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21 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
22 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
23 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

24 MED VETS INC. and BAY MEDICAL  
25 SOLUTIONS INC.,

26 *Plaintiffs,*

27 v.

28 VIP PETCARE HOLDINGS, INC.,  
successor in interest to COMMUNITY  
VETERINARY CLINICS, LLC d/b/a VIP  
Petcare and PETIQ, INC.,

*Defendants.*

**Case No. 3:18-cv-02054-MMC**

**OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'  
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF  
PRESS RELEASE**

Date: August 3, 2018  
Time: 9:00 a.m.  
Place: Courtroom 7 – 19th Floor  
San Francisco Courthouse  
450 Golden Gate Avenue,  
San Francisco, CA 94102

Judge: Hon. Maxine M. Chesney

1     **I. INTRODUCTION**

2           Defendants, VIP Petcare Holdings, Inc. and PetIQ, Inc., have requested the Court to take judicial  
3 notice of two documents (Dkt. No. 26) (“Defds. Request”). The first document is an FTC May 2015  
4 Staff Report entitled, “Competition in the Pet Medication Industry: Prescription Portability and  
5 Distribution Practices” (Dkt. No. 26-1). The FTC Report is referred to several times in the Complaint.  
6 Plaintiffs, Med Vets Inc. and Bay Medical Solutions Inc., have no objection and join in the request to  
7 the Court to take judicial notice of the FTC Report.

8           Defendants also request the Court to take judicial notice of PetIQ’s January 8, 2018 press release  
9 announcing the transaction that is the subject of this case (Dkt. No. 26-2). The press release is not  
10 referred to in the Complaint and sets forth facts subject to reasonable dispute. Accordingly, plaintiffs  
11 oppose defendants’ request for judicial notice of the press release.

12     **II. ARGUMENT**

13           Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is  
14 not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial  
15 jurisdiction or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot  
16 reasonably be questioned.” The statements in defendants’ press release are neither, so the document  
17 should not be considered a suitable candidate for judicial notice.

18           Whether to take judicial notice of a document, however, is within the sound discretion of the  
19 Court. *Qingdao Tang-Buy Int’l Imp. & Exp. v. Preferred Secured Agents*, No. 15-cv-00624, 2015 U.S.  
20 Dist. LEXIS 163100, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing *Lee v. City of Los Angeles*, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th  
21 Cir. 2001)). The general rule, however, is that “a court may not consider materials beyond the pleadings  
22 in ruling on a motion to dismiss.” *O’Sullivan v. Longview Fibre*, 993 F. Supp. 743, 745 (N.D. Cal. 1997)  
23 (Chesney, J.) (citing *Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner and Co.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.  
24 1990)); *see also In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.*, No. 11-cv-06714, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116245,  
25 at \*30 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing *Lee*, 250 F.3d at 689-90); *Retrophin v. Questcor Pharms.*, 41 F. Supp.  
26 3d 906, 911 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (denying judicial notice where documents were not mentioned in the  
27 complaint and the facts for which judicial notice was requested could be reasonably disputed) (citing  
28

1 *United States v. Corinthian Colleges*, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)).

2 Courts may also take judicial notice of (1) material necessarily relied upon in the complaint or  
3 (2) matters of public record, *Drouin v. Contra Cost Cnty.*, No. 15-cv-03694, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
4 50750, at \*7-8 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Defendants' press release is neither.<sup>1</sup>

5 A document has been "necessarily relied upon" under the doctrine of incorporation by reference  
6 only if (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and  
7 (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document. *Retrophin*, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 911 (citation  
8 omitted); *see also United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). None of these conditions  
9 are met.

10 Plaintiffs' Complaint does not refer to the press release.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the press release is not  
11 central to and does not form the basis for Plaintiffs' claims. The Request may be denied on that basis  
12 alone. *See Retrophin*, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 912 (denying judicial notice of two press releases where the  
13 complaint did not mention them and they were not central to plaintiff's claims); *see also In re Graphics*  
14 *Processing Units Antitrust Litig.*, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying judicial notice  
15 of press releases not referenced in the complaint and only tangentially related to plaintiff's allegations).  
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17 More importantly, judicial notice is not appropriate where the contents of the document may be  
18 subject to reasonable dispute. *Retrophin*, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 911; *In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.*, 2013  
19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116245, at \*31-32. A press release is inherently a self-serving and promotional  
20 document; it is not a "source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

21 Defendants concede that at most, the Court may consider the press release "for its existence and  
22 contents," but not "for the truth of any matters contained therein." Defds.' Request at 3; *Stewart v.*  
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24 <sup>1</sup> Because a document is publicly available, it is not necessarily a "matter of public record." *See, e.g.,*  
25 *Belodoff v. Netlist, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45289, \*11 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that a document  
that is publicly available is not necessarily a matter of public records appropriate for judicial notice).

26 <sup>2</sup> Defendants' Request implies that Plaintiff's Complaint references the Press Release in ¶ 35, *see*  
27 Request at 4. However, ¶ 35 refers to a March 2018 press release in which PetIQ announced the  
28 appointment of Susan Sholtis, a former Merial executive who was Head of North America Commercial  
Operations, as a member of PetIQ's Board of Directors. The Complaint does not refer to the January 8  
press release.

1 Gogo, No. 12-5164, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51895, at \*7-8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting *In re Am. Apparel*  
2 *S'holder Litig.*, No. 10-06352, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6977, at \*39 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). But Defendants  
3 do not (and cannot) offer any reason for the Court to take judicial notice of the mere existence of the  
4 press release without regard for its contents. It is likely that defendants will seek to use the document to  
5 make arguments about the effects of the merger on competition and other disputed matters in this case.  
6 See Defds. Motion at 6 (citing statement in press release about the merger's purported effects on  
7 "affordability" and "convenience" for consumers). The Court should not attempt to resolve "core  
8 disputed factual matter[s] in the case" at the pleading stage based on a press release. *Diversified Capital*  
9 *Invs. v. Sprint Comms.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68757, at \*13 (N.D. Cal. 2016).<sup>3</sup>

### 10 **III. CONCLUSION**

11 Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, plaintiffs respectfully request that defendants'  
12 request for judicial notice of their January 8, 2018 press release be denied.  
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26 <sup>3</sup> Defendants also do not dispute that "documents that are judicially noticed should not be accepted as  
27 true when they contradict a plaintiff's allegations." Defds. Request at 2 (citing *Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.*  
28 *Metropolitan Engravers, Ltd.*, 245 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1956)). Yet they later argue that "this Court should  
consider the Press Release to the extent it contradicts allegations of the Complaint." Defds. Request at  
4. This is an unsupportable position.

1 Dated: June 15, 2018

2 /s/ Jonathan Rubin

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