Applied Antitrust Law

Dale Collins
Georgetown University Law Center

NB: "±" indicates that the hyperlink will take you to another site.

 

Home page
Topical index
Case studies index

 

Basic Antitrust Reference Materials

Modern Antitrust Enforcement Policy and Practice
Supplementary Reading on the Design of Antitrust Regimes

Statutes

Antitrust statutes

Sherman Act

Clayton Act

Federal Trade Commission Act

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974)

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976)

Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154 (1980)

Executive Order No. 14036

Promoting Competition in the American Economy, Exec. Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987 (July 14, 2021) (issued July 9, 2021)

Executive Office of the President, FACT SHEET: Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021)

± Benjamin Din, Biden Competition Adviser Offers His Take on the Executive Order, Politico.com (July 13, 2021)

± John Cassidy, The Biden Antitrust Revolution, The New Yorker (July 12, 2021)

± Ryan Tracy, Meet Tim Wu, the Man Behind Biden’s Push to Promote Business Competition, Wall St. J. (July 9, 2021)

Pending Legislation (as of March 29, 2022)

± See Ty Perkins, House Judiciary Committee Clears Six Antitrust Bills Targeting Big Tech Companies, BroadbandBreakfast.com (June 25, 2021)

— H.R. 2668: Consumer Protection and Recovery Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Rep. Tony Cardenas (D-CA)

Would amend FTC Act § 13(b) to enable the FTC to seek, and the courts to grant, restitution, contract rescission and reformation, refunds, return of property and and disgorgement as remedies for violations of any law enforced by the FTC.

As reported by the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (June 10, 2021)

Committee markup transcript (June 10, 2021)

— H.R. 3460: State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Ken Buck (R-CO)

Would eliminate motions to change venue by defendants in antitrust cases brought by state attorneys general control. See S. 1787.

As introduced (May 21, 2021) and reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (34 to 7)

— H.R. 3816: American Choice and Innovation Online Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by David Cicilline (D-RI)
Related bill: S. 2992

Would make it illegal for operators to favor their own products over those of competitors in the market that they operate. Provides for civil penalties not more than 15 percent of the total average daily United States revenue of the operator or 30 percent of the total average daily United States revenue of the target. (WDC: These may be too large to qualify as "civil penalties" and may be deemed by the court to be criminal fines)

As reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (24 to 20)

— H.R. 3825: Ending Platform Monopolies Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash)

Would make it illegal for a covered platform to sell their own product on a market they operate. Provides for civil penalties not more than 15 percent of the total average daily United States revenue of the operator or 30 percent of the total average daily United States revenue of the target. (WDC: These may be too large to qualify as "civil penalties" and may be deemed by the court to be criminal fines)

As reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (21-20)

— H.R. 3826: Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)

Would restrict mergers and acquisitions facilitated by “covered platforms.”

This bill generally prohibits operators of covered platforms from acquiring the stock or other share capital or the assets of another person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce. Covered platforms are online platforms that (1) have at least 50 million U.S.-based monthly active users or at least 100,000 U.S.-based monthly active business users, (2) are owned or controlled by a person with net annual sales or a market capitalization greater than $600 billion, and (3) are critical trading partners for the sale or provision of any product or service offered on or directly related to the platform. The Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice must designate whether an entity is a covered platform, and both must carry out enforcement activities. The bill provides for any person (other than a foreign state and any instrumentality thereof) who is injured by an activity forbidden under the bill to recover triple damages. (A foreign state may only recover actual damages.) Further, the bill specifies the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as the judicial venue for a covered platform's appeals related to (1) the designation as a covered platform, (2) other administrative and enforcement proceedings, or (3) a final order issued in any district court.

As reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (23-18)

— H.R. 3843: Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Joe Neguse (D-CO)

Would increase HSR Act filing fees. Also contains authorizations — though not appropriations — of $252 million for the Justice Department and $418 million for the FTC under the proposed fee structure. See S. 228 (now incorporated in s. 1260, which passed the Senate on June 8, 2021)

As reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (29-12)

— H.R. 3849: Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 2021 (ACCESS Act)

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Pa)

Would make it easier for consumers to leave the platform and take their data to competitors. Provides for portability of data interoperability. This bill requires large online platforms (e.g., YouTube, Salesforce) to facilitate consumers and businesses switching from one platform to another. Specifically, the platforms must maintain interfaces that (1) securely transfer user data to other platforms (i.e., portability), and (2) allow other platforms to connect and communicate with their systems (i.e., interoperability). The bill provides the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice with the authority to designate specific platforms to which these requirements apply. After a platform is designated, the FTC must issue standards of interoperability specific to the platform. A platform may not change its interoperability interface without petitioning the FTC, and the platform must provide to competing businesses documentation for accessing the interface.

As reported (June 11, 2021) (± markup) (25-19)

— H.R.7101 - Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act of 2022

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Mr. Jones (for himself, Ms. Bush, Mr. Pocan, Mr. Espaillat, Mr. García of Illinois, Mr. Levin of Michigan, Ms. Norton, Ms. Ocasio-Cortez, Ms. Porter, Ms. Pressley, Mr. Takano, and Ms. Tlaib)
Bill summary
Related bill: S. 3847

As introduced (Mar. 16, 2022)

— S. 225: Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)

As introduced (Feb. 4, 2021)

Note: No companion bill has been introduced in the House

— S. 228: Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)

As introduced (Feb. 4, 2021) and reported without amendment (May 13, 2021)

Incorporated in S. 1260 (United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021) as Section 6202. Passed Senate (June 8, 2021) (68-32) ± Congress.gov

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the incremental increase in the filing fee would have a net cost to the private sector of about $200 million in each of the first five years the mandate is in effect. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate on S. 1260, at 7 (May 25, 2021)

— S. 1074: Trust-Busting for the Twenty-First Century Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO)

As introduced (Apr. 12, 2021)

— S. 1787: State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT)

As introduced (May 24, 2021)
Reported by Judiciary Committee without amendment (Sept. 23, 2021)

— S. 2039: Tougher Enforcement Against Monopolists Act (TEAM Act)

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT)

As introduced (June 4, 2021) (summary) (± Sen. Lee floor remarks)

167 Cong. Rec. S4519 (daily ed. June 14, 2021) (statement by Sen. Lee introducing bill)

Note: No companion bill introduced in the House

— S. 2710: Open App Markets Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)

Among other things, would prohibit "Covered Companies"--companies that owns or controls an App Store for which users in the United States exceed 50,000,000 (currently, Apple and Google)--from requiring users to download apps from their app store (i.e., would permit "sideloading"). Apple currently forbid the practice, asserting that it poses a security risk to users. Google, meanwhile, allow users to download apps from elsewhere, but are being accused in a separate lawsuit of making it “unnecessarily cumbersome and impractical” to do so.

As introduced (Aug. 11, 2021) (press release)

— S. 2992: American Innovation and Choice Act

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Related bill: H.R. 3816

This bill prohibits certain large online platforms from engaging in specified acts, including giving preference to their own products on the platform, unfairly limiting the availability on the platform of competing products from another business, or discriminating in the application or enforcement of the platform's terms of service among similarly situated users.

Further, a platform may not materially restrict or impede the capacity of a competing business user to access or interoperate with the same platform, operating system, or hardware or software features. The bill also restricts the platform's use of nonpublic data obtained from or generated on the platform and prohibits the platform from restricting access to platform data generated by the activity of a competing business user. The bill also provides additional restrictions related to installing or uninstalling software, search or ranking functionality, and retaliation for contact with law enforcement regarding actual or potential violations of law.

As introduced (Oct. 18, 2021)

As reported (Mar. 2, 2022) (amendment in the nature of a substitute)

DOJ letter of support (Mar. 28, 2022)

American Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Law Section, Comments Regarding the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992) (Apr. 27, 2022)

— S. 3197: Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021

± Congress.gov
Introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)

This bill generally prohibits operators of covered platforms from acquiring the stock or other share capital or the assets of another person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce.

Covered platforms are online platforms that (1) have at least 50 million U.S.-based monthly active users or at least 100,000 U.S.-based monthly active business users, (2) are owned or controlled by a person with net annual sales or a market capitalization greater than $600 billion, and (3) are critical trading partners for the sale or provision of any product or service offered on or directly related to the platform. The Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice must designate whether an entity is a covered platform, and both must carry out enforcement activities.

The bill provides for any person (other than a foreign state and any instrumentality thereof) who is injured by an activity forbidden under the bill to recover triple damages. (A foreign state may only recover actual damages.)

Tthe bill specifies the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as the judicial venue for a covered platform's appeals related to (1) the designation as a covered platform, (2) other administrative and enforcement proceedings, or (3) a final order issued in any district court.

As introduced (Nov. 4, 2021)

— S. 3847: Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act of 2022

± Bill status (Senate)
Introduced by Elizabeth Warren (for herself, Cory Booker, Mr. Sanders, Ms. Baldwin, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Merkley, and Mr. Markey)
Bill summary
Warren press release (Mar. 16, 2022)
Related bill: H.R. 7101

As introduced (Mar. 16, 2022)

— S993A: Twenty-First Century Anti-Trust Act (N.Y.)

± Bill status (Senate)
± NY Senate web page

As introduced (Jan. 6, 2021)
Introduced by Senate Deputy Leader Michael Gianaris

± Senate Deputy Leader Michael Gianaris floor speech (June 7, 2021)

± Senator Gianaris' Remarks at 21st Century Antitrust Act Press Conference (June 7, 2021)

± Public Hearing: To discuss antitrust laws and issues (Sept. 14, 2020)
Discusses S8700 (reintroduced in the next session as S993A)

± NYS Senate hearing web page (with links to written testimony)

As passed by the Senate (June 7, 2021) (43-20)
Note: A bill reported out of committee but later amended retains its original number, but amended versions are denoted by a letter suffix A, B, C, D and so on for each time the bill is altered. See ± New York Senate, How a Bill Becomes a Law.

Companion bill: Assembly Bill A1812A
± Bill status (Assembly)

As introduced (Jan. 11, 2021)

   
Rules

± Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

± Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

± Federal Rules of Evidence
Also see Federal Evidence Review, ± Federal Rules of Evidence 2013 (containing links to legislative history)

± Federal of Appellate Procedure

± Supreme Court Rules

Courts

± PacerPacer Case Locator)

± U.S. Supreme Court web site

± Justices by term
± Timeline of Justices

± U.S. Circuit map

± Oyez web site (for audio recordings of Supreme Court arguments)

DOJ

± Antitrust Division web site

± U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., DOJ Antitrust Division Manual (5th ed. rev. Mar. 2014)

± U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Grand Jury Manual

± DOJ case list

± Appropriation Figures for the Antitrust Division, Fiscal Years 1903-2014 (rev. Oct. 2015)

FTC

± FTC web site

± FTC Bureau of Competition web site

± FTC Bureau of Economics web site

± FTC Operating Manual

± FTC case list

± FTC Decisions Case Index (Volumes 46-151, July 1949 Through June 2011)

± FTC Decisions (by volume for Volumes 46-151)

± FTC Annual Report Archive

Congress

Congressional Record

Find by page number
Search the Congressional Record

State attorneys general

± National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) antitrust web site

± NAAG State Antitrust Litigation Database
± Multistate Task Force
± Guidelines and Protocols
± Antitrust Press Releases

EU

± Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

± DG COMP, Antitrust Manual of Procedures (Mar. 2012)
Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

± DG COMP web site

The ± Competition Policy Newsletter contains articles written by staff of the Competition Directorate-General about policy issues and cases. It is published three times a year.

Other international sites

± OECD

± International Competition Network

International cooperation

U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation (Jan. 13, 2017) (DOJ press release)

± Public comments and related materials

Prior version: ± U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation (Apr. 1995)

Antitrust references

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments (Eight) (2017).

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Issues in Competition Law and Policy (2008).

Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application (1996 and supplements).

Ernest Gellhorn, William E. Kovacic & Stephen Calkins, Antitrust in a Nutshell (5th ed. 2004).

Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (3d ed. 2005).

Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (2006).

Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003).

Richard Posner, Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2001).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Policy, in 1 International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 553 (2001).

± Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1073 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).

Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1978).

George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox: An Essay in Honor of Robert H. Bork, 31 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 455 (2008).

Recent antitrust developments

± United States, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in the United States of America, Report to the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, DAF/COMP/AR(2013)10 (June 17, 2013).

Microeconomics

± R. Preston McAfee & Tracy R. Lewis, Introduction to Economic Analysis (continuously updated). Chapters may be read online without cost.

Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis (3d ed. 1992).

Geoffrey A. Jehle & Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2000).

David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (1990).

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston & Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory (1995) (more of a reference text).

± E. Glen Weyl, A Short Summary of Price Theory (May 2014).

Industrial organization economics

Stephen Martin, Industrial Organization in Context (2010)

Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (4th ed. 2005).

Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988).

I Handbook of Industrial Organization (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).

II Handbook of Industrial Organization (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).

III Handbook of Industrial Organization (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007).

Alvin K. Klevorick, Directions and Trends in Industrial Organization: A Review Essay on the Handbook of Industrial Organization, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 241 (1991).

Michael Waterson, Economic Theory of the Industry (1984).

Peter Davis & Eliana Garcés, Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis (2010).

Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report, 24 J. Econ. Perspectives 145 (2010).

Game theory

± Jean Drèze, The Real Insights of Game Theory, Econ. & Pol. Weekly, Apr. 2, 2016, at 55.

± Nicola Giocoli, Three Alternative (?) Stories on the Late 20th-Century Rise of Game Theory (June 1, 2008).

Dynamic economic analysis

± Ulrich Doraszelski & Ariel Pakes, A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO, in 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization (Mark Armstrong and Robert H. Porter eds. 2007).

Antitrust economics

Michael D. Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics (2008).

Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2004).

ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Issues in Competition Law and Policy (2008).

Handbook of Antitrust Economics (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

± Patrice Bougette, Marc Deschamps & Frédéric Marty, When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2014)

± Douglas H. Ginsburg & Eric M. Fraser, The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law (May 16, 2010), final version at Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia 35 (Ian McEwin, ed. 2011).

± J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Next Challenges for Antitrust Economists, Remarks Before the 2010 NERA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar, Santa Fe, New Mexico (July 8, 2010).

J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Law Enforcement: What To Do About The Current Economics Cacophony?, Remarks Before the Bates White Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. (June 1, 2009).

± Oliver Budzinski, Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits (June 16, 2009).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in How the Chicago School Overshot The Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed. 2008).

± Lawrence J. White, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion (NYU Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 08-07, Feb. 2008).

± P. Van Cayseele, Using Economics in Antitrust Decisions: Five Lessons from the European Scene (2005).

Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Penn. L. Rev. 925 (1979).

Empirical methods in antitrust

J. Douglas Zona, Structural Approaches to Estimating Overcharges in Price-Fixing Cases, 77 Antitrust L.J. 473 (2011)

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Issues in Antitrust Analysis, 166 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 62 (2010).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust, in 1 Issues In Competition Law and Policy 723 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

Theon van Dijk & Frank Verboven, Quantification of Damages, in Issues in Competition Law and Policy 2331 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008)

± Daniel Ackerberg, C. Lanier Benkard, Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes (June 14, 2006).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 386 (1999).

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter O. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 69 (1983).

± Michael O. Finkelstein & Hans Levenbacht, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing Cases, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 145 (1983).

± Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 312 (1980).

Behavioral economics and antitrust

± Richard H. Thaler, From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of Behavioral Economics, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 1265 (2018) (± slides from Nobel lecture, Dec. 8, 2017)

± Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 573 (2014).

± Luca Arnaudo, The Quest for Behavioural Antitrust: Beyond the Label Battle, Towards a Cognitive Approach (Temi e Problemi no. 15 - Italian Competition Authority Working Papers Series, Nov. 2013).

± Alan J. Devlin & Michael S. Jacobs, The Empty Promise of Behavioral Antitrust, 37 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1009 (2013)

± Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1517 (2012).

Maurice E. Stucke, The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust (July 16, 2012).

± Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control, 167 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 126 (2011).

± Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 Indiana L.J. 1527 (2010).

± J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead, Outline of Remarks Before the Vienna Competition Conference, Vienna, Austria (June 9, 2010).

± Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis In Antitrust, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 261 (2010).

± Mark Armstrong & Stephen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer (Jan. 2010).

± Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust: Unanswered Questions on the Horizon, Antitrust Source, June 2010.

± Elizabeth Bailey, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Antitrust Practitioners, Antitrust Source, June 2010.

± Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 21st Century, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 513 (2007).

± Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization (Jan. 2006), final version at 2 Advances In Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications 142 (Richard Blundell, Whitney Newey & Torsten Persson eds., 2006).

Welfare economics

± John Creedy, The Welfare Gain from a New Good: An Introduction (January 2015).

Role of economics in antitrust investigations

± United States, The Role of Economic Analysis in Judicial Decisions, (OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, DAF/COMP/LACF/WD(2008)2, Aug. 19, 2008).

± United States, Techniques for Presenting Complex Economic Analysis to Judges (OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, DAF/COMP/LACF/WD(2008)2, Aug. 19, 2008).

Antitrust enforcement

± Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Evaluating Antitrust Enforcement: Economic Foundations, in Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, International Antitrust Law & Policy 457 Barry E. Hawk, ed., 2009).

Case studies

The Antitrust Revolution (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014) (for chapters in earlier editions, see ± Antitrust Revolution web site).

Antitrust blogs

± Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog (Danny Sokol)

± Antitrust Unpacked

± Global Competition Review

± Truth on the Market

Declining Competition

Commentary

± José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration, J. Human Resources (2020): 1218-9914R1

Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. Econ. 561 (2020)

± American Economic Liberties Project, Confronting America’s Concentration Crisis: A Ledger of Harms and Framework for Advancing Economic Liberty for All (Aug. 2020)

Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 Rev. Fin. 697 (2019) (± working paper)

Josh Bivens, Lawrence Mishe & John Schmitt, It’s Not Just Monopoly and Monopsony: How Market Power Has Affected American Wages (Apr. 25, 2018)

± The Problem with Profits. Economist.com, Mar. 26, 2016.

Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power (Apr. 2016).

Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares (Nov. 2016).

± Asher Schechter, Nobel Laureates: Eliminating Rent Seeking and Tougher Antitrust Enforcement Are Critical to Reducing Inequality, ProMarket.com, Jan. 10, 2017

Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S. (July 2017).

David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (NBER Working Paper No. 23396, May 2017).

± David Dayen, How America Broke Its Economy, NewRepublic.com, May 8, 2018.

± Simcha Barkai, The Anticompetitive Effects of Low Interest Rates, ProMarket.com, Jan. 10, 2017.

± Ernest Liu, Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity Growth (NBER Working Paper No. 25505, Jan. 2019)

± Presentation slides

± Gauti Eggertsson, Jacob A. Robbins & Ella Getz Wold, Kaldor and Piketty’s Facts: The Rise of Monopoly Power in the United States (Jan. 2018)

± Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the US (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 23583. 2017)

Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An Empirical Investigation (Spt. 2017) (slides used in Brookings Institution presentation)

± Economic Innovation Group, Dynamism in Retreat: Consequences for Regions, Markets, and Workers (Feb. 2017)

Modern Antitrust Enforcement Policy and Practice

 

Bill Baer, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Reflections on Antitrust Enforcement in the Obama Administration, Prepared Remarks Before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 30, 2014).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, Antitrust & Competition Pol’y Blog (June 25, 2012).

± Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 Stan. L. Rev. Online 13 (July 18, 2012).

± Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Response: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, 65 Stan. L. Rev. Online 28 (Aug. 21, 2012).

The Modern Critique of Antitrust Law and Enforcement

The debate on antitrust standards

± William E. Kovacic, Root and Branch Reconstruction: The Modern Transformation of U.S. Antitrust Law and Policy?, 35 Antitrust 46 (2021).

Christine S. Wilson, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Neo-Brandeisian Revolution: Unforced Errors and the Diminution of the FTC, Prepared Remarks before the ABA Antitrust Law Section’s 2021 Fall Forum (Nov. 9, 2021)

Majority Staff of the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial & Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets (Oct. 2020)

± Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocation of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. Rev. 378 (2000).

± Lina Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1655 (2020)

± Rohit Chopra & Lina Khan, The Case for 'Unfair Methods of Competition' Rulemaking, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357 (2020).

± Sanjukta Paul & Sandeep Vaheesan, Make Antitrust Democratic Again!, The Nation.com (Nov. 19, 2019)

± Tim Wu, The Utah Statement: Reviving Antimonopoly Traditions for the Era of Big Tech, OneZero.com (Nov. 18, 2019)

± A New Future for Antitrust?, Conference sponsored by the University of Utah Department of Economics and the Antitrust Section of the Utah State Bar (Oct. 25-26, 2019) (conference web page with links to video and papers)

± David Edmon, The Utah Statement: A Bulwark Against Private Power, The American Prospect (Dec. 19, 2019)

± Max Gulker, Hipster Antitrust Is Overdue for a Backlash, American Institute for Economic Research (Dec. 3, 2019)

± Zephyr Teachout, Antitrust Law, Freedom, and Human Development, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1081 (2019)

± Maurice E. Stucke & Marshall Steinbaum, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 595 (2019).

± Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded Ages, 78 Md. L. Rev. 766 (2019)

Tim Wu, The Curse of Big Business (2018)

± Democratic Party, A Better Deal

± Crack Down on Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power

Daniel A. Crane & Thibault Schrepel, The Democrats' 'Better Deal' Is Neither Better Nor a Deal (November 6, 2017).

± Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. Eur. Competition L. & Practice 131 (2018)

± Lina Khan, The Ideological Roots of America's Market Power Problem, 127 Yale L.J. F. 960 (2018)

± David McLaughlin, Forget Consumer Welfare. This Antitrust Movement Targets Power Instead, Bloomberg BusinessWeek.com, Jan. 17, 2018.

Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What?, Competition Policy Int’l (May 2018).

A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, Before “After Consumer Welfare” – A Response to Professor Wu, Competition Policy Int’l (July 2018).

± Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 Int'l J. Ind. Org. 714 (March 2018)

± Lina Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710 (2017).

± Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 235 (2017)

± Matt Stoller, The Return of Monopoly, New Republic, July 13, 2017.

± Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Reigniting Competition in the American Economy, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Market Program Event (June 29, 2016)

± Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul, The Atlantic (Oct. 24, 2016),

K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination (2016)

± Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of Antitrust, 49 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1 (2015).

Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 37 (2014).

± Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1009 (2013)

± Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2543 (2012).

Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 551 (2012)

Barry C. Lynn, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction (2010)

Responses

± Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout & Joshua D. Wright, Consumer Welfare & the Rule of Law: The Case Against the New Populist Antitrust Movement, 47 Pepperdine L. Rev. 861 (2020)

A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets, 54 Rev. Indus. Org. 741 (2019)

—Antitrust and labor markets

± José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration, J. Human Resources (2020): 1218-9914R1

Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares (Nov. 2016).

David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (NBER Working Paper No. 23396, May 2017).

—Antitrust and inflation

± Paul Glastris, Pretending Monopoly Has Nothing to Do With Inflation, Wash. Monthly, Jan. 12, 2022

± Editorial, The White House Once Again Offers a Bizarre Message on Inflation, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 2022

± Jeff Stein, White House Allies Split over Inflation Plan as Biden Focuses on Corporate Greed, Wash. Post. Jan. 10, 2022

± Jeffry Bartash, Biden Anti-Inflation Strategy Could Make Things Worse, Larry Summers Says, MarketWatch.com, Dec. 27, 2021

± Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, As Prices Rise, Biden Turns to Antitrust Enforcers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2021

± Noah Joshua Phillips & Joshua D. Wright, As Inflation Rises, Antitrust ‘Reformers’ Target Lower Prices, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 2021

—Antitrust and inequality

± Steve Lohr, Economists Pin More Blame on Tech for Rising Inequality, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2022

± Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 235 (2017)

± Daniel Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1171 (2016)

± Asher Schechter, Market Power and Inequality: How Big Should Antitrust’s Role Be in Reducing Inequality?, ProMarket.com, July 14, 2016.

± Asher Schechter, Nobel Laureates: Eliminating Rent Seeking and Tougher Antitrust Enforcement Are Critical to Reducing Inequality, ProMarket.com, Jan. 10, 2017.

± Noam Scheiber & Ben Casselman, Why Is Pay Lagging? Maybe Too Many Mergers in the Heartland, NYTimes.com, Jan. 25, 2018.

Dan Andrews Chiara Criscuolo & Peter N. Gal, The Best Versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence Across Firms and the Role of Public Policy (OECD Productivity Working Paper No. 5, Nov. 2016)

The Design of Antitrust Regimes

 

± Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 Notre Dame L. REV. 583, 585 (2018)

± Jonathan M. Jacobson, Another Take on the Relevant Welfare Standard for Antitrust, Source, August 2015.

± Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2157 (2013).

± David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2163 (2013).

± Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2175 (2013).

± Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2405 (2013).

± John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 425 (2013).

± Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2471 (2013).

± Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2497 (2013).

± Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2543 (2013).

± Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies At War With Each Other, 121 Yale L.J. 2216 (2012).

± Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2012).

William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu?, (2012), final version at 8 European Comp. J. 527 (2012).

Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 551 (2012).

Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (2011).

± Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 693, May 1, 2011).

± Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case For Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 Antitrust L.J. 301 (2011).

± J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Rewriting History: Antitrust Not As We Know It . . . Yet, Remarks Before the ABA Antitrust Section 2010 Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 23, 2010).

± Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1911 (2009).

± Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, Optimal Enforcement Structures for Competition Policy (Jan. 2009).

± Richard B. McKenzie, In Defense of Monopoly, Regulation, Winter 2009-2010, at 16.

± J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Law Enforcement: What To Do About The Current Economics Cacophony?, Remarks Before the Bates White Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. (June 1, 2009)

Gregory J. Werden, Essays on Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy (Mar. 2, 2009).

± How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)

± Joshua D. Wright, Overshot The Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust (Geo. Mason U. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 09-23, Mar. 31, 2009)

± Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism (University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1323815, ____), final version at Global Competition Policy (Jan. 6, 2009)

± David S. Evans, Economics and the Design of Competition Law, in 1 Issues In Competition Law and Policy 99 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).

± Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations (2007).

The full ± Commission web site contains a wealth of reports and transcripts on the state of modern antitrust law.

± William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2007).

Robert H. Lande & Neil Averitt, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L.J. 175 (2007).

± Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized? (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper EAG 07-3 Jan. 2007), final version at 21 J. Econ. Perspectives 155 (2007).

± Edwin Rockefeller, The Antitrust Religion (Cato Institute 2007).

± Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the Best? (EAG 06-8, Mar. 2006).

± William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377 (2003).

± Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, Remarks Before the George Mason University Law Review's Winter Antitrust Symposium (Jan. 15, 2003).

Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 04-07, Apr. 2004), final version at 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 3 (2003).

± Gregory J. Werden, The Effect of Antitrust Policy on Consumer Welfare: What Crandall and Winston Overlook (U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Division Discussion Paper No. EAG 03-2, Jan. 2003).

± Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 503, (2001).

± William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43 (2000).

± Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 44 (1998).

William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 915 (1997).

Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, Competition Pol'y Int'l, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 2007.

John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 893, 897 (1990).

William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105 (1989).

± Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 797, 798 (1987).

± Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 Duke L.J. 1014.

± Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1985).

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits to Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).

William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 (1982).

± Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 32 Hastings L. J. 67 (1982).

Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981).

± Robert Pitofsky. The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979).

± Louis B. Schwartz, Justice and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076 (1979).

± Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust—Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1191 (1977).

Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in The Paranoid Style In American Politics And Other Essays 188 (1965).

Robert Bork, Ward Bowman, Harlan Blake & Kenneth Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (1965);

Economics of antitrust enforcement

± Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Merger Policy with Merger Choice (Sept. 2010).

 

 

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