⁵ CONTINUATION
	Page 54	Page 56
1	Page 54	Page 56
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team?	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² BY MR. LANGER:
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right.
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay.
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. 7 Do you know who you wouldn't
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. 7 Do you know who you wouldn't 8 you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's
2 4 5 7 8	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National
2 4 5 6 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League? A. You can go through that, and I will
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up. I just don't have the everybody's names as I sit	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League? A. You can go through that, and I will give you exactly the same number answer, because I think it is a true answer, which is to say that I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League? A. You can go through that, and I will give you exactly the same number answer, because I think it is a true answer, which is to say that I have not thoroughly memorized the job titles and the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up. I just don't have the everybody's names as I sit here. Like you, I'm challenged on the names front.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League? A. You can go through that, and I will give you exactly the same number answer, because I think it is a true answer, which is to say that I have not thoroughly memorized the job titles and the employers of these various people on the list.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up. I just don't have the everybody's names as I sit here. Like you, I'm challenged on the names front. Q. Okay.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. It says that you considered his Declaration. A. Right. Q. Okay. Do you know who you wouldn't you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's associated with Major League Baseball or the National Hockey League? A. You can go through that, and I will give you exactly the same number answer, because I think it is a true answer, which is to say that I have not thoroughly memorized the job titles and the employers of these various people on the list. Q. So, you don't know who Patrick Crumb
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up. I just don't have the everybody's names as I sit here. Like you, I'm challenged on the names front. Q. Okay. Now, I want to go back to Exhibit-1.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 BY MR. LANGER: 3 Q. It says that you considered his 4 Declaration. 5 A. Right. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Do you know who you wouldn't 8 you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's 9 associated with Major League Baseball or the National 10 Hockey League? 11 A. You can go through that, and I will 12 give you exactly the same number answer, because I 13 think it is a true answer, which is to say that I 14 have not thoroughly memorized the job titles and the 15 Q. So, you don't know who Patrick Crumb 16 Q. So, you don't know who Patrick Crumb 17 is.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL team? A. I think that the second person that joined us was Dr Dr. Keating, Brian Keating. Again, he is a I think Stanford-trained Ph.D. economist with a lot of expertise in the area of applied econometrics and industrial organization econometrics, put it that way. Q. Anybody else? A. As I said, I did not there I understand there were a number of people working with Jay, and then with Jay and Brian, and backing me up. I just don't have the everybody's names as I sit here. Like you, I'm challenged on the names front. Q. Okay. Now, I want to go back to Exhibit-1. A. Okay.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 BY MR. LANGER: 3 Q. It says that you considered his 4 Declaration. 5 A. Right. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Do you know who you wouldn't 8 you don't know who Robert Bowman is or whether he's 9 associated with Major League Baseball or the National 10 Hockey League? 11 A. You can go through that, and I will 12 give you exactly the same number answer, because I 13 think it is a true answer, which is to say that I 14 have not thoroughly memorized the job titles and the 15 employers of these various people on the list. 16 Q. So, you don't know who Patrick Crumb 17 is. 18 Is that right?
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15 (Pages 57 to 60)

	Page 57		Page 59
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	BY MR. LANGER:	2	Q. Okay. And okay. Thank you.
3	Q. You don't know who Patrick Crumb is.	3	Now, when did you receive these
4	Is that right?	4	Declarations that are listed in the Declarations
5	A. My prior answer stands.	5	group?
6	I do not memorize the job titles of	6	When did you receive the
7	the various people. I spoke to people from National	7	Declarations of Mr. Biard and Mr. Bowman?
8	Hockey League and Major League Baseball, that's for	8	MR. TOSCANO: Objection.
9	sure	9	Asked and answered.
10	Q. Okay.	10	This is the same general topic of
11	A and others as well.	11	about when he received.
12	Q. Oh, okay.	12	MR. LANGER: This is very specific.
13	Just two more.	13	MR. TOSCANO: But it's a specific
14	A. Okay.	14	example of the whole line you have already exhausted.
15	Q. Okay.	15	
16	You don't know who Jeffrey Krolik is	16	CONTINUATION
17	employed by.	17	BY MR. LANGER:
18	Is that right?	18	Q. Do you recall when you received
19	A. No, but I don't I think the	19	them?
20	answer would be; I think he's no, I would be	20	A. I received these Declarations either
21	guessing his title. I remember conversation with	21	the night before or the day they were filed.
22	him, but I don't remember the	22	Q. The night before or the day they
23	Q. And you don't know who Jon Litner is	23	were filed?
24	employed by.	24	A. Right.
25	Is that right?	25	Q. And you haven't received them before
	Page 58		Page 60
1	_	1	_
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who?		HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then?
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner?	2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of
2	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. 	2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir.
2 3 4	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. 	2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of
2 3 4 5	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. 	2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions.
2 3 4 5 6	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. A. Oh oh, Litner. I thought you 	2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions. Q. Okay.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. A. Oh oh, Litner. I thought you meant Whitner. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Would your answer be the same if I asked you any of the people and I want you to look down the list any of the people shown as a Declarant or a deposition transcript? A. Well, some of them are on both lists, and I know that Mr. Birbiglia, for example, and Thomas Brosnan are the plaintiffs in this case. So, that I know. Q. But aside from those two, you could not attach an employer or a job description to any of the other people?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions. Q. Okay. So, if they are dated November 12, you saw them for the first time the night before A. Or the day of Q or November 12th? A yeah. Q. Okay. MR. LANGER: I want to take a couple minute break. MR. TOSCANO: Sure. MR. LANGER: Thank you. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Off the record at
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. A. Oh oh, Litner. I thought you meant Whitner. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Would your answer be the same if I asked you any of the people and I want you to look down the list any of the people shown as a Declarant or a deposition transcript? A. Well, some of them are on both lists, and I know that Mr. Birbiglia, for example, and Thomas Brosnan are the plaintiffs in this case. So, that I know. Q. But aside from those two, you could not attach an employer or a job description to any of the other people? A. That is true. Q. And you reviewed all of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions. Q. Okay. So, if they are dated November 12, you saw them for the first time the night before A. Or the day of Q or November 12th? A yeah. Q. Okay. MR. LANGER: I want to take a couple minute break. MR. TOSCANO: Sure. MR. LANGER: Thank you. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Off the record at 10:21. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Stand by, please.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. A. Oh oh, Litner. I thought you meant Whitner. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Would your answer be the same if I asked you any of the people and I want you to look down the list any of the people shown as a Declarant or a deposition transcript? A. Well, some of them are on both lists, and I know that Mr. Birbiglia, for example, and Thomas Brosnan are the plaintiffs in this case. So, that I know. Q. But aside from those two, you could not attach an employer or a job description to any of the other people? A. That is true. Q. And you reviewed all of the deposition transcripts you have listed here?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions. Q. Okay. So, if they are dated November 12, you saw them for the first time the night before A. Or the day of Q or November 12th? A yeah. Q. Okay. MR. LANGER: I want to take a couple minute break. MR. TOSCANO: Sure. MR. LANGER: Thank you. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Off the record at 10:21. (Recess was taken at this time.) VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Stand by, please. The time is 11:28.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Jon who? Q. Litner? A. Whitner. I don't see him on this. Q. Right under Mr. Krolik. A. Oh oh, Litner. I thought you meant Whitner. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Would your answer be the same if I asked you any of the people and I want you to look down the list any of the people shown as a Declarant or a deposition transcript? A. Well, some of them are on both lists, and I know that Mr. Birbiglia, for example, and Thomas Brosnan are the plaintiffs in this case. So, that I know. Q. But aside from those two, you could not attach an employer or a job description to any of the other people? A. That is true. Q. And you reviewed all of the deposition transcripts you have listed here? A. Yes, but my focus was on the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL then? A. I had not seen any prior version of those Declarations, no, sir. I only saw the final versions. Q. Okay. So, if they are dated November 12, you saw them for the first time the night before A. Or the day of Q or November 12th? A yeah. Q. Okay. MR. LANGER: I want to take a couple minute break. MR. TOSCANO: Sure. MR. LANGER: Thank you. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Off the record at 10:21. VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Stand by, please. The time is 11:28. We're back on record.
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21 (Pages 8<u>1 to 84)</u>

Page 81 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 (Pause) 2	
IIIGIET CONFIDENTIAL IIIOHET CONFIDENTIAL	Page 83
² (Pause) ²	
³ Q. 17, as I counted here, prior to ³ CONTINUATION	
⁴ being retained in this case, okay, you had testified ⁴ BY MR. LANGER:	
⁵ in at least 20 anti-trust class actions with regard ⁵ Q. Okay.	
⁶ to proof of "common impact." Just tallied up the ⁶ In every occasion you the testific	ed
⁷ ones you mentioned. ⁷ the class should not be certified.	
⁸ A. Okay. ⁸ Just so we're clear.	
⁹ Q. I say, at least, because there were ⁹ Is that right?	
¹⁰ certain cases you weren't sure which cases, and I ¹⁰ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to fo	rm.
¹¹ haven't included those. ¹¹ THE WITNESS: Every occasion	
¹² MR. TOSCANO: Wait for a question. ¹² I've testified, either by Declaration or deposit	
¹³ THE WITNESS: Okay. ¹³ or in Court, that was the testimony that I gave	
¹⁵ CONTINUATION ¹⁵ CONTINUATION	
¹⁶ BY MR. LANGER: ¹⁶ BY MR. LANGER:	
¹⁷ Q. So, by the time you were retained in ¹⁷ Q. Have you ever told a potential	
¹⁸ this case you had given testimony in 20 such cases. ¹⁸ client, without identifying the client, sough	it your
¹⁹ Had you ever on any occasion given ¹⁹ opinion with regard to issues of "common	-
²⁰ an opinion that you believed the class action should ²⁰ class certification that you could not provi	-
²¹ be certified that "common impact" could be proven on ²¹ opinion to them?	
²² a class-wide basis? ²² MR. GOLDFEIN: I'm going to of	bject
²³ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. ²³ to the form of the question.	5
²⁴ Lack of foundation. ²⁴ MR. LANGER: I haven't finished	it
²⁵ THE WITNESS: The answer ²⁵ yet.	
	Daga 94
	Page 84
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
2 MR. TOSCANO: Assumes facts not in 2 MR. GOLDFEIN: not leading	to any
1 Initial Contribution Initial Contribution Initial Contribution 2 MR. TOSCANO: Assumes facts not in 2 MR. GOLDFEIN: not leading in the disclosure of that requires the disclosure of 3 evidence. 3 that requires the disclosure of	to any
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1 Initial recommission of the formation of th	to any
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11101111 CONVIDENTIAL 11101111 CONVIDENTIAL 2 MR. TOSCANO: Assumes facts not in 3 evidence. 4 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 5 MR. TOSCANO: Go ahead. 6 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 7 I didn't mean to rush. 8 I was never - the answer would be; 9 I was never - the answer would be; 10 testimony from an expert economist. 11 12 CONTINUATION 13 BY MR. LANGER: 14 Q. Again, I'm going to ask you; have	nt there could ion of nyself
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1 MR. TOSCANO: Assumes facts not in 1 MR. GOLDFEIN: not leading 3 evidence. 3 that requires the disclosure of 4 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 4 5 MR. TOSCANO: Go ahead. 5 CONTINUATION 6 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 6 BY MR. LANGER: 7 I didn't mean to rush. 7 Q. Have you ever advised the clier 8 I was never - the answer would be; 9 not be "common proof" of class certificati 10 testimony from an expert economist. 10 impact onto the class? 11 11 MR. GOLDFEIN: Speaking for r 12 CONTINUATION 12 and my firm, we have the same objection to to 13 BY MR. LANGER: 13 attorney/client communication. 14 Q. Again, I'm going to ask you; have 14 attorney/client communication. 15 you ever testified in any case have you ever come 15 COUNSEL: I join in that. 16 to the opinion in any case that a that proof of 17 or no question. I haven't asked for identificat or anything else. 18 MR. TOSCANO: Objec	nt there could ion of nyself he extent yes ion the
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22 (Pages 85 to 88)

Page 85 Page 85 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 CONTINUATION 3 CONTINUATION 4 Page 87 5 O. Now, these cases that we've gone 6 O. Now, these cases that we've gone 7 O. They involve all different kinds of industries. 1 If that fright? 2 A. Thaf's true. 3 They involve all different kinds of industries. 4 They involve allogs, pharmaceutical 4 They involve allogs, pharmaceutical 4 They involve allogs, pes. 5 A. Thaf's true. 9 They involve allogs, pes. 9 A. Plasmaceutical dings, yes. 9 A. Yes. 9 Chemicals? 14 A. Yes. 15 A. Yes. 16 Chemicals? 17 A. Yes. 18 A. Yes. 19 Page 86 10 DOVb sale? 11 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 12 A. Yes. 13 A. Yes. 14 O. Onter medical devices? 15 A. Yes. 16 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 17 HIGHLY CONFI			22 (Tages 05 00 00)
1 Institut CONTINUATION 2 CONTINUATION 3 CONTINUATION 4 Products, see asset and we've gone 6 OVER DEVISION (DATE) 7 A 9 OVER DEVISION (DATE) 9 They involve all different kinds of industries. 10 By MR, LANGER: 2 O. They involve all construction of the group pardon? 3 A 4 Yes, Sit a single product 3 A 4 Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 5 A 6 Supermarkets? 7 A 7 A 8 O. Chemicals? 9 Concerts? 4 Yes. 9 Pube Oximetry? 4 Yes. 9 Page 86 10 Outre and base are solut? 11 Depage 86 12 A 13 A 14 Yes. 15 A 16 Medical devices?		Page 85	Page 87
2 CONTINUATION 3 DY MR. LANGER: 4 DY MR. LANGER: 5 O. Now, these cases that we've gone 6 over they involve all different kinds of industries. 7 G. They involve wall-ons in college 8 sports. 13 Is that right? 14 drugs? 15 A. That's true. 16 O. Chemicals? 17 A. That's true. 18 Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 19 A. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 19 A. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 19 A. Yes. 19 C. Chemicals? 10 Concerts? 11 A. Yes. 12 A. Yes. 12 A. Yes. 14 G. Optical disk drives? 15 A. Yes. 16 O. Optical disk drives? 17 A. Yes. 18 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 19 A. Yes. 10 Other modical devices? 14 A. Yes	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLANGER: Control (Control (Contro) (Contro) (Control (Control (Contro) (Control (Contro	2		2
Driver, DANORA. Page 86 0 Now, these cases that we've gone over they involve all different kinds of industries. Is that orgent? I Now many different strengths? 1 A. Yes, sir, Yes. O. They involve walk-ons in college sports. With the Propranolol, was it multiple strengths? 2 A. Yes, sir, Yes. O. They involve all different strengths? A. I don't as I said, some of the products. 3 O. They involve all different strengths? A. I don't as I said, some of the products. Involve all different strengths? 3 O. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs? O. With the Propranolol, was it multiple strengths? Involve all different strengths? 3 O. Chemicals? Involve all different strengths? New the Propranolol, was it multiple strengths? 3 O. Chemicals? Involve all different strengths? New the strengths? 4 O. Duby sales? Involve all different strengths? Involve all different strengths? 2 O. DVD sales? I don't recall thou many different strengths? I don't recall thou many different strengths? 3 A. Yes. Page 86 Page 86 Some involved many different strengths? 4 O. Duby makes? A. Yes. O. Medical devices? A. Yes. 5 A. Yes. Page 86 Some involved only one seler. 6 O. Other meditan devices? <th>3</th> <th>CONTINUATION</th> <th>³ CONTINUATION</th>	3	CONTINUATION	³ CONTINUATION
c) 1000000000000000000000000000000000000	4	BY MR. LANGER:	⁴ BY MR. LANGER:
• over they involve all different kinds of industries. Is that correct? • A I beg your pardon? • A Ves, Sir, Ves, Sir, Ves, Sir, Sports. • A I dott	5	Q. Now, these cases that we've gone	⁵ Q. How many different strengths?
9 Is that correct? 9 0. With the Propranolol, was it 9 0. They involve walk-ons in college 9 0. Mith the Propranolol, was it 10 Is that right? 1. I dont = a I said, some of the 11 Is that right? 1. I dont = a I said, some of the 12 A. That's true. 1. I dont = a I said, some of the 13 A. That's true. 1. I dont = a I said, some of the 14 drugs? 1. I dont = a I said, some of the 15 A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 1. I dont = a I said, some of the rear 16 O. Chemicals? 1. I dont = a I said, some of these as is a light product or is I a 17 A. Yes. 1. I dont = a I said, some of these as I dont recall how many different strengths. 18 Matrix Yes. 1. I dont recall how many different strengths. 19 A. Yes. 1. I dont recall how many different strengths. 10 Page 86 1. I dont recall how many different strengths. 11 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1. I dont recall how. 12 Page 86 1. I dont recall how. 13 A. Yes. 1. I dont recall how. 14 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	6		⁶ A. I beg your pardon?
 They involve wall-ons in college sports. Is that right? A. Taal's true. G. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs? A. That's true. G. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs? A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. G. Chemicals? A. Yes. G. Concerts? A. Yes. G. Oberitals? A. Yes. G. Oberitals were involved many different strengths there were orize of the pills were involved. Is that right? A. Yes. G. Oberital devices? A. Yes. G. Oberital devices? A. Yes. G. Oberital devices? A. Yes. G. And some cases involved just one product. Is that right? M. Guita devicen: Note of the pills were were	7		7 Q. With the Propranolol, was it
9 Q. They involve walk-ons in college sports. A. I don't - as I said, some of the products, so-called single product. 11 Is that right? Lake Hydrogen Peroxide, for example, involves a lot of different dilutors or strengths, involves a lot of different dilutors or strengths in a single product or sit a multiplicity of products? 12 A. Plas. 13 A. Chemicals? 14 Yes. 15 A. Yes. 16 Concerts? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. DVD sales? 19 Page 86 10 Page 86 11 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 12 Page 86 13 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 14 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 15 A. Yes. 16 Page 86 17 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 18 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 19 Page 86 10 Nets-revel, pulse oximetry is a medical device. 16 M. Case on volved only one seller. 16 Nets-revel, pulse oximetry is a medical	8	A. Yes, sir. Yes.	⁸ multiple strengths?
is that right? is that right? i.i. that right? i.i. that correct? i.i. that right? i.i. that correct? i.i. that correct? i.i. that correct? i.i. that right? i.i. that right? i.i. that rig	9		⁹ A. I don't as I said, some of the
12 A. That's true. 10 involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths, 13 Q. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 10 involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths, 14 drugs? A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 11 involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths, 15 A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 0. Well, there are some – there are 30 15 A. Yes. 12 Some product cases that involve just a single product sees that involve just a single product see that involve just a single product sees that involve different diffe	10		¹⁰ products, so-called single product.
12 A. That's true. 12 involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths, 13 Q. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical 12 involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths, 13 A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 13 but - so, is it a single product or is it a 14 Mathy involve drugs, pharmaceutical 14 multiplicity of products? 15 A. Yes. 15 O. Well, there aresome - there are 16 O. Concerts? 15 Soft in a single form. 17 Soft in a single form. Isn't that correct? 18 A. Yes. 16 A. Meta-Fem might be one of those 19 A. Yes. 10 A. Meta-Fem might be one of those 11 A. Yes. 10 O tokay. 10 12 A. Yes. 20 DVD sales? 21 10 Identrecal brain that. 12 A. Yes. 20 O tokay. Some of these cases involved many different strengths. 10 10 14 Medical devices? 1 11 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 11 10 10 10 14 Medical devices?	11	Is that right?	¹¹ Like Hydrogen Peroxide, for example,
G. F. They involve ungs, plan indecturent id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it a single product is it a id. dr. 90, is it as it a id.	12		¹² involves a lot of different dilutions or strengths,
14 drugs? 15 A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes. 16 O. Well, there are some there are some there are some product cases that involve just a single product source are some rothere are somere are somere are some rothere are some rothere are s	13	Q. They involve drugs, pharmaceutical	¹³ but so, is it a single product or is it a
A. Printinaceuted and up, yes. G. Vere, net value and some product areas that involve just a single product areas that involve just a single product and some product cases that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just a single product and some product areas that involve just and some product areas that involve just and some product areas that involve interval areas area unit. 10 Chemicals? 10 11 A. Yes. 11 11 12 A. Yes. 12 A. Meta-ferm might be one of those cases involved and and and and and areas area unit? 12 A. Yes. 12 A. Meta-ferm might be one of those cases involved many different strengths there were or size of the product and and areas area unit? 13 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 14 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 15 A. Yes. 1 1 A. That is true, too. 0 16 M. Yes. 1 1 1 <th>14</th> <th></th> <th>¹⁴ multiplicity of products?</th>	14		¹⁴ multiplicity of products?
1 A. Yes. 10 Some product sells of a single form. 13 Q. Chemicals? 10 Sold in a single form. 13 Q. Chemicals? 10 Sold in a single form. 14 A. Yes. 10 Sold in a single form. 15 A. Yes. 10 Sold in a single form. 15 A. Yes. 10 Sold in a single form. 16 A. Yes. 10 A. Meta-Fem mights be one of those 17 A. Yes. 10 Concerts? 10 18 MEdit Sold in a single form. Some of these cases involved. 1 19 A. Yes. 20 Okay. Some of these cases involved many 19 MEGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 10 A. Yes. 10 Some involved more than two. Q. Okay. 19 Medical devices? 1 A. That is true, depending what you 10 A. Yes. 1 Some of these cases you 10 A. Yes. 1 G. And some cases involved plust one 1 10 A. Yes.	15	A. Pharmaceutical drugs, yes.	¹⁵ Q. Well, there are some there are
13 Q. Chemicals? 13 isn't that correct? 13 A. Yes. 13 A. Meta-Fem might be one of those 14 Q. Concerts? 13 A. Meta-Fem might be one of those 15 A. Yes. 14 16 16 DVD sales? 12 1 don't recall that. 17 A. Yes. 1 20 Okay. 18 A. Yes. 20 Okay. 19 A. Yes. 20 Okay. 10 Page 86 Page 88 11 Page 86 Page 88 12 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 13 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 A. That is rug. depending what you 14 Medical devices? 4 A. That is rug. depending what you 15 Medical devices? 4 A. That is rug. depending what you 16 medical devices? 4 A. That is rug. depending what you 17 Q. Other medical devices? 4 A. That is rug. depending what you 16 medical device? 9 Weer of the opinion that impact could not be shown on	16	Q. Supermarkets?	¹⁶ some product cases that involve just a single product
19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Concerts? 20 A. Yes. 20 A. Yes. 21 A. Yes. 20 Q. DVD sales? 20 1 don't recall how many different strengths 22 Q. DVD sales? 20 Q. Okay. 23 A. Yes. 20 Q. Okay. 24 Q. Pulse Oximetry? 20 20 Okay. 25 A. Yes. 20 Okay. 20 26 Page 86 Page 88 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. That is true, depending what you mean by "many," but some involved more than two. 3 A. Yes. 3 Medical devices? 4 Q. Some involved more than two. 4 Q. Other medical devices? 4 Q. Some involved more than two. 4 5 A. Yes. 4 A. That is true, too. 7 6 Other medical devices? 7 Q. Other medical devices? 7 Q. Okay. 6 A. Yes. 4 A. That is true, too. 7 9 Q. Video games? 7 Q. Okay. 4 A. devery one of those cases you	17	A. Yes.	¹⁷ sold in a single form.
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21 A Yes. 21 there were or size of the pills were involved. 22 Q. DVD sales? 22 I don't recall that. 23 A Yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 Q. Pulse Oximetry? 24 Some of these cases involved many 25 A Yes. 25 Some of these cases involved many 26 Pulse Oximetry? 24 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. Optical disk drives? 2 A. That is true, depending what you 3 A. Yes. 2 A. That is true, too. 3 A. Yes. 3 A. Yes. 3 A. Yes. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Other medical devices? 6 A. That is true, too. 7 Q. Other medical devices? 7 Q. Okay. 3 A. Yes. 9 Q. Video games? 1 a class-wide basis. 11 Q. And some cases invol	19	A. Yes.	¹⁹ A. Meta-Fem might be one of those
22 Q. DVD sales? 22 I don't recall that. 23 A. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 Q. Pulse Oximetry? 24 Some of these cases involved many 25 A. Yes. 23 defendants as a result? Page 86 Page 86 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. Optical disk drives? 3 A. Yes. 3 3 A. Yes. 3 Medical devices? 4 Q. Some involved only one seller. 4 Q. Other medical devices? 5 A. That is true, depending what you mean by "many," but some involved more than two. 4 Q. Other medical devices? 6 A. That is true, too. 7 Q. Other medical devices? 7 Q. Okay. 4 A. Yes. 9 A. Yes. 9 9 Q. And some cases involved just one 1 Is that right? 14 A. Like what – what cases would that 14 You may answer. 15 be? 1 Lack of foundation. Assumes facts not in evidence. 9 <td< th=""><th>20</th><th>Q. Concerts?</th><th>²⁰ cases. I don't recall how many different strengths</th></td<>	20	Q. Concerts?	²⁰ cases. I don't recall how many different strengths
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24 Q. Pulse Oximetry? 25 A. Yes. 26 Page 86 27 Page 86 28 Page 86 29 Page 86 20 Optical disk drives? 3 A. 4 Yes. 4 O. 6 medical device?? 7 O. 9 O. 10	22	Q. DVD sales?	²² I don't recall that.
25 A. Yes. 25 Bage 86 Page 86 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 A. That is true, depending what you 3 A. Yes. 3 A. Yes. 3 That is true, depending what you 3 A. Yes. 3 That is true, depending what you mean by "many," but some involved only one seller. 4 Q. Optical disk drives? 4 Q. Some involved only one seller. 4 5 A. Yes. 5 A. Yes. 6 6 medical device? 6 A. That is true, too. 7 Q. Other medical devices? 7 Q. Okay. 8 A. Yes. 9 A. Yes. 9 9 Q. Video games? 7 Q. Okay. 1 10 A. Yes. 10 a class-wide basis. 1 11 Q. And some cases involved just one 1 1 Is that right? 14 A. Like what – what cases would that 14 You may answer. 14 15 be? 15 THE WITNESS: As I said, every case 16 in which I testified that the c	23	A. Yes.	²³ Q. Okay.
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21 THE WITNESS: Well, there are 21 22 products some cases involve a particular 22 CONTINUATION 23 pharmaceutical product like Propranolol which, 23 BY MR. LANGER: 24 however, was sold in a variety of formulations and 24 Q. And these cases involved many			That's the list that we have
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 however, was sold in a variety of formulations and Q. And these cases involved many 			CONTINONTION
10wever, was sold in a variety of formulations and Q. And these cases involved many	23	pharmaceutical product like FIODIANOIOI WINCH.	T DI IVIN, LANNUZA.
	24	however, was sold in a variety of formulations and	Q. And these cases involved many

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

	Page 97 Page 99
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² MR. LANGER: No, from C	ompass ² Is that right?
³ Lexecon.	³ A. Once you account for all of the
⁴ THE WITNESS: I do receiv	e other ⁴ share of the billings to which I am entitled under
⁵ compensation which is not related to a	successor of ⁵ the contract, the answer would be, yes.
⁶ any of the cases that I or Compass Lex	econ works on. ⁶ Q. Okay.
⁷ It's a compensation based on some form	nula relating 7 Do you have any understanding as to
⁸ what I and other economists in the firm	
⁹ share share of what is called an earn	
10	¹⁰ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
¹¹ CONTINUATION	11
¹² BY MR. LANGER:	¹² CONTINUATION
¹³ Q. Are you are you paid ar	y part of ¹³ BY MR. LANGER:
¹⁴ the time of the other people who wor	
¹⁵ A. Under the new contract I do	
¹⁶ portion of their billings on a case, and t	hat portion ¹⁶ hourly rate being charged and what proportion comes
¹⁷ depends on their status in and their p	nosition in from the different staff members working?
¹⁸ the in the firm.	¹⁸ A. That is true. I have no familiarity
¹⁹ Q. Okay.	¹⁹ with the bills.
²⁰ With regard to this case, an	e you ²⁰ Q. Okay.
²¹ getting paid a portion of the hours	the hourly ²¹ Do you know how much has been billed
²² rate of Dr. Ezrielev?	²² to date in this case?
²³ A. Ezrielev and Dr. Keating, ju	st to ²³ A. No.
²⁴ help you out, I think they may be senior	
²⁵ I do not get any portion of their hourly	billings, ²⁵ A. No.
	Page 98 Page 100
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² but it all depends on the seniority of the pers	2^2 O How many hours have you put in?
	Q. How many nours have you put in:
³ supporting me.	3 A. Probably a couple of hundred hours
⁴ Q. You don't know?	3 A. Probably a couple of hundred hours 4 or maybe
 ⁴ Q. You don't know? ⁵ A. I sit here, I don't remember that. 	 A. Probably a couple of hundred hours or maybe Q. Couple of hundred?
 ⁴ Q. You don't know? ⁵ A. I sit here, I don't remember that. ⁶ Q. Are there other members of the 	a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a or maybe 5 Q. Couple of hundred? 6 A. Maybe more, yeah. I haven't
 Q. You don't know? A. I sit here, I don't remember that. Q. Are there other members of the who are less senior who have worked on 	a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a or maybe 5 b Q. Couple of hundred? a A. Maybe more, yeah. I haven't haven't done my billings in a while. 6
4 Q. You don't know? 5 A. I sit here, I don't remember that. 6 Q. Are there other members of th 7 who are less senior who have worked on 8 whom from who you receive a portion	a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a or maybe 5 b Q. Couple of hundred? a A. Maybe more, yeah. I haven't haven't done my billings in a while. 8 Q. And would that be the tip of the 9
4 Q. You don't know? 5 A. I sit here, I don't remember that. 6 Q. Are there other members of th 7 who are less senior who have worked on 8 whom from who you receive a portion 9 they charge?	a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a A. Probably a couple of hundred hours a or maybe 5 b Q. Couple of hundred? c A. Maybe more, yeah. I haven't haven't done my billings in a while. 0. And would that be the tip of the 9 iceberg? 10
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4 Q. You don't know? 5 A. I sit here, I don't remember that. 6 Q. Are there other members of th 7 who are less senior who have worked on 8 whom from who you receive a portion 9 they charge? 10 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to fo 11 mr. LANGER: I will rephrase th 12 question, because it got a little messed up. 13 Okay. 14 15 CONTINUATION 16 BY MR. LANGER: 17 Q. Are there any less senior mem 18 the team that has worked on this case for 19 whose the for whom you were compense 10 for the hours that they put in the case? 21 A. There likely are, because there w 22 A. There likely are, because there w 23 my supervision, so, yes.	and under 3 A. Probably a couple of hundred hours and under 3 A. Probably a couple of hundred hours and under 3 A. Probably a couple of hundred? A. Probably a couple of hundred? A. Maybe more, yeah. I haven't haven't done my billings in a while. Q. And would that be the tip of the iceberg? 8 Q. And would that be the tip of the iceberg? 10 Would the staff have put in more than a couple of hundred hours than you put in? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. MR. MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection. MR. THE WITNESS: The tip of the iceberg is not defined, but, obviously, the staff has been working diligently to support me, but how many hours they put in, I don't know. 10 CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. 12 Can you compare the percentage of 13 the income you receive as a consultant in cases in which you've testified on impact in class actions with your income as a professor from NVL12

26 (Pages 101 to 104)

[20 (18965 101 60 104)
Page 101	Page 103
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	² making a year.
³ THE WITNESS: Yes, I can compare,	³ Q. Okay.
⁴ but crudely.	⁴ Now, you said that you taught last
⁵ MR. LANGER: Okay.	⁵ semester, not this immediate semester, but the Spring
⁶ THE WITNESS: The income that I	⁶ semester from 2014.
⁷ receive from my consulting activities, because I do	7 Is that right?
⁸ not break them out by subject matter, is	⁸ A. Yes, I only teach in the Spring.
⁹ significantly higher than what I receive from NYU.	⁹ I teach my full course load in the Spring semester.
10	¹⁰ Q. And how many cases did you teach
¹¹ CONTINUATION	¹¹ then?
¹² BY MR. LANGER:	¹² A. The full course load at my level is
¹³ Q. More than double?	¹³ the three courses, and I taught three courses.
¹⁴ A. Yes.	¹⁴ Q. What three courses did you teach?
¹⁵ Q. More than triple?	¹⁵ MR. TOSCANO: Objection.
¹⁶ A. Yes.	¹⁶ Asked and answered.
¹⁷ Q. More than quadruple?	¹⁷ THE WITNESS: I taught an
¹⁸ A. Yes.	¹⁸ undergraduate course in industrial organization
¹⁹ Q. Rather than me going through it, can	¹⁹ economics, and I taught to MA level course, one in
²⁰ you tell me about how many times more it is?	²⁰ industrial organization economics, and the other one
²¹ MR. TOSCANO: Before we do that, it	²¹ in international trade.
²² needs to be clear. His question was about your	22
²³ income in connection with class action.	²³ CONTINUATION
²⁴ THE WITNESS: Right.	²⁴ BY MR. LANGER:
²⁵ MR. TOSCANO: Okay.	²⁵ Q. And have you were you overseeing
Page 102	Page 104
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² Just so you understand.	² any doctoral students at that time?
³ THE WITNESS: I understood, and my	³ A. No. No.
⁴ answer to that was that I don't keep track of my	⁴ Q. Okay.
⁵ income by subject matter, but it is the case that my	⁵ Have you ever taught any courses
⁶ even if we were to try to narrow down the sources	⁶ devoted to sports economics?
⁷ of my consulting income by subject matter, they would	⁷ A. No, but
⁸ be multiple of what I earn from NYU.	⁸ Q. Okay.
9	⁹ A I, of course, deal with the issue
¹⁰ CONTINUATION	¹⁰ of the sports economics, sports not sports
¹¹ BY MR. LANGER: ¹² O At least four or five times	¹¹ economics. Sports in my undergrad industrial
Q. At least four or five times	organization economics course.
A. ICS.	Q. In what form:
Q If oin what you just said.	A. III what form?
is that right:	i aiking about joint ventures.
A. That is true.	Taiking about coordination issues.
Q. More than that:	Taiking about such unings as
Four or live is appropriate?	¹⁸ regulatory interventions into the marketplace.
$1^{1/2}$ A If you count all the account time	19 So those tonics some slaws as I
¹⁹ A. If you count all the consulting	¹⁹ So, those topics come along as I
²⁰ activities it could be more, yes.	²⁰ teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course
 activities it could be more, yes. Q. Okay. 	 teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course since in various versions for the past 30 odd
 activities it could be more, yes. Q. Okay. And how much is your annual salary 	 teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course since in various versions for the past 30 odd years. So, sports issues have come up along the way
 activities it could be more, yes. Q. Okay. And how much is your annual salary at NYU? 	 teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course since in various versions for the past 30 odd years. So, sports issues have come up along the way in a variety of forms in different ways throughout my
 activities it could be more, yes. Q. Okay. And how much is your annual salary at NYU? A. 	 teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course since in various versions for the past 30 odd years. So, sports issues have come up along the way in a variety of forms in different ways throughout my teaching career.
 activities it could be more, yes. Q. Okay. And how much is your annual salary at NYU? A. 	 teach. As I said, I have been doing this IO course since in various versions for the past 30 odd years. So, sports issues have come up along the way in a variety of forms in different ways throughout my teaching career.

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

		27 (Fages 105 to 108)
	Page 105	Page 107
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	particular industries?	² seen that Web page.
3	A. I don't know what you mean by	³ MR. LANGER: and it says, "Janusz
4	"specialized."	⁴ Alexander Ordover, October, 2014."
5	How would you define that for me	⁵ Okay.
6	so I can answer it better?	⁶ MR. TOSCANO: Okay.
7	Q. Well, sometimes you get an expert	⁷ Thank you.
8	who is, you know, extensively studied the	8
9	pharmaceutical industry, for example, or the	⁹ CONTINUATION
10	corrugated box industry, or some other industry.	¹⁰ BY MR. LANGER:
11	Is there any particular industry or	¹¹ Q. Take a look, scroll through it, and
12	sector of the economy that you have studied	¹² let me know if that's your CV, and, if you don't
13	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	¹³ mind, can I look over your shoulder for a minute,
14	MR. LANGER: and specialized in?	¹⁴ because he just handed it to me.
15	MR. TOSCANO: Same objection.	¹⁵ MR. BURKE: Is this the most
16	THE WITNESS: I certainly have spent	¹⁶ efficient way to do this?
17	a fair amount of time thinking and lecturing on the	¹⁷ Can we get a copy?
18	subjects involving media content industries, and I	18
19	spent a good chunk of my career some years ago	¹⁹ (Discussion held off the record.)
20	focusing on telecommunications industries or	20
21	telecommunication industry.	²¹ THE WITNESS: So, I'm scrolling
22	So, that would be two industries	²² through this document. Looks like my CV, and looks
23	that I spend a lot of time on and	²³ like my CV my CV.
24	MR. LANGER: Sorry.	²⁴ Do you want to look over?
25	It's hard for me to talk when you're	²⁵ Come on, guys.
	Page 106	Page 108
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry.	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² MR. BURKE: Is there something in
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at?
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause)	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.)	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV.
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.) CONTINUATION	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV. I'm not very fine on the
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.) CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV. I'm not very fine on the completeness, but it is certainly a version of my
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.) CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Dr. Ordover, unfortunately, the copy	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV. I'm not very fine on the completeness, but it is certainly a version of my MR. LANGER: Okay.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.) CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Dr. Ordover, unfortunately, the copy machines and everything here are out of order, and I	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV. I'm not very fine on the completeness, but it is certainly a version of my MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: my CV.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL talking. I'm sorry. (Pause) (Discussion held off the record.) CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Dr. Ordover, unfortunately, the copy	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. BURKE: Is there something in particular you want Professor Ordover to look at? MR. LANGER: Yes. Well, we'll establish that that's your CV. THE WITNESS: It looks like my CV. I'm not very fine on the completeness, but it is certainly a version of my MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: my CV.
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28 (Pages 109 to 112)

	20 (Pages 109 to 112)
Page 109	Page 111
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² have not written anything in sports economics	² have not, no.
³ directly.	³ Q. Okay.
⁴ Q. Okay.	⁴ And you have not read any of the
⁵ Do any of these articles	⁵ articles by Professor Noll that are referenced in his
⁶ tangentially deal with sports economics	⁶ Declaration.
⁷ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	⁷ Is that right?
⁸ MR. LANGER: any of the articles	⁸ A. I have read some of his work over
⁹ listed in your CV?	⁹ the years, but I did not find any of his work
¹⁰ MR. TOSCANO: Same objection.	¹⁰ pertinent to what I was doing in this case.
¹¹ THE WITNESS: I just, you know	¹¹ Q. You did not read any of the articles
¹² MR. LANGER: Take a minute.	¹² that he had written that he referenced in his
¹³ THE WITNESS: Well, as I said, I	¹³ Declaration with regard to sports economics?
¹⁴ don't recall writing an article that explicitly deals	¹⁴ MR. TOSCANO: Objection.
¹⁵ with the issues of sports economics.	¹⁵ Asked and answered.
¹⁶ MR. LANGER: Okay.	¹⁶ COUNSEL: Object to the form of the
¹⁷ THE WITNESS: So, this is not the	¹⁷ question.
¹⁸ complete CV, because a couple of things that have	¹⁸ THE WITNESS: As I said, I have seen
¹⁹ been accepted for publication or published already	¹⁹ those references, and I did not read those articles
²⁰ are missing, but it's good enough	²⁰ that he references because I did not regard I did
²¹ MR. LANGER: Okay.	²¹ not consider these articles to be necessarily
²² THE WITNESS: for your purposes.	²² pertinent to my very narrow assignment, which is to
23	 discuss the class issues.
²⁴ CONTINUATION	alscuss the class issues.
²⁵ BY MR. LANGER:	²⁵ CONTINUATION
	CONTINUATION
Page 110	Page 112
Page 110	Page 112
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Okay. 	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² BY MR. LANGER:
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Okay. Going back to Exhibit-1, if you 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay.
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1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. Okay. 3 Going back to Exhibit-1, if you 4 would. 5 Do you have that, the documents you 6 considered? 7 A. Yep. 8 Q. You list various texts 9 Do you not? 10 A. Correct. 11 Q and articles? 12 MR. TOSCANO: Where are you 13 referring? 14 THE WITNESS: Yeah, the second page. 15 MR. GOLDFEIN: Exhibit Number-1. 17 THE WITNESS: Number one. 18 MR. TOSCANO: Second page. 19 20 CONTINUATION 18 MR. LANGER: 22 Q. You did not consult any texts or	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 BY MR. LANGER: 3 Q. Okay. 4 Do you hold yourself as having 5 special expertise in the field of econometrics? 6 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 7 THE WITNESS: I have a workable 8 knowledge. I don't teach econometrics, but I have 9 been using it in connection with my various 10 assignments and somewhat less so. 11 12 CONTINUATION 13 BY MR. LANGER: 14 Q. Now, do any of the articles that you 15 have in your CV, are any of those articles devoted to 16 econometrics? 17 A. No. I'm not a published 18 econometrician, no. 19 Q. Okay. 20 Now, in paragraph two of your 21 Declaration 22 MR. TOSCANO: Are we going to mark
1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. Okay. 3 Going back to Exhibit-1, if you 4 would. 5 Do you have that, the documents you 6 considered? 7 A. Yep. 8 Q. You list various texts 9 Do you not? 10 A. Correct. 11 Q and articles? 12 MR. TOSCANO: Where are you 13 referring? 14 THE WITNESS: Yeah, the second page. 15 MR. GOLDFEIN: Exhibit Number-1. 17 THE WITNESS: Number one. 18 MR. TOSCANO: Second page. 19 20 CONTINUATION 18 MR. LANGER: 20 Q. You did not consult any texts or 21 Q. You did not consult any texts or 22 Q. You did not consult any texts or 23 articles devoted to sports economics, is that	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 BY MR. LANGER: 3 Q. Okay. 4 Do you hold yourself as having 5 special expertise in the field of econometrics? 6 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 7 THE WITNESS: I have a workable 8 knowledge. I don't teach econometrics, but I have 9 been using it in connection with my various 10 assignments and somewhat less so. 11 12 CONTINUATION 13 BY MR. LANGER: 14 Q. Now, do any of the articles that you 15 have in your CV, are any of those articles devoted to 16 econometrics? 17 A. No. I'm not a published 18 econometrician, no. 19 Q. Okay. 10 Now, in paragraph two of your 12 Declaration 13 MR. TOSCANO: Are we going to mark 14 0. Nok, in paragraph two of your
1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. Okay. 3 Going back to Exhibit-1, if you 4 would. 5 Do you have that, the documents you 6 considered? 7 A. Yep. 8 Q. You list various texts 9 Do you not? 10 A. Correct. 11 Q and articles? 12 MR. TOSCANO: Where are you 13 referring? 14 THE WITNESS: Yeah, the second page. 15 MR. GOLDFEIN: Exhibit Number-1. 17 THE WITNESS: Number one. 18 MR. TOSCANO: Second page. 19 20 CONTINUATION 13 BY MR. LANGER: 20 Q. You did not consult any texts or 23 articles devoted to sports economics, is that	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 BY MR. LANGER: 3 Q. Okay. 4 Do you hold yourself as having 5 special expertise in the field of econometrics? 6 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 7 THE WITNESS: I have a workable 8 knowledge. I don't teach econometrics, but I have 9 been using it in connection with my various 10 assignments and somewhat less so. 11 12 CONTINUATION 13 BY MR. LANGER: 14 Q. Now, do any of the articles that you 15 have in your CV, are any of those articles devoted to 16 econometrics? 17 A. No. I'm not a published 18 econometrician, no. 19 Q. Okay. 10 Now, in paragraph two of your 12 Declaration 13 MR. TOSCANO: Are we going to mark 14 0. Nokay.

31 (Pages 121 to 124)

		31 (Pages 121 to 124)
	Page 121	Page 123
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. I don't believe there was	2 of the question.
3	necessarily a lawsuit.	³ THE WITNESS: Sorry.
4	I was involved in trying to	⁴ MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form
5	determine the economic effects from potential	⁵ of the question.
6	transaction.	⁶ THE WITNESS: Oh.
7	Q. Okay.	⁷ MR. GOLDFEIN: He's making an
8	So, you just did an analysis for	⁸ assumption.
9	some people?	9
10	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	
11	THE WITNESS: Just the analysis.	¹¹ BY MR. LANGER:
12	It's not just the analysis.	¹² Q. Can you tell me which of the cases
13	There is a lot of thinking involved.	¹³ listed there
14	MR. LANGER: We're all lawyers here.	¹⁴ MR. TOSCANO: If any.
15	If you're not in court, you don't think of it as	¹⁵ MR. LANGER: involved media, if
16	being a big deal.	¹⁶ any?
17	THE WITNESS:	¹⁷ THE WITNESS: Well, if you think of
18	MR. TOSCANO: Wait for a question.	¹⁸ gaming as a part of the media, then Geoffrey Pecover
19	MR. LANGER: I was being sarcastic.	¹⁹ versus Electronics Arts is certainly a pertinent one,
20	THE WITNESS: Yes.	²⁰ but, as you know, not all cases involve depositions
21	I'll try not to be sarcastic by	²¹ or court appearances.
22	saying that, there was, obviously, a law firm here	²² So, there are other matters on which
23	which I and I for which I developed some simple	²³ I work that are not listed here, but which involve
24	techniques that are relevant to gauging the extent to	²⁴ media industries.
25	which different teams are substitutes for each other	25
	Page 122	Page 124
1	Page 122 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 124
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	-	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² CONTINUATION
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² CONTINUATION ³ BY MR. LANGER:
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers.	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² CONTINUATION ³ BY MR. LANGER:
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us?
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice.
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which which party were you retained by?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice.
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. A. Yes, I'm sorry.
2 4 5 6 7 8	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which - which party were you retained by? (Pause)	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. A. Yes, I'm sorry. MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound.
2 3 5 6 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which - which party were you retained by? (Pause) A. It was MSG.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. A. Yes, I'm sorry. MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound. You can answer.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which - which party were you retained by? (Pause) A. It was MSG. Q. Did you use any report that you prepared in the merger matter with regard to your work in this case? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. A. Yes, I'm sorry. MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound. You can answer. THE WITNESS: As I said, maybe I haven't, but so let me just say briefly. I have done a fair amount of work for motion picture companies in the United States.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: O. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which events which party were you retained by? (Pause) A. It was MSG. O. Did you use any report that you prepared in the merger matter with regard to your work in this case? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. Assumes facts not in evidence. THE WITNESS: No.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. And do you want to describe those to us for us? Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. A. Yes, I'm sorry. MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound. You can answer. THE WITNESS: As I said, maybe I haven't, but so let me just say briefly. I have done a fair amount of work for motion picture companies in the United States. I have done a fair amount of work for music industry firms, both here and in Europe. So, I will just point to these two
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which - which party were you retained by? (Pause) A. It was MSG. Q. Did you use any report that you prepared in the merger matter with regard to your work in this case? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. Assumes facts not in evidence. THE WITNESS: No. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Now, you said you've worked extensively in the media distribution market. A. Yep.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 CONTINUATION 3 BY MR. LANGER: 4 Q. And do you want to describe those to 5 us for us? 6 Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. 7 A. Yes, I'm sorry. 8 MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound. 9 You can answer. 10 THE WITNESS: As I said, maybe I 11 haven't, but so let me just say briefly. 12 I have done a fair amount of work 13 for motion picture companies in the United States. 14 I have done a fair amount of work 15 for music industry firms, both here and in Europe. 16 So, I will just point to these two 17 sets of engagements as being very pertinent to the 18 distribution aspects of music and the distribution 19 aspects of motion pictures, and such is there. 20 21 CONTINUATION 22 BY MR. LANGER:
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the eyes of viewers. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. In the Time Warner MSG matter, which - which party were you retained by? (Pause) A. It was MSG. Q. Did you use any report that you prepared in the merger matter with regard to your work in this case? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. Assumes facts not in evidence. THE WITNESS: No. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Now, you said you've worked extensively in the media distribution market. A. Yep. Q. And can you tell us, looking at Exhibits-2 and 3, which cases involved media?	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 CONTINUATION 3 BY MR. LANGER: 4 Q. And do you want to describe those to 5 us for us? 6 Excuse me. I'm losing my voice. 7 A. Yes, I'm sorry. 8 MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Compound. 9 You can answer. 10 THE WITNESS: As I said, maybe I 11 haven't, but so let me just say briefly. 12 I have done a fair amount of work 13 for motion picture companies in the United States. 14 I have done a fair amount of work 15 for music industry firms, both here and in Europe. 16 So, I will just point to these two 17 sets of engagements as being very pertinent to the 18 distribution aspects of music and the distribution 19 aspects of motion pictures, and such is there. 20 21 CONTINUATION 22 Q. Did your work with regard to motion 23 Q. Did your work with regard to motion
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32 (Pages 125 to 128)

	Page 125	Page 127
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. Well, actually, my one of my	² Q. I'm confining it to broadcasting.
3	earliest cases called in which the United States	³ A. I didn't hear you confining that
4	Government was involved, was US versus Premier.	⁴ way. So, anyway so maybe I've gone too far.
5	I don't know. You may be too young	⁵ All right.
6	to remember that case, but so this was going back	⁶ Q. Okay.
7	to, oh, 1980's, I think, in which several motion	⁷ So, since just to make sure we
8	picture companies wanted to develop a product that	⁸ are clear
9	would be a competitive substitute to HBO, and I	⁹ A. Okay.
10	worked with the companies to understand the economics	¹⁰ Q we are going to take a break in a
11	of such a deal.	¹¹ couple of minutes
12	Q. Anything since since that work in	¹² A. Okay.
13	the 1980's?	¹³ Q because the video is running out,
14	A. Yes.	¹⁴ but since US versus Premier that you told us
15	I worked for Sony in connection with	¹⁵ occurred, and I was too young to remember, in the
16	its joint venture with German record company,	¹⁶ 1980's, was that only the case okay.
17	Berelsman.	¹⁷ But, anyway, since then, what
18	I worked for	¹⁸ matters involving the movie industry and broadcasting
19	Q. Wait. Wait. No, I'm sorry.	¹⁹ have you been involved in which involved the movie
20	MR. TOSCANO: Just let him finish	²⁰ industry and broadcasting together?
21	his answer.	²¹ (Pause)
22	MR. LANGER: No, no. I wanted to	A. I think that's probably the only
23	you misunderstood the question.	²³ one, but I would have to scratch
24 25	THE WITNESS: Okay.	²⁴ Q. Okay.
20		²⁵ A my memory some more.
	Page 126	Page 128
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	CONTINUATION	2 Q. Okay.
3	BY MR. LANGER:	³ Have you been involved in any cases
4	Q. I meant with regard to distribution	⁴ involving distribution of motion pictures over the
5	of motion pictures on television.	⁵ Internet?
6	A. On television?	⁶ (Pause)
7	Q. Yes.	A. No, not that I recall as I sit here.
8 9	A. I think there were subsequent	⁸ MR. LANGER: Okay. ⁹ I think we better break now because
10	efforts by the motion picture companies to develop	I think we better break now because
11	their product for distribution over over	the video is going to full out.
12	television, and I advised them in connection with	11 I suggest we go off the record. 12 VIDEO TECHNICIAN: 12:36.
13	those subsequent efforts.	¹³ Off the record.
14	Q. When was that, and who were your clients?	
15	A. I – generally, I worked for the	¹⁵ (Recess was taken at this time.)
16	motion picture companies. The the clients may	
17	have differed from time to from engagement to	¹⁷ MR. LANGER: Back on the record.
18	engagement. I don't believe that any of those are	¹⁸ VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Stand by, please.
19	necessarily public.	¹⁹ 12:46.
20	So, I just leave it at that.	²⁰ We're back on the record.
21	I think I remember I do work for,	21
22	I think, Sony, or one of the other movie distributors	²² CONTINUATION
23	in connection with allegations of exclusionary	²³ BY MR. LANGER:
24	conduct in the distribution of motion pictures in	Q. Oh, was I just asked you a series
25	New York City.	²⁵ of questions relating to your prior experience with

35 (Pages 137 to 140)

		55 (Lages 157 CO 140)
	Page 137	Page 139
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	industrial organization economist, and I believe that	² because I only have a somewhat vague recollection,
3	I understand what those things are about.	³ but more importantly, I have never was never
4	I understand their purpose.	⁴ presented as a testifying expert, and so
5		⁵ Q. Excuse me. I'm sorry.
6	CONTINUATION	⁶ Vertical distribution, this was in
7	BY MR. LANGER:	⁷ sports?
8	Q. Did you – did you read any articles	⁸ A. Vertical distribution of
9	or books relating to distribution of sports over	⁹ (Pause)
10	broadcast media?	¹⁰ A. Vertical distribution as as a
11	A. I am I am familiar with these	¹¹ topic in industrial organization economics. It is
12	things from the past. I did some work in a way	¹² something that I have devoted years of thinking
13	not so way back, but some years ago involving the	¹³ about, and and that's why I have been involved in
14		
15	regional sports network in in Philadelphia.	some of the engagements entier as a consultant of an
16	I didn't mention that, but it came	expert external expert.
17	back to my mind now that you are probing those	Q. Going back to my question, though.
18	things.	with your retention with Concast
19	So, I understood the role of the	r iniaucipina is that with regard to vertical
20	RSN.	distribution of any particular sport.
20	I understand the role of the nature	A. I think it was in relationship to
	of the vertical arrangements in the sports industry,	the issues relating to the RSIV generally, Regional
22	starting with the team going to the RSN, and going to	Sports Network.
23	the MVPD's or or of different kinds.	²³ Q. What sports were involved?
24	I understand the role of the	A. I think well, I think that the
25	Leagues, which I understand from my work for the	²⁵ issue involved hockey or baseball. I don't remember
	Page 138	Page 140
1	-	
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in collegiate collegiate sports.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL as I sit here. So, I do know that I did some of the
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39 (Pages 153 to 156)

		39 (rages 133 to 130)
	Page 153	Page 155
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	THE WITNESS: I'm not being a	² legal.
3	lawyer. I'm saying, if you give me a hypothetical	³ I am obtained to opine, if I can, on
4	that may not be sufficiently complete for me to be	⁴ the economic consequences in the well-defined market
5	able to answer your question. That's not being a	⁵ of such an alleged agreement by such alleged
6	lawyer. That's being a responsible testifier.	⁶ competitors, and such a thing as the alleged price,
7		⁷ and the answer will depend on the outcome of my
8	CONTINUATION	⁸ economic work.
9	BY MR. LANGER:	⁹ MR. TOSCANO: Asking Dr. Ordover
10	Q. Okay.	¹⁰ legal questions is really not a good use of any of
11	Horizontal agreement among	¹¹ our time.
12	competitors to reduce output, would that be a per se	12
13	violation?	¹³ CONTINUATION
14	MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form	¹⁴ BY MR. LANGER:
15	of the question.	¹⁵ Q. Have you ever heard it said that an
16	Calls for a legal conclusion.	¹⁶ agreement to allocate territories among competitors
17	Misleading.	¹⁷ is worse than an agreement among competitors to fix
18	MR. TOSCANO: Also, objection to the	¹⁸ prices, because under an agreement to allocate
19	form. It's an incomplete hypothetical.	¹⁹ territories there's neither price competition nor
20	Again, Dr. Ordover is not here as a	²⁰ service competition?
21	legal expert.	²¹ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
22	THE WITNESS: So, my answer is; that	²² Objection. Incomplete hypothetical.
23	will be determined by the Court, by or the	²³ Calls for a legal conclusion. Vague and ambiguous.
24	Department of Justice, whether they want to sue or	²⁴ THE WITNESS: I've seen statements
25	not. Totally, legal, law-driven decision.	²⁵ like that, but that doesn't mean anything to me as an
	Page 154	Page 156
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I will be able to potentially, if	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL economist, other than assertions that would have to
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I will be able to potentially, if asked analyze, the competitive effects of such an	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL economist, other than assertions that would have to be analyzed in a particular concrete case.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I will be able to potentially, if asked analyze, the competitive effects of such an alleged agreement and an alleged price among alleged	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL economist, other than assertions that would have to be analyzed in a particular concrete case. 4
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I will be able to potentially, if asked analyze, the competitive effects of such an alleged agreement and an alleged price among alleged horizontal competitors, and that may take awhile, and	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL economist, other than assertions that would have to be analyzed in a particular concrete case. CONTINUATION
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I will be able to potentially, if asked analyze, the competitive effects of such an alleged agreement and an alleged price among alleged horizontal competitors, and that may take awhile, and take a lot of effort and creativity to provide what I	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL economist, other than assertions that would have to be analyzed in a particular concrete case. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:
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40 (Pages 157 to 160)

		40 (rages 157 to 100)
	Page 157	Page 159
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	views, and I am happy to discuss some of them, but	² eliminated."
3	·	³ MR. TOSCANO: Same objections.
4	CONTINUATION	4 THE WITNESS: In in an in an
5	BY MR. LANGER:	⁵ effectively competitive market some producers will be
6	Q. Is the goal to assure	⁶ eliminated. There is no question.
7	A. To what?	⁷ But the question is, what kind of
8	Q. Is the goal to assure an optimal	⁸ what's the right measure of efficiency that one uses
9	distribution of goods and services for the consumer?	⁹ for asking and answering the question?
10	MR. GOLDFEIN: Object to the form of	¹⁰ And one would have to specify that
11	the question.	¹¹ vigorously in order to be able to answer what it is
12	MR. TOSCANO: Objection. Form.	¹² exactly that the marketplace accomplishes.
13	Calls for a legal conclusion.	13
14	Incomplete hypothetical. Vague and ambiguous.	¹⁴ CONTINUATION
15	MR. GOLDFEIN: Also beyond the scope	¹⁵ BY MR. LANGER:
16	of his report.	¹⁶ Q. What is a Bertrand model?
17	MR. PARIS: Objection.	¹⁷ A. A Bertrand model?
18	THE WITNESS: I think I would	¹⁸ Q. Huh-huh.
19	I would disagree with that, because as we said a	¹⁹ A. It is one of the so-called work
20	second ago, the role of the anti-trust is to	²⁰ horses of industrial organization economics. It is a
21	facilitate unimpeded workings of of the markets,	²¹ model of rivalry among firms, generally applied or
22	and there's not necessarily an assurance that that	²² initially applies to the question of the nature of
23	will accomplish an optimal allocation of resources	²³ price competition among firms in the marketplace.
24	from the standpoint of consumers.	²⁴ In the price version of the Bertrand
25	It will accomplish some allocation,	²⁵ model there are firms in the market, and each firm
	Page 158	Page 160
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and there may be other allocations that would be	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL makes a decision how much to charge for its product
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and there may be other allocations that would be better, but I'm not acting as a philosopher king or	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL makes a decision how much to charge for its product taking as given the prices of its rivals.
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42 (Pages 165 to 168)

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	Page 165	Page 167	
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
2		HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
3	for identification by the court reporter.)	MIR. TOSCANO. Objection.	
4		ASKEU allu allsweleu.	
5	CONTINUATION	WIK. LANOEK. THI COHIUSCU. THI JUST	
	BY MR. LANGER:	⁵ confused by the answer. That's all.	
6	Q. Dr. Ordover, Exhibit-5 is a page of	⁶ THE WITNESS: Oh, I thought I was	
7	a brief that you received a few weeks ago.	⁷ clear.	
8	A. Yes.	⁸ I have never used it in that context	
9	MR. TOSCANO: Do you have this whole	⁹ as far as I can recall, but I have used them,	
10	document?	¹⁰ Bertrand stimulation methodology, in the merger	
11	MR. LANGER: No, I don't, but I just	¹¹ context, yes.	
12	have one question. One quick question.	12	
13		¹³ CONTINUATION	
14	CONTINUATION	¹⁴ BY MR. LANGER:	
15	BY MR. LANGER:	¹⁵ Q. And have you done that without a	
16	Q. If you look on page two of footnote	¹⁶ control group methodology?	
17	eight	¹⁷ A. In the merger stimulation we do	
18	Do you see that?	¹⁸ something different, because you take the actual	
19	A. Yes.	¹⁹ world, and then you try to stimulate.	
20	Q the last sentence, you see it	²⁰ So, the the benchmark is the	
21	originally read, "in fact, neither Dr. Noll nor	²¹ actual world, and you ask yourself, "how would the	
22	Dr. Ordover has ever applied a Bertrand model without	²² actual world be changed in response in a wake of a	
23	also relying on the control group methodology to	 ²³ particular merger transaction?" 	
24	control economic damages."	²⁴ So, there's a control group is the	
25	Do you see that?	 ²⁵ world, as we defined it, the actual world, and the 	
	Do you see that:	world, as we defined it, the actual world, and the	
			1
	Page 166	Page 168	_
1	Page 166	Page 168	
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
1 2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes.	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² goal is to figure out where the but-for world would 	
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50 (Pages <u>197</u> to 200)

	Page 197		Page 199
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2		2	MR. LANGER: Do you understand what
3	CONTINUATION	³ I me	-
4	BY MR. LANGER:	4	THE WITNESS: No.
5		5	THE WITNESS. NO.
6	Q. Right.		JTINUATION
7	Now, you did not do anything to	COF	
8	determine what the actual relationship of the	8 81	MR. LANGER:
9	marginal cost of the individual feed would be in		Q. In other words, when I use a credit
10	relation to the marginal costs of an MLB package, I	10 Card	, a certain percentage goes to the vendor
11	take it, from what you just said.	11	A. Right.
12	A. I would not undertake an		Q and a certain percentage goes to
	investigation into the marginal cost either of the	¹² the c	card company, so to speak.
13	package or the standalone fees.		A. That I understand.
14	I only tested the sensitivity of	14	Q. So, would the per the amount that
15	Professor Noll's results		to the card company be a marginal cost?
16	Q. Okay.	16	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
17	A to what I considered to be a	17	Incomplete hypothetical.
18	reasonable modification, which was to bring the price	18	THE WITNESS: The marginal yeah,
19	of the standalone feed marginal costs, sorry of		ing at the net price.
20	the standalone offerings to that of of the	20	So, if a vendor sells the product,
21	package.		say, a package, the vendor will be looking at
22	Q. Do you know what the primary		et price to itself, and that will be accounted
23	marginal costs are of adding a customer to the MLB		Transaction costs with the credit card will be
24	package?		ame whether you sell the customer a standalone
25	A. I think well, those will differ	²⁵ feed,	, you have to pay say, seven percent or
	Page 198		Page 200
1	Page 198 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 200 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2			-
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	² three	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects	² three j ³ or wh	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card,
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace.	² three j ³ or wh	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the	 three 1 or wh be als 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the	 three 1 or wh be als 6 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer.	 three 1 or wh be als 6 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so
2 4 5 6 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having	 three 1 or wh be als CON' BY M cost of 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION IR. LANGER:
2 4 5 7 8	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer.	 three p or wh be als CON' BY M cost or 10 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION IR. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having enough bandwaves to service the additional customer. All kinds of costs are customer	 three 1 or wh be als CON BY M cost o 10 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION IR. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having enough bandwaves to service the additional customer. All kinds of costs are customer marginal specific or customer marginal specific, but	 three 1 or wh be als CON' BY M cost 0 10 11 12 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION IR. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right. So, essentially, my way to think
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having enough bandwaves to service the additional customer. All kinds of costs are customer marginal specific or customer marginal specific, but there are also other margins in which one may want to investigate the the the appropriate basis for cost. Q. Is the is the do you know whether those costs you just described would be greater or less? Let me just ask you this first. Would the Would the I want to	 three or wh be als CON BY M cost of cost of about selling charge pays vi a 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION IR. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right. So, essentially, my way to think it is to say; what is your net benefit from g to a customer? And that is the price that you e minus the fees that you charge if the customer with a credit card. Q. Okay. Another A. But that's going to be the same
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having enough bandwaves to service the additional customer. All kinds of costs are customer marginal specific or customer marginal specific, but there are also other margins in which one may want to investigate the the the appropriate basis for cost. Q. Is the is the do you know whether those costs you just described would be greater or less? Let me just ask you this first. Would the would the I want to use the right term. Would the discount rate on the credit card be a marginal cost?	 three particular set of the set of	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION R. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right. So, essentially, my way to think it is to say; what is your net benefit from g to a customer? And that is the price that you e minus the fees that you charge if the customer with a credit card. Q. Okay. Another A. But that's going to be the same her the customer is being sold by by the he bundle, vendor, purveyor or is sold by the alone supplier.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL depending on the realities of the individual aspects of the marketplace. The primary the one of the costs would be the cost of signing up the the customer. There might be the cost of maintaining the customer. There will be a cost of of having enough bandwaves to service the additional customer. All kinds of costs are customer marginal specific or customer marginal specific, but there are also other margins in which one may want to investigate the the the appropriate basis for cost. Q. Is the is the do you know whether those costs you just described would be greater or less? Let me just ask you this first. Would the would the I want to use the right term. Would the discount rate on the	 three or wh be als CON' BY M cost of cost of about selling charge charge charge charge the charge the charge<th>HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION R. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right. So, essentially, my way to think it is to say; what is your net benefit from g to a customer? And that is the price that you e minus the fees that you charge if the customer with a credit card. Q. Okay. Another A. But that's going to be the same her the customer is being sold by by the he bundle, vendor, purveyor or is sold by the</th>	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL percent or two percent, depends on the card, ether you sell the customer a package, that will o two percent, one percent, or or so TINUATION R. LANGER: Q. That would be part of the marginal of an additional customer. Is that correct? A. Right. So, essentially, my way to think it is to say; what is your net benefit from g to a customer? And that is the price that you e minus the fees that you charge if the customer with a credit card. Q. Okay. Another A. But that's going to be the same her the customer is being sold by by the he bundle, vendor, purveyor or is sold by the

51 (Pages 201 to 204)

		JI (PAGES 201 LO 204)
	Page 201	Page 203
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Professor Noll did, that the RSN's strike	² I didn't do that in Section 4.
3	strike the question.	³ Q. Now, aside from the – running the
4	You assumed that the RSN's would	 ⁴ model with a different calculation of marginal cost,
5		 ⁵ and running the model with the the change you just
6	charge a fee to the League.	and running the model with the the change you just
7	Is that correct?	uescribeu
8	A. Yes. I assumed that this is a	A. The lecu lee.
	fundamental problem with Professor Noll's modeling of	Q the feed fee, and you do any
9	the marketplace where he fails to recognize that the	⁹ other tests that you report in which you change any
10	owner of the scarce resource here, the feed, would	¹⁰ aspects of the inputs or design of Dr. Noll's model?
11	give it away for free in the but-for world to	¹¹ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
12	somebody who will then take that feed and compete,	¹² THE WITNESS: No. Everything that I
13	again, the seller of the input into the marketplace.	¹³ have done is reported in my Declaration.
14	I think that's just wrong	¹⁴ So, there's nothing in my back
15	Q. So	¹⁵ pocket.
16	A economics.	16
17	Q. So, you you you determined	¹⁷ CONTINUATION
18	what the fee would be.	¹⁸ BY MR. LANGER:
19	Is that correct?	¹⁹ O. So, those are those are the two
20	A. I took I went at it twice, as you	 ²⁰ – no, no. I wasn't suggesting you had anything in
21	may remember, in Section 4 and in Section 6.	 ²¹ your back pocket, but those are the two major
22	In Section 4, I did not actually	²² differences.
23	-	unici chees.
24	calculate out what some people might refer to as an	is that correct.
25	equilibrium fee, whatever the economic model that I'm	A. That is right.
25	calculating it out for.	²⁵ As far as I give you a full report,
	Page 202	Page 204
1		
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it realistic is it realistic to claim, as Professor	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore thumb, and I wanted to see how sore the thumb is.
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it realistic is it realistic to claim, as Professor Noll, that the RSN's will give their product away for	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore thumb, and I wanted to see how sore the thumb is. Q. Correct.
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it realistic is it realistic to claim, as Professor Noll, that the RSN's will give their product away for free?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore thumb, and I wanted to see how sore the thumb is. Q. Correct. A. So, that's all.
2 3 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it realistic is it realistic to claim, as Professor Noll, that the RSN's will give their product away for free? That's what he says. This is one of	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore thumb, and I wanted to see how sore the thumb is. Q. Correct. A. So, that's all. Q. Now, did you run the model with both
2 4 5 7 8	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL I attacked a simple question. A simpler question was to say; is it realistic is it realistic to claim, as Professor Noll, that the RSN's will give their product away for free? That's what he says. This is one of his key assumptions; giving it away for free to the	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that's what I have done, because I believed that those are two things that stick out like a sore thumb, and I wanted to see how sore the thumb is. Q. Correct. A. So, that's all. Q. Now, did you run the model with both changes or did you run each one separately?
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54 (Pages 213 to 216)

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	Page 213	Page 215
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Okay.	² Is that right?
3	You have not tried to run a single	³ A. It cannot take its game and have it
4	model including the critiques of Dr. Pakes,	⁴ broadcast through its RSN or RSN that it contracts
5	Dr. McFadden, and then the different elements you	 ⁵ with outside of its territory, that is true.
6	described at once.	⁶ O. It can't do it itself?
7	Is that correct?	
8		A. And you cannot do it fiseli.
9	A. That is entirely correct, because I	it is my understanding that learns
10	did not see the Pakes and McFadden affidavits after	that such, generally, do not engage in the production
11	until after I finished my work.	and distribution of the video product resulting from
	Q. Okay.	then games.
12	Now, you reached certain conclusions	Q. But each team negotiates its own
13	based on regarding the but-for world based on the	¹³ deal with an RSN subject to the constraints imposed
14	Noll model.	¹⁴ by the group as to what it can sell.
15	Is that correct?	¹⁵ Is that right?
16	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	¹⁶ A. It negotiates with the RSN, and
17	THE WITNESS: Well, depends what	¹⁷ under the within the four corners of the rules
18	conclusions you have in mind.	¹⁸ that it has to abide by, yes.
19	I reached the the overarching	¹⁹ Q. Okay.
20	conclusion based on sound economics as opposed to	²⁰ Who retains the copyright to the
21	empirics.	²¹ broadcast?
22	I reached a conclusion that the	²² MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
23	teams actually, they are RSN's sorry, will	²³ Calls for a legal conclusion.
24	impose a feed fee on the League, because in the new	²⁴ Dr. Ordover is not here as a legal
25	postulated environment the team or the RSN and the	²⁵ expert.
	Page 214	Page 216
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	League have become competitors, and it's only natural	² THE WITNESS: That I don't know.
3	and sound economics which I have, I thought, advanced	
		3
4		³ ⁴ CONTINUATION
4 5	some 30 or 40 years ago, that a rival cannot expect	
	some 30 or 40 years ago, that a rival cannot expect to get the input from the supplier who competes with	 ⁴ CONTINUATION ⁵ BY MR. LANGER:
5	some 30 or 40 years ago, that a rival cannot expect to get the input from the supplier who competes with it for free, and I think most people will agree with	 ⁴ CONTINUATION ⁵ BY MR. LANGER: ⁶ Q. Okay.
5	some 30 or 40 years ago, that a rival cannot expect to get the input from the supplier who competes with it for free, and I think most people will agree with that proposition.	 CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Do you know whether the RSN is
5 6 7	some 30 or 40 years ago, that a rival cannot expect to get the input from the supplier who competes with it for free, and I think most people will agree with that proposition. One of the effects of that, we	 CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Okay. Do you know whether the RSN is
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13 COUNSEL: Objection. THE WITNESS: I would be guessing as to whether they do or they don't. 1 13 THE WITNESS: I would be guessing as to whether they do or they don't. 1 14 CONTINUATION 20 15 COUNTINUATION 20 16 COUNTINUATION 20 17 Q. You don't know? 20 28 A. I don't recall. 20 16 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL As I sit here, I don't recall what their rights are with regard to the Internet streaming. 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL As I sit here, I don't recall what their rights are with regard to the Internet streaming. 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION 20 16 League rule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION 20 16 League rule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION 2 16 League rule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 BY MR. LANGER: 2 0 17 MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form 1 1 1 1 1 16 League rule for inclusion of the bundle, and I stress the words "at present," because it is a key assumption that Roger 1 <			Call you speak up?
19 THE WITNESS: I would be guessing as to whether they do or they don't. 21 22 CONTINUATION BY MR LANGER: 22 23 Q. You don't know? A. I don't recall. 24 Q. You don't know? A. I don't recall. 25 A. I don't recall. 26 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A s I sit here, I don't recall what their rights are with regard to the Internet streaming. 1 26 Q. And each team is required by the League to provide all of its broadcast to the League by a League rule for inclusion of the bundle. Is that correct? 1 27 MR, KASS: Objection. Foundation. 9 28 MR, COLDFEIN: Objection to the form of the question. 1 29 MR, COLDFEIN: Objection to the form inclusion in the bundle, and 1 stress the words "at treams provide their feed to the League for free for inclusion in the bundle, and 1 stress the words "at treams provide their feed to the League for free for inclusion in the ut-for environment in which all kinds of modifications in the environment in which all kinds of modifications in the environment has – has taken place. 26 CONTINUATION 27 CONTINUATION 28 BY MR, LANGER: 29 CONTINUATION 24 O <td< th=""><th></th><th></th><th>WIK. GOLDFEIN. I UIIIK you need to</th></td<>			WIK. GOLDFEIN. I UIIIK you need to
20 to whether they do or they don't. 20 MR. LANGER: Both Leagues. 21 CONTINUATION 21 THE WITNESS: Generally speaking, at the moment, in the actual world, the RSN's do not sell their product outside of the home territory. 23 Q. You don't know? 24 That's my understanding. 24 Q. You don't know? 24 That's my understanding. 25 A. I don't recall. 23 That's my understanding. 26 Page 218 Page 220 27 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 CONTINUATION 26 Q. And each team is required by the CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: 26 Q. And each team is required by the League trule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 27 By AL cague rule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 BY MR. LANGER: 0 The RSN does not sell the game that 26 Q. And each team is required by the League trule for inclusion of the bundle. 1 I the RSN's game or the team's 27 By AL Canger II: Objection to form. 2 3 I the RSN's game or the team's 28 Foundation. 1 THE WITNESS: It's my understanding <th></th> <th></th> <th>be more specific as to which League you are taiking</th>			be more specific as to which League you are taiking
21 First Street Str		6 6	about.
22 CONTINUATION 22 the moment, in the actual world, the RSN's do not sell their product outside of the home territory. 23 Q. You don't know? 23 24 Q. You don't know? 24 25 A. I don't recall. 23 26 Page 218 Page 220 27 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 26 As I sit here, I don't recall what 2 27 As I sit here, I don't recall what 2 28 Page 218 Page 220 29 MR charge and the humenet 3 BY MR. LANGER: 30 And each team is required by the 2 A. The RSN does not sell their product? 4 Q. And each team is required by the 2 A. The RSN does not sell the game that 4 it produces and distributes outside of the RSN's or 1 team's home territory. 3 MR. KASS: Objection. 7 Is that correct? 3 4 MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form 10 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 5 fthat, at present, in the current environment, t	-	they don't.	WIR. LANGER. Dour Leagues.
23 BY MR. LANGER: 24 Q. You don't know? 25 24 Q. You don't know? 26 27 25 A. I don't recall. 28 That's my understanding. 26 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 28 1 27 As I sit here, I don't recall what 26 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 26 As I sit here, I don't recall what 26 27 1 27 As I sit here, I don't recall what 26 27 1 28 There is a sit here, I don't recall what 26 27 1 39 Q. And each team is required by the 26 A. The RSN does not sell their product? 4 G. And each team is required by the 26 A. The RSN does not sell the RSN's or team's home territory. 30 By take correct? 9 MR. KASS: Objection to the form 10 31 MR, CASS: Objection to the form 10 10 10 10 32 MR, COLDFEIN: Objection to the form 12 11 MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. 32 The first if red to the League for free for 11 10 11 1	²² CONTINUATION		
24 Q. You don't know? 24 Set ther product outside of the nome territory. 25 A. I don't recall. 24 That's my understanding. 24 Page 218 Page 220 25 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 26 2 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 26 As I sit here, I don't recall what 2 1 3 their rights are with regard to the Internet 3 BY MR. LANGER: 4 streaming. 4 A. The RSN does not sell their product? 5 Q. And each team is required by the A. The RSN does not sell the game that it produces and distributes outside of the RSN's or 3 By MR. KASS: Objection. 9 Is it the RSN's game or the team's 4 MR. KASS: Objection to the form 9 Is it the RSN's game or the team's 3 THE WITNESS: It's my understanding 13 THE WITNESS: Exactly. I'm not a 14 hat, at present, in the current environment, the 14 lawyer. 15 teams provide their feed to the League for free for 16 contract, and it's the question; where can the game 16 that, at present, in			the moment, in the actual world, the KSN's do not
23 A. I don't recall. 1 Inars my understanding. 23 Page 218 Page 220 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 As I sit here, I don't recall what 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 3 their rights are with regard to the Internet 3 BY MR. LANGER: 4 streaming. 3 BY MR. LANGER: 5 Q. And each team is required by the 4 A. The RSN does not sell their product? 6 League to provide all of its broadcast to the League 6 D. They do not sell the RSN's or 7 by a League rule for inclusion of the bundle. 7 A. The RSN's game or the team's 7 BY MR. COLDFEIN: Objection to the form 7 Is it the RSN's game or the team's 9 MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form 7 Bit the RSN's game or the team's 13 THE WITNESS: It's my understanding 14 Hawyer. 14 that, at present, in the current environment, the 14 lawyer. 15 teams provide their feed to the League for free for 14 lawyer. 16 inclusion in the bundle, and I stress the words "at		't know?	sen men product ouiside of me nome territory.
Page 218 Page 220 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 As I sit here, I don't recall what 1 3 their rights are with regard to the Internet 5 4 Streaming. 0. 5 Q. And each team is required by the 2 6 League to provide all of its broadcast to the League by a League rule for inclusion of the bundle. 7 Is that correct? Q. Whose game is it? 8 MR, KASS: Objection. 9 9 MR, COLDFEIN: Objection to the form 0 10 Foundation. 1 11 THE WITNESS: It's my understanding 1 14 that, at present, in the current environment, the 1 15 teams provide their feed to the League for free for 1 16 that, at present, in the burdle, and I stress the words "at 1 17 makes – Roger Noll makes, that the same incentives 1 18 kinds of modifications in the environment has – has 1 19 would exist in the but-for environment has – has 1 10 Exert WR. LANGER:	-		That's my understanding.
1HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL1HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL2As I sit here, I don't recall whattheir rights are with regard to the InternetSi sit here, I don't recall whatSi sit here, I don't recall what3their rights are with regard to the InternetSi sit here, I don't recall whatBY MR. LANGER:4Q. And each team is required by theA. The RSN does not sell the game that5Q. And each team is required by theA. The RSN does not sell the game that6Is that correct?A. The RSN's game or the team's7MR. KASS: Objection.By MR. COLDFEIN: Objection to the form10MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the formMR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to the form11MR GOLDFEIN: Objection to the formMR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.12Calls for a legal conclusion.13THE WITNESS: It's my understanding14that, at present, in the current environment, the15teams provide their feed to the League for free for16inclusion in the bundle, and I stress the words "at17present," because it is a key assumption that Roger18kinds of modifications in the environment in which all19would exist in the but-for environment in which all10Kinds of modifications in the environment has has18the moment it's clear to me,19would exist in the but-for environment in which all10Kinds of modifications in the environment has has11LANGER:12CONTINUATION13BY MR. LANGER		2411.	25
21taken place.212222CONTINUATION23CONTINUATION23BY MR. LANGER:24BY MR. LANGER:24Q. So, the RSN looks for its own	 As I sit here, their rights are with reg streaming. Q. And each at by a League rule for it MR. KASS: Foundation. MR. GOLD of the question. THE WITNI that, at present, in the of teams provide their feet inclusion in the bundle, present," because it is at makes Roger Noll m 	I don't recall what gard to the Internet team is required by the of its broadcast to the League inclusion of the bundle. eet? Objection. FEIN: Objection to the form ESS: It's my understanding current environment, the ed to the League for free for and I stress the words "at a key assumption that Roger takes, that the same incentives	 CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. They do not sell their product? A. The RSN does not sell the game that it produces and distributes outside of the RSN's or team's home territory. Q. Whose game is it? Is it the RSN's game or the team's game? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. Calls for a legal conclusion. THE WITNESS: Exactly. I'm not a lawyer. There is a game. There is a contract, and it's the question; where can the game be sold and where it can't be sold? At the moment it's clear to me, anyway, I may be wrong, that no RSN sells its game
23 CONTINUATION 23 BY MR. LANGER: 24 BY MR. LANGER: 24 Q. So, the RSN looks for its own			
24 BY MR. LANGER: 24 Q. So, the RSN looks for its own			²² CONTINUATION
U I WIK, LANGER, U I SU, the KSN hooks for its own	²³ CONTINUATION		²³ BY MR. LANGER:
²⁵ Q. Okay. ²⁵ revenue to the home team territory?	²⁴ BY MR. LANGER:		²⁴ O. So, the RSN looks for its own
	25 O Okav		
	Q. Окау.		

57 (Pages 225 to 228)

	Page 225		Page 227
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	I know I take too long, but I	2	Kansas City, and there's a game and it's produced
3	usually come to an end.	3	by
4	At the moment	4	Q. The who?
5	MR. LANGER: Like all good things.	5	A. The Tampa the Tampa team,
6	THE WITNESS: What?	6	whatever name, I forget. Anyway.
7	MR. LANGER: Like all good things.	7	The Kansas City Royals are playing
8	THE WITNESS: Yes.	8	with the Tampa team, okay, and there is two feeds.
9	At the moment the package obtains	9	One is produced by the Tampa team, and the one is
10	the rights to what I regard as the valuable input,	10	produced by the Kansas City team, right?
11	which is the game feed for free for a specific	11	Q. Right.
12	purpose of inclusion in the package.	12	A. The question is; are they the same
13	In the but-for world that I	13	two products or are they different products?
14	understand your client, and the Roger Noll model	14	That was your question?
15	supports, that League would use that feed to compete	15	Q. Yeah.
16	with the RSN in the RSN's home territory.	16	A. There are some differences in the
17	I regard that as a huge change in	17	products, yes.
18	the way the market functions, and a huge change in	18	Q. Okay.
19	the scope of rights that the RSN has.	19	Does the feed that the Tampa team
20	the scope of rights that the KSN has.	20	into Kansas City violate what you call content
21	CONTINUATION	21	exclusivity?
22	BY MR. LANGER:	22	A. Does the sale?
23		23	$\mathbf{O}. \mathbf{No}.$
24	Q. Now, is the feed of the visiting team something that would violate content exclusivity	24	Q. No. Does the would where their
25	in your view?	25	feed of the Tampa game into Kansas City, the home
	in your view.		teed of the Tampa game into Kansas City, the nome
	Page 226		Page 228
1	_	1	-
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
3	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	3	game is in Kansas City, would that violate what you
4	Incomplete hypothetical.	4	call content exclusivity?
5	THE WITNESS: Yeah. I was going to ask the question that you finish the sentence.		
		5	A. I just truly don't understand the
6		5	hypothetical.
6 7	I don't know that a at the moment	1	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team
7	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the	6 7	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game.
7 8	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the	6	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct.
7	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that	6 7 8	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements,
7 8 9	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory.	6 7 8 9	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have
7 8 9 10	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right.	6 7 8 9 10	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different
7 8 9 10 11	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it	6 7 8 9 10 11	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is
7 8 9 10 11 12	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were available in the home team's territory, that would be	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team. A. Okay.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were available in the home team's territory, that would be a different feed.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team. A. Okay. Q. Would that violate what you call
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were available in the home team's territory, that would be a different feed. Isn't that correct?	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team. A. Okay. Q. Would that violate what you call content exclusivity?
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were available in the home team's territory, that would be a different feed. Isn't that correct? A. There will be sorry.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team. A. Okay. Q. Would that violate what you call
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I don't know that a at the moment the way things work is that the home team has the rights to its the feed in its territory, and the visiting team will have the rights to the feed that it produces in its home territory. MR. LANGER: Right. THE WITNESS: That is the way it works. That is my understanding. MR. LANGER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Correct me if I'm wrong. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. If the visiting team's feeds were available in the home team's territory, that would be a different feed. Isn't that correct?	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	hypothetical. At the moment the Tampa team produces its own feed of the same game. Q. Correct. A. It may have different announcements, or it will have different booths, it will have different stats. It will have all kinds of different things, and that's that's their feed, which is then is being shown on the Tampa team's RSN. Q. Right. A. It's not being shown now in the Kansas City teams on the Kansas City RSN's in the Kansas City team's home territory. Q. Under my hypothetical the situation would be that the Tampa feed would also be available within the home territory of the Kansas City team. A. Okay. Q. Would that violate what you call content exclusivity? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.

60 (Pages 237 to 240)

		00 (14965 207 60 240)
	Page 237	Page 239
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. But you're not I'm sorry.	² because it has to have some rights.
3	I didn't mean to interrupt you.	3
4	A. No.	4 CONTINUATION
5	And the key difference between what	⁵ BY MR. LANGER:
6	you're talking about right now and what I focused on,	⁶ Q. It simply would have rights to
7	was that I am examining the implications for	 ⁷ license its games for broadcast.
8	Professor Noll's predictions, not from the visiting	⁸ MR. TOSCANO: Same objection.
9	team now starting to send the feed into the home	⁹ THE WITNESS: Throughout the world?
10	territory of the host team or the home team, but the	¹⁰ United States? Eastern seaboard? What?
11	-	United States? Eastern seaboard? What?
12	implications for the economic arrangements in hockey	WIK. LANGER. Allywhere.
13	or in baseball that arise as a result of the League	THE WITNESS. SO, It would have no
14	using the feed that it obtains heretofore for free at	exclusive rights in its nonic territory as it has now,
15	zero price to compete with the RSN.	but in exchange, of it will obtain the right to
	I believe that arrangement is not	bloadcast its programming everywhere?
16	sustainable, and I believe that such an arrangement	¹⁶ Is that your hypothetical?
17	would have to trigger all kinds of notifications, all	
18	of which, in my view, leads to potentially higher	¹⁸ CONTINUATION
19	price for the League package than heretofore.	¹⁹ BY MR. LANGER:
20	MR. LANGER: Let's take a break.	²⁰ Q. Would have the rights to license
21	THE WITNESS: Okay.	²¹ someone to broadcast anywhere.
22	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Off the record.	²² A. Anywhere.
23	3:21.	²³ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
24		²⁴ Incomplete hypothetical.
25	(Recess was taken at this time.)	²⁵ THE WITNESS: Okay.
	Page 238	Page 240
1	-	_
1 2	Page 238 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	-	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL VIDEO TECHNICIAN: Stand by, please. The time is 3:29.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. Would the team be less valuable in
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61 (Pages 241 to 244)

			61 (Pages 241 to 244)
	Page 241		Page 243
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	2	
3	THE WITNESS: Selling the League	3	CONTINUATION
4	package in Tampa while the Tampa Rays are playing	4	BY MR. LANGER:
5	some other team, in my definition it does violate	5	Q. So, going back there's is there
6	content exclusivity unless there's a blackout of the	6	some magic formula or some some special formula
7	Tampa Rays' game in the package.	7	that an economist could use to determine where the
8	MR. LANGER: Right.	8	line is as to what would be defined content
9		9	exclusivity and what would not?
10	CONTINUATION	10	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
11	BY MR. LANGER:	11	MR. GOLDFEIN: Objection to form of
12	Q. But I'm talking about the package as	12	the question.
13	it is now.	13	
14	A. Oh, okay. I'm sorry.	14	CONTINUATION
15	Q. So, you're saying it does not	15	BY MR. LANGER:
16	violate content exclusivity?	16	O. In other words, what is the
17	A. At the moment it does not, because	17	distinction between the package being sold on a
18	the same content, which is a Tampa game Tampa game	18	blacked-out basis in Tampa and the visiting team feed
19	is not being made available from two different	19	being sold in Tampa?
20	sources.	20	MR. TOSCANO: Same objection.
21	So, content is not	21	THE WITNESS: There's a massive
22	Q. And	22	distinction. The blackout package does not have the
23	A content exclusivity is not being	23	feed of the home team or even the visiting team in
24	violated.	24	their home territory.
25		25	There is no ability for the viewer
	Q. But the visiting team – the		There is no ability for the viewer
	Page 242		Page 244
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	visiting team feed you agree was, to some degree, a	2	subscribing to the package to watch the home team's
3	different product than the home team feed.	3	game as it was developed and produced by the home
4	Is that right?	4	team RSN by acquiring the rights to watch the the
5	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	5	package.
6	THE WITNESS: To some viewers it	6	
7	might be a different product.	7	CONTINUATION
8	To other viewers it may not be a	8	BY MR. LANGER:
9	different product, but in any case, it is to me a	9	Q. But you told me earlier that a
10	a a distraction from the core issue here in this	10	majority of purchasers of the Major League Internet
11	in this in in this litigation which I tried	11	package, Major League Baseball Internet package,
12	to understand, discuss, and analyze, and assess as an	12	would pay 18 percent more to get the premium package.
13	economist.	13	Do you recall that?
14	I don't think I do not recall	14	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
15	Professor Noll at all addressing the issue of what	15	Misstates the witness' testimony.
16	what, I guess, you have called game exclusivity in	16	THE WITNESS: I think it would be
17	this but certainly one of the reasons I have not	17	great if we could focus on one issue at a time, but I
18	addressed it myself because, as I said, I believe it	18	understand it's your afternoon, and you can do
19	to be a distraction from the key question which is,	19	whatever you want.
20	can the League package; A, gauge the input for free	20	My I'm going to bring you back to
21	and use that free input to construct the product with	21	the core concern I have, and the core concern I have
22	which to compete against the home team territory RSN?	22	is not how much extra people are willing to pay for
23	That is the focus of everything that	23	the home feed for one feed versus the other. That
24	I'm thinking about.	24	is a possibility, an issue that can be resolved, I
25	(Pause)	25	think, in a variety of ways.
		1	,,,,
		1	

62 (Pages 245 to 248)

		62 (Pages 245 to 248)
	Page 245	Page 247
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	The more important question is the	² lower quality, which I believe is similarly explained
3	whole concept of content exclusivity as I defined it,	³ by the diminution in the rate of return by the RSN on
4	and I think it is entirely consistent with the	⁴ its investment in the in the production and
5	definition that the Judge uses, and in that context	⁵ distribution of the product.
6	the key question is; is the package violating content	⁶ Q. But you didn't do any analysis of
7	exclusivity as defined by selling the package in	⁷ your own of the minimum revenue required to provide a
8	which the home team's feed is available at the same	⁸ quality broadcast.
9	time?	⁹ Isn't that correct?
10		¹⁰ MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
11	CONTINUATION	¹¹ THE WITNESS: That is true. I speak
12	BY MR. LANGER:	¹² solely as an industrial organization economist who
13	Q. Do you conclude that if an RSN lost	¹³ is, I think, of the unimpeachable view that the less
14	content exclusivity there would be fewer broadcasts	¹⁴ money you make, the less incentive you have to spend
15	of inferior quality.	¹⁵ money on the product.
16	Is that correct?	16
17	A. Can you direct me to you are	¹⁷ CONTINUATION
18	reading from my deposition?	¹⁸ BY MR. LANGER:
19	Q. No, I'm not reading.	¹⁹ Q. And you didn't do any analysis of
20	A. Oh, okay.	²⁰ the actual decline in revenue to the RSN if the
21	Can you then restate the question or	²¹ relief sought in this case were granted?
22	please restate it again? Sorry.	²² MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
23	Q. You have concluded that if the RSN's	²³ THE WITNESS: No. My focus is on
24	lost content exclusivity there would be fewer	²⁴ the class certification issues as opposed to a host
25	broadcasts.	²⁵ of other issues that may be raised by this
	Page 246	Page 248
1	-	
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct?	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? A. Fewer games being produced?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? A. Fewer games being produced? Q. Yes.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:
2 3 4 5	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? A. Fewer games being produced? Q. Yes. A. I believe that there's such a 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:
2 3 4 5 6	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? A. Fewer games being produced? Q. Yes. A. I believe that there's such a possibility, because the effect on the RSN would be 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. So, you didn't do any empirical
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2 4 5 7 8 9	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? A. Fewer games being produced? Q. Yes. A. I believe that there's such a possibility, because the effect on the RSN would be to lose margin or preference on the investment that's made in the team, and it would have, therefore, incentive to react to react to it possibly through 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL litigation. CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER: Q. So, you didn't do any empirical analysis based on the revenues and costs of games on the diminution that would occur as you see it in the but-for world from which you could conclude strike
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63 (Pages 249 to 252)

		03 (rayes 249 to 232)
	Page 249	Page 251
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	clearly indicate that their incentives would be	² Q. Mr. Litner, Mr. Crumb and
3	effected if there were a frontal breach of the of	³ Mr. Krolick are the people upon whom you rely for
4	the content exclusivity as it is present in baseball	⁴ your conclusion that there would be a diminution in
5	and hockey right now.	⁵ the number of games broadcast.
6	All of them, I think, are in	⁶ Is that correct?
7	agreement on that proposition, but I, as an	⁷ A. No, it's totally incorrect.
8	economist, did not undertake such an investigation.	⁸ I relied on the economic analysis
9	-	 ⁹ which I think claims such as, if somebody is making
10	MR. LANGER: Okay.	which I think claims such as, it solicoody is making
11	So, wait a second.	less money on a product sale on an investment in the
12	(Pause)	product dicte will be a reaction.
		what kind of feaction will there be,
13	CONTINUATION	¹³ you may ask? The reaction would be to lessen the
14	BY MR. LANGER:	¹⁴ amount of investment. That's how firms react.
15	Q. Who is John Litner?	¹⁵ You want to equate marginal revenue
16	MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	¹⁶ with marginal cost. If your marginal revenue goes
17	Asked and answered.	¹⁷ down, then I pull back on the investment or on the
18	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.	¹⁸ sales, and, therefore, I find those Declarations that
19		¹⁹ you instance to be entirely consistent with my basic
20	CONTINUATION	²⁰ economic reaction to these arguments.
21	BY MR. LANGER:	21 Q. You haven't I'm sorry.
22	Q. Who is John Litner?	²² A. No, that's all right.
23	MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	²³ Q. You haven't done any empirical
24	Asked and answered.	²⁴ analysis as to how much the minimum amount a team
25	THE WITNESS: I thought we went over	²⁵ strike that the minimum amount an RSN requires in
	C C	
	Page 250	Page 252
1	-	
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that at 9:30 this morning. I do not recall the name,	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL order to broadcast a game the minimum amount of
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that at 9:30 this morning. I do not recall the name, and I did not refresh myself on the names or on any	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL order to broadcast a game the minimum amount of revenue.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that at 9:30 this morning. I do not recall the name, and I did not refresh myself on the names or on any of the grades. So, my answer would be as it was	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL order to broadcast a game the minimum amount of revenue. Is that correct?
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL that at 9:30 this morning. I do not recall the name, and I did not refresh myself on the names or on any	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL order to broadcast a game the minimum amount of revenue. Is that correct? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
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64 (Pages 253 to 256)

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	Page 253	Page 255
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Is that a legal conclusion on your	² are they are not advising me. I think they are
3	part as to whether they're a fact or opinion	³ advising, to the extent they are advising anybody, is
4	witnesses?	4 the Court.
5	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	⁵ My opinions are being supported by
6	That is ridiculous.	⁶ these fact witnesses. But I am not saying to
7	THE WITNESS: I I don't know the	⁷ myself until I read those Declarations, I thought
8	difference between. I think the fact witness is a	⁸ that was going to expand.
9	corporate witnesses who are talking about facts.	⁹ Wow, I was so wrong. How could I
10		¹⁰ have been so wrong?
11	CONTINUATION	¹¹ No, I have 43 years of thinking
12	BY MR. LANGER:	¹² about anti-trust industrial organization economics,
13	Q. Someone could ask you for a fact as	¹³ and what I'm testifying here is based on my thinking
14	to whether there are nine defense lawyers sitting at	¹⁴ on those issues in this case and other cases, and it
15	the table in your deposition; right?	¹⁵ happens to be consistent with what these people have
16	That would be a fact that you could	¹⁶ testified to for very good reason.
17	testify to.	¹⁷ They are experienced business
18	A. I, as an expert economist, could	¹⁸ people, and I am an experienced economist, and
19	come and testify as to the correctness of that	¹⁹ sometimes there is a parallel in the outcomes of
20	statement, yes.	²⁰ those two types of expertise.
21	Q. But if I were to ask you how many	21
22	lawyers are going to be present at Dr. McFadden's	²² CONTINUATION
23	deposition next week, that would be asking your	²³ BY MR. LANGER:
24	opinion as to what would occur next week.	²⁴ Q. They are also interested parties in
25	Isn't that correct?	²⁵ this litigation.
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	Page 254	Page 256
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2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. It sounds like you're trying to call	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. It sounds like you're trying to call for a legal conclusion. It's, quite frankly, so	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Is that correct? MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form. THE WITNESS: To the extent they
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65 (Pages 257 to 260)

		65 (Pages 257 to 260)
	Page 257	Page 259
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	CONTINUATION	² baseball game.
3	BY MR. LANGER:	³ Q. Do you know that women's college
4	Q. How many baseball games – Major	 ⁴ women's softball games appear on television?
5	League Baseball games currently are not broadcast in	⁵ A. Yes, and snooker is one of my
6	a season?	⁶ favorite things to watch, especially when I'm abroad.
7	A. There are some that are not.	 Darts. Every conceivable sport is can be seen
8		⁸ somewhere on TV.
9	How many, I don't know. Q. Maybe ten.	⁹ Some of it some advertising is
10	Q. Maybe ten.A. I don't know. I told you I don't	¹⁰ associated with some of them. Some are not. There's
11	-	¹¹ no advertising, but, yes, it's a huge amount of
12	know. I would be guessing to give you an answer, which I refuse to do.	 sports out there on TV.
13		sports out mere on 1 v.
14	Q. And those that are not broadcast,	Q. Correct, and it's worthwhile for
15	are they not broadcast by anyone or are they	KSIV S OF Some Droaucasters to undertake to Droaucast
16	broadcast only by the visiting team?	those unterent sports.
17	MR. TOSCANO: Objection to form.	is that correct:
18	Doesn't make any sense.	A. 1 cs, because of the the
19	THE WITNESS: As I said, I mean,	contonies. How many of those games will be
20	what else can I say? I said look, I have not done	bibaucast? who knows. It may be just one. Maybe
21	this kind of analysis. I do know that not even in	unce per season.
22	the current environment the not all games are	But Wajor League Baseban and Wajor
23	broadcast by all teams. There are teams teams of	League Hockey generally broadcasts cach and every
24	all the games are not necessarily all broadcast,	game, other than mose that are being broadcasted
25	but the number, the frequency, the reasons, I just	unough national distribution.
20	don't know as I sit here. I would be guessing.	²⁵ So, it's a difference between the
	Page 258	Page 260
1	Page 258 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 260 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	_	-
	_	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL one of snooker game versus the full season with
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL one of snooker game versus the full season with expensive announcers and other production values
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUATION BY MR. LANGER:	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL one of snooker game versus the full season with expensive announcers and other production values being invested by the RSN into the into the
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EXHIBIT D

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

	I (Pages I to 4)
Page 1	Page 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL APPEARANCES:
THOMAS LAUMANN, FERNANDA CIVIL ACTION NO. GARBER, ROBERT SILVER, 12-cv-1817(SAS) GARRETT TRAUB, DAVID DILLON, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated vs NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, NHL ENTERPRISES, L.P., NHL INTERACTIVE CYBERENTERPRISES, LLC, NEW YORK RANGERS HOCKEY CLUB, NEW JERSEY DEVILS, LLC, NEW YORK ISLANDERS HOCKEY CLUB, L.P., COMCAST-SPECTACOR, L.P., LINCOLN HOCKEY, LLC, LEMIEUX GROUP, L.P., HOCKEY WESTERN NEW YORK, LLC, CHCAGO BLACKHAWKS HOCKEY TEAM, INC., SAN JOSE SHARKS, LLC, DIRECTV, LLC, ROOT SPORTS PITTSBURCH, (Caption continued), Monday, December 8, 2014 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL DEPOSITION OF: ARIEL PAKES Kaplan, Leaman and Wolfe 325 Chestnut Street Suite 909 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (800) 295-7571 KapLeaWol@aol.com	 LANGER GROGAN & DIVER, P.C. BY: NED DIVER, ESQUIRE (215) 320-5663 ndiver@langergrogan.com PETER E. LECKMAN, ESQUIRE (215) 320-0876 pleckman@langergrogan.com 1717 Arch Street Suite 4130 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Representing the Plaintiffs SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP BY: PAUL ECKLES, ESQUIRE Paul.Eckles@skadden.com Four Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 735-2578 Representing the Defendants, NHL (except MSG) ALSTON & BIRD BY: LOUIS A. KARASIK, ESQUIRE lou.karasik@alston.com ANDREW E. PARIS, ESQUIRE drew paris@alston.com ALEXANDER ACKERMAN, ESQUIRE drew paris@alston.com 333 South Hope Street 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 576-1000 Representing the Defendants, DIRECTV Sports Networks, LLC
Page 2	Page 4
 (CAPTION CONTINUED), COMCAST CORPORATION, COMCAST SPORTSNET PHILADELPHIA, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET MID-ATLANTIC, L.P., COMCAST SPORTSNET CALIFORNIA, LLC, COMCAST SPORTSNET CHICAGO, LLC, and MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY FERNANDA GARBER, MARC CIVIL ACTION NO. LERNER, DEREK RASMUSSEN, 12-cv-3704(SAS) ROBERT SILVER, GARRETT TRAUB, and PETER HERMAN, representing themselves and all others similarly situated VS OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, et al. Videotaped Deposition of ARIEL PAKES, was taken pursuant to Notice at the law offices of COHEN MILSTEIN, 88 Pine Street, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10005 on the above date before DEBRA G. JOHNSON-SPALLONE, CCR, RPR, Delaware CSR, Notary Public in and for the States Of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, and a Federally Approved Reporter of the United States District Court commencing on or about 9:54 a.m. 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL APPEARANCES: (Continued), DAVIS POLK BY: DAVID B. TOSCANO, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4515 david.toscano@davispolk.com ANDREW N. DeLANEY, ESQUIRE (212) 450-4294 andrew.delaney@davispolk.com 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 Representing the Defendant, Comcast PROSKAUER ROSE, LLC BY: ADRIAN FONTECILLA, ESQUIRE (202) 416-5863 afontecilla@proskauer.com (202) 416-6890 ckass@proskauer.com (202) 416-6890 ckass@proskauer.com 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 400 South Washington, DC 20004-2533 Representing the Defendants, Major League Baseball (except New York Yankees) PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &i GARRISON, LLP BY: WILLIAM Y, DURBIN, ESQUIRE WolfHT DRAUGHON, ESQUIRE 2001 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 (202) 23-7375 Representing the Defendants, YES Network ALSO PRESENT: Jeffrey F. Brown, Ph.D., Bates White Economic Consulting Phillip Roller, Video Technician

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

	4 (Pages 13 to 16)
Page 13	Page 15
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
HIGHLI CONFIDENTIAL	HIGHLI CONFIDENTIAL
Q. You are you don't consider	those primitives nom appropriate data, and then uses
yoursen an expert in broadcasting broadcasting	a benavioral assumption and those primitives that
instory in particular:	you've estimated to determine the endogenous
A. NO.	variables which could be price of quantity of whether
Q. Do you consider yoursen an expert	The going to participate.
in sports economics:	Q. How do you know when when you
A. NO.	nave a perfect model.
Q. Are you a sports tan?	A. There is no perfect model.
¹⁰ A. Somewhat.	¹⁰ Okay.
¹¹ Q. And of what sports are you a fan?	¹¹ But what I can tell you, what we do
¹² A. Mostly the NBA.	¹² do, which is
13 Q. The NBA.	¹³ Q. Please.
¹⁴ And do you watch NBA basketball on	¹⁴ A in my report, but I will repeat
¹⁵ television?	¹⁵ it, we take a model. We make it as close as we think
¹⁶ A. Sometimes.	¹⁶ is necessary for the real issue at hand, and then we
¹⁷ Q. Frequently?	¹⁷ seminars and our referees, their job is to relax
¹⁸ A. Depends how busy I am.	¹⁸ the assumptions that are as far away from reality as
¹⁹ Q. You have never purchased an	¹⁹ they're questionable with respect to reality, and
²⁰ out-of-market package from the NBA?	²⁰ see if the answer with respect to the issue at hand
²¹ A. No.	²¹ changes.
²² Q. Have you ever studied economics in	²² Q. And how do you know when an
²³ sports in any formal setting?	²³ assumption is far away from reality?
²⁴ A. Have I studied?	A. We look at the institutions.
²⁵ No.	²⁵ It's separate for every industry.
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Page 14	Page 16
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¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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9 (Pages 33 to 36)

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	Page 33	Page 35
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	differential, very little variance.	² A. I should say, by the way
3	The reason that happens is, there's	3 Q. Yeah.
4	- there's a price that the dealers get charged and	⁴ A. – I think every structural model
5	they can bargain if they like, okay, but it's the	⁵ I've written well, I shouldn't say that almost
6	price that the dealers get charged is the variance in	⁶ every certainly is written with somebody who is an
7	- that is almost all the variance in car prices.	 expert in the field of that industry.
8	So and that's what we're interested in.	8 Q. Okay.
9	Q. In in the voluntary export	9 Now, was your report in this case
10	restraints paper, did you model the prices paid by	¹⁰ written with an expert in sports broadcasting?
11	the dealers?	¹¹ A. My report was not written to be a
12	A. We you know, I don't so, I	 ¹² model of sports broadcasting.
13	can't remember whether we used transaction prices or	¹³ I was brought on line by counsel to
14	MSRP prices here, so	¹⁴ find out whether Dr. Noll's model was
15	Q. I can help you so that we don't	¹⁵ methodologically flawed, and whether I could I
16	guess.	¹⁶ would think that the predictions from that model were
17	A. Okay.	¹⁷ reliable or not. Nobody asked me to build a model of
18	Q. On page 412.	¹⁸ the sports industry.
19	A. Good. 412. Okay. Used list	19 Q. Okay.
20	prices, which I guess are MSRP prices.	²⁰ Now, with respect to the auto
21	Q. Am I reading it correctly that the	²¹ prices, the MSRP's that you used, your model assumed
22	top the first paragraph on 412 that, in fact,	 those prices were profit maximizing prices.
23	you're using the list prices of the base model, even	²³ A. Our model assumed that yes, I
24	if somebody bought a different model?	 ²⁴ believe so, I imagine, because every one of them
25	A. Yeah. It depends how you define	²⁵ are models, when we do a counterfactual price we say
	A. Tean. It depends now you define	are models, when we do a counterfactual price we say
	Dama 24	
		Page 36
	Page 34	Page 36
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model. So, let me let me be more clear	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium. Q. And the observed prices are assumed
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model. So, let me let me be more clear on this. Okay. You always have to define what a	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium. Q. And the observed prices are assumed to be in that national price equilibrium?
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model. So, let me let me be more clear on this. Okay. You always have to define what a product is. Okay. Otherwise, you would be in a	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium. Q. And the observed prices are assumed to be in that national price equilibrium? A. In this paper I believe the answer
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model. So, let me let me be more clear on this. Okay. You always have to define what a product is. Okay. Otherwise, you would be in a situation where, you know, different color seats	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium. Q. And the observed prices are assumed to be in that national price equilibrium? A. In this paper I believe the answer is, yes, with a bunch of robustness tests.
2 3 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL model. So, let me let me be more clear on this. Okay. You always have to define what a product is. Okay. Otherwise, you would be in a situation where, you know, different color seats would be a different product. Okay.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL it's a national price equilibrium. Q. And the observed prices are assumed to be in that national price equilibrium? A. In this paper I believe the answer is, yes, with a bunch of robustness tests. Q. Now, you agree people don't pay list
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11 (Pages 41 to 44)

			11 (Pages 41 to 44)
	Page 41		Page 43
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	MR. DIVER: Yes.	2	COUNSEL: Objection.
3	MR. KARASIK: if if you	3	Vague.
4	would	4	THE WITNESS: We did it, and did
5	THE WITNESS: Okay.	5	other robustness tests alongside of it.
6	MR. KARASIK:	6	Again, you have to realize what went
7	THE WITNESS: Yeah.	⁷ h	before this was a paper that or papers in this
8	(Pause)		rade literature that said the opposite.
9	THE WITNESS: Go ahead.	9	
10		10	(Discussion held off the record.)
11	CONTINUATION	11	(u)
12	BY MR. DIVER:	12	MR. DIVER: I wonder if we should
13	Q. Now, correct my understanding if	¹³ t	ake a break right now?
14	it's wrong.	14	MR. KARASIK: Okay.
15	Do I understand that – that you	15	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: The time is
16	modeled the Japanese manufacturers as being subject	16 1	.0:39.
17	to a tax on the production of their automobiles, even	17	Off the record.
18	though they were not, in fact, subject to a tax?	18	
19	A. They were subject to pressure by	19	(Recess was taken at this time.)
20	MITI, which is their industrial I don't know	20	
21	exactly the structure of the Japanese Regulatory	21	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: The time is
22	Authorities, but Jim does, but so, they were	²² 1	0:59.
23	subject to various types of pressure from MITI.	23	We're back on the record.
24	So, for if they exceeded a limit,	24	
25	okay, that was given to them by MITI, presumably	²⁵ (CONTINUATION
	Page 42		Page 44
1	Page 42	1	-
1 2	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes		HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER:
2	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way	2 B 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general
2 3	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes	² B ³ ⁴ q	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER:
2 3 4	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way we did that is just, we put in a dummy variable at	² B ³ ⁴ q	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general uestion, if you could explain what double
2 3 4 5	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way we did that is just, we put in a dummy variable at the right place and see if there was really a cost or	² B ³ q ⁵ m ⁶	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general uestion, if you could explain what double parginalization is.
2 3 4 5 6	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way we did that is just, we put in a dummy variable at the right place and see if there was really a cost or not a cost.	² B ³ q ⁵ m ⁶ ⁷ v	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general uestion, if you could explain what double marginalization is. A. Double marginalization occurs in
2 3 4 5 6 7	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way we did that is just, we put in a dummy variable at the right place and see if there was really a cost or not a cost. If there was not a cost, you would	² B ³ q ⁵ m ⁶ ⁷ va ⁸	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general uestion, if you could explain what double marginalization is. A. Double marginalization occurs in ertical industries where a there's a manufacturer
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Page 42 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Something happened. MITI provides funds. Makes regulations for them. Does everything, and the way we did that is just, we put in a dummy variable at the right place and see if there was really a cost or not a cost. If there was not a cost, you would expect the dummy variables to have a zero coefficient. Those are the dummy variables that I showed you prior. Okay. And they ended up significant, and you know, important and significant. O. Am I understanding this correctly fust there's you are unable to model the actual effects on the manufacturers, so you used, plus the taxes, an approximation that you thought would approximate the effects of the pressure? A. We did not have a political model for the interaction between MITI and Honda, Toyota and et cetera, which would have been what was required. Q. And and it was appropriate to	 2 3 4 4 7 7 9 au 10 au 11 12 11 12 11 12 14 15 14 15 16 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 21 	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Y MR. DIVER: Q. I want to ask you a general uestion, if you could explain what double targinalization is. A. Double marginalization occurs in ertical industries where a there's a manufacturer a producer of a service who then resells or forms a greement with either a retailer or some other gent who then re-markets the good to consumers. There's a margin in the first ansaction, and then there's a second margin in the econd transaction. So, that's called so the first ansaction is a transaction between the producer and the retailer, and the second transaction between the etailer and the customer. Q. Does double marginalization help onsumers? A. Yes.
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	12 (Pages 45 to 48)
Page 45	Page 47
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Q. Does it raise prices for consumers?	² CONTINUATION
MR. KARASIK: Same objections.	³ BY MR. DIVER:
THE WITNESS: Relative to what?	4 O. Do do firms ever make take
MR. DIVER: Relative to single	⁵ affirmative efforts to avoid the effect of double
marginalization.	⁶ marginalization?
MR. KARASIK: Same objections.	⁷ MR. KARASIK: Incomplete
Overly broad.	⁸ hypothetical. Lacks foundation.
THE WITNESS: Probably the answer	⁹ THE WITNESS: Again, I don't know
is, no, but it depends on the industry.	¹⁰ what you mean by "affirmative efforts."
CONTINUATION	¹² CONTINUATION
BY MR. DIVER:	¹³ BY MR. DIVER:
Q. Is double marginalization profit	¹⁴ Q. Let me see. On page 15 and 16 of
maximizing for the sellers and producers?	¹⁵ your report put that one down.
COUNSEL: Objection.	16 A. Okay.
Vague.	¹⁷ And what page? I'm sorry.
MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	$\mathbf{Q}. \mathbf{I'm on 16}.$
Overly broad, and incomplete hypothetical.	19 A. Okay. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what you	²⁰ O. The third line down.
mean actually. There's contracts being signed in the	21 A. Okay.
middle of this. Everybody is trying to do the best	²² Go ahead, what's the question?
they can.	²³ Q. Now, you perhaps you can explain.
Thanks.	²⁴ I'm curious to the term double marginalization in
	²⁵ this sentence.
Page 46	Page 48
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
CONTINUATION	² MR. KARASIK: Would you like to read
BY MR. DIVER:	³ the sentence so we have some context?
Q. If the producer and the retailer are	⁴ THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can read it,
vertically integrated, would they be able to avoid	⁵ but let me just say okay. So, I want to provide
double marginalizations?	⁶ context.
MR. KARASIK: Incomplete	⁷ So, you know what's going on, which
hypothetical. Vague and ambiguous. Lacks	⁸ is, this is the case. We're asking the question, how
foundation.	⁹ would the RSN's and the league bundle be priced?
THE WITNESS: They would incur other	¹⁰ Okay. And as it is in Dr. Noll's report, the RSN's

1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	CONTINUATION	2	MR. KARASIK: Would you like to read
3	BY MR. DIVER:	3	the sentence so we have some context?
4	Q. If the producer and the retailer are	4	THE WITNESS: Yeah, I can read it,
5	vertically integrated, would they be able to avoid	5	but let me just say okay. So, I want to provide
6	double marginalizations?	6	context.
7	MR. KARASIK: Incomplete	7	So, you know what's going on, which
8	hypothetical. Vague and ambiguous. Lacks	8	is, this is the case. We're asking the question, how
9	foundation.	9	would the RSN's and the league bundle be priced?
10	THE WITNESS: They would incur other	10	Okay. And as it is in Dr. Noll's report, the RSN's
11	costs in most of the industries I'm aware of. Okay.	11	is doing the pricing. In the real world the RSN's
12	MR. DIVER: Okay.	12	don't have power to do pricing. So, the MVPD would
13	THE WITNESS: There's a reason for	13	do the pricing. Okay. And if the MVPD did the
14	that.	14	pricing it would have to add a markup.
15		15	
16	CONTINUATION	16	CONTINUATION
17	BY MR. DIVER:	17	BY MR. DIVER:
18	Q. But leaving leaving the other	18	Q. All right.
19	costs aside, is the effect of double marginalization	19	And if the MVPD if the MVPD's
20	to raise prices?	20	action results, as you suggest here, double
21	MR. KARASIK: Same same	21	marginalization?
22	objections.	22	A. The MVPD action
23	THE WITNESS: How can you leave the	23	MR. KARASIK: Wait a second.
24	other part aside? The industry is an industry.	24	That mischaracterizes the sentence.
25		25	Again, I'll ask you to read it

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

Page 49	Page 51
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² THE WITNESS: Okay.	² Q. Is there kind of a textbook
³ MR. KARASIK: if you're going to	³ definition so we can have a working understanding?
⁴ ask him questions about the sentence.	⁴ A. I think it is what I told you when I
⁵ THE WITNESS: I will read it.	⁵ started this, when I was asked the question.
⁶ Do you want me to read it?	⁶ Q. And what did you mean "my margin"
⁷ MR. DIVER: Sure.	 ⁷ when you said there's
⁸ THE WITNESS: "The resulting	⁸ A. Margin means price minus marginal
⁹ equilibrium price of the but-for world League Package	⁹ cost.
¹⁰ to DIRECTV's markup, the League would recognize that	10 Q. So, it's it's pricing
¹¹ as a result of double marginalization it would lose	above marginal cost by both firms?
¹² some end customers and it would change its price."	¹² A. Yes.
¹³ MR. DIVER: So	¹³ Q. Let me I'm sure you have seen
¹⁴ THE WITNESS: So, this is a caveat	-
	¹⁴ this paper. ¹⁵ MR. DIVER: This is Exhibit-3.
to my own analysis.	NIK, DIVER, THIS IS EXHIBIT-3.
WIK. DIVER. Huil-huil. Teall, and Fall	
Just if ying to understand.	(At which the The wehate Effects
I want to come back to this	of Bununing in Municipalitier Television
analysis, but fin just uying to understand the	Markets, was received and marked as
concept of double marginalization.	Deposition Exhibit 5 for identification by
21	²¹ the court reporter.)
²² CONTINUATION	22
²³ BY MR. DIVER:	²³ THE WITNESS: Yes, I have seen his
²⁴ Q. Relative – this double	²⁴ paper.
²⁵ marginalization results in prices that are higher	25
Page 50	Page 52
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² than the joint profit maximizing prices.	² CONTINUATION
³ MR. KARASIK: Incomplete	³ BY MR. DIVER:
man and an	
⁴ hypothetical. Lacks foundation.	G. All right.
hypothetical. Lacks foundation.	Q. All right.
⁵ THE WITNESS: And you don't know	 An right. Now, am I correct in understanding
 THE WITNESS: And you don't know I don't know the answer to that. Depends on the 	 An right. Now, am I correct in understanding that this is a that Mr. Yurukoglu
⁵ THE WITNESS: And you don't know ⁶ I don't know the answer to that. Depends on the	 An right. Now, am I correct in understanding that this is a that Mr. Yurukoglu - Dr. Yurukoglu's dissertation was, in effect, an
 THE WITNESS: And you don't know I don't know the answer to that. Depends on the industry, the demand of the cost functions. 	 An right. Now, am I correct in understanding that this is a that Mr. Yurukoglu Dr. Yurukoglu's dissertation was, in effect, an earlier version of what became this paper?
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5 THE WITNESS: And you don't know 6 I don't know the answer to that. Depends on the 7 industry, the demand of the cost functions. 8 9 CONTINUATION 10 BY MR. DIVER: 11 Q. And if you isolated the effects of 12 double marginalization, you wouldn't be able to say? 13 COUNSEL: Objection. 14 Vague. 15 MR. KARASIK: Saying incomplete 16 hypothetical. Lacks foundation. 17 18 (Discussion held off the record.) 19 20 CONTINUATION 21 BY MR. DIVER: 22 Q. Now, do you do you teach the 23 concept of double marginalization to your students?	 Now, am I correct in understanding that this is a that Mr. Yurukoglu - Dr. Yurukoglu's dissertation was, in effect, an earlier version of what became this paper? A. I don't know if it became his dissertation was on a similar topic. Q. It was on a similar topic. Okay. And you're an advisor to Dr. Yurukoglu? A. Yes. Q. Now, I notice that Professor Crawford is listed as a co-author on his dissertation. Did you work with him as well? A. No, I never worked directly with Greg. Q. Are you familiar with Dr. Crawford's work?
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		11 (10geb 00 00 00)
	Page 53	Page 55
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	dissertation; correct?	² A. I think the authors themselves
3	A. Yes.	³ understand that parts of it are unreliable, and
4	Q. And you agree that it was this	⁴ they're writing a subsequent paper right now.
5	analysis was reliable?	⁵ Q. And what parts are those?
6	A. It was certainly more reliable than	⁶ A. I think there's I should not
7	anything that had been done before this.	⁷ speak for the authors, but I believe one of their
8	Q. And it met the standards of the	⁸ issues that I saw in this seminar was viewer hours
9	economic community?	⁹ are not the only the only indicator of intensity
10	A. Yes, for two reasons.	¹⁰ of preference.
11	One reason was, it was a	¹¹ Q. And is the lack of consideration of
12	methodological innovation.	¹² of other indicators mean that this paper shouldn't
13	Q. And what's the other reason?	¹³ have been published?
14	A. It was better than what had been	¹⁴ A. This paper again, let's take a
15	done in this literature prior to this. It was an	¹⁵ step back.
16	improvement.	¹⁶ It always depends on what the issue
17	Q. Now, did you review the AER paper	¹⁷ at hand is. In this paper the issue at hand was
18	before it was published?	¹⁸ whether we should de-bundle cable tiers. This was an
19	A. No.	¹⁹ issue in front of the FCC, I believe at the time, and
20	Q. Did you make any suggestions?	²⁰ being debated in Congress, and the presumption was
21	A. I saw it in seminars probably. I	²¹ that if we de-bundled, every person would just buy
22	don't recall. It's it's considered unethical for	²² what he wanted or she wanted, and that would be less
23	an advisor to referee a paper by one of his students.	²³ costly to consumers.
24	Q. But you've reviewed this	²⁴ What this paper found is that if
25	A. I've read it since.	²⁵ everybody de-bundled, and you considered that effect
1 2 3 4 5	Page 54 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q since? A. Yeah. Q. You read it prior to this	Page 56 I HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 on the content providers, they would re 3 re-do their contracts, increase their fees, and the 4 prices to consumers would actually go up. 5 And so, their conclusion was very.
6	litigation? A. Yeah. I was looking at it a few	 And so, their conclusion was very different from what was in literature prior to it,
7	÷	 and that was because of the mode of analysis.
8	weeks ago.	⁸ Q. And you agree if – say the FCC had
9	Q. Was that the first time you looked at it?	⁹ asked Drs. Crawford or Yurukoglu to analyze this
10	A. You know, I really don't recall.	¹⁰ question that you just described, that they would be
11	Q. Do you agree that it's a reliable	¹¹ entitled to do rely on the results?
12	paper?	¹² MR. KARASIK: Objection. Lacks
13	MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered.	¹³ foundation. Vague and ambiguous. Incomplete
14	MR. DIVER: I believe I asked him	¹⁴ hypothetical.
15	about the dissertation.	¹⁵ THE WITNESS: Depends what issue
16	THE WITNESS: Again, it's more	¹⁶ they were studying, but if they were studying
17	reliable than what had been done in this literature	¹⁷ de-bundling
18	prior to this, considerably, for the industry it's	¹⁸ MR. DIVER: Yes.
19	studying.	¹⁹ THE WITNESS: I'm sure this would
20		²⁰ have an effect on it.
21	CONTINUATION	21
22	BY MR. DIVER:	22 CONTINUATION
23	Q. Huh-huh.	²³ BY MR. DIVER:
24	Is there any part of it that you	²⁴ Q. Now, is the analysis in here an
0.5		²⁵ instance of the BLP method?
25	think is is unreliable?	²⁵ instance of the BLP method?

15 (Pages 57 to 60)

Page 57	Page 59
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² A. So, this analysis BLP method is	² which negotiation of a price occurs need to be
³ directed at products that are sold to consumers. So,	³ subject to a formal bargaining model?
 ⁴ the second stage of this model there is an upstream 	⁴ MR. KARASIK: Overly broad. Vague
	⁵ and ambiguous. Lacks foundation. Incomplete
 ⁵ part where the content providers are contracting with ⁶ the networks, and then the networks are selling to 	⁶ hypothetical.
	7 THE WITNESS: I don't want to say
consumers. That stage uses a DLF model.	THE WITNESS. I dont want to say
Q. Hun-nun.	⁸ every anything. Okay, and I won't.
And was it a good choice for them to	
use mat:	CONTINOATION
A. I don't unitk it would have been	DI WIK. DIVER.
¹² possible to do with any other model. Maybe not, I	¹² Q. So, is your answer no?
¹³ don't know, but	¹³ MR. KARASIK: Same objections.
Q. And you agree that viewership data	¹⁴ Asked and answered.
¹⁵ is a good basis for determining consumer demand with	¹⁵ THE WITNESS: And what I'll say is,
¹⁶ other indicators?	¹⁶ you study the institutions of the market, and what's
¹⁷ MR. KARASIK: Objection. Incomplete	¹⁷ required by the institutions is what you do, or what
¹⁸ hypothetical. Vague and ambiguous.	¹⁸ you try to approximate at least.
¹⁹ THE WITNESS: Depends on the	19
²⁰ context.	²⁰ CONTINUATION
21	²¹ BY MR. DIVER:
22 CONTINUATION	²² Q. Now, did C&Y analyze any of the
²³ BY MR. DIVER:	²³ vertical relationships in this market, other than the
Q. But in this paper, that's my	²⁴ relationship between the programmers and the MVPD's?
²⁵ question?	²⁵ A. Content providers and MVPD's.
Page 58	Page 60
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² A. It was better than what was done	² I don't know what you mean by vert
³ before. I think now they're using more data.	³ I mean, the vertical relationship is both sides,
⁴ Q. Now, they they introduced a	⁴ right. So, the other side is also involved. It's
⁵ formal bargaining model into into the model.	⁵ sort of an upstream part and a downstream part we
⁶ Is that correct?	⁶ usually call in economics.
⁷ A. Correct.	7 Q. Okay.
⁸ Q. Now, is it is it their conclusion	⁸ Is there any is there any other
⁹ that every vertical relationship must be subject to a	⁹ relationship in this market that is subject to a
¹⁰ formal bar bargaining model?	¹⁰ formal bargaining model than the relationship between
¹¹ MR. KARASIK: Did you say, is it	¹¹ the content providers and the MVPD's?
¹² their conclusion?	¹² MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
¹³ MR. DIVER: Yeah.	¹³ THE WITNESS: Yeah, I would have to
¹⁴ MR. KARASIK: The document speaks	¹⁴ look at how the content providers are doing things,
¹⁵ for itself. Calls for conclusion. No foundation.	 ¹⁵ each one individually.
¹⁶ MR. DIVER: You can answer.	
¹⁷ THE WITNESS: I don't remember what	¹⁷ CONTINUATION
¹⁸ they I'm sure they didn't conclude that every	¹⁸ BY MR. DIVER:
¹⁹ vertical model nobody would be that silly to	DT WIKE DIVER.
²⁰ include everything about everything.	Q. Dia Dis. Crawiora and Furukogia
²¹ We do things based on institutions.	bargam any any bargaming involving the content
²²	providers, other than then contracts with the
²³ CONTINUATION	²² MVPD's?
	²³ A. Not to my recollection. You know, I
²⁴ BY MR DIVER.	
 ²⁴ BY MR. DIVER: ²⁵ Q. Does every vertical relationship in 	 can't remember exactly what they did, but not to my recollection.

16 (Pages 61 to 64)

		16 (Pages 61 to 64)
	Page 61	Page 63
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Now, how did they model the prices	² So, the Nash price depends on cost.
3	that MVPD's charged to consumers, that stage?	³ So, we allowed these extra costs to MITI, and we
4	A. National prices.	⁴ allowed them in a general way so we could estimate
5	Q. And that's the Bertrand model?	⁵ the costs because we didn't know what they were.
6	A. So, we've been over this also, I	6
7	think. So, Bertrand came before Nash. Okay. So,	7 CONTINUATION
8	Bertrand was 19th century and Nash is 20th century.	⁸ BY MR. DIVER:
9	So, I don't know what you call it.	⁹ Q. Now, you'll agree that consumers
10	I think what Dr. Noll means when he	¹⁰ bargain with dealers over the price of their
11	said, Bertrand, and I think he said, Bertrand, Nash	¹¹ automobiles; correct?
12	Bertrand or something at a different point, I think	¹² MR. KARASIK: Overly broad. Vague
13	he means national prices.	¹³ and ambiguous.
14	Q. All right. Oh, okay.	¹⁴ THE WITNESS: They argue over the
15	And if I used the term Bertrand, I	¹⁵ difference between the inventory price that the
16	think I mean the same thing as Nash Bertrand,	¹⁶ management sets, okay, and the price they pay.
17	national prices. If you're okay with that, then we	¹⁷ The inventory price is set by
18	can go with that.	¹⁸ General Motors or Honda, whoever is sending it.
19	A. I'm okay with that.	19
20	Q. So, that just so so, the MVPD's	²⁰ CONTINUATION
21	pricing to consumers was modeled by Nash Bertrand	²¹ BY MR. DIVER:
22	A. Yeah, I'm pretty sure.	²² Q. And but you didn't need to you
23	Q model in this case, was that a	²³ didn't need to model the bargaining that goes on
24	mistake?	²⁴ between those two?
25	A. No well, a mistake? I don't want	²⁵ A. As I said before, we studied this,
	Page 62	Page 64
1	Page 62	Page 64
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers?
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided.
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2 4 5 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export
2 4 5 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about exactly how this is marketed. Also, I'm sure that everybody else	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export
2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about exactly how this is marketed. Also, I'm sure that everybody else that studied this industry prior to the MO is	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export restraints, the parts suppliers may wish to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about exactly how this is marketed. Also, I'm sure that everybody else that studied this industry prior to the MO is considering the de-bundling, okay, used something	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export restraints, the parts suppliers may wish to renegotiate those contracts?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about exactly how this is marketed. Also, I'm sure that everybody else that studied this industry prior to the MO is considering the de-bundling, okay, used something like the national prices. I don't know the whole	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export renegotiate those contracts? A. No. We took the cost functions
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to say it is probably the best approximation you could do at this Q. There's no need to to to to model bargaining with consumers? A. Well, it's two things. I don't know enough about my guess is, no, by the way. I don't know enough about exactly how this is marketed. Also, I'm sure that everybody else that studied this industry prior to the MO is considering the de-bundling, okay, used something like the national prices. I don't know the whole literature, but I'd be amazed if it wasn't the case. Q. Now, going back to your automobile	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL and it was too small a fraction of a variance in price to have any impact on our results. Q. Did you model any bargaining between components, suppliers and manufacturers? A. We modeled the cost of manufacturers, and the cost of manufacturers includes the prices that the component suppliers provided. Q. Did you assess the question of whether, given the removal of the voluntary export renegotiate those contracts? A. No. We took the cost functions fixed, but, again, this is going to be one of those things, just like the other things, that I'm sure we
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17 (Pages 65 to 68)

Page 65	Page 67
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² Hockey League has a contract with NBC Sports?	² Q. – that is in the C&Y paper, and
³ A. Do I know or do I expect?	³ that's one of two relationships?
⁴ I expect it to be true, but I don't	⁴ A. Yeah, but that's the one that is
⁵ know. I have not seen a contract.	⁵ analogous, yeah.
⁶ Q. Now, did Drs. Crawford and Yurukoglu	⁶ Q. Okay.
⁷ model the bargaining between the leagues in those	⁷ I mean, the paper doesn't tell me
⁸ networks under a la Carte?	⁸ anything about a bargain between TSR, does it
⁹ A. Drs. Crawford and Yurukoglu had all	⁹ A. Not that I recall.
¹⁰ of the content providers to television in their	¹⁰ Q. – or between clubs and leagues?
¹¹ model. Okay. What they did is, they modeled the	¹¹ A. Not that I recall.
¹² relationship between those content providers and the	¹² Though, again, you should keep in
¹³ MVPD's by this Nash bargaining. That's	¹³ mind their goal, and their goal was to show what
¹⁴ Q. Do you have any reason to doubt	¹⁴ would happen if we de-bundled, and their goal was to
¹⁵ that, if ESPN became a standalone a la Carte channel,	¹⁵ find out whether what was generally thought to be
¹⁶ that Major League Baseball may wish to renegotiate	¹⁶ true, would, in fact, be true.
¹⁷ its contract with ESPN?	¹⁷ Q. And they didn't they didn't model
¹⁸ MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	¹⁸ anything that came to RSN's bargaining with leagues?
¹⁹ Incomplete hypothetical.	¹⁹ A. My presumption is for the major
²⁰ THE WITNESS: I know less about the	²⁰ conclusion of their paper, that was not.
²¹ ESPN contract than I do about the RSN's contracts.	²¹ Q. Do you think that they they
²² So, if you want to rephrase that, it	²² tested the effects of of those other bargaining
²³ may be easier to answer it.	²³ A. I can't tell you that.
24	²⁴ Q situations?
²⁵ CONTINUATION	²⁵ A. I wasn't a referee on this paper.
Page 66	Page 68
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² BY MR. DIVER:	² I can't tell you that.
³ Q. Did you ever suggest to	³ Q. Do you have any reason to believe
⁴ Dr. Yurukoglu that he model the bargaining between	4 that the lack of such bargaining renders this paper
⁵ either of the leagues and any content providers?	⁵ unreliable?
⁶ A. In which paper? In in Dr. Noll's	⁶ A. Again, the issue is unreliable with
⁷ paper or Dr. Noll's report?	⁷ respect to what? And the and the issue raised by
⁸ Q. Did – did you ever recommend to	⁸ the paper was that de-bundling would enhance consumer
⁹ Dr. Yurukoglu that he add such an analysis to his	⁹ welfare.
¹⁰ model?	¹⁰ In this paper it made it clear that
¹¹ A. Dr. Yurukoglu knows much more about	¹¹ that may not happen, and they claim it's unlikely to
¹² the sports industry and about the content providers	¹² happen, and I think that's a fairly reliable result.
¹³ in this industry than I do.	¹³ Certainly a result that the regulatory agencies
¹⁴ I would have relied on him for that.	¹⁴ should keep in mind when they're determining this
¹⁵ Q. Now, so you want to talk about	¹⁵ regulation.
¹⁶ RSN's.	¹⁶ Q. Now, you agree you understand
¹⁷ RSN's are content providers;	¹⁷ that, in this case, there are both television
¹⁸ correct?	¹⁸ products and Internet products?
¹⁹ A. Correct.	¹⁹ A. In Dr. Noll's case?
²⁰ Q. And they sell their programs to	²⁰ Q. Yeah.
²¹ MVPD's?	²¹ A. Yes.
²² A. Correct.	²² Q. And you agree that there are no
²³ Q. So, that that's the relationship	²³ MVPD's involved in the Internet?
²⁴ that is analogous to bargaining that that	²⁴ A. As far as I understand, it's direct.

18	(Pages	69	to	72)

	18 (Pages 69 to 72)
Page 69	Page 71
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² directly addressed in this paper doesn't have any	² I mean, it's a result of a
³ analog on the Internet side?	³ bargaining process, and then re
⁴ MR. KARASIK: I didn't understand	⁴ Q. We may – we may have a problem, but
⁵ your question.	⁵ I'm just not smart enough. I thought I understood
⁶ THE WITNESS: Yeah, neither did I.	 ⁶ something about double marginalization, but I guess I
 ⁷ MR. DIVER: All right. 	⁷ don't.
⁸	⁸ MR. DIVER: Exhibit-4, I believe.
⁹ CONTINUATION	9
¹⁰ BY MR. DIVER:	¹⁰ (At which time Price Discrimination
D1 WIK, $D1$ V LK.	¹¹ and Vertical Relationships in Multichannel
¹¹ Q. If I were to analyze the Inter ¹² Internet distribution toward the program. I would not	¹² Television was received and marked as
internet distribution toward the program, I would not	Television was received and marked as
mu a relationship in that distribution that wash t	Deposition Exhibit 4 for identification by
analogous to the one that's modeled as barganing in	¹⁴ the court reporter.)
uns case.	
A. Uniess you also wanted to do	CONTINUATION
oops. Excuse me.	DT WIK, DT V DK.
with KARASIK. Vague and amorguous.	Q. Now, I have do you recognize the
meomplete hypothetical.	
WIK. DIVER. Tou call allswel.	A. I can, I saw it. I have uns in my
THE WITNESS. Okay.	ine somewhere.
Tou know, the other relationship	Q. Okay.
would be between the KSIN's and the teams. Okay. 30,	So, this is a conection of four
uncre might went be, and more, undoubleary, would be	pages of the dissertation of All 1 ur ukogiu.
²⁵ a contracting arrangement or bargaining rela	²⁵ I have the whole thing, but I didn't
Page 70	Page 72
Page 70	Page 72
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL negotiations. 	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL think it was useful.
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19 (Pages 73 to 76)

-		13 (10geb / 5 66 / 6)
	Page 73	Page 75
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. I'm not sure I reviewed the	² Oh, up here.
3	introduction.	³ MR. KARASIK: What page, counsel?
4	Q. Do you understand what he's saying?	⁴ MR. DIVER: 658.
5	A. Yes. I think I do.	⁵ THE WITNESS: I'm going to start
6		⁶ early on just to see where we are.
7	Q. What is he saying?	
8	A. I think he's saying the result of	(rause)
9	the bargaining process provided a price marginal cost	THE WITNESS. OKdy.
	markup to the content providers, which is necessary	THI HOL SULE I KHOW ALL OF THE
10	to cover their fixed costs they were covering in a	¹⁰ relevant literature on the topic.
11	different way before. And so, that was one cost.	Let me just say that before I go on.
12	And then the MVPD's added another	¹² MR. KARASIK: What is the question
13	markup. They had to add that markup just to cover	¹³ pending?
14	their fixed costs so they wouldn't be a liable	¹⁴ Wait a minute.
15	enterprise.	¹⁵ THE WITNESS: There's no question
16	Q. But they're already covering their	¹⁶ pending, but there's about to be.
17	markup markup we'll get back to that.	¹⁷ MR. KARASIK: Okay.
18	Why does he call it a problem	¹⁸ Wait for a question.
19	MR. KARASIK: You're asking	¹⁹ THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
20	MR. DIVER: double	²⁰ Sorry.
21	marginalization?	21
22	MR. KARASIK: what this witness	²² CONTINUATION
23	why this?	²³ BY MR. DIVER:
24	MR. DIVER: Yes.	Q. Well, do you understand what he
25	THE WITNESS: I have no idea.	²⁵ means when he said that "linear input costs above the
n	Page 74	Page 76
1	-	
1 2	Page 74 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation.	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation.	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² production marginal cost, in this case zero, are
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation. THE WITNESS: I have no idea. He	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL production marginal cost, in this case zero, are often considered unrealistic''?
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL production marginal cost, in this case zero, are often considered unrealistic"? MR. KARASIK: He is asking your
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation. THE WITNESS: I have no idea. He	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL production marginal cost, in this case zero, are often considered unrealistic''? MR. KARASIK: He is asking your understanding of that.
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20 (Pages 77 to 80)

		20 (Pages // LO 80)
	Page 77	Page 79
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	saying that there's also literature that says that	² COUNSEL: Objection to form.
3	that's not what will be done. The rational for	³ THE WITNESS: Is it where? What?
4	them okay.	4
5	Go ahead.	5 CONTINUATION
6		⁶ BY MR. DIVER:
7	CONTINUATION	7 Q. Why would somebody choose a two-part
8	BY MR. DIVER:	⁸ tariff instead of straight linear pricing?
9	Q. Do you disagree with their	⁹ MR. KARASIK: Incomplete
10	assertions that some people would consider it	¹⁰ hypothetical. Vague and ambiguous.
11	unrealistic?	¹¹ THE WITNESS: There are times when
12		
13	A. No, I don't know what some people	¹² it would lead to higher profits.
14	think.	
15	Q. Do you think it would be	CONTINUATION
	unrealistic?	DI WIK, DIVER,
16 17	A. No, and the reason I don't think it	Q. And what would those circumstances
	is unrealistic is because they say in the paragraph	De:
18	preceding that that's actually what's done.	WIK. KAKASIK. Same objections.
19	Q. So, will you agree that if if	¹⁹ THE WITNESS: You have to give me
20	if the double marginalization increases they would be	²⁰ models, and then I can tell you, or maybe I can tell
21	less likely to do it that way?	²¹ you without looking it up.
22	COUNSEL: Objection.	22
23	THE WITNESS: I honestly don't know	²³ (Discussion held off the record.)
24	what you mean.	24
25	MR. KARASIK: Hold on.	²⁵ CONTINUATION
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Vague and ambiguous. Incomplete hypothetical. CONTINUATION BY MR. DIVER: Q. Do you understand why people think that fixed transfers can make both better off after changing the input cost to marginal cost? MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation. Vague and ambiguous. Incomplete hypothetical. THE WITNESS: In certain structures it would be true. I think, although, that, you know, I would have to write down things, and figure it out. CONTINUATION BY MR. DIVER: Q. Do you do you know what a two-part tariff is? A. Yes.	 BY MR. DIVER: Q. When you when you when you teach double marginalization, do you teach two-part tariffs as a potential response? A. No. Do I when I do it? No, I don't. Q. Is are two-part tariffs a strategy for dealing with double marginalization? MR. KARASIK: Vague vague and ambiguous. THE WITNESS: Well, when you say, "dealing with double marginalization," I don't know what you mean. CONTINUATION BY MR. DIVER: Q. With with improving the profitability of a relationship. MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
22	Q. What is a two-part tariff?A. It's usually considered a fixed fee,	 Incomplete hypothetical. THE WITNESS: It can be true. It
23	and then a marginal cost.	²³ depends on the model.
24	Q. And why would somebody use a	24
25	two-part tariff?	²⁵ CONTINUATION

21 (Pages 81 to 84)

			21 (14ges 01 00 04)
	Page 81		Page 83
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	BY MR. DIVER:	2	if the bargain didn't change, then it would be
3	Q. Do you have any reason to doubt that	3	unnecessary to conduct this this exercise.
4	reasonable economists might view it as an unrealistic	4	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
5	model to prices as linear?	5	THE WITNESS: I believe in the one
6	A. In this industry?	6	contract I looked at, okay, in every contract
7	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	7	well, at least in the one I looked at, I shouldn't
8	Incomplete hypothetical.	8	say in every contract there is a clause that says,
9	MR. DIVER: Yes.	9	"if there is a material change in the environment, we
10	THE WITNESS: The paragraph before,	10	get to renegotiate."
11	I don't know any economist I would be surprised if	11	
12	anybody I trusted did not trust the paragraph before	12	CONTINUATION
13	that says, this is how it is done in the industry.	13	BY MR. DIVER:
14	So, if we want to approximate the	14	Q. Let's focus on the second sentence
15	industry, this is what we do. But, you know,	15	here.
16	somebody could doubt that. I don't know.	16	A. Sure.
17		17	So, you want me to read it?
18	CONTINUATION	18	Q. Back to 23. Paragraph 23, the
19	BY MR. DIVER:	19	footnote.
20	Q. But if there was a change to the	20	A. Yeah.
21	industry that would enhance profits, you would expect	21	Q. It says, "when there is downstream
22	that to change?	22	competition, however, committing to linear contracts
23	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	23	is one way of avoiding the dissipation of profits due
24	Incomplete hypothetical.	24	to such competition."
25	THE WITNESS: I would have expected	25	A. I do read it.
		<u> </u>	
	Page 82		Page 84
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	it to change already prior to this.	2	Q. Do you believe that that that
3		3	justifies using modeling linear contracts in this
4	CONTINUATION	4	case?
5	BY MR. DIVER:	5	MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered.
6	Q. You agree that the bargain	6	Vague and ambiguous.
/	A. Perhaps. It depends.	7	THE WITNESS: Again, I'll answer
8	Q that the bargaining model in the	8	exactly what I said before.
9	paper has an effect because the bargaining situation	9 10	What would convince me is the fact
10	is different in the a la Carte world than it is in		that that's what they do. So, you know, when you are
11 12	the bundled cable world?	11 12	writing an article, okay, it's you cite all the
12	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	12	relevant literature and explain it, and that's what
13	Incomplete hypothetical.	13	he's doing here.
14	THE WITNESS: Again, I'm trying to	14	
16	figure out what you're trying to get at.	16	CONTINUATION
17		17	BY MR. DIVER:
18	CONTINUATION DV MD, DW/ED,	18	Q. Now, if if an economist came to
19	BY MR. DIVER:	19	you and said that he or she thought that this model
20	Q. Well, the programing providers	20	was unrealistic because of the linear pricing
20	bargain now with MVPD's; correct?	21	assumption, would you judge that economist to be
22	A. Content providers.	22	unreasonable, or do you think that's a reasonable
22	Q. Content providers?	23	position an economist could take?
23	A. Yes.	24	MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered.
24	Q. Yes.	25	THE WITNESS: You know, it would
	And they would bargain if if		depend what he why he felt it was unreasonable or

-		24 (Pages 93 to 96)
	Page 93	Page 95
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	consequences from our baseline, full a la Carte"	² A. V.
3	model. So, the ALC did the a la Carte model	³ Q which I will represent is the
4	"counterfactual with input-cost	⁴ former name of the NBC Sports Net.
5	renegotiation." Okay. So, they allow for input cost	⁵ A. It's positive 17 percent, 18
6	renegotiation.	⁶ percent.
7	"As in Table 8, downstream prices	7 Q. That's that's a modest raise as
8	are set at the renegotiated input costs. See	⁸ compared to all the other numbers on this table;
9	footnote 39. The first three columns report weighted	⁹ correct?
10	average across distributors of our estimated per	¹⁰ A. These model do not depend on, you
11	subscriber input costs under bundling and ALC	¹¹ know, what the content provider thinks, not what I
12		know, what the content provider times, not what I
13	equilibria."	uiiiik.
14	So, without going into the heart of	Q. Now, you re aware that the overall
15	the paper, that's what I know.	cost of the sports-offented programming on this table
	MR. DIVER: Okay.	show a decrease.
16	I think we have a common	is that correct:
17	understanding, and I don't think we need to know in	¹⁷ A. The three of the four you pointed
18	more detail than that, but if we need to, then we	¹⁸ out, or four of the five, I can't remember.
19	will hopefully we'll reach it.	¹⁹ Q. Were you aware of that before now?
20		²⁰ A. Yes.
21	CONTINUATION	²¹ Q. Okay.
22	BY MR. DIVER:	²² Before today?
23	Q. It's the third column, you see, is	²³ A. Before you asked me, yes.
24	the percentage change between the first two columns.	Q. Before I asked you, yes.
25	A. Correct.	²⁵ Could a reasonable economist assume
	Page 94	Page 96
1	Page 94 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	Page 96
1 2	-	
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially;	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise?
2 3 4 5	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No.
2 3 4 5 6	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No. Q. And why not?
2 3 4 5 6 7	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No. Q. And why not? A. There are two reasons really. You know, there's the overall reason which is, this is modeling something entirely
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No. Q. And why not? A. There are two reasons really. You know, there's the overall reason
2 4 5 7 8 9	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No. Q. And why not? A. There are two reasons really. You know, there's the overall reason which is, this is modeling something entirely
2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL from looking at this table that the cost of the programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation would not rise? A. No. Q. And why not? A. There are two reasons really. You know, there's the overall reason which is, this is modeling something entirely different from what they're modeling. What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, this is modeling content providers who are very, you know you know, one of them is the Family Channel.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN? A. It's negative 64 percent.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN?	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN. 15 You know, that's a very different kind of competition
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN? A. It's negative 64 percent.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN. 15 You know, that's a very different kind of competition 16 than you're talking about in this context. That's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN? A. It's negative 64 percent. Q. And what is the percentage change of FOX Sports Net? A. It's negative 49 percent.	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN. 15 You know, that's a very different kind of competition 16 than you're talking about in this context. That's 17 the first thing, and that's the major thing about it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN? A. It's negative 64 percent. Q. And what is the percentage change of FOX Sports Net?	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN. 15 You know, that's a very different kind of competition 16 than you're talking about in this context. That's 17 the first thing, and that's the major thing about it. 18 The other thing is, they say
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And those are correct substantially; correct? A. Looks like it, and their average goes up for sure. Q. But some of them go down. A. Sure. Q. Okay. Now, do you see ESPN? A. It's alphabetical, so it's easy to see. Okay. Q. What is the percentage change of ESPN? A. It's negative 64 percent. Q. And what is the percentage change of FOX Sports Net? A. It's negative 49 percent. Q. What is the percentage change in Golf Channel?	1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 from looking at this table that the cost of the 3 programming in an a la Carte bargaining situation 4 would not rise? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And why not? 7 A. There are two reasons really. 8 You know, there's the overall reason 9 which is, this is modeling something entirely 10 different from what they're modeling. 11 What Dr. Noll is modeling, you know, 12 this is modeling content providers who are very, you 13 know you know, one of them is the Family Channel. 14 One of them is Animal Planet. One of them is CNN. 15 You know, that's a very different kind of competition 16 than you're talking about in this context. That's 17 the first thing, and that's the major thing about it. 18 The other thing is, they say 19 somewhere here that they believe the numbers on the
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25 (Pages 97 to 100)

	25 (Pages 97 to 100)
	Page 97 Page 99
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
² The one I saw, presentation I hav	e 2 A. The conclusion of the model is, we
³ seen on their next paper corrects this.	³ should be aware that de-bundling cannot be analyzed
⁴ Q. Did they model that in this pa	
⁵ A. I don't I believe not, but they	⁵ of this market or you'll get a very wrong answer. It
⁶ did not have the data even.	⁶ wasn't specific to a particular content provider.
 ⁷ Q. And the fact that that's not m 	
⁸ in this paper didn't prevent this paper fr	-
⁹ published in the AER.	⁹ response to the recollection
¹⁰ MR. PARIS: Objection.	
WIK. FAKIS. Objection.	THE WITNESS. OKay.
vague and amoiguous.	Thank on.
THE WITNESS. I dont know w	INK. KARASIK you have of the
mean by prevent. The you know, these	aution's segmented a problem in sports?
say as a caveat that that's a problem. This	THE WITNESS. Chamles onering
was partly flad two foles.	sports programming, for example, may be watched less
¹⁶ One role was; wake up society.	but valued more.
¹⁷ De-bundling might not help everybody. Ok	
¹⁸ was, you know, an issue at the time. That i	
¹⁹ going go through Congress. It was going t	
²⁰ FCC, et cetera. Okay. That was one role of	
²¹ paper.	²¹ footnote 41.
²² The second role of the paper was	
²³ just to provide methodology and show that	
²⁴ actually do this in an intelligent way.	²⁴ in this table should be interpreted under the
²⁵ So, it's a first step, and it's	²⁵ maintained assumption that the more households
	Page 98 Page 100
	Page 98 Page 100
¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL better than what has been done before. T 	hat's the ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² watches a channel, the more they value that channel.
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL better than what has been done before. T reason it got published in AER. 	hat's the ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² watches a channel, the more they value that channel. ³ In online Appendix B, we conduct a Monte Carlo
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL better than what has been done before. T reason it got published in AER. 	hat's the ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² watches a channel, the more they value that channel. ³ In online Appendix B, we conduct a Monte Carlo ⁴ analysis to explore the consequences of allowing
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26 (Pages 101 to 104)

		26 (Pages 101 to 104)
	Page 101	Page 103
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Is this reliably established?	² you mean by Fox RSN's.
3	A. They say	³ Do you mean they bundled together or
4	MR. TOSCANO: Objection.	4
5	THE WITNESS: They say "may."	5
6		⁶ CONTINUATION
7	CONTINUATION	⁷ BY MR. DIVER:
8	BY MR. DIVER:	⁸ Q. What he meant when referring to the
9	Q. They say "may," so they don't have	⁹ Fox Network RSN's?
10	an answer to this question.	¹⁰ MR. KARASIK: Do you know one way or
11	A. They are clearly worried about it.	¹¹ another?
12	Q. Are they worried about it because	¹² THE WITNESS: No, I don't know.
13	there was lies in their modeling?	13
14	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	¹⁴ CONTINUATION
15	Lacks foundation. Incomplete hypothetical.	¹⁵ BY MR. DIVER:
16	THE WITNESS: They are worried about	¹⁶ Q. If if that were true, could a
17	it because they are good economists, and in this	¹⁷ reasonable economist in looking at this table come to
18	paper, they wrote a paper that was careful.	¹⁸ the conclusion that because they recorded a drop of
19		¹⁹ 49.3 percent in the cost, Fox would be able to charge
20	CONTINUATION	²⁰ MVPD's for the Fox Sports Net that that bargaining
21	BY MR. DIVER:	²¹ would not be likely to increase the price?
22	Q. Now, you have suggested, I believe,	A. They told you
23	and please characterize this if it's incorrect, that	²³ MR. KARASIK: Just lacks foundation.
24	the conglomerated nature of 21st Century Fox means	²⁴ Calls for conclusion. Incomplete hypothetical, and
25	that its bargaining power will be enhanced.	²⁵ partially asked and answer.
	Page 102	Page 104
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Is it bargaining with multiple RSN's	² THE WITNESS: They told you to read
3	at the same time?	³ about this already, you know. So, you know, a
4	A. Typically, yes, I think that's the	⁴ reasonable economist would tell you, you should worry
5	answer.	⁵ about this. If you're interested in that issue, you
6	Q. Now, you understand that	⁶ worry about it.
7	Drs. Crawford and Yurukoglu modeled the bargaining by	7
8	content provider, and not by channel?	⁸ CONTINUATION
9	A. Is that true?	⁹ BY MR. DIVER:
10	I can't remember.	¹⁰ Q. Are the results generally undermined
11	Does somebody know the answer?	¹¹ by the fact that they they didn't they counted
12	You want to point me to the page	¹² each minute of viewing time equally?
13	where they say that?	¹³ MR. PARIS: Objection to form.
14	Q. Okay. This we'll have to find.	¹⁴ MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
15	So, you did you did not know	¹⁵ Overly broad. ¹⁶ THE WITNESS: The result of interact
16	that; correct, that's correct?	THE WITNESS. The result of interest
17	A. At one point I probably knew that	was that, if the substantive of empirical result of
18	Q. Okay.	interest was, if we de-buildred you should not unik
19	A but this was written the	that the content provider's prices will stay the
20	thesis was written how many? Seven, eight years ago.	same. Okay. And mai, as a result, mere will be an
21	Q. Now, you understand that that Fox	impact on consumers just you know, consumers could
22	Sports Net is the Fox RSN's?	 choose each one separately. The result was, we should be worried
		The result was we should be worried
23	MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation.	
24	MR. KARASIK: Lacks foundation. Calls for a conclusion.	²⁴ about de-bundling. It's not obvious that it helps
		²⁴ about de-bundling. It's not obvious that it helps

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

		27 (Pages 105 to 108)
	Page 105	Page 107
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2		² report.
3	CONTINUATION	³ A. Okay.
4	BY MR. DIVER:	⁴ Q. I'm looking at three lines above the
5	Q. Now, are you surprised that	⁵ number 58.
6	Drs. Crawford and Yurukoglu chose to report the	⁶ A. Okay.
7	values of the sports channels in this table?	7 Q. You say, "in this model each team in
8	A. Why?	⁸ its RNS agree to choose prices to maximize their
9	I mean	⁹ joint profits".
10	Q. In light of what they say in	¹⁰ Why is that a reasonable assumption?
11	paragraph 41.	¹¹ A. Can we go, and tell you what comes
12	A. No. They appropriately report the	¹² before that
13	results and caveat them.	¹³ O. Huh-huh.
14	Q. And does paragraph 41 say anything	¹⁴ A because I'm going to read the
15	about the effect on prices?	¹⁵ whole thing, the paragraph.
16	A. You mean footnote 41?	¹⁶ "The current contracts between the
17	Q. Footnote 41.	¹⁷ RNS's and the teams are negotia negotiated
18	MR. KARASIK: Footnote will speak	¹⁸ pursuant to the League requirement that the RSN's
19	for itself.	¹⁹ must provide their telecasts to the BFW League
20	THE WITNESS: Yeah.	 Package free of charge. Since the ownership of the
21	MR. DIVER: Okay.	 league is just the ownership of the teams, this is
22	IVIR. DIVER. Okay.	 not surprising. However, it does imply that the
23	CONTINUATION	 League can and will constrain the negotiations
24	BY MR. DIVER:	 between the teams and the RSN's in ways that increase
25	Q. Have you modeled the bargaining	 the value of the joint venture."
	Q. Have you mouched the barganning	the value of the joint venture.
	Page 106	Page 108
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	between the RSN's and the MVPD's in this case?	² The joint venture being the leagues
3	A. You mean in my deposition?	³ and the teams, "and that the agreed upon rights fees,
4	In my report? I'm sorry.	⁴ which are subject to League requirements, will thus
5	Q. Yeah.	⁵ be related to the subsequent profit and hence price
6	A. I was not asked to do that.	⁶ of the BFW League Package".
7	I was asked the question, and it's	 And what I'm referring to here is
8	stated in my report very clearly, "are Dr. Noll's	⁸ that the League package, its price that Dr. Noll set,
9	results reliable?"	⁹ is does not take into account the fact that the
10	And as I said before, the way we do	¹⁰ League is the team. So, if the League increases
11	this is, we take what we think to be unrealistic	¹¹ increase its price or decreases its price, probably
12	assumptions. Okay. Modify them to become more	¹² the best way to say, it takes away from the teams
13	realistic to the extent possible, and find out	 ¹³ it might take away consumers from the teams. Okay.
14	whether that changes the results, and in this case	¹⁴ Which is detrimental to the League and similarly the
15	every change I tried changed the issue of interest	¹⁵ team's price. Okay.
16	result.	¹⁶ When it sets its price, it doesn't
17	So, I view them as unreliable.	¹⁷ take into account the demands of the League, and
18	Q. But you didn't – you didn't model	¹⁸ there are just two bundles of money that go to the
19	this bargaining?	¹⁹ team. So, cares equally about the two of them.
20	A. No.	²⁰ Okay.
21	Q. So, you don't know what the effect	²¹ So, that is not in Dr. Noll's
22	would be of this bargaining?	²² modeling, and when I say, to model this directly
23	A. I don't know, and Dr. Noll doesn't	²³ would require a more complex set of relationships
24	know.	²⁴ between the teams and the RNS's in the League.
25	Q. Let me turn to page 25 of your	²⁵ So, I'm going to consider a related
1		

29 (Pages 113 to 116)

		29 (Pages 113 to 116)
	Page 113	Page 115
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Dr. Pakes, you said you have seen at	2
3	least one of the contracts at issue in this case.	³ CONTINUATION
4	A. I skimmed one of the contracts,	⁴ BY MR. DIVER:
5	yeah.	5 Q. All right.
6	Q. Do you remember what contract it	⁶ Now, if if the prices in
7	was?	⁷ Dr. Noll's model are not, in fact, profit maximizing,
8	A. It's listed, I believe, in the list	 ⁸ would that effect your modeling?
9	of documents. I think it's Com if I remember	⁹ MR. KARASIK: Incomplete
10	correctly, the Com	¹⁰ hypothetical.
11	O. It's one one of the three Bates	¹¹ THE WITNESS: Again, I don't have a
12	numbered documents you listed.	¹² model. I'm taking Dr. Noll's model, and moving it
13	Okay.	¹³ one step towards reality at a time, and seeing if the
14	Is that an RSN's contract?	¹⁴ major results change.
15	A. Yeah. Yes.	¹⁵ So, when you refer to my model, I'm
16	Q. Yes.	¹⁶ not sure what you're talking about.
17	Have you seen – I take it that	17
18	means you haven't seen League contracts with MVPD's	¹⁸ CONTINUATION
19	for out-of-market packages?	¹⁹ BY MR. DIVER:
20	A. No, I haven't.	²⁰ Q. In Dr. Noll's model, if if you
21	Q. Do you know how those contracts are	 ²¹ knew that the current prices for the packages were
22	structured?	 not profit maximizing, would you think that that
23	A. No, I don't.	 needed to be accounted for in his model?
24	Q. You don't.	²⁴ MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
25	Now, when you modeled we	²⁵ Incomplete hypothetical.
		incomprete hypothetical.
	Page 114	Page 116
1	_	
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL discussed this, I think, earlier with the	 ¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ² THE WITNESS: I don't see how I
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL discussed this, I think, earlier with the automobiles.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL THE WITNESS: I don't see how I would know that.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL discussed this, I think, earlier with the automobiles. When you modeled your models in this	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL THE WITNESS: I don't see how I would know that. Let me put it a different way.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL discussed this, I think, earlier with the automobiles. When you modeled your models in this case, do you take it that the observed prices for the	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL THE WITNESS: I don't see how I would know that. Let me put it a different way. And, you know, the reason, if I knew
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33 (Pages 129 to 132)

		55 (Tages 125 to 152)
	Page 129	Page 131
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. Yes.	² good it considers its impact on the other goods that
3	Q. And is that not what Dr. Noll is	³ it's marketing, including the League bundle and the
4	doing here.	⁴ other teams.
5	A. No. In fact, they are different	⁵ That's nowhere in Dr. Noll's
6	industry structures.	⁶ pricing. Okay. And that's in virtually in every
7	So, in this market, okay, in the car	⁷ paper since BLP.
8	market, okay, what GM does or its various divisions	⁸ Not every paper. That's too
9	do is set an inventory price, perhaps, and I can't	⁹ strong
10	remember this exactly, there might be a travel cost	¹⁰ Q. Okay.
11	from you know, that they add on to depending on	¹¹ A but every paper that I've
12	how far, but those prices are set by GM. Okay.	¹² accepted at the journal since BLP, and that will tend
13	They also give you a suggested MSRP.	¹³ to raise prices.
14	Those prices are set by GM, and the variance around	¹⁴ It's also true, by the way, in C&Y.
15	those prices is very small among consumers for a	¹⁵ Q. Let me ask you a question about
16	given car with the same	¹⁶ that.
17	Q. But structurally the modeling is the	¹⁷ Now, in your model of DIRECTV's
18	same?	¹⁸ pricing, DIRECTV isn't facing any competition of any
19	A. No.	¹⁹ kind; correct?
20	Q. The difference is that your pricing,	²⁰ A. In Dr. Noll's model of DIRECTV
21	the difference is smaller in yours?	²¹ pricing isn't facing. So, I repeated Dr. Noll's
22	MR. KARASIK: Objection.	²² assumptions, and relaxed parts of it.
23	Asked and answered.	²³ Q. Okay.
24	THE WITNESS: It is asked and	And as a result you saw the price go
25	answered, but I don't mind answering it again.	²⁵ up because DIRECTV was pricing as a pure monopolist?
	Page 130	Page 132
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1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. DIVER: That's fine.	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered.
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. DIVER: That's fine. CONTINUATION	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered. Misstates prior testimony.
2 3 4	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. DIVER: That's fine. CONTINUATION BY MR. DIVER:	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. KARASIK: Asked and answered. Misstates prior testimony. CONTINUATION
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34 (Pages 133 to 136)

		51 (14965 155 66 150)
	Page 133	Page 135
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	MR. TOSCANO: Same objection.	² double marginalization sis situation, isn't that
3	Vague.	³ an increase in the double marginalization problem?
4	MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.	4 COUNSEL: Objection.
5	THE WITNESS: All right.	5 Vague.
6	I'm not sure what competition means	⁶ MR. KARASIK: Vague and ambiguous.
7	in this context.	⁷ Incomplete hypothetical. No foundation.
8	COUNSEL: What are the products?	⁸ THE WITNESS: So, I'm trying to
9		⁹ understand what you're saying, and I'm not.
10	CONTINUATION	
11	BY MR. DIVER:	¹¹ CONTINUATION
12		¹² BY MR. DIVER:
13	Q. Do you recall that Dr. Yurukoglu	DI WIK, DIVER.
14	justified the assumption of linear cost on the fact	Q. Okay.
15	that the MVPD's faced competition?	If the input prices rise to the
	A. Dr which Dr. Yurukoglu paper?	MIVID, that will cause okay then the MIVID will
16	Q. I'm referring to the footnote that	¹⁶ add its own margin.
17	we looked at earlier. If you want to	¹⁷ A. Yes.
18	A. I thought the footnote was a, by the	¹⁸ Q. The quantity will go down.
19	way, and the real reason was in the paragraph, which	¹⁹ A. It is likely that part of the if
20	is in the text. This gives you an additional reason,	²⁰ the costs increase and the MVPD's pricing relative to
21	which is in the footnote, but the major reason is,	²¹ those costs, it is likely that some of those costs
22	that's what they do.	²² will be passed through to the consumer.
23	Q. Right.	²³ Q. And is it possible that the result
24	But he's he's talking about a	²⁴ would be a decrease in profits for the firms?
25	hypothetical world; correct?	²⁵ MR. KARASIK: Incomplete
	Page 134	Page 136
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. So, you would have to tell me why	² hypothetical.
3	the hypothetical world by the "hypothetical world"	³ THE WITNESS: Which firms?
4	do you mean de-bundling?	⁴ MR. KARASIK: No foundation.
5	Q. Right.	⁵ THE WITNESS: Which firms?
6	A. You would have to tell me why the	6
7	hypothetical world would change that.	7 CONTINUATION
8	Q. Wouldn't marginal costs rise for the	⁸ BY MR. DIVER:
9	– for the MVPD's?	⁹ Q. Content providers and the MVPD's.
10	A. That's what the estimates say.	¹⁰ A. No, not the content providers.
11	Q. And wouldn't that –	¹¹ Maybe to the MVPD. Maybe not.
12	A. Not	¹² What why you just the costs
13	Q. – increase?	¹³ to the MVPD are the revenues of the content
14	A. Not all.	¹⁴ providers. The MVPD is in the middle of this.
15	Q. And wouldn't that increase the	¹⁵ Q. Would the overall profits of the two
16	likelihood that double marginalization would – would	¹⁶ firms together?
17	cause the the profits to decrease?	¹⁷ A. How why do you think that's true?
18	COUNSEL: Objection.	¹⁸ Q. Does marginalization ever cause the
19	Vague.	Q. Does marginalization ever cause the
20	-	over an profits of two firms to to fair
21	THE WITNESS: No. Maybe.	WIK. KAKASIK. IIIComplete
22	Why would it cause profits to	hypothetical. Lacks foundation. Vague and
23		amorguous.
24	CONTINUATION DV MD, DIVED.	THE WITNESS. But It but III not
24	BY MR. DIVER:	understanding
23	Q. If if if margins rise in a	²⁵ MR. DIVER: relative to single

35 (Pages 137 to 140)

		35 (Pages 137 to 140)
	Page 137	Page 139
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	marginalization?	² A. Yes.
3	THE WITNESS: So, relative to an	³ Q. You say, "to the extent that
4	integrated firm. Is that what you're saying?	⁴ consumers would substitute away from DIRECTV in
5	MR. DIVER: Well, yes. That's one	⁵ response to price increases on these products, this
6	possibility.	⁶ convention will likely overstate the price of the BFW
7	THE WITNESS: Okay.	⁷ League Package, all else equal''.
8	The answer is now, what is the	⁸ A. I did say that.
9	question again?	⁹ Q. Huh-huh.
10	I can now interpret the question	¹⁰ So, if you incorporate competition
11	given that I know what you're trying to ask me.	¹¹ that induced consumers that recognized that consumers
12		¹² may substitute DIRECTV, their prices would be lowered
13	CONTINUATION	¹³ in your report.
14	BY MR. DIVER:	¹⁴ A. So, again
15	Q. To the extent the content provider	¹⁵ MR. KARASIK: Objection. Ignoring
16	was able to increase the marginal costs, would that	¹⁶ part of the footnote that you're referring to.
17	not raise the possibility that the joint profits of	¹⁷ THE WITNESS: C&Y and FCC reports
18	the two firms would be less?	¹⁸ suggest that, in general, switching costs are
19	MR. KARASIK: Incomplete	¹⁹ non-trivial.
20	hypothetical. No foundation.	²⁰ So, again, I'm going to keep going
21	THE WITNESS: Raises the possibility	²¹ back to this, but I was asked to look at Dr. Noll's
22	of less. Possibility it would be more. Raises all	²² model which doesn't consider this competition. It
23	sorts of possibilities.	²³ makes claims based on without this competition.
24		²⁴ Okay.
25	CONTINUATION	²⁵ My understanding is from what I
	Page 138	Page 140
1	-	5
1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	¹ HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. DIVER:	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know of the literature, is that it is very difficult
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. DIVER: Q. Do you doubt that DIRECTV faces	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know of the literature, is that it is very difficult to switch. If you're talking about I thought you
2 3	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BY MR. DIVER: Q. Do you doubt that DIRECTV faces competition that constrains its pricing?	 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know of the literature, is that it is very difficult to switch. If you're talking about I thought you were talking about Internet or Comcast, doesn't
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