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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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AXON ENTERPRISE, INC.,)

Petitioner,)

v.) No. 21-86

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ET AL.,)

Respondents.)

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Washington, D.C.

Monday, November 7, 2022

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:03 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQUIRE, Alexandria, Virginia; on behalf of the Petitioner.

MALCOLM L. STEWART, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Respondents.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:03 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 21-86, Axon Enterprise versus FTC.

Mr. Clement.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. CLEMENT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

Congress has expressly granted district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, and it is common ground that Congress has never expressly withdrawn or restricted that jurisdiction with respect to the constitutional claims at issue here. Instead, all that Congress has done expressly is to give additional jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to a person subject to an FTC cease-and-desist order.

Axon is not subject to and does not challenge such an order. Instead, Axon challenges the constitutionality of statutes that insulate agency officials from presidential

1 removal and the clearance process by which Axon
2 is denied access to the courts.

3 Nonetheless, the government insists
4 that the grant of additional jurisdiction to the
5 courts of appeals over orders not at issue here
6 impliedly precludes jurisdiction that Congress
7 expressly conferred.

8 That argument does not follow from any
9 explicit statutory text, and the three factors
10 that this Court has fashioned to decide the
11 reach of implied preclusion all favor district
12 court jurisdiction here, just as in *Free*
13 *Enterprise Fund*.

14 First, any review mechanism that
15 delays judicial review of a here-and-now
16 constitutional injury until it has come and went
17 does not provide meaningful review. Second, the
18 constitutional claims here are wholly collateral
19 to the merits of any particular contested
20 acquisition. And, third and finally, not only
21 does the agency lack expertise in these
22 constitutional issues, it is wholly outside its
23 authority to declare itself unconstitutional or
24 strike down removal restrictions on ALJs that
25 are located in an entirely separate statutory

1 provision.

2 Simply put, there's nothing in the
3 statutory text nor the Thunder Basin factors
4 that provides a basis for finding in two express
5 grants of jurisdiction an elimination of the
6 jurisdiction for the claims at issue here.

7 JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Clement -- Mr.
8 Clement, is this case distinguishable from Free
9 Enterprise? We -- it seems as though we've been
10 down this road.

11 MR. CLEMENT: We don't think it is
12 distinguishable from Free Enterprise, Justice
13 Thomas. Obviously, some lower courts have
14 disagreed with us on that. But I don't think
15 there's any material basis for distinguishing
16 the two, especially when you look at the nature
17 of the claims here.

18 The nature of the claims here are
19 structural claims. They go to the very
20 existence of the agency. And those are wholly
21 collateral to the merits of any acquisition.
22 Those claims are beyond the competence of the
23 agency. And the agency is not in a position to
24 provide meaningful relief.

25 JUSTICE THOMAS: Could you take just a

1 minute to set out just more specifically why the
2 agency could not consider these constitutional
3 claims within its structure? What -- I think
4 you have to start by saying what it actually
5 does and what would be reviewed at the appellate
6 level after the agency issues an order.

7 MR. CLEMENT: Sure. So, if you start
8 with the -- the typical case, where the agency
9 builds an administrative record that informs
10 their position on a particular transaction, all
11 of the claims here are sort of cross-cutting or
12 may be even logically anterior to any of that
13 process.

14 One of the due process claims goes to
15 the clearance process by which a transaction
16 goes before the FTC rather than the Justice
17 Department, and that claim obviously doesn't
18 really focus on FTC agency action, but it
19 focuses on executive branch action that's beyond
20 the FTC.

21 And then, as to the more structural
22 claims, I mean, those are beyond the competence
23 of the agency for two reasons. One, no agency
24 has the authority to declare itself
25 unconstitutional. But, if you think about the

1 double for-cause removal restriction on the ALJs
2 in particular, I mean, the most logical way to
3 remedy that violation, at least following the
4 logic of Free Enterprise Fund, would be to
5 declare the second layer of for-cause removal
6 provisions unconstitutional. But that second
7 layer of provisions is in Title 5, 5 U.S.C.
8 7521. It's not in the FTC Act.

9 So the idea that the FTC could declare
10 another act of Congress in a different title of
11 the U.S. Code unconstitutional is completely
12 beyond its ken, but, of course, that's exactly
13 what district courts do on a day-to-day basis
14 exercising jurisdiction under Section 1331.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: May I ask, Mr.
16 Clement, about the scope of your argument?
17 Because sometimes, as you just responded to
18 Justice Thomas's question, you're focused very
19 specifically on the constitutional claims at
20 issue in this case, and, in particular, the
21 Thunder Basin analysis lends itself to that kind
22 of focus.

23 You have other arguments in your
24 brief, the -- you know, sometimes you call them
25 the plain text arguments or just about the way

1 1331 and the review provisions interact, which
2 would seem to go much further, would seem to
3 sweep in not just constitutional claims but
4 statutory claims and would seem to sweep in many
5 preliminary rulings, you know, like real -- you
6 know, truly, truly interlocutory rulings of the
7 kind -- you know, it might be evidentiary
8 rulings, it might be discovery rulings.

9 So some of those statutory arguments
10 would seem to extend way beyond the -- the
11 constitutional claims at issue here. So which
12 are you really arguing?

13 MR. CLEMENT: So, Justice Kagan, I'm
14 really arguing to win this case on the Thunder
15 Basin factors. That seems to be the
16 straightforward way to win the case.

17 If I can just say a moment about the
18 broader arguments, I think, if you look at the
19 statutes, if the Court were drawing on a clean
20 slate, I would probably say the right way to
21 decide these cases is, of course, there's
22 jurisdiction, and there's a whole host of
23 non-jurisdictional doctrines, like ripeness and
24 exhaustion, that would probably get you to
25 almost the exact same result as the Thunder

1 Basin factors.

2 So, if I were a law professor, I might
3 quibble that these factors that the Court has
4 come up with for jurisdiction really should go
5 to non-jurisdictional factors and these cases
6 should be resolved on B-6 rather than B-1, but
7 I'm not a law professor. I'm here to represent
8 a client. And I think our client wins well
9 under the Thunder Basin factors. So we're happy
10 to win on -- on those factors.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, almost
12 any administrative process could be called
13 collateral on constitutional issues, whether
14 it's tax review, as in Elgin, or it's
15 immigration issues. All of those petitioners
16 are required to go through administrative
17 processes, despite the fact that most of those
18 agencies can't reach constitutional issues.

19 So I don't know what makes this
20 situation different, other than perhaps -- and
21 I'm not sure about this -- the existence of the
22 adjudicatory body, the fact that the A -- your
23 removal clause challenge.

24 But all of the other due process
25 challenges seem to be the quintessential

1 process-dependent claim. You can't get more
2 intertwined than that.

3 Your argument seems to be saying that
4 any due process claim counts. What about the
5 claim in the companion case, Cochran, that there
6 has been -- that has been abandoned, that the
7 SEC violated her due process rights by failing
8 to follow its own rules and procedures?

9 That's a classic due process claim
10 that, I think, in almost every other agency
11 action we wait until the end of the review
12 process for the Court to look at.

13 So it seems to be that you're saying
14 this is unfair because I have to go through the
15 process. But going through the process is what
16 due process is all about. I don't understand
17 why you are any different than any other
18 administrative agency petitioner who has to go
19 through the process, a flawed process, and wait
20 until the end to have that corrected.

21 MR. CLEMENT: So, Justice Sotomayor,
22 with respect to due process claims in
23 particular, I don't think we're -- we're arguing
24 for a special rule for this particular agency.
25 As I look at the Court's cases -- and they go

1 all the way back to Mathews v. Eldridge and
2 McNary, so this, you know, would apply in
3 immigration cases as well -- the distinction
4 that the Court has drawn is between
5 cross-cutting due process claims that don't in
6 any way depend on the circumstances of a
7 particular case.

8 So, if you think essentially on its
9 face that the statute doesn't provide due
10 process, then that does seem like a claim that
11 is wholly collateral to the merits of any
12 particular --

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, what about
14 if you win? You don't care how you win,
15 meaning, once you're in a case, if you've been
16 given inadequate process, but you still win,
17 you're not going to -- you're going to suffer
18 the litigation costs, et cetera, but it doesn't
19 really matter what basis you win on.

20 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: This -- this just
22 gives you another hole in the -- in your pocket,
23 another card in your pocket that you can play if
24 you lose.

25 MR. CLEMENT: I don't think that's

1 quite right, Justice Sotomayor, which is, you
2 know, this isn't a case like Elgin, where
3 there's a review process for losing your federal
4 job and all the plaintiffs wanted was their
5 federal job back.

6 This is not a situation where all we
7 want is to not have a cease-and-desist order.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, it is because
9 your complaint asked the district court to
10 enjoin the FTC and its Commissioners from
11 pursuing an administrative enforcement action.
12 Your motion for a preliminary injunction asked
13 for the same thing.

14 MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely. But that's
15 actually --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it is tied to
17 the proceeding very directly.

18 MR. CLEMENT: It's tied to the
19 proceeding, but it's not tied to a
20 cease-and-desist order in the same way as the
21 challenge in Elgin. We believe that we suffer a
22 here-and-now constitutional injury just from
23 being subjected to an unconstitutional agency
24 process with respect to the removal
25 restrictions, and we think we suffer an injury

1 the second that we are assigned to the FTC
2 rather than the Justice Department and
3 effectively denied any early access to court.
4 Those are the claims we want to bring.

5 They're not the claim that, like, we
6 wanted to have three witnesses and we only got
7 two and, gee whiz, if the ALJ would have just
8 given us one more witness, that would have
9 satisfied due process. Those are the kind of
10 claims that are not wholly collateral, and those
11 are the kind of claims that belong in the
12 administrative process.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But those are
14 --

15 JUSTICE BARRETT: So what's the remedy
16 that you -- sorry, go ahead.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was just
18 going to say that the examples you gave are
19 pretty extreme to make your point, but it
20 strikes me that your -- your distinction between
21 structural constitutional claims and the
22 particular due process claims in the proceeding
23 is going to be hard to draw in a large number of
24 cases, particularly if you -- you prevail and
25 people -- it makes a difference to when they can

1 bring their constitutional or other challenges.

2 MR. CLEMENT: Well, with respect, Mr.
3 Chief Justice, I don't know that that's the
4 case. I mean, all we're asking for, as I
5 stressed with Justice Kagan, is an application
6 of the Thunder Basin factors.

7 I think what we've been talking about
8 really goes to the second factor about what it
9 means to be wholly collateral. And I don't
10 really think that's that difficult to apply in
11 the due process context. If you think that the
12 statute as set up just says -- doesn't give you
13 any witnesses and that's going to be true in
14 every single hearing, that seems like a case you
15 ought to be able --

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's
17 again -- yeah, sure, but that's an easy case. I
18 mean, anytime you get multi-factors, as in
19 Thunder Basin, the application is going to be
20 difficult in, I think, many cases.

21 MR. CLEMENT: I mean, look, there are
22 going to be edge cases to be sure. And I guess
23 I would -- you know, this is where I would sort
24 of remind you that the statutory text actually
25 is pretty clear here.

1 And if we're going to have a rule for
2 the edge cases, I'd rather live in a republic
3 where the -- where the rule for the edge cases
4 was we err on the side of giving the citizen
5 early access to the courts as opposed to erring
6 on the side of deferring judicial review.

7 I mean, the Court could provide a
8 different presumption, I suppose, to help with
9 the edge cases, but I'd prefer it if it was a
10 presumption that was in favor of judicial
11 review.

12 After all, Congress did pass 1331 that
13 does seem to promise the people that if you have
14 a problem with the constitutionality of
15 government action, you can get early access to
16 court to sort it out.

17 JUSTICE JACKSON: But, Mr. Clement,
18 why doesn't -- why doesn't whether or not it's
19 wholly collateral turn to some extent on the
20 remedy that you're asking for? It would seem to
21 me that one way to think about the
22 collateralness of this is whether, when you're
23 done with it, the claim that you want to bring
24 in district court, you would go back to the
25 agency and the agency would proceed.

1 I think that in a situation in which
2 you have the type of claim, maybe some of your
3 removal claims with respect to the ALJ, for
4 example, if the remedy is just give us a new
5 ALJ, then there's the -- there's a concern that
6 what is happening by allowing citizens to go to
7 the district court is that they're sort of
8 superintending the agency process, whereas you
9 could say -- and, therefore, you could say it's
10 not wholly collateral in the same way as if you
11 went over and the remedy was to terminate the
12 agency process.

13 So why -- why can't -- why shouldn't
14 we be thinking about the collateral nature of
15 this based on the remedy that you're asking for?

16 MR. CLEMENT: So two things, Justice
17 Jackson. First of all, I think the most sort of
18 straightforward way to think about whether it's
19 wholly collateral is does it turn on the facts
20 of the particular case or is it a claim that
21 would be the same no matter what the facts of
22 the particular transaction is or the particular
23 immigration circumstances of an individual. And
24 if it really doesn't matter on your
25 circumstances, then I think it's wholly

1 collateral.

2 To your point about the remedy,
3 though, I think that favors us, especially on
4 the removal claim, because I -- I think the
5 problem is there are cases where the remedy you
6 want is really just to have your federal job
7 back or the mine safety board order vacated.

8 And in those situations, maybe it
9 makes sense to say, yeah, if you're in the
10 process that leads to an order and at the end of
11 the order you can get it vacated, that's good
12 enough. That's a meaningful judicial remedy.

13 JUSTICE JACKSON: But I guess --

14 JUSTICE BARRETT: Mister --

15 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- maybe I'm not so
16 clear. I meant a remedy that does not have you
17 returning to the agency in any respect so that
18 your claim is such that, you know, the core
19 constitutional claim this agency doesn't have
20 power over me, you can go to the district court
21 because, if you win, then the agency is done.

22 What I'm concerned about is the
23 interpretation that allows you to take certain
24 claims over to the district court and have it
25 impact the agency -- ongoing agency proceeding

1 in a way that makes it unclear that that's what
2 Congress intended in terms of saving 1331.

3 MR. CLEMENT: So I guess I would just
4 amend your observation. I mean, I think you're
5 right that if you have a remedy that says I
6 ought to be completely immune from this agency's
7 actions at all, that's something that does seem
8 like it should be able to go forward in district
9 court.

10 But I think, if you have a claim
11 that's effectively I shouldn't be in front of
12 this agency at all as currently structured, that
13 is equally a claim that doesn't belong in front
14 of the agency. And I think -- as I indicated to
15 Justice Thomas, I think it's particularly clear
16 when you start thinking about the right remedy
17 for the double for-cause removal restriction
18 here.

19 Now, obviously, you could remedy a
20 double for-cause removal restriction by
21 invalidating either layer of removal, but if a
22 court were to follow the pattern of Free
23 Enterprise Fund, you'd get rid of the second
24 layer of removal restrictions, and those are in
25 5 U.S.C. 7521.

1 JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Clement, can --

2 MR. CLEMENT: Now there's --

3 JUSTICE BARRETT: Go ahead, Justice
4 Alito.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: No.

6 JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. I just wanted
7 to know, could you say a little bit about what
8 remedy you want for your black-box claim? Are
9 you arguing that everything needs to go the DOJ
10 track, or are you saying you just want
11 transparency on that claim? Because we've been
12 kind of focused on the removal claim.

13 MR. CLEMENT: I -- I think either one
14 of those would probably remedy the claim. So,
15 you know, I think we'd ask for what would
16 probably be the most robust remedy, which is
17 send us to DOJ. We want early access to court.

18 But, if a court fashioned a remedy
19 that said that, okay, we're going to provide
20 transparency to this process, I don't know what
21 it would be, you know, everything sort of A
22 through M goes to DOJ and everything N through Z
23 goes to the FTC, something that would tell the
24 citizenry, okay, there's a rational process by
25 which you're being denied early access to court,

1 I think that would at least be an available
2 remedy.

3 But, obviously, we got stuck -- you
4 know, we lost at the threshold here, so we
5 didn't get to the point of electing our
6 remedies.

7 JUSTICE BARRETT: Do you think that's
8 a weaker case for immediate pre-enforcement
9 action in district court than the removal claim?

10 MR. CLEMENT: I mean, I suppose by one
11 tick on the scale, sure. I mean, the -- the
12 claims that go to the very existence of the
13 agency are the structure of the agency as it's
14 currently structured got -- have to be in my
15 view the strongest possible claims, but I think
16 a due process claim that actually attacks a
17 decision that's anterior to the whole agency
18 process would be, you know, pretty high on the
19 list as well.

20 If I could say one thing about why I
21 think, in addition to the existential nature of
22 the kind of removal claim, why that's such a
23 strong case is, if you sort of think about,
24 like, the theory for why it is that, like, a
25 challenge to kind of early agency action doesn't

1 go to federal court, it must be, I think, on the
2 theory that, well, until it gets to the Article
3 III court, there's at least supervision by the
4 Article II branch that provides the citizen with
5 some protection of their liberty.

6 So, if your whole claim is that the
7 Article II supervision being provided by the
8 President is insufficient, then you're really
9 saying I don't have any protection the whole
10 time this stays before the executive branch.
11 And that really does seem like a claim that
12 almost uniquely belongs in district court, and
13 then it gets resolved one way or another.

14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can I ask you
15 about Free Enterprise Fund in particular?
16 Because Judge Lee in the opinion in the Ninth
17 Circuit really tried to carefully parse Elgin
18 and Free Enterprise Fund.

19 What do you do with the part of Free
20 Enterprise Fund that emphasized the fact that it
21 was at the investigation stage and that would be
22 the only way -- that, therefore, there would be
23 no way ever to get judicial review of the claim
24 at issue there? I guess it's the one paragraph
25 on 490 of Free Enterprise Fund. How do you

1 think we should deal with that?

2 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I -- I think you
3 should deal with it by sort of applying it here
4 and saying, actually, it's on all fours with
5 that situation. I mean, obviously, in Free
6 Enterprise, because of the structure there, you
7 had the unique sort of dynamic that, you know,
8 there was a complaint about the Board's
9 activity, and the review mechanism dealt with
10 the Commission's activity.

11 But, with respect to the idea that the
12 only real way you could get review for the
13 here-and-now injury that the -- the Free
14 Enterprise Fund was suffering was to sort of
15 precipitate a contempt sanction and go to court
16 immediately, that's exactly our situation. Our
17 beef here isn't limited to the cease-and-desist
18 order. We're -- we've been trying for years to
19 get out of the FTC process. We've even offered
20 to walk away from the transaction. So we think
21 just being subjected to their processes as
22 currently structured is our injury.

23 The only way we can try to get that
24 remedied is exactly what the situation was in
25 Free Enterprise Fund. We can try to resist any

1 cooperation with the FTC, sort of get ourselves
2 in contempt and see if they did something to
3 bring us to federal court. But this Court has
4 said you don't have to bet the farm in that kind
5 of way.

6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And -- and your
7 distinction of Elgin I want to explore briefly.
8 So, if you were bringing a claim challenging the
9 constitutionality of the statute that was being
10 investigated or -- or the basis for the
11 investigation/enforcement action, you couldn't
12 -- or what's your answer to whether you could
13 bring a challenge like that in district court?

14 MR. CLEMENT: Well, maybe the easier
15 way is to just articulate how I would
16 distinguish Elgin, and then maybe, if --

17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah.

18 MR. CLEMENT: -- if that doesn't
19 answer your question, I'm happy to respond.

20 But, to me, the critical thing in
21 Elgin was the party was challenging the very
22 government action that the review mechanism was
23 set up to provide a special avenue for review.
24 So it was the challenge to adverse major
25 employment action. And what the Court held, I

1 think correctly, is it doesn't matter what your
2 theory is. It can be a cross-cutting
3 constitutional theory, but if you're challenging
4 the exact same adverse major employment action,
5 you have to go through the process.

6 So, if we were -- like, if we waited
7 until the very end of this process and
8 challenged the cease-and-desist order, I think
9 then we'd be on all fours with Elgin. And I
10 actually think, no matter what our theory was at
11 that point, we'd have to bring it in the court
12 of appeals. We couldn't at that late stage
13 challenge the cease-and-desist order itself in
14 district court.

15 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And --

16 MR. CLEMENT: But, to me, that's the
17 way to distinguish Elgin.

18 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- and then one
19 last one. What's your exact formulation of the
20 rule? So a challenge to the structure of the
21 agency, I think, is covered. Anything beyond
22 that?

23 MR. CLEMENT: So I would start with
24 Judge Bumatay's formulation that its structure,
25 existence, and procedures --

1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: So let me stop you
2 there. "Procedures" concerns me because I think
3 that could be wildly open-ended and presents
4 some of the problems that the Chief Justice and
5 others were pointing out. So respond to that.

6 MR. CLEMENT: It -- it concerns me as
7 well, which is why I was about to say, by
8 "procedures," I think he meant the kind of
9 cross-cutting procedures that don't turn on the
10 circumstances of any particular case. And I
11 think that sort of -- that actually explains
12 some of the pre-Thunder Basin cases, like McNary
13 and Mathews v. Eldridge.

14 But I did want to add one important
15 point. That describes the basic universe of
16 situations that you're dealing with, these kind
17 of, like, specialized appellate court review
18 regimes, but there are other situations where
19 you get into district court under 1331 despite
20 the government making a Thunder Basin argument,
21 and a great example of that is the first Sackett
22 case back in 2012, because there you had a
23 situation where the government, relying on
24 Thunder Basin, was telling the citizen: Hey,
25 wait, you can't get into court to challenge this

1 determination. You have to wait until we bring
2 an enforcement action.

3 And this Court rejected that argument
4 and said, no, the citizen gets into court under
5 1331. So I think the formulation with that
6 slight amendment that Judge Bumatay had is the
7 right one for this class of cases.

8 JUSTICE KAGAN: I think that the --
9 the gloss you put on the procedures language
10 doesn't go all that far. I mean, even if you
11 say it's a challenge to a procedure that extends
12 to all cases, I mean, you know, agencies have a
13 lot of procedures, just as courts do.

14 And, you know, suppose you claimed
15 something about the way agencies treated
16 witnesses or what kinds of witnesses were
17 allowed or what kinds of cross-examination or
18 when subpoenas were issued or -- you could just
19 keep on going. I mean, would all of that go to
20 a court first?

21 MR. CLEMENT: I don't think so,
22 Justice Kagan, and that's sort of the beauty of
23 the Thunder Basin factors because, if you're
24 talking about a procedural provision that's put
25 in only by a rule and you want to challenge

1 that, I think you could say, well, that's
2 actually within the agency's, you know,
3 competency to fix.

4 If -- if -- but, if Congress passes a
5 new, like, agency tomorrow and it just says, you
6 know, the citizen's going to be dragged in front
7 of there and they're going to be denied any
8 ability to call any witnesses, I would think
9 that you would actually want people to be able
10 to get into court immediately and say: Well,
11 that's crazy. That -- that -- we should declare
12 that that restriction is unconstitutional. It
13 doesn't turn on the circumstances of any
14 individual's case.

15 So I -- I -- I do think that's the --
16 the right rule, but, you know -- and I think,
17 you know, our -- our particular due process
18 challenge, I think, is a strong case because
19 it's a step that's anterior to the agency
20 itself's process.

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: So can I ask just on
22 the -- the actual challenge that you've brought,
23 it seems to me that the hardest of the Thunder
24 Basin factors for you is the meaningful review
25 factor because, you know, basically, what we

1 think about appealing, appeals generally, is you
2 have to wait until the end, and often that's a
3 lot of inconvenience, that's a lot of expense,
4 but we're very stingy in allowing interlocutory
5 appeals as long as you'll get your chance in the
6 end. So what makes this different?

7 MR. CLEMENT: So what makes this
8 different is that the relief at the end of the
9 process is -- doesn't really go to the heart of
10 the constitutional injury, which is being
11 subject to the unconstitutional agency action.
12 There's sort of a mix --

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: So I -- I thought you
14 were going to say that, and I was trying to
15 think of other examples that are pretty
16 analogous to it.

17 So I -- I would think that when
18 somebody claims that a court did not have
19 subject matter jurisdiction or when somebody
20 claims that there was no personal jurisdiction
21 as to that person or a criminal defendant saying
22 that a prosecutor was unconstitutionally
23 appointed, all of these are basically saying the
24 entire process is illegitimate and I should not
25 have been subject to it.

1 So what makes yours different from
2 those?

3 MR. CLEMENT: Well, two things, Your
4 Honor. I mean, one, as to the removal, you
5 know, provisions and the Humphrey's executor
6 claim for that matter, as to those provisions,
7 there's a big difference, which is all of the
8 cases that are already in federal district
9 court, it's taken as a given that the Article
10 III judges are legitimate, properly appointed,
11 properly insulated by good -- you know, good
12 behavior and all of that.

13 Whereas, here, on the Article II
14 claims, we're basically saying that the process
15 we're stuck in until we get to Article III court
16 is itself constitutionally deficient as a
17 structural matter. So that does seem kind of
18 fundamentally different.

19 And then, with respect to the other
20 claims, I mean, nobody says in the situation of
21 the district court, court of appeals, collateral
22 order kind of context, nobody says that the
23 district court is, like, powerless to hear the
24 claim in the first instance. It's just the
25 district court's perfectly powerful to hear the

1 claim. It just ruled against you.

2 And in this situation, if we have a
3 claim before the agency like our due process
4 claim about the clearance process that is
5 anterior to the agency, the agency has no
6 business deciding it, that doesn't seem
7 analogous to the situation in most of the
8 collateral order cases.

9 And, of course, even in the collateral
10 order cases, you do have things like double
11 jeopardy, where you conceptualize the injury as
12 really being subject to the procedure or the
13 proceeding, rather, and I would say that is a
14 fair description of the claims that we're
15 bringing.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
17 counsel.

18 Justice Thomas, anything further?

19 JUSTICE THOMAS: Just briefly.

20 Mr. Clement, there's a lot of
21 discussion about reaching a final order and then
22 assuming, I guess, an appeal.

23 What percentage of these cases
24 actually go to a cease-and-desist order and what
25 percentage actually are appealed?

1 MR. CLEMENT: So I think -- I mean, I
2 don't have the exact denominator, I'm afraid, so
3 I can't tell you. The overwhelming majority of
4 these cases do settle out in the process, and so
5 there's no appeal.

6 It's a relatively small number of
7 these cases where the party has kind of the
8 wherewithal to endure the whole process. And
9 one of the things that does sort of skew the
10 numbers is that the FTC's position has been that
11 they essentially won't accept a settlement
12 unless you forego your appellate rights.

13 And so it is really -- you have to be
14 very hardy to make yourself all the way through
15 that process and preserve your objections.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Are the so-called
18 Thunder Basin factors simply inferences about
19 congressional intent? And if that -- that's
20 what they are, are they the whole ball game? Is
21 there anything else that the Court should or
22 must consider in determining whether, in a case
23 where we're under the Thunder Basin line of
24 cases, anything else that's proper for us to
25 consider or that we must consider?

1 MR. CLEMENT: So, Justice Alito, I
2 guess what I would say is, you know, if you want
3 to sort of save the Thunder Basin factors, I
4 think you would construe them as being helpful
5 guideposts to discern the underlying legislative
6 intent.

7 You know, it's more traditional for
8 this Court, of course, to discern legislative
9 intent from text. And I think, if you did infer
10 legislative intent from text, you would end up
11 in a world as I was describing to Justice Kagan
12 where you -- you much more readily recognize
13 that there's jurisdiction in the district court,
14 but then you start applying all these other
15 doctrines, like finality and exhaustion.

16 I can't help but look at the Thunder
17 Basin factors and think that the Court was sort
18 of cheating a little and sort of front-loading
19 some of those non-jurisdictional factors into
20 the jurisdictional inquiry, but be that as it
21 may, we -- we -- we think you'd probably get to
22 almost the same result by applying finality,
23 ripeness, primary jurisdiction, all of those
24 other doctrines.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

1 Sotomayor?

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Clement,
3 Justice Thomas asked you a question about the
4 impetus to settle. That's true in an Article
5 III court. The number of district court cases
6 that go on appeal is very small. Very true in
7 criminal law cases, where most are settled by
8 plea and most prosecutors require waivers there.

9 So I'm not quite sure that merely
10 because a good number of cases settle means that
11 you still don't have an adequate and meaningful
12 opportunity to raise these claims before a
13 court, which is what I think Thunder Basin --

14 MR. CLEMENT: So, Justice Sotomayor, I
15 -- I --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- Thunder Basin
17 was based on, which is, if you have a chance to
18 raise it, that's enough.

19 MR. CLEMENT: So I guess what I would
20 say is I don't think my answer to Justice Thomas
21 was meant to subsume all three factors or be a
22 complete answer, but I do think it's worth
23 recognizing how anomalous this situation is
24 because, if you take the case of my client, for
25 example, they offered basically to walk away

1 from the transaction and infuse the potential
2 acquisition company with cash.

3 Now it seems to me that if we were in
4 front of an Article III court and with the
5 Justice Department prosecuting this --

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now you're getting
7 to the merits, Mr. Clement. Thank you.

8 MR. CLEMENT: Well -- okay.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
10 Justice Gorsuch?

11 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Tell me what I'm
12 missing. 1331 says that district courts have
13 jurisdiction over these claims absent any other
14 consideration. And, normally, we consider
15 district courts bound to exercise their
16 jurisdiction when they have a claim.

17 Okay. Then we have the FTC Act that
18 says cease-and-desist orders can be reviewed in
19 the courts of appeals rather than the district
20 courts. Those are the two statutes we have.

21 We don't have a cease-and-desist order
22 here. I would have thought that might have been
23 the end of the game and that the Thunder Basin
24 factors would come in handy if we did have a
25 cease-and-desist order. In that circumstance,

1 then perhaps we would make you wait and consider
2 all these prudential factors about interfering
3 with agency proceedings.

4 Again, what am I missing?

5 MR. CLEMENT: So I don't think you're
6 missing anything. I think you're going to love
7 Mr. Garre's argument later today. But what I
8 would say is I do think, if you go with that
9 simplistic, you know -- straightforward --

10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is simplistic -- no,
11 go ahead. Go ahead.

12 MR. CLEMENT: -- straightforward.

13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Simplistic, we can
14 --

15 MR. CLEMENT: I didn't like
16 simplistic. Straightforward. If you go --

17 (Laughter.)

18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Textual maybe? How
19 about that?

20 MR. CLEMENT: Textual.

21 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.

22 MR. CLEMENT: Straightforward. All of
23 those words seem to apply. Simplistic was a bad
24 word choice.

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: It could have been

1 worse.

2 (Laughter.)

3 MR. CLEMENT: But, if you go with that
4 approach, then I do think that, you know,
5 district courts are going to have to be ready to
6 apply a whole bunch of, you know, fairly
7 well-established doctrines of ripeness and
8 exhaustion, primary jurisdiction, maybe
9 abstention. I know, you know, you generally --

10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Don't they do that
11 all the time? I mean, maybe that's simplistic,
12 but --

13 MR. CLEMENT: They -- they do do that
14 all the time. I don't think it's, like,
15 entirely kismet, though, that -- if you -- if
16 you step back and said what would the result be
17 of applying all of those other
18 non-jurisdictional doctrines, boy, I think you'd
19 get to a situation that said they've got a claim
20 that's wholly collateral, you don't get
21 meaningful review, and the agency doesn't have
22 any expertise, that's going to go forward to the
23 merits in the district court.

24 And if one of those or two of those
25 actually aren't satisfied, then probably you're

1 going to get tripped up by ripeness or
2 exhaustion or something. So it would be a
3 cleaner world. It would be a simpler world, a
4 more textual world to go that route.

5 But I think you're going to end up in
6 kind of the same place, which is why, you know,
7 we're -- we're here happy to win on the Thunder
8 Basin factors as well.

9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. And then you
10 haven't had a chance to address the government's
11 APA argument. Put aside the waiver or
12 forfeiture issue. If you could address it on
13 the merits.

14 MR. CLEMENT: Sure. I mean, we -- we
15 don't feel like we have anything to fear under
16 the APA argument. We actually think the APA
17 gets you to a very similar place. And we do
18 think the APA is best understood as a
19 non-jurisdictional argument, one of the many,
20 and it does basically say, you know, you should
21 apply a specialized administrative regime but
22 not where it doesn't provide adequate relief.

23 And we think this is a classic
24 situation where it doesn't provide adequate
25 relief.

1 So another way of sort of answering
2 your first question is to say I suppose you
3 could get to the Thunder Basin factors just as a
4 gloss on the APA, but I don't think it would
5 cause you under any circumstances to say that
6 these claims can't go forward to the merits in
7 district court.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
9 Kavanaugh?

10 Justice Barrett?

11 JUSTICE BARRETT: Just a quick
12 question. So Justice Kagan asked you about
13 interlocutory appeals, and it's true they're
14 disfavored in all the contexts in which Justice
15 Kagan was saying.

16 I had been thinking about those too as
17 I was reading your brief and thinking about your
18 argument. I want to ask you if I'm making this
19 distinction in -- in the right way.

20 When we are talking about appeals or
21 interlocutory appeals from district court to the
22 court of appeals, we're talking about 1292 and
23 finality under 1292 and exceptions to what can
24 be final. So, you know, is it a collateral
25 order? Could we treat it as final for that

1 purpose?

2 But this isn't that, really, because
3 we're not asking whether it's final or
4 collateral in that sense of finality. And we're
5 not talking about looking at 1292 in a
6 definition of final. A pre-enforcement
7 challenge isn't interlocutory in that sense
8 because there's no appeal from any kind of order
9 that's been made, right?

10 So what are we supposed to draw --
11 because, I mean, I had some of those same
12 questions in my mind too. What are we supposed
13 to draw from that context of interlocutory
14 appeal? Nothing or something?

15 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I think you can
16 draw something, which is I -- I do think even in
17 that context, although it's focused on a
18 different question, there is this concept of
19 whether the claim you're bringing is collateral
20 from the merits.

21 JUSTICE BARRETT: Right.

22 MR. CLEMENT: And I -- I do think
23 that's a useful thing to borrow and bring over
24 to this context, but I also think, as -- as I --
25 as I said to Justice Kagan, it's also important

1 to recognize the differences in the context
2 because, in an Article III court, when you have
3 some claim that doesn't qualify for the
4 collateral order doctrine, you've still gotten a
5 ruling by a properly structured entity that has
6 -- has every competence to decide the issue in
7 your favor.

8 We don't have issues where we concede
9 that the district court doesn't have any ability
10 to consider the issue, but you're still stuck in
11 --

12 JUSTICE BARRETT: Jurisdiction to
13 decide jurisdiction?

14 MR. CLEMENT: Yeah.

15 JUSTICE BARRETT: Yeah.

16 MR. CLEMENT: Yeah. We don't accept
17 that notion. I mean, so -- so you already are
18 in a much better position if you're in district
19 court. Again, our -- you know, the thrust of
20 our complaint is we would love to be in district
21 court fighting the bona fides of this
22 acquisition. So I do think it's a different
23 context.

24 JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice

1 Jackson?

2 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Mr. Clement,
3 did I misunderstand you to say that your client
4 has not received a cease -- cease-and-desist
5 order? Is there such an order at issue here? I
6 mean, not at issue. Did you get a
7 cease-and-desist order, your client?

8 MR. CLEMENT: No. The
9 cease-and-desist order, for purposes of the
10 statutory review provision, is the culmination
11 of the FTC process.

12 JUSTICE JACKSON: I see.

13 MR. CLEMENT: So we haven't gotten
14 that. I mean --

15 JUSTICE JACKSON: But you are in the
16 active agency review process, right?

17 MR. CLEMENT: Well, it's a little bit
18 complicated because we did get a stay of the
19 process pending this case out of the Ninth
20 Circuit.

21 JUSTICE JACKSON: Absent that stay,
22 the agency had decided that they were going to
23 go forward with respect to your client?

24 MR. CLEMENT: Not on the morning that
25 we filed our complaint. On the afternoon that

1 we filed our complaint.

2 JUSTICE JACKSON: I see.

3 MR. CLEMENT: And, you know, look, I
4 -- I don't know -- for purposes of the argument
5 I'm making today --

6 JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

7 MR. CLEMENT: -- I don't know that
8 anything turns on that. For some of these
9 non-jurisdictional doctrines, like abstention --

10 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right.

11 MR. CLEMENT: -- who filed first might
12 matter a lot.

13 JUSTICE JACKSON: But can -- can I
14 just explore that, though, because I'm wondering
15 why anything doesn't turn on that. In other
16 words, when the agency decides to go forward, I
17 would assume they're sort of in -- you're in the
18 channel then of agency review, as opposed to
19 cases like Free Enterprise Fund, where they were
20 just in the investigative world and they hadn't
21 decided.

22 And so, once you're now in the agency
23 process, I'm concerned about people using the
24 district court jurisdiction to sort of do -- to
25 -- to stay the agency process or do an end run

1 around it. And I'm wondering, why isn't that a
2 legitimate concern, given a statute in which
3 it's pretty clear that once you are in the
4 channel, they've given exclusive review or
5 exclusive jurisdiction to the court of appeals
6 to review a final order of the agency?

7 MR. CLEMENT: So two kinds of answers,
8 Justice Jackson. The first is, I mean, you
9 know, generally, for jurisdictional purposes,
10 it's the situation at the time of the filing of
11 the complaint that matters. So, even if you're
12 going to draw this distinction, I think we're on
13 the right line.

14 But the second and probably more
15 responsive answer is I think this is why you
16 have to look at the nature of the claim that's
17 being brought, because if you're bringing sort
18 of a claim that's really about the agency
19 process and that's your beef, then I think it's
20 fine to say we're in the channel of review.

21 But, if you're saying this whole
22 agency is unconstitutional or it has no business
23 exercising jurisdiction over this case, you're
24 not in the regulatory channel; you're in the
25 regulatory maw. That's your whole claim, is

1 that we don't belong here at all.

2 JUSTICE JACKSON: And it doesn't
3 matter to you that as a result of making that
4 second kind of claim, you would be
5 terminating -- I mean, I'm with you to the
6 extent that you say I'm making that claim and
7 the point is we -- they have no jurisdiction
8 over me, and, district court, if you agree, I'm
9 out, and the whole thing is over.

10 What I'm concerned about is drawing a
11 line that involves you returning to the agency
12 after you've made a claim in district court,
13 because then it seems like the district court is
14 being used to superintend the agency process
15 rather than making the very kind of claim you
16 say you want to make in this case.

17 MR. CLEMENT: But, if you think about
18 our two claims -- or, you know, we had three
19 claims. Depends how you number them. But, if
20 you think about our claim that we shouldn't be
21 in the FTC at all, that seems to fit your
22 paradigm. The relief we could get there, at
23 least one of the forms of relief we could get,
24 is essentially to be sent to the DOJ.

25 But then, if you think about our

1 removal claims, what we're basically saying is
2 we shouldn't be sent to the agency at all as it
3 is currently structured. The agency can't help
4 us with that claim. They're powerless to do
5 anything about the claim. But the district
6 court isn't, and what the district court could
7 do is -- I mean, here, they port us out on
8 jurisdiction, but if it granted the merits, it
9 could say, you know, you're right, 5 U.S.C. 7521
10 is unconstitutional. ALJs can be removed by the
11 MSPB at will. And in that world, now you're
12 back to the agency. But you're -- you're, in
13 our view, back at a different agency where we at
14 least kind of know who to complain about if we
15 think we're being mistreated by the ALJs.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
17 counsel.

18 Mr. Stewart.

19 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

20 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

21 MR. STEWART: Mr. Chief Justice, and
22 may it please the Court:

23 It is a longstanding principle of
24 administrative law that courts will not
25 intervene in an ongoing agency proceeding until

1 that proceeding culminates in a rule or order
2 that imposes sanctions or determines legal
3 rights or obligations.

4 Consistent with that principle, the
5 FTC Act review provisions governing
6 adjudications authorize court of appeals review
7 only of the final Commission orders that
8 terminate the proceedings. The APA confirms
9 that this review mechanism is exclusive and
10 further confirms that antecedent steps taken
11 during the adjudications are subject to review
12 on the review of the final agency action. Those
13 provisions, taken together, make clear that
14 district courts have no authority to entertain
15 constitutional challenges to the Commission's
16 conduct of agency adjudications.

17 Axon argues that review of final
18 Commission orders will provide inadequate relief
19 because it will not protect it from the burdens
20 associated with the administrative proceedings
21 themselves.

22 But this Court has repeatedly rejected
23 similar arguments both in the agency review
24 context and in applying the collateral order
25 doctrine. The Court, therefore, should hold

1 that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
2 this suit.

3 In the alternative, the Court should
4 hold that Axon lacks a valid cause of action
5 because the commencement of a Commission
6 adjudication is not immediately reviewable.

7 I welcome the Court's questions.

8 JUSTICE THOMAS: Would you at least
9 give us your clearest textual argument? As
10 Justice Gorsuch mentioned, you have the FTC Act
11 and you have 1331. Could you make -- could you
12 at least argue textually why there is no
13 jurisdiction as between those two statutes?

14 MR. STEWART: I -- I guess the other
15 thing I would point to, Justice Thomas, is the
16 APA and specifically 5 U.S.C. 704, which is
17 reproduced at page 1a of the appendix to our
18 brief, and -- and the relevant sentence for
19 these purposes is: "A preliminary, procedural,
20 or intermediate agency action or ruling not
21 directly reviewable is subject to review on the
22 review of the final agency action." And the
23 Court in FTC versus Standard Oil discussed the
24 implications of this provision.

25 And imagine for a second that this

1 sentence appeared as the second sentence of the
2 FTC Act review provision and you had the first
3 sentence with words to the effect that a person
4 who receives a cease-and-desist order may file a
5 petition for review in the court of appeals, and
6 then the second sentence said preliminary steps
7 taken during the adjudication shall be reviewed
8 on review of the final agency action.

9 That would be powerful evidence that
10 Congress intended any review of the antecedent
11 steps to occur in the court of appeals when the
12 final cease-and-desist order is issued. And the
13 language doesn't have any less salience by
14 virtue of the fact that it appears in the APA
15 instead. The whole --

16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Stewart?

17 MR. STEWART: Yes.

18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So, if I understand
19 your -- your answer, and I'm sorry to interrupt
20 you, but I -- I just want to make sure I
21 understand, 1331 grants jurisdiction to district
22 courts. The FTC Act grants jurisdiction to
23 courts of appeals for cease-and-desist orders.
24 There's no withdrawal jurisdiction anywhere in
25 those statutes, and so you ask us to turn to the

1 APA to discern that. Is that right?

2 MR. STEWART: Well, actually --

3 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is that your
4 argument?

5 MR. STEWART: -- I think the APA
6 confirms that the provision governing review of
7 final cease-and-desist orders is intended to
8 cover not only the final order itself but any
9 challenge --

10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well --

11 MR. STEWART: -- to the manner in
12 which the proceeding was --

13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- okay. So we're
14 on to the APA now. We're past the FTC Act. And
15 what do you say first to the argument that --
16 that that contention by the government was
17 forfeited or waived?

18 And, second, what do you say to the
19 argument that the sentence you're pointing to in
20 704 speaks to an agency action that's not
21 directly reviewable, is subject to review on the
22 final agency order, final agency action, and an
23 agency action is defined as a rule, an order, a
24 license, a sanction, or relief? And we have
25 none of those things here. So we don't have

1 agency action.

2 What do you say to those two -- two
3 arguments?

4 MR. STEWART: I think -- as -- as to
5 the first point, I don't think that our court of
6 appeals brief quoted the specific sentence from
7 the APA. We did make the argument in the court
8 of appeals that what they are challenging is not
9 final agency action to begin with because, under
10 Standard Oil, the commencement of agency
11 proceedings is not reviewable at all. So that
12 argument has been preserved.

13 The second thing I would say is I
14 think that agency action is at issue in this
15 case; that is, Mr. Clement said what we're
16 really challenging is the composition of the
17 agency or the question of whether it's
18 constitutionally structured.

19 But, obviously, as a matter of Article
20 III, a plaintiff couldn't get into court simply
21 by saying the relevant statutory --

22 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm not concerned
23 about what the plaintiff's saying. I'm
24 concerned about where is the agency action that
25 would implicate 704. That 704, the sentence you

1 rely on, speaks of agency action being
2 reviewable upon the final order.

3 MR. STEWART: In this case, it --

4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And, here, where is
5 the agency action? Under 551, I think it's
6 paragraph 13 maybe --

7 MR. STEWART: In -- in this --

8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- it defines agency
9 action, and I'm just struggling to see where
10 that's present in this case.

11 MR. STEWART: In this case, it is the
12 commencement of the FTC's administrative
13 adjudication, the commencement by the FTC and
14 the assignment of that proceeding to an ALJ.

15 And the point I was making is a
16 plaintiff can't get into court simply by saying
17 the statute is unconstitutional because the
18 agency is improperly structured. In order to
19 have Article III standing, the plaintiff would
20 have to say the agency is doing something or is
21 about to do something that injures me.

22 And, in this case, the thing that the
23 agency was about to do, because, as Mr. Clement
24 said, the suit was filed a few hours before the
25 proceeding was commenced, the thing that Mr.

1 Clement is complaining about is the fact that an
2 administrative adjudication was commenced.

3 Had there been no adjudication
4 commenced, perhaps Axon could have found other
5 --

6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do we have -- do we
7 have here a rule, an order, a license, a
8 sanction, or relief?

9 MR. STEWART: Well, the whole thing
10 that -- we don't have that, and that's why --

11 JUSTICE GORSUCH: We don't have any of
12 those things?

13 MR. STEWART: But that's why -- that
14 is why we don't have final agency action, but if
15 Mr. -- if --

16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, we can have an
17 interim order. That -- I mean, there are all
18 sorts of interim orders and interim relief that
19 an agency could grant that would constitute
20 agency action under that definition.

21 MR. STEWART: If the Commission had
22 given no indication that it intended to commence
23 an administrative adjudication against Axon,
24 then Axon would clearly have lacked standing to
25 raise the claim that the ALJs were improperly

1 insulated from removal.

2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. Let me
3 see if I just have a summary of it. Textually,
4 putting aside other things, we don't have
5 anything in the FTC Act, we don't have anything
6 in 1331, we have to go to the APA, we have to
7 find that you didn't waive it, and we have to
8 agree with your understanding of what an agency
9 action is. Is that right?

10 MR. STEWART: Well, you certainly have
11 to agree that a plaintiff needs to identify an
12 agency action in order to challenge the
13 composition or structure of the agency, but I
14 think that is basic administrative law.

15 I don't think any litigant or Justice
16 on the Court would say that the --

17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm going to take
18 that as a yes.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't understand why
20 you have to go to the APA, Mr. Stewart. I mean,
21 you have a statutory provision that says there's
22 jurisdiction over these cease-and-desist or
23 other final orders in the courts of appeals,
24 that jurisdiction is exclusive.

25 The question is, what does that

1 subsume? And, I mean, you might be using the
2 APA as kind of an analogy to help you answer
3 that question, but you can answer that question
4 without the APA that, normally, in our legal
5 system, we understand that when you give
6 exclusive jurisdiction to a court as to a final
7 order it also subsumes a whole lot of
8 interlocutory things leading up to it.

9 MR. STEWART: I would agree that we
10 would -- we don't need the APA, that this would
11 be the logical inference to be drawn from the
12 provision that authorizes court of appeals
13 review of final Commission orders. I think it
14 is more than an analogy because the APA is not
15 simply a statute that covers district court
16 suits in circumstances where no special review
17 provision exists.

18 The APA covers, provides basic rules
19 of the road even for review of agency action
20 under a special review provision.

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: May -- may I ask --

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Doesn't -- no,
23 go ahead.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Go ahead.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Doesn't Free

1 Enterprise stand as a pretty insurmountable
2 barrier to your argument?

3 MR. STEWART: No, I think there are
4 three distinctions between this case and Free
5 Enterprise Fund.

6 The first is the Court in Free
7 Enterprise Fund stressed that, in order to
8 trigger an SEC adjudication and thereby get
9 judicial review under the Exchange Act review
10 provision, the Free Enterprise Fund would have
11 had to deliberately committed a violation and
12 subjected itself to penalties.

13 And this Court invoked MedImmune,
14 which, in turn, summarizes a long line of this
15 Court's decisions that say we really strain to
16 provide judicial review that is not contingent
17 on committing a violation and subjecting
18 yourself to penalties.

19 And the Court in Standard Oil
20 addressed this point where the Court was
21 explaining why the requirement to participate in
22 the adjudication itself was different from what
23 was at issue in Abbott Labs.

24 And the Court said in Abbott Labs we
25 were dealing with judicial review of

1 regulations, and the rules imposed legal
2 obligations, you could get penalties, you could
3 be subjected to penalties if you violated them.

4 And in that --

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I -- I thought
6 it was pretty clear in -- in that opinion that
7 the availability, the grant of judicial
8 jurisdiction in other forums wouldn't be read as
9 an implied removal of jurisdiction in 1331.

10 MR. STEWART: Well, the other thing
11 that was different about Free Enterprise Fund
12 was that in that case, people were not -- the
13 plaintiff was not complaining about removal
14 protections that attached to SEC officials who
15 conducted the adjudications. They were
16 complaining about the removal protections for
17 the PCAOB members, and there was only a kind of
18 --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, no, but
20 the -- the Board's activities were fully under
21 the supervision of the agency.

22 MR. STEWART: Yes, but the point was
23 their -- their challenge was to an ongoing
24 investigation that affected them on the ground.
25 It had only an attenuated and speculative

1 connection to any potential SEC adjudication.

2 Here, the challenge is directed
3 specifically at the adjudication itself, and, as
4 I say, it could -- the people -- people to
5 challenge the removal protections for FTC ALJs
6 that have standing only if they were involved in
7 an actual or imminent FTC adjudication.

8 The other thing I'd say is, in Elgin,
9 which was decided two years after Free
10 Enterprise Fund, the Court said we don't
11 distinguish for purposes of an exclusive review
12 provision between different types of
13 constitutional claims. And --

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, in
15 Elgin, you understand the response from your
16 friends on the other side that the claims there
17 were intertwined with the proceeding itself
18 before the Commission while, in this case, it
19 doesn't matter what the Commission's going to do
20 under the -- your friend's claim. It's still
21 unconstitutionally constituted.

22 MR. STEWART: Well, I think Mr.
23 Clement, with -- with respect, was going back
24 and forth between two arguments. That is, he
25 said in this case our claim is systemic. We're

1 not arguing about anything that will happen in
2 any particular adjudication. We're arguing
3 about the way that the Commission is structured
4 and the way that its proceedings take place
5 generally.

6 But then, when he was asked to discuss
7 Elgin, he acknowledged that, yes, the claim in
8 that case was that the federal statute that
9 provides for mail-only Selective Service
10 registration was unconstitutional. That was the
11 nature of the Elgin plaintiffs' claims.

12 And he said it doesn't matter that
13 their legal theory was broad and sweeping. What
14 matters is that they asserted that legal theory
15 as a vehicle for trying to get their own jobs
16 back.

17 And we think he was right when he was
18 talking about Elgin. But we think that the same
19 thing is true here. What Axon is complaining
20 about is the fact that they are in an
21 administrative adjudication, and their complaint
22 sought certain forms of declaratory relief.

23 But the only injunctive relief it
24 sought, the only tangible change in the agency's
25 behavior that it sought was terminate the ALJ

1 proceedings, enjoin the administrative
2 adjudication.

3 And so, under Elgin, the fact that
4 their constitutional basis for seeking that
5 relief is broad and sweeping doesn't mean that
6 they can get any court -- into court any sooner
7 than they could get into court --

8 JUSTICE KAGAN: May I step back for --
9 unless -- do you have a sentence finisher there?

10 MR. STEWART: No, that's fine.

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess I was pretty
12 surprised when I read your brief, Mr. Stewart,
13 because, you know, three times in the last
14 couple of decades we've confronted a case like
15 this one and three times we've used Thunder
16 Basin to decide it.

17 And your brief doesn't talk about
18 Thunder Basin until page 51, and it doesn't use
19 -- it doesn't talk about Thunder Basin at all in
20 your summary of the argument.

21 And I guess I read your brief and I'm
22 trying to figure out, do you think you lose
23 under Thunder Basin? Because I thought Thunder
24 Basin was the law here.

25 MR. STEWART: We think that we win

1 under Thunder Basin. I -- I think, you know,
2 Mr. Clement thought that the Court in Thunder
3 Basin was tilting the scales against the
4 claimants.

5 I think the Thunder Basin perhaps
6 could have been written even more vigorously if
7 it said certain things that we are treating as
8 implications are, in fact, buttressed by the
9 text of the APA.

10 And so, for instance, the Court has
11 said repeatedly when Congress provides for a
12 comprehensive and specific review mechanism
13 governing a particular class of agency conduct,
14 we will often infer from that detail and
15 specificity that it is intended to be exclusive
16 and that review through an alternative district
17 court mechanism is unavailable.

18 And so what we intended to be an
19 important point in our brief was that is not
20 just an inference. The APA actually says that.
21 And on the same page of the appendix to our
22 brief, 5 U.S.C. 703 says the form of proceeding
23 for judicial review is the special statutory
24 review proceeding relevant to the subject matter
25 in a court specified by statute or, in the

1 absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable
2 form of legal action.

3 And so, again, the APA actually says,
4 if there is a special statutory review mechanism
5 and if it is not inadequate, then you have to
6 use that. You can only use the fallback review
7 mechanism in district court in the absence or
8 inadequacy of a special review mechanism.

9 So we were trying to respond to the
10 argument that Thunder Basin is on thin ice
11 because it's all implication by saying no, there
12 is specific language in the APA that says the
13 same thing.

14 JUSTICE JACKSON: But what about the
15 argument that Thunder Basin either supports you
16 just on its actual elements or doesn't? I --
17 I'm trying to understand your argument with
18 respect to the collateral nature or not of the
19 claims that are being made in this case.

20 MR. STEWART: We think Thunder Basin
21 supports us. That is, the first factor is
22 meaningful review available through the -- the
23 special review provision. That maps on
24 precisely to the APA language about inadequacy
25 of review. And we say this is adequate because,

1 at the end of the day, if a court agrees with
2 their constitutional theory, it can set aside
3 the final order issued by the --

4 JUSTICE JACKSON: What about
5 collateral? Isn't that the hardest part for
6 you?

7 MR. STEWART: I don't think it is
8 because the Thunder Basin test refers to
9 collateral to the review provisions. And in our
10 view, this is really the least collateral thing
11 you can imagine; that is, the very thing -- it
12 is not like in Thunder Basin or in Elgin, where
13 the plaintiff was complaining about something
14 that happened in the world, the requirement that
15 the employer post a notice in Thunder Basin or
16 the termination from employment in Elgin, and
17 then the question was, do you have to go through
18 this review scheme?

19 Here, the review scheme is the precise
20 thing that they are complaining about. They are
21 saying --

22 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that --

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, I don't
24 understand --

25 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that

1 meaningful review means no review? Do you think
2 a party gets meaningful review if, unless at the
3 end of the administrative proceeding, it can't
4 get any review of its claim?

5 MR. STEWART: I think, if it can't get
6 review of the claim, that would be correct, but
7 if --

8 JUSTICE ALITO: Sure. Then it has no
9 review. So what does the word "meaningful" add
10 to it?

11 MR. STEWART: I mean, I -- I think
12 what the Court is -- what the statute -- or what
13 the Court is perhaps getting at is in
14 circumstances, for instance, like Digital
15 Equipment. Digital Equipment involved a -- a
16 situation in which the defendant said -- I'm
17 sorry, a better case would be Mohawk, where the
18 question was, should materials that were
19 arguably subject to the attorney-client
20 privilege be turned over?

21 And the district court said no, and
22 the question was, is that immediately appealable
23 under the collateral order doctrine? And the
24 Court said no collateral order review, that if
25 these materials are introduced at trial and

1 that's later determined to be error, you can get
2 vacatur of the judgment and that's good enough.

3 And the Court acknowledged that
4 wouldn't undo the whole harm of turning over
5 privileged materials because the privilege was
6 against disclosure at all, not simply about the
7 introduction in court proceedings, but this is
8 good enough. And I think similarly here.

9 And to -- to kind of proceed directly
10 to the -- the argument that Axon is making, the
11 prime argument as to why review at the end of
12 the day wouldn't be adequate is that it wouldn't
13 save them from the burdens of the proceeding.
14 They would still get review only after having
15 gone through the ALJ and Commission
16 adjudication.

17 And that's the kind of argument that
18 the Court has rejected time after time. In FTC
19 versus Standard Oil, the claim was there was an
20 inadequate evidentiary basis for commencing the
21 adjudication in the first place.

22 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me ask a question
23 that -- that is simplistic perhaps. What sense
24 does it make for a claim that goes to the very
25 structure of the agency having to go through the

1 administrative process?

2 MR. STEWART: I think we would say two
3 things, and I'll say what I really believe to be
4 the less important point first. The first is
5 the SEC -- I'm sorry, the FTC Commissioners
6 probably don't have anything about their own
7 removal protections that a court would find
8 useful, but the Commissioners do have expertise
9 in the way that the adjudications are conducted.
10 And so they could say it might seem like a black
11 box to someone else, but here are the criteria
12 that we use to determine which cases will go to
13 court or which cases --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I'm talking
15 about -- let's take the removal -- the removal
16 claim. That's really what I'm thinking of to
17 start out.

18 MR. STEWART: I -- I would say two
19 things. The first is, even as to that, the FTC
20 Commissioners could say here are what we think
21 of as the advantages and disadvantages of
22 removal protections for our ALJs. And the
23 court -- the agency couldn't declare the statute
24 unconstitutional, so it couldn't provide relief
25 on that ground at the end of the day, but it

1 could still provide something that could be
2 useful to a reviewing court.

3 But the main practical advantage, the
4 main reason we think it makes sense are the
5 reasons that the Court identified in *FTC versus*
6 *Standard Oil*. First, you avoid piecemeal
7 litigation. If there's ultimately a
8 cease-and-desist order entered, it may well be
9 that Axon will want to challenge it not just on
10 the ground that various officials had improper
11 removal protections but also on the ground that
12 there was no antitrust violation or that the ALJ
13 committed some error in the conduct of the
14 proceedings.

15 And as the Court said in *Standard Oil*,
16 by deferring review until the end of the day, we
17 ensure that all of those challenges can be
18 consolidated in a single proceeding.

19 JUSTICE ALITO: But this argument
20 about the -- the removal status of ALJs hangs
21 over everything the agency is doing. Isn't it
22 in your interest to get this decided?

23 MR. STEWART: Well, we -- we actually
24 have a case out of the Fifth Circuit in *Jarkesy*
25 in which the court recently denied -- the Fifth

1 Circuit recently denied rehearing en banc, in
2 which the Fifth Circuit has held that two layers
3 of removal protections for the ALJs do violate
4 the Constitution. And so we do have a prospect
5 of getting that to the court and getting final
6 resolution now, and that's the way that these
7 issues have been decided recently in cases like
8 *Seila Law*, *Arthrex*, *Noel Canning*. You had
9 systemic challenges to the way that agency
10 adjudications were conducted, but the Court has
11 always resolved those challenges in the context
12 of an appeal from an actual agency adjudication.

13 And to go -- to go back to -- to your
14 prior question, the second thing that the Court
15 said in *Standard Oil* as an advantage of
16 deferring review, in addition to the fact that
17 you avoid piecemeal litigation, is that
18 sometimes the agency adjudication will culminate
19 in a way that makes judicial review unnecessary.

20 And so, for instance, if the FTC
21 ultimately agrees with *Axon* that there was no
22 antitrust violation here or that it's been
23 sufficiently cured, the Court would not need to
24 weigh in. And the Court in *Standard Oil* pointed
25 out that has traditionally been seen as an

1 advantage rather than a disadvantage of
2 requiring agency processes.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Given that
4 laundry list of cases where the government
5 didn't prevail, and I gather the one in the
6 Fifth Circuit as well, doesn't that underscore
7 the need for direct -- a direct proceeding to
8 raise the constitutional claim rather than
9 waiting however many years before the agency?

10 MR. STEWART: I mean, it -- it is --
11 this is true of deferral of review generally
12 in -- both in the collateral order doctrine and
13 in the agency review context, that, yes, when a
14 challenge has been found to be meritorious, we
15 will almost always say, looking back on it, it
16 would have saved people time and trouble if
17 there had been a more expeditious --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's
19 the case with respect to one, but this is a
20 series of cases that are a constellation around
21 some fairly basic propositions. And to have it
22 go over and over and over again, it does make
23 the case about the need for direct resolution of
24 a related claim pretty strong.

25 MR. STEWART: Well, as we've said in

1 our brief, mandamus review is available in
2 extreme cases. And so, for instance, if an
3 agency in the -- had simply flouted Seila Law
4 and -- or, I'm sorry, had flouted Lucia and in
5 the wake of Lucia had continued to conduct
6 adjudications through ALJs who had not been
7 appointed in conformity with the Appointments
8 Clause, then mandamus review could have been
9 granted.

10 But I think it would be perilous to
11 try to identify a class of systemic challenges
12 that, from recent experience, we think are
13 sufficiently likely to proceed that they should
14 go to -- to the front of the line.

15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Isn't that a little
16 awkward, though, that we -- we would think that
17 the APA or -- or whatever precludes 1331
18 jurisdiction to resolve these claims, but it
19 doesn't preclude All Writs Act jurisdiction in
20 the district court to bring these claims? I
21 mean --

22 MR. STEWART: No.

23 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- what if Mr.
24 Clement had simply styled this as a mandamus
25 petition, suggesting that the FTC had acted

1 wholly without jurisdiction, which is a classic
2 mandamus argument, because of all of our
3 mountain of precedent with respect to two layers
4 of removal?

5 MR. STEWART: He certainly could have
6 made that argument. I -- I --

7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And so then we would
8 have been in district court, and that would have
9 been okay?

10 MR. STEWART: No. First, the mandamus
11 petition would have had to be filed in the court
12 of appeals. That is the All Writ -- 1651
13 authorizes courts to issue writs in aid of their
14 jurisdiction. And we cited a couple of cases --

15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So he would
16 have been in the court of appeals, but he could
17 have gotten to a court immediately --

18 MR. STEWART: But --

19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- you would agree,
20 to raise his claim if he had simply styled it
21 under the All Writs Act rather than under 1331?

22 MR. STEWART: The only claim that he
23 could have raised under mandamus would have been
24 that he had a clear and indisputable right to
25 this relief. And I think that even --

1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, that's -- that
2 -- I think that's the nature of his argument,
3 that the two layers of removal is clear and
4 indisputable.

5 MR. STEWART: It -- it can't be --

6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let's suppose it
7 were. Let's -- he could do that.

8 MR. STEWART: Oh, if it were clear and
9 undisputable, if the Court in Free Enterprise
10 Fund had said and our holding about double
11 for-cause removal applies to adjudicative
12 officials as well, he would have a clear and
13 indisputable right to relief.

14 Now the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
15 did the opposite of that. It said we are
16 specifically reserving the question whether
17 adjudicative officials are to be treated
18 differently.

19 He -- - he -- Mr. Clement may win on
20 that argument in -- in the fullness of time, but
21 I don't think he could plausibly have told a
22 court of appeals on a request for mandamus that
23 he had a clear and undisputable right to that.

24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why -- why -- why
25 does the APA preclude 1331 but not All Writs?

1 MR. STEWART: Again, I don't think of
2 it as the APA precluding. The APA confirms the
3 inference that the court of appeals is the only
4 court to exercise review.

5 And, in general, the court of appeals
6 jurisdiction is limited to the final
7 cease-and-desist order. But we cited two cases
8 at page 50 of our brief that say when the All
9 Writs Act refers to issuing writs in aid of your
10 jurisdiction, that can mean not only an actual
11 pending appeal but a potential appeal.

12 And so the court that could review the
13 cease-and-desist order has a form of ancillary
14 jurisdiction to -- to superintend the
15 administrative process to the extent of being
16 able to step in if there is really an egregious
17 deviation from appropriate practice.

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Stewart, go --
19 going back to Thunder Basin, I told Mr. Clement
20 that I thought his worst factor was meaningful
21 review. I -- I think that the other two factors
22 are pretty darn bad for you.

23 On expertise, the Court in Free
24 Enterprise Fund, whatever distinctions there
25 might be as between Free Enterprise Fund and

1 this case, the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
2 just says you lose on expertise.

3 Then, on collateral, I mean, I think
4 just the ordinary understanding of what we --
5 what we mean when we use that term is, is it
6 unrelated to the essence or the subject matter
7 of the dispute, and -- and a claim that goes to
8 the legitimacy of the agency structure as a
9 whole is completely unrelated to the subject
10 matter of the suit.

11 So why aren't those two pretty easy
12 wins for Mr. Clement?

13 MR. STEWART: I think, as to the --
14 even as to the expertise factor, the SEC may
15 have lacked expertise regarding the way in which
16 the PC -- the -- the removal protections for the
17 PCAOB officers, but it certainly has expertise
18 in the way SEC adjudications are conducted.

19 But the second thing I would say is,
20 if this were a challenge, for instance, to a
21 rule of evidence that bound the ALJ and the rule
22 -- and it was being attacked on the ground that
23 it violated due process because it didn't allow
24 the respondent in the proceeding a sufficient
25 opportunity to rebut the agency's charges, we

1 would surely say that challenge has to go
2 through the administrative scheme.

3 It may -- whether the due process
4 challenge succeeds may be unrelated to the
5 merits of any particular allegation that a
6 regulated party has violated the FTC Act, but
7 it's still -- it is still not collateral to the
8 review provisions because it goes to the way in
9 which the administrative adjudication will be
10 conducted.

11 And -- and, here, we have basically
12 the same thing, that -- oh -- oh, the challenge
13 to the removal protections for the FTC
14 Commissioners is a little bit different because
15 the FTC does a lot of other things.

16 If the Commission issued a rule, then
17 the rule could be challenged on the ground that
18 the Commissioners were unlawfully protected from
19 removal. That kind of challenge is not
20 inherently linked to an injury --

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and if -- if I
22 just sort of cut to -- to the core of your
23 argument, you seem to be saying something like
24 it's not collateral if it arose from an
25 enforcement proceeding. But almost everything

1 is going to arise from an enforcement
2 proceeding. That -- you're basically making the
3 collateral inquiry do no work at all.

4 MR. STEWART: I think we're -- there's
5 a difference between asking did it arise from
6 the -- well, did it arise from the enforcement
7 proceeding and was it directed at the
8 enforcement proceeding.

9 For instance, the statute that governs
10 the SEC, the Exchange Act, authorizes the SEC to
11 issue temporary cease-and-desist orders that
12 constrain the regulated parties' conduct while
13 the adjudication is ongoing.

14 And that -- that may be -- and the
15 Exchange Act specifically provides for district
16 court review of those orders because they
17 require the party to do more than participate in
18 the proceedings themselves. They constrain the
19 parties' freedom of movement outside the
20 proceedings.

21 And those could be viewed as
22 collateral because even though they are
23 contingent on the pendency of an adjudication,
24 they are still not part of the process by which
25 the adjudication is resolved. They affect

1 private conduct outside the scope of the
2 proceedings themselves.

3 I will say one other thing about the
4 Court's collateral review doctrine -- collateral
5 order doctrine, that both in the agency -- I'm
6 sorry.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You can finish
8 your thought.

9 MR. STEWART: Both in the agency
10 review context and in the collateral order
11 context, really, the only exception the Court
12 has recognized to the general principle that you
13 can't get out of it simply by invoking the
14 burdens of the proceedings, the only exception
15 to that principle is claims of immunity.

16 So the Court has said adverse rulings
17 on the double jeopardy clause, on state
18 sovereign immunity, on qualified immunity, they
19 can be appealed immediately, but other claims
20 that would terminate the proceedings can't.

21 What we have here is at the furthest
22 -- furthest extreme from a claim of immunity.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you.

24 Justice Thomas?

25 JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Stewart, I'm

1 interested in how -- what that review would look
2 like before the FTC. How would they consider
3 Mr. Clement's, Petitioner's, claims here?

4 MR. STEWART: I think the ALJ --

5 JUSTICE THOMAS: And particularly the
6 constitutional claims.

7 MR. STEWART: Probably the ALJ
8 wouldn't consider them at all. And the FTC, if
9 it proceeded to that point, if there was an
10 appeal to the FTC, he's right that they could --
11 the FTC couldn't declare a federal statute
12 unconstitutional, but it could say here are what
13 we think of as the strengths and weaknesses of
14 giving removal protections to the ALJs, coming
15 at it from a -- their perspective, coming at it
16 from a position of expertise.

17 The -- the corollary point I would
18 make, in FTC versus Standard Oil, the Court said
19 we don't anticipate that the agency in the
20 course of the administrative proceedings will
21 reconsider its original determination that there
22 was reason to believe a violation had occurred.

23 So the justification was -- for
24 deferring review was not that the Court expected
25 the agency to shed more light on it in the

1 course of the proceedings.

2 JUSTICE THOMAS: And the -- the
3 remedy, I assume, that they would like is an
4 injunction against having to appear before an --
5 a Commission or an ALJ they think is
6 unconstitutionally appointed.

7 So how would they get that remedy at
8 the appellate court level?

9 MR. STEWART: I -- I mean, I think
10 they would -- I think the remedy they would be
11 entitled to at the appellate court level would
12 be vacatur of the cease-and-desist order. And
13 if the court of appeals said our rationale for
14 vacating the cease-and-desist order is that we
15 think that the ALJs are unconstitutionally
16 insulated from removal, that would effectively
17 preclude the FTC from using the adjudicative
18 method in any case that could be appealed to the
19 Eighth Circuit, unless and until -- yeah, unless
20 -- I'm sorry, the Ninth Circuit, unless and
21 until the removal protection was eliminated.

22 Now, if the case ever reached this
23 Court and the Court said it was right to vacate
24 the cease-and-desist order because we agree that
25 the ALJs had an unconstitutional removal

1 protection, this Court could specify what's the
2 remedy, what statutory provisions could be
3 severed, et cetera.

4 JUSTICE THOMAS: Thank you.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?

6 JUSTICE ALITO: On the Thunder Basin
7 factors, does Axon have to win on all three, do
8 you have to win on all three, or is the
9 appropriate course to balance how they -- how
10 they end up?

11 MR. STEWART: I mean, I think, if Axon
12 won on Factor 1, that would be sufficient under
13 the APA because the APA, the provision I was
14 referring to earlier, Section 703, says the form
15 of proceeding is the special statutory review
16 proceeding, except -- or in the absence or
17 inadequacy thereof any form of action in
18 district court.

19 And so I think the implication of that
20 is, if Axon prevailed at the first Thunder Bay
21 factor, if it showed that the -- there was no
22 meaningful relief at the end of the day, that
23 would be tantamount to saying the administrative
24 -- the specified statutory review provision is
25 inadequate for purposes of this sort of claim.

1 And -- and that would facilitate suit in
2 district court.

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. Suppose they
4 lose on the first factor but win on the other
5 two. What happens?

6 MR. STEWART: I mean, I --

7 JUSTICE ALITO: You say they have to
8 -- they have to win on all three?

9 MR. STEWART: I mean, I think the
10 first factor under the text of the APA is the
11 most important factor because it says you use
12 the special statutory review procedure unless
13 it's inadequate.

14 Another category of cases that I
15 haven't mentioned in which the collateral factor
16 could be relevant is suppose that at the same
17 time Axon had a pending adjudication the
18 Commission issued a rule, a regulation that
19 caused Axon separate harm.

20 There is a separate provision of the
21 FTC Act that authorizes court of appeals review
22 of regulations, and that sort of dispute would
23 clearly be collateral to the adjudication. It
24 would be a step -- a legal dispute between the
25 regulated party and the same agency.

1 JUSTICE ALITO: But this is really
2 kind of a simple question, and maybe Mr. Clement
3 will also address it when he -- when he delivers
4 his rebuttal. Does Axon have to win on all
5 three? Do you have to win on all three? Or can
6 either of you win if one or more factors go in
7 one direction and the other factor or factors go
8 in the other direction?

9 MR. STEWART: I -- I -- I'm not trying
10 to be obstreperous, but I think it would depend
11 on the rationale for holding that this is not
12 collateral. That is, if you say so long as it
13 is unrelated to the merits of the -- the claim,
14 then it is collateral, even if it is a tack on
15 the way that the adjudication will be conducted.
16 I don't think that would be sufficient.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. Thank you.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
19 Sotomayor?

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I have a
21 question about Mathews versus Eldridge. The
22 Ninth Circuit held, and it makes some sense to
23 me, that "wholly collateral" should be
24 understood to mean not the procedural vehicle
25 that a party is using to reverse the agency act

1 -- decision. But that definition doesn't fit
2 with Mathews v. Eldridge.

3 I think -- I could be wrong, and you
4 can correct me -- that Mathews v. Eldridge talks
5 about what's meaningful, correct?

6 MR. STEWART: Yes. And, I mean,
7 Mathews versus Eldridge dealt with a very
8 specific fact pattern: Individuals who had been
9 receiving Social Security disability benefits
10 were informed that they were -- that the
11 relevant agency considered them no longer to be
12 disabled, and, therefore, their benefits would
13 be terminated.

14 And the specific complaint in Mathews
15 versus Eldridge was my benefits were terminated
16 before I received a hearing. They were still
17 entitled to a hearing down the road, and they
18 could get retroactive benefits if their benefits
19 were terminated, and then, at the end of the
20 day, they were found to be entitled. But there
21 would be an interruption of the stream of
22 benefits.

23 And the Court said that's sufficiently
24 collateral to the overall proceedings that you
25 don't have to use the review mechanism that you

1 would use after your benefits claim was finally
2 resolved.

3 But I think that case really has a
4 close resemblance to the collateral -- I mean
5 the temporary cease-and-desist order that I
6 mentioned earlier; that is, sometimes you have
7 situations where you have an ongoing proceeding,
8 and then you have a dispute about what rules
9 will apply while the proceeding continues,
10 before the proceeding resolved. And the
11 claimants in -- the Court said in Mathews versus
12 Eldridge the claimant -- the claimants didn't
13 have any problem with the totality of the
14 proceedings that would be used to make a final
15 determination of what they got, the benefits.
16 What --

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Stewart, I --
18 I have a separate part of this question.

19 MR. STEWART: Okay. Sorry.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think that there
21 are three claims, constitutional claims, here.
22 One is the removal. And I really -- whether or
23 not they like the double renewal or not, they
24 could advise us about that. In an adjudication,
25 that's a pure legal question, okay? Pure

1 constitutional legal question. It's rarely
2 fact-bound in the same way.

3 That's different than the clearance
4 process and combined investigator/prosecutor/
5 adjudicator claims, which they call their due
6 process claims. And I think the Chief was
7 right, where you draw that line is really hard
8 to draw.

9 So tell me what the agency could tell
10 us about the other two that counsels waiting
11 until the end.

12 MR. STEWART: Well, I mean, the first
13 thing we would say about the -- kind of the
14 black-box claim, the contention that there is
15 either not a sufficient process or not a
16 sufficiently transparent process for deciding
17 when we go to court and when we commence agency
18 proceedings, that's kind of at the farthest
19 removed from any contention that the precedents
20 of this Court have more or less decided it and
21 so it's a waste of time.

22 The -- I guess what we would say is
23 the attempt to distinguish among these claims is
24 contrary to the Court's precedents. That is,
25 Elgin was decided two years after Free

1 Enterprise Fund, and the Court said it would be
2 unproductive and confusing to try to distinguish
3 among constitutional claims in order to
4 determine which can go forward immediately and
5 which have to wait until the end of the day,
6 that what the focus ought to be on is, what
7 agency action are you challenging and what
8 relief are you seeking?

9 And, here, they're challenging the
10 commencement of an adjudication. They're
11 seeking an injunction against the adjudication.
12 And it doesn't matter what their different
13 theories of relief are. Those are the salient
14 points for purposes of when they get into court.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
17 Justice Gorsuch?

18 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: On Elgin, you
19 emphasize that the Court said that just because
20 it's a constitutional claim doesn't mean that
21 you have to go -- that you can avoid the agency
22 review process. That case definitely helps you.
23 No doubt about it.

24 But then Free Enterprise Fund makes
25 clear, and I realize it was two years earlier,

1 that some constitutional claims, you can avoid
2 the agency process, namely, I think, on 490,
3 claims going to the Board's existence. And --
4 and I think where the confusion has come in in
5 the courts of appeals, and the courts of appeals
6 have been very explicit about trying to figure
7 out the distinction between Free Enterprise Fund
8 and Elgin, is that next paragraph of Free
9 Enterprise Fund, which was responding to the
10 government's argument that, oh, you could just
11 get review afterwards anyway.

12 And the Court said: No, not in this
13 particular circumstance because the court --
14 because the plaintiff was challenging the
15 investigation itself and there might not be a
16 final sanction.

17 And the question's really, if you're
18 just sticking within the precedent, you know, is
19 that last -- is that second paragraph in Free
20 Enterprise Fund, is that just responding to the
21 government's argument, or is that setting forth
22 a condition that is necessary before you can
23 avoid the agency review process?

24 I think that's what the court of
25 appeals have zeroed in on, exactly that, and I'd

1 be interested in your response.

2 MR. STEWART: I mean, I don't know
3 that it's -- I think the Court in Free
4 Enterprise Fund in the paragraph you refer to,
5 the idea that in order to trigger an SEC
6 adjudication, you would have to commit a
7 violation deliberately and subject yourself to
8 penalties, I think that's really the -- the
9 heart of the opinion.

10 And I think, in that respect, it was
11 not announcing anything new. It was drawing on
12 a long line of precedent that said --

13 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But -- but one
14 could say the heart of the opinion -- and to
15 follow up on Justice Alito's question, the --
16 the Court really emphasizes the wholly
17 collateral factor, and one could say that the
18 heart of the opinion is the paragraph before,
19 where, in responding to the government's
20 argument, the Court says but Petitioners object
21 to the Board's existence, not to any of its
22 auditing standards. Petitioners' general
23 challenge to the Board is collateral to any
24 Commission orders or rules from which review
25 might be sought.

1 So you could say, well, Free
2 Enterprise Fund was about a challenge to the
3 Board's existence or structure, and, therefore,
4 it's collateral.

5 MR. STEWART: I guess the two things I
6 would say are, first, Elgin did come two years
7 after Free Enterprise Fund, and it said don't
8 distinguish among constitutional claims. And
9 that would be a peculiar thing to say if the
10 Court thought it had announced the other
11 principle.

12 But the other thing I would say is, to
13 the extent that you read the MedImmune
14 paragraph, the bet-the-farm paragraph, as the
15 heart of the opinion, then the case was drawing
16 on a very longstanding, well-established body of
17 doctrine. It was articulating a principle that
18 the Court had articulated time and again, that
19 regulated parties should not have to commit
20 violations in order to get judicial review.

21 If you say the crucial part of the
22 opinion was the part that said this is a
23 systemic challenge to the -- kind of the very
24 composition of the agency, you are -- you're
25 introducing a thought that really had -- as an

1 exclusive test or a predominant test, had no
2 grounding in the Court's precedents, and it's
3 very hard to square with constitutional
4 avoidance principles. That is, usually, we
5 would say we'll try particularly hard to avoid
6 constitutional challenges if it's possible to do
7 so. And so it would be peculiar to say at a
8 stage of the proceedings where you couldn't
9 raise any other sort of challenge, you can raise
10 a broad-ranging constitutional challenge to the
11 very composition and structure of the agency.

12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
14 Barrett?

15 JUSTICE BARRETT: So I have a question
16 about meaningful review, although it -- it
17 overlaps a little bit with the collateral point.

18 So, on page 36 of his brief, Mr.
19 Clement points out that Axon's beef is not that
20 it must pay an invalid fine or should not lose a
21 job on an unconstitutional basis, like the
22 claims in Thunder Basin and Elgin, that the
23 relief that it's seeking, you know, isn't going
24 to get it off the hook from liability altogether
25 for either a constitutional reason or some

1 reason related to the application of the statute
2 to its facts.

3 Now Justice Sotomayor pointed out
4 earlier that even a -- a structural challenge to
5 the agency is a means of escaping from an
6 ultimate order. It's -- it's a challenge that
7 you can make to get out from under it. But I
8 take Mr. Clement's point to be that, listen, the
9 most we get is a do-over. So this isn't just
10 about having to endure the expense and the
11 inconvenience of proceedings before we can
12 ultimately challenge them and get relief. It's
13 that the relief that we get in the end isn't an
14 ultimate out from liability, but it's simply
15 saying, if you want to come after us again, you
16 have to do it in a properly constituted agency.

17 Is that an argument that you find
18 persuasive on the meaningful review point?

19 MR. STEWART: I -- I -- I don't
20 because they -- they -- if anything, you would
21 think it would cut the other way. If anything,
22 you would say -- think that they would be
23 arguing getting this particular cease-and-desist
24 order set aside wouldn't provide adequate relief
25 because -- it wouldn't provide meaningful relief

1 because they could always come at us some other
2 direction.

3 I -- I think it -- still, in
4 determining whether it's adequate relief, the
5 only real reason they've said this would be
6 inadequate is we will have to go through the
7 proceeding itself if we wait -- have to wait for
8 a cease-and-desist order in order to get
9 judicial review.

10 And the Court has said in a variety of
11 contexts that's not a sufficient basis either
12 for avoiding the limits on judicial review of
13 agency action or for getting immediate review
14 under the collateral order doctrine.

15 JUSTICE BARRETT: Thanks.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
17 Jackson?

18 Thank you, counsel.

19 MR. STEWART: Thank you.

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Rebuttal, Mr.
21 Clement?

22 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT
23 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

24 MR. CLEMENT: Thank you. Just a few
25 points in rebuttal.

1 First of all, my friend on the other
2 side is very focused on the APA and review of
3 agency action, but, of course, here, we're not
4 really challenging agency action as such.

5 We are challenging the
6 constitutionality of statutes that insulate
7 agency officials from presidential removal, and
8 we're challenging the assignment process, the
9 clearance process that actually precedes any
10 agency action by the FTC.

11 My friend loves the Standard Oil case,
12 but the Standard Oil case, of course, is a
13 finality case. It's not, strictly speaking, a
14 jurisdictional case. And it also illustrates
15 how different this case is from that.

16 In that case, what Standard Oil's beef
17 was about was about the initiation of a
18 complaint. They said we're so innocent from all
19 of this you shouldn't have even initiated a
20 complaint.

21 Well, of course, that is unripe -- an
22 unripe challenge because that agency action is
23 very specific to that individual company and
24 will eventually be merged into the final agency
25 action. But what we have in these cross-cutting

1 constitutional claims is fundamentally
2 different.

3 Now my friend also invoked this
4 argument in the briefs, this kind of standing
5 jurisdiction trap until you have an agency
6 action you don't have standing. Then, as soon
7 as you do, you're stuck in the agency forever
8 until they let you out.

9 That's sort of wrong on both ends, I
10 think. I mean, first of all, if we have a
11 reasonable belief that we're about to be subject
12 to agency action that we think is
13 unconstitutional, the government would have to
14 come in in response to our complaint and say,
15 well, they have no reasonable risk, that's
16 speculative.

17 I don't think they could have done
18 that the morning we filed our complaint when
19 they were going to initiate action later that
20 day. And if we'd done it three weeks earlier or
21 four weeks earlier, we would still have standing
22 to bring the claim. It doesn't depend on the
23 agency action. It depends on a meaningful
24 possibility that we're going to be subjected to
25 government action.

1 And on the back end, we think, for all
2 the reasons we've talked about, we're not in
3 this jurisdictional trap because we're not
4 really challenging the agency action.

5 Now, on the difference between the APA
6 factors and the Thunder Basin factors, I mean, I
7 was quite surprised when the government was
8 asked about its argument under the Thunder Basin
9 factors that it seemed to really want to talk
10 about the APA instead, and I sort of took from
11 the whole colloquy that the government's view is
12 that the Thunder Basin factors are kind of a bad
13 gloss or an inadequate gloss on where the APA
14 would get you.

15 And maybe, you know, that starts to
16 make me think that maybe the straightforward way
17 of approaching this is right if I kind of
18 thought the best thing you could say about the
19 Thunder Basin factors is they sort of get you
20 where you would get with the APA anyway, so it's
21 kind of no harm, no foul, but if even the
22 government thinks that that's not the right
23 gloss on the APA, maybe we should just stick
24 with the text.

25 Now that brings us to the Thunder

1 Basin factors. Justice Alito asked, you know,
2 are the three factors necessary or sufficient.
3 I don't think -- when the Court was formulating
4 those three factors, I think they're more
5 guideposts than factors. I don't think they
6 were designed perfectly to be mutually exclusive
7 and collectively exhaustive.

8 I think, if you look at the way this
9 Court applied them, they tend to kind of all go
10 in a sweep one way or the other. Either all
11 three factors go together one way, or all three
12 factors go the other way.

13 I suppose, if there were a case of a
14 true, like, you know, kind of tie or a tossup,
15 I'd like to think that the tie would go to the
16 citizen and to judicial review and to the text
17 of 1331 and that the tie wouldn't go to being
18 sucked into administrative action that you're
19 challenging as unconstitutional.

20 Lastly, on the issue of meaningful
21 relief, I mean, as to the removal claims in
22 particular, I mean, with all due respect to this
23 Court, if you look at what the splintered
24 decisions in the Collins case, when it came to
25 relief for this kind of removal action, when

1 it's retrospective, that seems like a
2 particularly good reason to allow prospective
3 relief and say, look, if an agency is
4 unconstitutionally structured, we shouldn't have
5 to go in there prospectively. And then you
6 don't have to get into all these difficult
7 questions about how to remedy the situation
8 retrospectively.

9 Second, just on the government's
10 response about the Jarkesy case, if you -- if
11 you really think about the answer there, there
12 is a constitutional problem that I think has
13 been glaring since this Court decided the Lucia
14 case in the October term 2017.

15 The government's response is you might
16 be able to review that question in October '23
17 if and only if the government decides to file a
18 cert petition.

19 From the perspective of those subject
20 to this unconstitutional action, that's not good
21 enough. We should be able to go into court
22 under 1331 and get an immediate answer as to
23 whether or not the writing is on the wall and
24 the structure is unconstitutional.

25 And, lastly, the government says,

1 look, it's every citizen's burden to have to go
2 through these administrative processes before
3 you get judicial review.

4 I don't think that's right if the
5 administrative agency is alleged to be
6 unconstitutional or you're alleged to have to go
7 in front of the wrong agency. That should not
8 be the burden of citizenship, particularly given
9 the clarity with which 1331 promises judicial
10 review.

11 Thank you.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
13 counsel. The case is submitted.

14 (Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the case
15 was submitted.)

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Official - Subject to Final Review

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